



# OIG HIGHLIGHTS

View Report: [ISP-I-15-31A](#).

## What OIG Inspected

OIG Inspected the U.S. Embassy Tunis from February 17 to March 12, 2015.

## What OIG Recommended

OIG made 33 recommendations to Embassy Tunis and U.S. Department of State bureaus to update and enforce policies to improve embassy operations; to strengthen management controls; to initiate a Vital Presence Validation Process to determine mission staffing needs; and to establish an orientation program for locally employed staff, orientation and training programs for consular staff, and certified grants officer representative training. OIG also recommended that the front office adhere to leadership principles and conduct effective oversight of assistance programs.

## Authorities and Methodology

This report was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

July 2015

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Inspection of Embassy Tunis, Tunisia

## What OIG Found

- The Ambassador has advanced U.S. national interests in Tunisia, but his communication, coordination, feedback, and interpersonal skills negatively affected the senior staff's ability to manage operations and programs.
- Embassy Tunis has not held a town hall meeting with nonofficial American citizens or [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) in more than 2 years.
- The Ambassador is not providing oversight to growing assistance programs. He needs to meet individually and regularly with both the U.S. Agency for International Development senior officer and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs chief, both of whom manage large assistance programs.
- The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program is not staffed to manage growth of its programs.
- The Tunisian American Enterprise Fund has received \$60 million in Economic Support Funds but has not complied with monitoring requirements and has made outlays of \$3 million. Prior to providing additional financing, the Department of State should conduct an evaluation of the enterprise fund's performance.
- The embassy does not have performance indicators or measurable outcomes by which to evaluate its programs in Tunisia.



OIG

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

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ISP-I-15-31A

Office of Inspections

July 2015

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# Inspection of Embassy Tunis, Tunisia

## BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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## KEY FINDINGS

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- The Ambassador has advanced U.S. national interests in Tunisia, but his communication, coordination, feedback, and interpersonal skills negatively affected the senior staff's ability to manage operations and programs.
- Embassy Tunis has not held a town hall meeting with nonofficial American citizens or ~~Redacted (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)~~ in more than 2 years.
- The Ambassador is not providing oversight to growing assistance programs. He needs to meet individually and regularly with both the U.S. Agency for International Development senior officer and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs chief, both of whom manage large assistance programs.
- The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program is not staffed to manage growth of its programs.
- The Tunisian American Enterprise Fund has received \$60 million in Economic Support Funds but has not complied with monitoring requirements and has made outlays of \$3 million. Prior to providing additional financing, the Department of State should conduct an evaluation of the enterprise fund's performance.
- The embassy does not have performance indicators or measurable outcomes by which to evaluate its programs in Tunisia.

## CONTEXT

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In September 2012, when protests erupted across the Muslim world in reaction to a film considered blasphemous by Muslims, hundreds of protesters, including individuals affiliated with the militant organization Ansar al-Sharia, attacked the U.S. embassy compound in Tunis and the nearby [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (6). Twenty persons were convicted for the attacks but received suspended sentences. Following the attack, all U.S. direct-hire embassy personnel were evacuated. Embassy Tunis reopened in March 2013 with reduced staffing and a 2-year unaccompanied tour of duty with an associated prohibition on travel to post of dependents. Embassy Tunis is a High Threat Program Post. The embassy was also operating under a staffing cap of 78 U.S. direct-hire and 7 eligible family member employees, established as a result of the March 2014 Vital Presence Validation Process (VP2).<sup>1</sup>

In December 2014, the embassy formally requested that the Under Secretary for Management eliminate the staffing cap and change post's status to a 2-year fully accompanied post. On April 2, 2015, the Under Secretary for Management approved lifting the staffing cap and changing the status to partially unaccompanied, including adult spouses and adult partners and children under 5 years of age, with an associated prohibition on travel to post of school-age children. The Under Secretary for Management also approved a 2015 joint Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)-Bureau of Diplomatic Security review of post's request for the return of school-age children in summer 2016.

This decision was made after the March 18, 2015, terrorist attack at the Bardo National Art Museum adjacent to the Tunisian parliament, in which 21 persons—mostly foreign tourists—were killed. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed credit for the attack, one of only a few in Tunis in recent years. The attack highlights the continuing threat of extremist violence in Tunisia.

Since the January 2011 revolution, the United States has committed more than \$570 million to support Tunisia's transition. U.S. assistance to Tunisia focuses on an array of targeted areas that include ensuring and enhancing internal and external security, promoting democratic practices and good governance, and supporting sustainable economic growth. The United States has committed more than \$150 million in assistance to bolster Tunisia's capacity to counter internal and regional threats. The United States also guaranteed two sovereign loans in 2012 and 2014 worth approximately \$1 billion and has provided \$6 million in technical assistance to support Tunisia's economic reform agenda.

In fall 2014, the country held its first democratic parliamentary and presidential elections. A secularist, Beji Caid Essebsi, was elected President, and the government is dominated by non-Islamist parties. The bilateral U.S.-Tunisia relationship receives high-level attention in

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<sup>1</sup> VP2 is a process designed to assess and manage risk by weighing mission objectives, knowledge of threats, threat mitigation options, and an explicit acceptance of unmitigatable risk.

Washington. In April 2014, President Obama met in Washington with the then-Prime Minister of Tunisia, and he has invited the newly elected Tunisian President to visit Washington in 2015.

During the same period, the embassy staffing roster comprised 270 employee positions, of which 67 were U.S. direct hires (12 were listed as vacant), 2 were eligible family members, and 201 were filled by locally employed (LE) staff, contract, or personal services agreement personnel. These employees staff five U.S. Government agencies with offices in the embassy. The restart of the Peace Corps program remains on hold. Until April 2, 2015, post's unaccompanied status with the associated prohibition on travel to post of dependents had resulted in a dearth of bidders and chronic staffing gaps that negatively affected morale and mission performance. For example, the embassy has had five management counselors since September 2012.

Of the embassy's 13 resident principal officers, 9 arrived during the summer 2014 transfer cycle, and 2 (Federal Bureau of Investigation/Office of the Legal Attaché and the U.S. Agency for International Development) of the 5 agency heads were on long-term (3-month) temporary assignments. The embassy also has 11 first- and second-tour officers.

## LEADERSHIP

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As reflected in the 2015 Integrated Country Strategy, the embassy's three priorities are: supporting Tunisia's political transition and institutions, enhancing the capabilities of Tunisia's security forces to combat domestic and transnational terrorist groups and to protect U.S. Government personnel and facilities, and promoting economic reform and sustainable economic growth in Tunisia. Through multiple changes of governments, the Ambassador established and maintained cooperative relationships with the national leadership. His promotion of U.S. national interests in Tunisia includes the establishment of the U.S.-Tunisia Strategic Dialogue in February 2014, with a focus on cooperation in security matters and on promoting closer economic ties; as well as the March 2015 Investment and Entrepreneurship Conference on Maghreb, which brought to Tunis the Secretary of Commerce and a large delegation of American corporate heads.

