



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TO: CA – Michele T. Bond, Acting Assistant Secretary

FROM: OIG/INV - Geoffrey A. Cherrington, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations *GAC*

SUBJECT: Posting of Management Assistance Report (Misuse of Consular Consolidated Database)

Attached is a copy of the Office of Inspector General's Management Assistance Report (Misuse of Consular Consolidated Database) dated June 25, 2014, in which you previously provided comments.

OIG will be publishing the report on our Internet in the near future. We welcome any suggestions you may have for us to consider in redacting portions of the report before it is published. OIG publishes its reports on its website in accordance with the Inspector General Act (as amended), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552), and related statutes/regulations, as well as the President's memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, dated January 21, 2009, and the Attorney General's FOIA guidelines, dated March 19, 2009. OIG makes the final decision on what to redact.

Please provide your suggestions to Special Agent in Charge Susan Rogers at Redacted (b) (6) @state.gov. by April 6, 2015.



United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

June 25, 2014

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TO: CA – Michele T. Bond

FROM: OIG/INV – Wesley Kilgore

SUBJECT: (U) Management Assistance Report (Misuse of Consular Consolidated Database)

(SBU) During the course of an investigation, the Department of State Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations (INV), identified vulnerabilities in the manner in which [Redacted] (b) (5) personnel access and use the Department of State (Department) Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). These vulnerabilities could leave the Department's programs and processes susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse.

(U) This report is intended to alert senior Department management to the serious nature of access vulnerabilities in the CCD and provide recommendations to assist in eliminating or mitigating risks.

(U) Background:

(SBU) The CCD is one of the largest Oracle-based data warehouses in the world. It is maintained within the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) Office of Consular Systems and Technology (CA/CST), Enterprise Systems Division, Data Engineering Branch, and serves as a gateway to multiple databases, including:

[Redacted] (b) (5)

(SBU) [Redacted] (b) (5)

(U) Findings and Analysis:

(SBU) OIG's investigation revealed a consistent practice of [Redacted] (b) (5) personnel performing test checks on official CCD records, including those of their family

members, while performing CCD database management and training. [Redacted] (b) (5)

(SBU) ~~(SBU)~~ OIG's investigation identified at least one [Redacted] (b) (5) employee who admitted that he routinely accessed his family members' live records on the CCD during the course of his job. The [Redacted] (b) (5) would use records he was familiar with to evaluate, troubleshoot, and check the performance of the system, and when training CA personnel on the CCD. The [Redacted] (b) (5) confirmed that he had also conducted hundreds of checks for the same purposes on the records of people who were not his family members.

(U) The Department has already recognized the need to provide a simulated, rather than live, database environment to train its consular officers. Over the last two years, CA/CST has been developing the Enterprise Training Environment (ETE) for the Foreign Service Institute. Once completed, the ETE will allow students to conduct practice searches from a model CCD database. This provides a more realistic replication of what they will be required to perform in the course of their duties in assignments overseas. The implementation date for the test phase of the project, however, is still undetermined. CCD administrators require a similar model environment to limit risk to live records during the performance of their duties.

(SBU) ~~(SBU)~~ Real-time monitoring capabilities exist for CCD users [Redacted] (b) (5)

(U) Recommendations:

(U) OIG offers three recommendations to CA/CST:

1. (SBU) ~~(SBU)~~ OIG recommends that CA/CST develop a process and/or program that actively monitors, records, and reports [Redacted] (b) (5)

(A similar recommendation was provided to CA/CST related to OIG report ISP-I-11-51, dated May 2011. CA/CST stated they it was working with Oracle Corporation to develop a program to provide near-real-time auditing and monitoring [Redacted] (b) (5). The estimated completion time was 22 months. More

than 36 months after the publication of OIG Report ISP I-11-51, CA/CST still lacks a real-time auditing and monitoring program.)

2. ~~(SBU)~~ OIG recommends that CA/CST, when developing and fielding the ETE, ensures the system can be utilized by CCD administrators in the field, thereby eliminating the need to access live records for training purposes.
3. ~~(SBU)~~ OIG recommends that CA/CST train all direct-hire and non-direct-hire employees on the proper access of the CCD database and the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 222 (f); the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C 552a (e)(9)); and section 5 of the Foreign Affairs Manual, "The Privacy Act and Personally Identifiable Information" (5 FAM 460-469).

(U) OIG would appreciate a written response to this report and information on actions taken or planned for the report's three recommendations. The response should indicate agreement or disagreement with each recommendation.

(U) Comments received within 14 calendar days of the date of this Management Assistance Report will be reprinted as an appendix to the report. In addition to the hard-copy response, please provide an electronic copy of the final response to Mr. Wesley Kilgore, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, at ~~Redacted (b) (6)~~@state.gov.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Kilgore at (703) 284-~~Redacted (b) (6)~~⁶⁾