The Ambassador's scores on Office of Inspector General (OIG)-administered questionnaires, however, were below average (compared to the 116 prior chiefs of mission inspected) in all 13 leadership categories. Sixty percent of all respondents and 83 percent of the those respondents who are permanent, non-front office members of the country team indicated that, in particular, the Ambassador's communication, coordination, feedback, and interpersonal behaviors, as well as his intolerance for dissenting views on policy and management issues, had contributed to low morale. In OIG interviews with these respondents, the majority reconfirmed their scores and rationale. Eighty percent of U.S. Department of State (Department) section chiefs and heads of other agencies indicated that the lack of adequate and timely feedback and explanation of decisions taken—or not taken—were inhibiting their initiative and hampering their ability to manage their operations and programs because they were not clear what he expected or wanted from them. In particular, the Ambassador's failure to involve senior embassy staff

members in decision-making processes undermined interagency coordination on some important programs.

The majority of these Department section and other agency heads also stated that the Ambassador had conveyed to them and other staff members the impression that he does not trust them to do their jobs and that this had negatively affected their morale and productivity. The Ambassador acknowledged that he was aware of some of these perceptions and had, in the past, taken specific actions to improve his communication and coordination with staff. He had initiated regular brown bags with sections, attended community events, and walked around the embassy and visited with personnel in their places of work. As indicated by the OIG-administered questionnaire, 69 percent of LE staff members rated their satisfaction with front office leadership as above average with a score of 4.26 on a 5-point scale. The OIG team advised the Ambassador to continue to work on improving his leadership skills, in accordance with 3 *Foreign Affairs Manual* (FAM) 1214 precepts, and provided suggestions on ways to communicate and connect more effectively with staff.

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should require the Ambassador to enroll in the individualized leadership coaching program offered by the Foreign Service Institute's Leadership and Management School. (Action: NEA)

### *Deputy Chief of Mission*

The deputy chief of mission's (DCM) primary focus is oversight of daily embassy operations; her bilateral policy-related responsibility is leading the embassy's discussions with the host government on trafficking in persons. The DCM is attuned to the need for and has worked to foster a greater sense of mission community among both LE and direct-hire employees. She hosts community events at her residence, regularly sets aside open office hours to meet with staff, and mentors and provides training opportunities for first- and second-tour officers. The OIG team met with first- and second-tour officers, who expressed their appreciation for her attention to their career development.

The DCM's scores on the OIG-administered questionnaires, however, were below average (compared to the 114 prior DCMs inspected) in all 13 leadership categories. Eighty-three percent of those respondents who are permanent, non-front office members of the country team indicated that, in particular, the DCM's unwillingness to consider dissenting or alternative views and her inability to provide explanations or feedback for the decisions and instructions she relays to staff from the Ambassador were contributing to poor morale and hampering some operations. In OIG interviews with these respondents, the majority reconfirmed their scores and rationale. As indicated by the OIG-administered questionnaire, 69 percent of LE staff members rated their satisfaction with front office leadership as above average with a score of 4.26. The OIG team advised the DCM to continue to work on her leadership skills, in accordance with 3 FAM 1214 precepts, and provided suggestions on ways to communicate more effectively with staff members.

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should require that the deputy chief of mission enroll in the individualized leadership coaching program offered by the Foreign Service Institute's Leadership and Management School. (Action: NEA)

### ***U.S. Direct-Hire and Eligible Family Member Morale Rated as Fair***

American employees rated mission morale fair in the OIG workplace and quality of life questionnaire with a score of 2.09 out of a possible 5, well below the average score of 3.29 (good) for all posts inspected over the past 5 years. In OIG interviews with all direct-hire embassy staff members, many staff members cited heavy workload and lack of family visitation travel to post as the major factors contributing to low morale.

The factors cited by embassy staff members are consistent with the results of a standardized morale survey conducted at Embassy Tunis in September 2014: the "family visitation" restriction was cited by 71 percent of the direct-hire staff and the "heavy workload" was cited by 45 percent of the staff. While in Tunis, the visiting NEA regional medical officer/psychiatrist (RMO/P), based in Cairo, briefed the OIG team on the purpose and methodology of the morale survey as a tool for advising embassy front offices on managing morale at high-threat and hardship posts overseas.

The RMO/P, who worked as management consultant to Fortune 500 companies designed the morale survey. He got buy-in from NEA embassy front offices and conducted the survey at all nine posts for which he is responsible; other NEA RMO/Ps subsequently conducted the survey at their posts. The Cairo-based RMO/P has briefed the Foreign Service Institute, the Director General, NEA management counselors, and more than 30 chiefs of mission in other regional bureaus on use of the survey as a management tool.

The Ambassador and the DCM told the OIG team that they found the survey results and counseling provided by the RMO/P very useful and are planning to ask that he conduct the survey again in the near future.

### ***Lack of Written Family Visitation Policy***

During the inspection, Embassy Tunis was a 2-year "unaccompanied" post. Per 3 FAM 3775.2, associated with the status is a total prohibition on visits to post of family members/dependents. Guidance in 3 FAM 3776 outlines procedures for requesting a waiver to permit a short-duration family member visit. During 2014, Embassy Tunis forwarded to Washington the requests of three staff members. The latest request was made in November 2014. The Department denied all the requests. Direct-hire staff members complained that, in stark contrast to this prohibition, no prohibition exists on nonfamily member visits, congressional delegations have visited with spouses, all other Western embassies in Tunis are fully accompanied, and the U.S. Government canceled the Travel Warning for Tunisia in March 2014 on the basis of an assessment of security risks to American citizens in Tunisia. In December 2014, the embassy emergency action committee formally requested that Washington change post's status to "fully accompanied." On April 2, 2015, the Under Secretary for Management approved a change of post's status to

“partially unaccompanied” to permit spouses/adult partners and children under the age of 5 years to accompany staff members to post.

To address embassy direct-hire concerns about the rules governing visits to post of dependent school-age children (the age group specifically excluded under the new status) and to clarify the waiver procedure, the OIG team encouraged the embassy to provide written guidance to staff that outlines the 3 FAM 3775.1 overview of the travel policy for unaccompanied or partially unaccompanied posts, the 3 FAM 3775.3 personal or work-related travel to partially unaccompanied posts, and the procedures for seeking waivers of travel prohibitions contained in 3 FAM 3776.

### ***Staffing and Workload***

During the inspection, Embassy Tunis was operating under a staffing cap, established by the March 2014 VP2 review, of 78 direct-hire and 7 eligible family member positions or about 87 percent of its pre-2012 authorized staffing level of 97 positions. At the same time, Washington’s high-level attention to the post-2011 Arab Spring relationship with Tunisia has increased policy, program, and operational demands on the embassy. Further, post’s “unaccompanied” status limited the pool of potential bidders, with the result that many of the positions were being filled by rotating, short-term temporary duty (TDY) staff members.

Restrictions on short-term TDY staff members to support specific projects and programs also hampered operations and programming. Heads of those sections providing support services and of those agencies involved in military assistance programs noted to OIG that the cap on TDY staffing had hindered their ability to manage their programs and operations. In mid-2014, the Under Secretary for Management delegated to the Ambassador the authority to manage the VP2-established cap on TDY officers at post. In November 2014, the Ambassador delegated that authority to each agency head, while reserving his authority to approve agency heads’ requests for TDY staff in excess of their agency cap. In addition, the Ambassador also committed to be flexible in approving agency head requests for TDY staffing in excess of their cap. OIG interviews indicated that agency heads appreciated the Ambassador’s November 2014 delegation of management authority and his willingness to be flexible in approving additional TDY personnel.

The April 2, 2015, decision to eliminate the staffing cap—both on permanent as well as TDY personnel—will permit the embassy to fill its positions up to the pre-2013 authorized level. In principle, the April 2, 2015, decision to change post’s status to “partially unaccompanied” could attract more bidders. But the associated prohibition on travel to post of school-age children will continue to limit the pool of bidders for the 2015 bid cycle and, depending on the outcome of the joint NEA-Bureau of Diplomatic Security review of post’s status in June 2015, could possibly limit the pool of bidders in the out-year bid cycles.

### ***Vital Presence Validation Process Not Conducted Prior to Colocation of Embassy Tripoli Staff to Embassy Tunis***

The Department did not conduct a VP2 process prior to the decision to add 11 direct-hire positions to Embassy Tunis, a High-Threat/High-Risk post. During the time of the inspection, the

Department requested that Embassy Tunis facilitate the relocation of Embassy Tripoli to Tunis from Embassy Valletta, where the Ambassador and her direct-hire staff had been evacuated in July 2014. Language in 2 FAM 410 and the February 2015 Standard Operating Procedure: Overview of Vital Presence Validation Process include the following guidance: "VP2 is an institutionalized, repeatable, transparent, and corporate process to make risk-managed decisions regarding the U.S. presence at high-threat locations, including whether to begin, restart, continue, modify current staffing levels, or discontinue operations. This process must take place annually for all posts on the High-Threat/High-Risk list but may also take place on an ad hoc basis." An increase of embassy staff without an assessment of the risk and without reviewing the resources needed to mitigate the risk makes Embassy Tunis personnel vulnerable in the event of a mass demonstration or attack on U.S. Government facilities or personnel.

**Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should initiate a Vital Presence Validation Process decision memorandum for the approval of the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources prior to modifying current staffing levels at Embassy Tunis. (Action: NEA, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

### *Libyan Locally Employed Staff Lack Proper Work Documentation*

An LE staff Foreign Service national investigator is employed via a decision memorandum that has been approved on a month-to-month basis by the Tunis front office with the concurrence of NEA. The employee, a Libyan citizen formerly employed by Embassy Tripoli, works in the financial management section where he serves as a registry point of contact for Libyan LE staff members currently residing in Tunisia, mainly helping these employees set up bank accounts in local financial institutions into which their salaries can be deposited via electronic funds transfer. His legal status in Tunisia is tenuous. The decision memorandum is not sufficient to document his work with the mission. Additional Libyan staff may accompany the 11 diplomats planning to move from Valetta, Malta, to Tunis.

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should establish a formal policy to document all Embassy Tripoli Libyan locally employed staff members working at Embassy Tunis. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination NEA)

## **POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**

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### **Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant: Tunisian Foreign Fighters and Countering Violent Extremism**

Tunisia is not a member of the global coalition to counter ISIL, although local media estimates of Tunisians joining ISIL and fighting in Syria and Iraq range as high as 3,000–3,500. Countering the flow of foreign fighters into ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria is a high U.S. priority. The embassy uses social media to highlight U.S. policy and to counter extremism. During 2011-12, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of Transition Initiatives conducted

a small pilot countering violent extremism effort as part of its larger Tunisia Transition Initiative. Since that time, however, no countering violent extremism project has taken place. At the time of the inspection, the Bureau of Counterterrorism was considering an embassy-proposed project to counter violent extremism. The project would fill a gap in U.S. assistance efforts and help Tunisia address the causes of violent extremism that have contributed to the large number of Tunisians joining ISIL as foreign fighters.

Since the January 2011 Arab Spring revolution, the U.S. Government has committed more than \$150 million in assistance to bolster Tunisia's capacity to counter internal and regional threats. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Bureau of Counterterrorism provided funding in 2014 for Tunisian officials to visit the United States to learn about the organization of a fusion center, which the Tunisian Government desired to stand up in order to improve counterterrorism information sharing among ministries.

The Security Governance Initiative is a Presidential proposal set to commence in FY 2016. Tunisia is a designated recipient of assistance under the initiative, which will establish a multiyear partnership to strengthen Tunisian security institutions. Washington's point of contact in the embassy is the INL section chief, who has no U.S. direct-hire staff. In addition, although USAID is part of the Washington Security Governance Initiative interagency team, the embassy's senior development officer (USAID) is not—but should be—included in the embassy's Security Assistance Working Group (SAWG), where Security Governance Initiative programming is discussed. The Ambassador told the OIG team he would set aside regular time to meet individually with both the INL section chief and the USAID representative and would include the USAID representative in the SAWG.

## Foreign Assistance

The Department requested for FY 2016 \$134.4 million for Tunisia, a 133-percent increase over the FY 2014 budget; \$62.5 million in foreign military financing, a 213-percent increase over FY 2014; and \$55.0 million economic assistance, a 120-percent increase from FY 2014.

Over the past 3 years, USAID awarded \$60 million in economic support funds to the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund to invest in small- and medium-size enterprises as an engine for economic growth.<sup>2</sup> During the inspection, the Department informed the embassy that Tunisia will receive an additional \$20 million in economic support funds, which the Department was considering investing in the Tunisia-American Enterprise Fund. A top U.S. policy objective is sustainable Tunisian economic growth.

However, a U.S. Government Accountability Office review of the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund found that it had not met USAID performance monitoring requirements. In the first 3 years of operation, it has failed to meet monitoring and reporting requirements, has invested only

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<sup>2</sup> *Enterprise Funds - Egypt and Tunisia Funds Are Established: Additional Steps Would Strengthen Compliance with USAID Grant Agreements and Other Requirements*, Report No. GAO-15-196, February 2015.

\$3 million in Tunisian small- and medium-size businesses, and thus has not demonstrated an ability to manage U.S. funding effectively.

The Office of Management and Budget has established monitoring and reporting requirements for grant recipients (2 Code of Federal Regulations 215.51-52). The Department's Grants Policy Directive No. 42 also provides that grants shall be appropriately monitored. Failure to adhere to these requirements puts government funds at risk of waste and/or fraud.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, should establish a process to comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements for grants recipients for the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with F)

### ***Middle East Partnership Initiative***

In November 2014, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) regional coordinator relocated from Tunis to Rabat. The remaining six LE staff members in Tunis (all grants officer representatives who have taken required training) are in the process of closing out the remaining 81 grants files by the end of FY 2015. Embassy Rabat and staff from NEA provide regular TDY coverage to oversee the close-out process, which at the current rate of 6–8 closures per week should conclude on schedule. Any grants not closed out by September 2015 will be transferred to grants officer representatives in either Rabat or Washington.

The OIG team selected the four largest MEPI regional grants files (of a total of 81) that had a total value of over \$400,000. Before the conclusion of the inspection, the grants files complied with grants records requirements. Seven MEPI obligations remained unliquidated, for three of which the regional MEPI was awaiting final reports. Four others involve Egyptian grantees who, because of changes in Egyptian law, could not obtain authorization to spend or to return the funds. The MEPI regional coordinator plans to refer these cases to the Bureau of Administration for final disposition. Project officers in Tunis comply with the MEPI requirement to read the scope of work, visit at least one activity in a calendar year, and read/comment as appropriate on the quarterly reports. The embassy's MEPI coordinator and administrator have taken online Foreign Service Institute courses PY 220 and 222, and all grants officer representatives in the MEPI office have taken required training courses.

The Department is considering allocating \$10 million in FY 2015 MEPI funding to Tunisia to improve governance, strengthen parliament, and decentralize government administration. U.S. funding of democracy and governance programs was limited in scope in recent years. A democratically elected Tunisian Government came to office in February 2015, and USAID is scheduled to conduct a democracy and governance assessment of Tunisia's needs in 2015, which can inform the Department on Tunisia's priorities and how to coordinate MEPI funding with planned USAID democracy and governance programs. Department guidance (3 *Foreign Affairs Handbook* [FAH]-2 H-123.1) on decisionmaking provides that managers should gather and analyze relevant facts and then develop and evaluate objectively possible solutions. Failure to obtain relevant information about Tunisia's democracy needs risks the ineffective and inefficient use of U.S. funds

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, should review the results of the U.S. Agency for International Development assessment of Tunisia's democracy and governance needs and provide the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs with a recommended course of action on how to use Middle East Partnership Initiative funding effectively. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with NEA and F)

### ***Antiterrorism Assistance***

The FY 2014 budget was \$1 million, but the Bureau of Counterterrorism told the OIG team it expects funding to double in FY 2015. The program focuses on border security, terrorist investigations, and building crisis response and management capacities. In December 2014, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security assessed Tunisian capabilities, including how well the country had institutionalized antiterrorism assistance training. Training is now also being provided to the National Guard's special unit and to the National Police commandos. As INL's program expands in Tunisia, the embassy's SAWG will need to ensure that parallel lines of effort are coordinated to avoid duplicative activities. The OIG team advised the working group on the importance of such coordination.

### **Advocacy and Reporting**

The OIG team reviewed 121 reporting messages from June to December 2014 and found reporting was policy relevant, timely, and well sourced. Of these reports, eight were analytical and the rest were spot reports focusing on domestic politics and parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall. With few exceptions, the Ambassador approved reporting messages. The political/economic section chief recognized the desire of some Washington consumers for more analytical reporting and took steps to ensure more discipline in the use of Department-required traffic analysis by geography and subject markers, known as "TAGS."

The political/economic section coordinates, as appropriate, draft reports with other agencies at the embassy. However, those same agencies rarely coordinate their draft reports with the political/economic section. The OIG team advised embassy staff that coordination (not clearance) of draft reports would enhance the overall quality of reporting and build mission cohesion.

### ***Embassy Personnel Are Not Using the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset***

Embassy reporting officers and others are not using the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART) appropriately to send and preserve record emails. Language in 5 FAM 443 delineates responsibilities for preserving records contained in emails, and the embassy information management unit has provided guidance to staff members on the relevant requirements. The Department has provided front channel guidance on the use of SMART record email to preserve record traffic, but embassy personnel are not abiding by the guidance. The embassy and NEA, however, exchange daily official-informal reports via regular email, although these messages regularly contain record traffic. Embassy officials explained that the

aim is to limit access to the reported information. As a result, no retrievable record of a large quantity of substantive embassy work, such as strategy papers, reports of important meetings, reports that facilitate action, and document policy formulation and execution exists.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Tunis should require that employees adhere to Department of State guidance related to preserving record traffic by using record email. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Security Assistance Working Group – Developing a Strategic Framework***

Long lead times in the security assistance budget and funding process complicate efforts to enhance the capabilities of Tunisia's security forces to combat domestic and transnational terrorist groups. The embassy's SAWG meets weekly and includes agencies and sections that provide security assistance/training. Three out of four weeks, the DCM chairs the SAWG, and it focuses largely on operational matters. For example, it deconflicts any overlap in planned training offerings. The Ambassador presides every fourth week and focuses on strategic questions. Embassy leadership is cognizant of the need to develop a strategic framework for security assistance now that Tunisia has an elected government in place. During the inspection the DCM tasked the INL section chief, who is the SAWG coordinator, to prepare a spreadsheet on border control projects to determine what gaps may exist in U.S. assistance efforts. The coordinator maintains a data base for security assistance that includes the projects of other agencies in the embassy.

### ***Grants Management***

The assistance unit in the political/economic section manages bilateral grants. In FY 2015, the unit will manage approximately \$5 million in Economic Support Funds, not counting the Enterprise Fund. The OIG team reviewed five grants files the assistance unit manages, including the largest active grant, in the amount of approximately \$1.1 million. Altogether, three grants related to economic growth, one to humanitarian assistance, and another to travel. The grants files contained the required forms and reports and were stored properly. The assistance unit staff said some grantees have experienced delays in payment disbursements from the Bangkok post support unit. With the exception of two grantees located in areas that are off limits for security reasons, the assistance unit had monitored all projects.

Embassy leadership has requested an interagency team to visit Tunis in the first half of 2015 to assess the effectiveness of economic growth projects, an initiative the OIG team endorses. In late 2014, the assistance coordinator led preparation of the embassy's performance plan and report, operations plan, and the Mission Resource Request. In 2013, the Department prepared these reports because of embassy staffing limitations.

### ***Interagency Committee on Economic Growth and Assistance***

The embassy created an interagency committee on economic growth and assistance, which the assistance coordinator chairs weekly, to review and approve proposed grant proposals. It includes representatives from USAID, the political/economic section, the public affairs section,

the INL chief, and the MEPI office. The committee provides a common standard by which to score project proposals, ensure against project redundancy, and maximize the scope of expertise in the evaluating proposals. It is one of the few posts at which USAID has the opportunity to suggest revisions to Department projects.

### ***Investment and Entrepreneurship Conference Highlights Economic Reform***

During the inspection, the political/economic section staff played a leading role in an Investment and Entrepreneurship Conference on the Maghreb, cohosted by the embassy. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce, the Assistant Secretary of Economic and Business Affairs, the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and a former Secretary of State participated in the conference, which highlighted the embassy's strategic goal of sustainable Tunisian economic growth through increased trade and investment. The OIG team heard from participants the conference was successful in building a public/private partnership on advancing reforms to promote investment and entrepreneurship. The embassy is also working to establish a Joint Economic Commission with Tunisia and to secure additional loan guarantees for Tunisia to give the government adequate time to push through tough economic reforms.

The Ambassador coordinates with chiefs of mission of other donor countries in promoting economic reform. In this effort, he does not include the embassy's TDY USAID representative, the embassy's senior development officer. USAID expects in 2015 to assign a senior officer to the embassy for a normal tour of duty, which will provide an opportunity to improve coordination and unity of effort.

### ***Need for Science and Technology Training***

The section is working on establishing a science endowment under the bilateral science and technology agreement signed in August 2014. The economic officer spends approximately 20 percent of his time on science and technology work, and he supervises an LE staff member whose principal responsibility is environment, science, technology, and health. The OIG team discussed with the section head the expected growth in environment, science, technology, and health work and the need for the next economic officer to receive training in this area.

### ***International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Section Program Growth – Management Challenge***

The INL section manages a growing assistance program that supports the Tunisian Government in countering regional threats, extremist violence, and cross-border movement of weapons. INL expenditures grew from virtually zero in FY 2012 to almost \$12 million in FY 2014. Staffing, now five positions, has not kept pace with program growth. Between 2012 and late 2014, INL projects grew from 0 to 16. INL plans to add sizeable corrections and justice sector projects to current assistance efforts focused on the law enforcement sector, for which it is in the process of requesting one U.S. direct-hire and three LE staff positions. Embassy leadership will consider these new positions together with other anticipated position requests, if the staffing cap is raised or eliminated. The OIG team urged embassy leadership to ensure the INL section is staffed to manage effectively the growing number of International Narcotics Control and Law

Enforcement-funded projects or, if necessary, to limit the scope of INL activities to the capacity of its INL section.

Embassy leadership informed the OIG team that they have different priorities than INL for Embassy Tunisia. The embassy's emphasis is on the immediate goals of security during the democratic transition, but INL gives priority to institution building. Although the INL section manages a large assistance program that relates directly to the embassy's strategic goal of supporting effective Tunisian security institutions, the INL section head does not meet with the Ambassador. The different emphases require the engagement of senior embassy leadership with INL. Senior leaders are not planning strategically and managing conflict in accordance with 3 FAM 1214 b (2) and (9). Moreover, 18 FAM 301.1-2(A) states that the Department is committed to using performance management best practices, including evaluation, to achieve the most effective U.S. foreign policy outcomes. A robust, coordinated evaluation function is essential to the Department's capacity to monitor performance, make critical management and programmatic decisions, and improve management practices and services. It is also necessary to measure results; provide inputs for policy, planning, and budget decisions; and assure accountability.

**Recommendation 8:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, and the Bureau of Budget and Planning, should conduct an evaluation in FY 2016 of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program in Tunisia to identify areas of applicability and use. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, F, and BP)

The embassy does not have performance indicators, or measurable outcomes, by which to evaluate its INL program in Tunisia. According to 18 FAM 301.1-2, all bureaus and independent offices are encouraged to conduct evaluations to improve their programs, projects, management processes, service delivery, or performance at a rate commensurate with the scale of their work, scope of their portfolio, and size of their budget. The section chief anticipates that by FY 2016 INL will have obligated approximately \$30 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding in Tunisia for the period FY 2012-2016. The absence of performance indicators does not permit INL to evaluate effectively International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement programs in Tunisia.

**Recommendation 9:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should establish performance indicators for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program in Tunisia. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

The section facilitates the provision of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement-funded equipment requested by the Government of Tunisia to support its counterterrorism efforts. This has been a policy priority for the embassy and the Department since 2014. The Tunisian Government also presented the same equipment list to other donor countries. The section coordinates with the Ministry of Interior to avoid duplication. In early March 2015, INL

advised the embassy of the need to amend the Letter of Agreement with the Ministry of Interior before \$10 million worth of equipment could be donated.

### ***No Guidance on Monitoring of Equipment Subject to Defense Trade Controls***

INL has not provided post with guidance on proper procedures for storing and monitoring donated items subject to defense trade controls. In accordance with INL end use monitoring report guidelines, "INL requires submission of an annual end use monitoring report which contains a summary of all monitorable aspects of INL-funded program support provided to host nations by INL programs." Commodities are required to be monitored throughout their useful life. The INL section's end use monitoring plan for 2015 includes donated items. It maintains an inventory of donated assets, which it tracks through the embassy's integrated logistics management system.

**Recommendation 10:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, should provide Embassy Tunis with guidance on the proper handling, storage, and monitoring of donated items subject to defense trade controls. (Action: INL, in coordination with PM)

## **Public Affairs**

The public affairs section is stabilizing after 2 years of staffing shortages. At the time of the inspection, the one vacant direct-hire and five vacant LE staff positions hampered full operations, but plans are in place to achieve a full complement within several months.

The section is free to conduct public outreach throughout the country, although travel to areas near the Algerian border requires case-by-case approval by the regional security office.

A review of mission activity tracker reports on embassy public affairs programs from July 1, 2014, to December 31, 2014, showed an imbalance in the section's programs: Students comprised 71 percent of the entire audience, reflecting the section's large academic exchange portfolio, with no outreach to business people or religious figures, and a total of only seven contacts reached in arts/culture and media combined.

Embassy officers do not participate regularly in public affairs activities. For example, in a poll of eight first- and second-tour officers, only one had helped interview exchange candidates, and only two had visited one of the three American Corners. The four officers with other public outreach experience had talked to Tunisian students in the embassy's Information Resource Center. The public affairs section has not engaged the front office to issue a memorandum urging officers to do public outreach, which is a required component of all officers' work requirements. The program, properly implemented, would fulfil the promotion precept in 3 FAH-1 Exhibit H-2321.1B requiring exercising oral communication skills in dealing with the public and society, as well as 2013 State 126608 urging officers to seek out public opportunities to articulate mission goals. This low level of activity does not capitalize on officers' personal interests and professional knowledge as manpower for an embassy speakers program.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Tunis should establish a mission speakers program for direct-hire employees, including first- and second-tour officers, to conduct outreach to Tunisian audiences. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *Cultural Programs and American Spaces*

The cultural programs unit manages an exchange portfolio and the three American Corners. Because of security restrictions, American Fulbright students and scholars have not participated in Tunisia's program since 2012, but a total of 27 Fulbright Tunisian students and scholars were scheduled to visit the United States in the 2014–2015 academic year. The unit also manages many smaller exchange programs as well as the International Visitor Leadership Program, with 43 slots for Tunisian participants in FY 2015.

The unit launched two exchange programs in 2013. In the 2014–2015 academic year, 50 Tunisian undergraduates and 36 community college students are studying in the United States. The 5-year program is funded at approximately \$20 million, but because the grantee has only one full-time staffer in Tunisia to administer the program, the inspectors advised the embassy to coordinate closely with the grantee's Washington office.

Exchanges are announced on the embassy's Web site and on social media, but the section does not use the full resources of press releases and events to promote the exchanges. The inspectors advised the cultural LE staff to coordinate their work with the information unit of the section.

The inspection team visited two of the three American Corners, both led by American coordinators under contract to an American nongovernmental organization. Both of the Corners are operating under expired memoranda of understanding. The inspection team urged the section to renew the memoranda and to consider multiyear extensions; discussions started on this process during the inspection.

These programs have little relevance to embassy priorities, which are unknown to the coordinators. The team urged the section officers to discuss policy themes with the coordinators and provide them materials on a regular basis.

### *Information Programs*

The unit produces a comprehensive daily media summary, prepared in cooperation with the political/economic section, with a list of media contacts. The inspection team recommended the section add language informing readers that the summary is for approved recipients only and add clarifications or commentary to media versions of events, when necessary.

The section conducts a limited number of information programs, as evidenced both by mission activity tracker records and by its neglect of media support offered by the Bureau of International Information Programs. Officials at the bureau said that Tunis is one of their least active posts. In the past year, it has performed no web chats, "co-ops" (TV production team reporting tours to the United States), or digital video conferences. It has taken advantage of few bureau services apart from Web site and Twitter support.

The Arabic, English, and French versions of the official embassy Web site have several shortcomings. The site is not up to date, in accordance with 5 FAH 8. Its page on the American Center lists open hours and staffing by two employees, though the center has been closed and unstaffed since July 2014. The Web site is not consistent with 5 FAM 915.7 requirements for disability, and information on the English and French pages is missing on the Arabic-language page.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Tunis should keep its official Web site information accurate and up to date. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

The inspection team reviewed 99 grants files for FYs 2013 and 2014. These files contain the correct forms, with proper financial documentation and close-outs. The reporting by grantees and monitoring by the section for the larger grants, however, have shortcomings. Two grants to one nongovernmental organization—for \$79,000 and \$85,000—have no adequate documentation of performance or record of monitoring. A \$140,000 grant for the nongovernmental organization AMIDEAST contained the required documentation in the files but has no record of monitoring. Documentation of performance is also missing for grants to two American universities for “linkages,” a program to fund academic exchanges and cooperation. The public affairs officer said the section would do better monitoring after staffing gaps are filled in the coming months.

The section had no certified grants officer representatives, although the section is responsible for grants in excess of \$100,000, and one uncertified LE staffer is responsible for the entire grants program. Certifications are required by Grants Policy Directive 16 to ensure that grants are properly monitored and funding is not misspent.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Tunis should designate and train at least one certified grants officer representative. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

## Consular Affairs

### *Consular Management*

A first-tour consular-coned officer currently manages the Tunis consular section, which has been without an FS-02 consular chief since July 2013. The Bureau of Consular Affairs has supported the section with two TDY officers in 2013, six in 2014, and one to date in 2015 and is committed to providing temporary support until the permanent section chief arrives in the summer of 2015. With the closure of Embassy Tripoli in July 2014, the workload at Embassy Tunis has increased to provide services to American citizens habitually resident in Libya and to Libyan visa applicants, further straining the section’s manpower capacity. Despite these challenges, the Offices of Visa and American Citizens Services, the executive office, and the front office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs as well as the regional consular officer based in Frankfurt all commend the acting consular chief for performing well.

In October 2014, the Bureau of Consular Affairs sought approval from Embassy Tunis to designate Tunis as having consular authority to provide all nonimmigrant visa services to Libyan

applicants and consular services to American citizens habitually resident in Libya. The embassy objected, arguing that the consular section could not absorb the additional workload without continuous temporary coverage or until the section returned to normal staffing levels. During the inspection, further consultations between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the embassy resulted in chief of mission approval of an amended action memo to redistrict and designate Tunis for American citizens services and Libyan official and diplomatic visas.

The consular section does not have an orientation program for new officers or a consular training plan for new LE staff members. Officers and LE staff members must be adequately trained to carry out their responsibilities correctly. Per 7 FAH-1 H-645.2, each embassy should have a written orientation and training program for new arrivals. The consular section is currently finalizing plans to hire a new American citizens services assistant/principal cashier, and the new section chief is scheduled to arrive shortly.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Tunis should establish a structured orientation and training program for consular section employees. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *American Citizens Services*

Thirteen wardens<sup>3</sup> cover 14 warden zones, with the embassy responsible for the remaining zone. The warden list was updated recently and new wardens added. More than 1,230 American citizens are registered, although the embassy estimates another 5,000 visit annually from the cruise ships that visit Tunis. Demand for emergency services is minimal.

Because of deteriorating security conditions in Libya and the closure of the Embassy in Tripoli, many American citizens habitually resident there documented their claim to U.S. citizenship at Embassy Tunis and then filed an immigrant visa Petition for Alien Relative for immediate family members. The number of petitions filed spiked from 45 in 2013 to 95 in 2014, 70 of which were filed in July and August following the closure of Embassy Tripoli. In fact, the consular section estimates that American citizens from Libya represent approximately two-thirds of the American citizens services workload since July 2014. Many of these American citizens, born in the United States to Libyan students during the 1970s, were never documented because they never planned to exercise their citizenship, especially during the Qaddafi regime. As a result, these cases are often more complex and demanding because the applicants/petitioners lack proper documentation.

### *Lack of Outreach*

The embassy has conducted only limited outreach to nonofficial American citizens resident in Tunisia and has not conducted a warden or town hall meeting, per 7 FAM 073 and 7 FAM 076, since December 2012, shortly after the attack on the embassy and American school. The

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<sup>3</sup> Wardens assist consular sections in disaster preparedness by alerting U.S. citizens to emergency situations and passing on information from the post or Department. Wardens are also a valuable asset that can provide post with key information, both about specific individuals and for situational awareness, from the local community or area.

Department and its embassies and consulates abroad have no greater responsibility than the protection of U.S. citizens overseas (7 FAM 011). According to 7 FAM 076 a, the consular section chief must engage in periodic outreach to wardens. Department regulation 7 FAM 078 also encourages the use of town halls to engage the U.S. expatriate community at post. Town hall meetings are intended to inform the nonofficial American community of security-related issues and policies and to recruit and update the warden system. In addition, 7 FAM 1812.1-2 a and b states that the consular section chief should take an active role in keeping the warden system current and test it regularly, and to consider communicating with the U.S. citizen community regularly via a newsletter, or holding town hall meetings and/or warden meetings on a regular basis to discuss the effectiveness of the warden system, local security issues, and other concerns of the U.S. community. Consular staff attributed the failure to hold these meetings to staffing shortages and security concerns.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Tunis should conduct regular outreach, including town hall meetings, with resident American citizens to recruit additional wardens and better inform current wardens of their responsibilities and their role in protecting U.S. citizens. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

The embassy has sent 35 warden notices in the past 18 months, [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) Given the evolving security environment following the 2012 attack on the embassy and school as well as the 2015 terrorist attack in Tunisia, the embassy needs to be proactive in maintaining ties with the American community by periodically conducting town hall meetings [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) officers must take into account various factors when testing the warden system, including speed, redundancy, and effectiveness. Speed reflects the measurement of the time required to transmit a message from the embassy to all registered U.S. citizens; redundancy reflects the number of sources by which an American citizen could obtain information included in a message; and effectiveness reflects the measured percentage of registered U.S. citizens who both received and understood the test message. The consular section is responsible for managing the warden system, including periodic testing, updating contact information, recruiting wardens to ensure adequate coverage of the consular district, and holding periodic meetings and/or conferences with wardens.

**Recommendation 16:** [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)  
[Redacted]

### *Visa Services*

In FY 2014, the embassy adjudicated 437 immigrant visas, a 13-percent decrease from the preceding year, and 8,856 nonimmigrant visas, a decrease of 8 percent. The nonimmigrant visa workload had an adjusted refusal rate of 16.75 in FY 2014. Although Consulate General Casablanca and Embassy Amman are designated to process Libyan immigrant visa applicants, a small number continue to complete the process in Tunis, especially if they have been denied entry to Morocco. Most Libyans apply for nonimmigrant visas at Embassy Amman. The acting section chief and the LE staff have used the Enterprise Case Assessment Service—which is a

computer-based tool—to report, track, and manage consular fraud cases but would benefit from additional training and familiarization. The inspection team advised that the acting consular chief obtain the appropriate training for herself and her staff. A Global Support Strategy contractor,<sup>4</sup> based in Morocco, provides information and appointment scheduling services to nonimmigrant visa applicants, who pay the visa application fees at the post office.

### *Validation Studies Not Current*

Embassy Tunis visa validations are not current. The embassy submitted a visa validation study on referrals during the inspection. The previous study was submitted in February 2013, and the last nonreferral study was submitted in 2011. Embassies are required to conduct at least one validation study per year in addition to an annual validation of referral cases, as noted in 9 FAM Appendix K. Validation studies are a useful tool in fraud management to determine whether officers at the embassy are correctly adjudicating individual applications or whether additional training is needed. The Office of Fraud Prevention Programs in the Bureau of Consular Affairs indicated that a visa validation study of either Tunisian or Libyan visa holders for tourism/business, in addition to the annual referral study, would be welcome.

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should conduct validation studies for 2013 and 2014 for the annual referral study and a second study as required. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with CA)

### *Participation in Visas Viper Program Not Embassywide*

Although the embassy complies with monthly reporting requirements, not all agencies are contributing to or are active participants in the Visas Viper Program. Key agencies in the embassy refused to participate. Per 9 FAM 40.37, the embassy must use the cooperative resources of all elements of the embassy to identify known or potential terrorists and to develop information on those individuals; to ensure that such information is routinely and consistently brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. Government officials for use in administering the immigration laws of the United States; and to ensure that the names of known and suspected terrorists are entered into the appropriate lookout databases. Compliance with this program will help deter terrorists from travel to the United States.

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Tunis should require that all agencies fully participate in and contribute to the Visas Viper Program. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

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<sup>4</sup> Global Support Strategy is a worldwide, 10-year contract with a maximum value of \$2.8 billion designed to change the way third parties provide information, appointments, fee collection, document delivery, and greeters for visa services.

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

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**Table 1: FY 2015 Staffing and Funding, by Agency**

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff (authorized)	U.S. Local-Hire Staff (authorized)	Foreign National Staff (authorized)	Total Staff (authorized)	Total Funding FY 2015
<b>U.S. Department of State</b>					
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	31	4	25	60	\$2,806,473
ICASS	7	5	128	140	\$6,679,229
Public Diplomacy	4	0	16	20	\$911,901
Diplomatic Security	8	2	29	39	\$1,632,310
Marine Security	13		4	17	\$117,680
Representation	0	0	0	0	\$31,426
Overseas Buildings Operations	0	0	0	0	\$1,074,439
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	1		3	4	\$7,537,651
Consular Affairs	2	0	5	7	\$252,991
<b>U.S. Department of Agriculture</b>					
Foreign Agriculture Service**	0	0	2	2	\$152,910
<b>U.S. Department of Defense</b>					
Defense Attaché Office	7	0	1	8	\$146,850
Office of Defense Cooperation	6	1	1	8	
U.S. Army	2			2	\$0
<b>U.S. Department of Justice</b>					
Legal Attaché's Office*	2	0	0	2	\$60,693
<b>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</b>					
American Battlefields Monument Commission	0	0	9	9	
<b>Foreign Commercial Service**</b>	0	0	0	0	
<b>USAID*</b>	1	0	2	3	
Economic Support Funds Overseas Contingency Operations				0	\$1,741,788
<b>Total</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>\$23,146,341</b>

\* Personnel are TDY.

\*\*Personnel are located out of country.

**Source:** Generated by OIG from data provided by Embassy Tunis.

Customer satisfaction scores for overall International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) rose to 4.18 in 2015—above worldwide scores of 4.12 out of 5—from 3.65 in 2014. Several areas, such as procurement, human resources, budget and payroll, vehicle maintenance, and nonexpendable property management increased.

In OIG survey questionnaires and interviews, both American and LE staff members noted that vacant positions and frequent turnover of TDY employees affected continuity and oversight to accomplish long-term projects. For example, the current management counselor is the fifth since the attack of 2012. The American staff acknowledged the competence of the experienced LE staff in maintaining management operations despite the lack of continuity in American supervision.

## **Human Resources**

The human resources office comprises an LE senior specialist (currently working part time), two human resources assistants, and a benefits manager. The human resources officer also supervises three contract language teachers. The permanently assigned human resources officer departed after the 2012 attack, and the responsibility for managing the office has fallen to the financial management officer, supplemented periodically by TDY assistance. A first-tour human resource officer was scheduled to arrive in April 2015.

### ***Mission American Direct-Hire Staffing***

Prior to the 2012 attack, the embassy was staffed by 83 permanent American direct-hire employees. Post-attack staffing was capped at 68 American direct hires, and one of the positions eliminated to reduce staffing was the human resources officer slot. The cap was increased to 78 in March 2014, but the human resources officer position remains vacant.

During the inspection, discussions were ongoing to move 11 U.S. direct-hire employees, who served in Tripoli and were evacuated to Valetta, Malta, to Tunis. In addition, four National Security Decision Directive-38 requests are currently pending.

### ***Temporary Duty Management Support***

The staffing cap, the frequent rest and recuperation travel opportunities for Americans (four during a 2-year tour), and the absence of a full-time human resources officer have all placed a burden on the management section. LE staff cited the absence of a full-time human resources officer as a hindrance and not a benefit to productivity. NEA's executive office reported 12 TDY visits by the management staff in 2013 and 2014, not including the two TDY management staffers in the mission during the first week of the inspection.

These factors contributed to the fact that an awards ceremony, originally scheduled for January 2015, had to be postponed.

### *Meeting with the Locally Employed Staff Committee*

OIG inspectors met with the Tunisian American Management Committee, the board that represents LE staff members in the mission. The committee expressed satisfaction with the front office and with the management section and noted their frequent meetings with both the management officer and the DCM. In September 2014, the Ambassador convened a town hall meeting with the LE staff and then held a brown bag lunch to meet with the committee.

Committee members conveyed several morale and security concerns. They noted that their unique conditions of pay allowance had been eliminated in December 2014, yet the 25-percent danger pay for Americans remains. Coincidentally, the post hardship differential pay for Americans increased in December 2014 from 10 percent to 15 percent. They also noted that they do not feel comfortable telling friends and especially strangers that they are employed by the American embassy.

### *Check-In/Check-Out Procedures Lacking*

Embassy Tunis does not have a formal check-in/check-out policy. The human resources section maintains check-in and check-out sheets to ensure that arriving personnel are acquainted with mission services and resources and that departing personnel leave embassy furniture and equipment in working order. Separate yet similar sheets are available for TDY employees, although no definition stipulates how long an employee must be at post before being required to complete the form. As described in 6 FAH-5 H-342.1-1, managing the check-in/check-out procedures is one of the basic package ICASS services.

The check-in sheet also does not distinguish between arrival courtesy call appointments between the Ambassador and the DCM, which the OIG team suggested post remedy by revising the form to include two separate action boxes, one for the Ambassador and one for the DCM.

A review of American personnel file folders indicated that arriving and departing personnel were not returning their sheets to the human resources office. A review of approximately 30 file folders for 2013 and 2014 arrivals revealed only 15 returned forms. Similarly, a review of approximately 30 file folders for 2013 and 2014 departures showed only 9 returned. The TDY check-in/check-out folder was virtually empty. The lack of both a policy and enforcement of the document return procedure lead to this situation.

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Tunis should develop a formal check-in/check-out policy and create a system to enforce the policy for both permanent direct-hire and temporary duty employees. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Inaccurate Post Allowance Reporting***

The embassy has a post differential policy dating back to 2007 but does not have a policy related to danger pay. American employees of the Department at Embassy Tunis receive 25-percent danger pay and 15-percent hardship differential. According to 4 FAH-3 H-533.10-3, all these benefits require close monitoring because salary adjustments are started and stopped, depending upon the number of days the employees are out of country, where they are traveling, and, in the case of danger pay, the exact time an employee arrives in and departs from Tunisia.

This information is not being accurately reported to the timekeepers, and subsequently the human resources office, in a timely manner. Consequently, employees are receiving inaccurate compensation, and catch-up adjustments require additional work from the timekeepers and the human resources office, if indeed they are ever identified.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Tunis should develop and enforce a policy requiring employees to report detailed arrival dates and times from post to their timekeepers in order to adjust post allowances accurately. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Post Report Is Outdated***

The post report is out of date. Although no date is on the available report, information contained in it indicates it was prepared in 2009. Guidance in 2 FAM 171 3-2a requires that regional bureaus remind posts to perform their reviews of the post reports annually and that a post designee edit and keep the report up to date. Employees use post reports in the bidding process, so accurate reports are essential.

**Recommendation 21:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should remind its posts, on an annual basis, to review and update their post reports. (Action: NEA)

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Tunis should designate one of its management staff members to update the post report annually. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Locally Employed Staff Orientation Program Is Outdated***

Embassy Tunis had an LE staff orientation program prior to the attack in 2012. Since then, the program has been moribund, which directly contradicts 3 FAM 7244. Orienting LE staff work to overall mission goals contributes to their understanding and job satisfaction.

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Tunis should establish a locally employed staff orientation program. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Financial Management***

The financial management office is staffed by an American direct-hire financial management officer (who doubles as a human resources officer), a financial specialist, a cashier, three voucher clerks, four budget and financial analysts, and an office manager. Another analyst to manage the

ICASS account was recently hired but was not yet on board at the time of the inspection. This is a new position approved by the ICASS council. The mission is adequately funded.

### ***Staffing Needs***

The vouchering section, with three voucher clerks, is understaffed. Embassy Tunis makes excellent use of the post support unit to process vouchers, but a significant workload still falls on the staff. A workload analysis provided by the ICASS services center indicates the appropriate staffing for the vouchering section to be four voucher clerks. A review of this section is warranted, and a recommendation to review all ICASS staffing needs is addressed below.

### ***Mission ICASS Staffing***

The current number of authorized LE staff members is 225. In May 2012, with the impending departure of the Foreign Service Institute's Arab language school and the subsequent loss of ICASS funding, the ICASS council commissioned an ICASS working group to come up with cost avoidance recommendations. In the end, 20 LE staff positions were eliminated. Since March 2013, Embassy Tunis has been an unaccompanied tour of duty post with a cap on the number of U.S. direct-hire staff and restrictions on TDY visitors. The pending relocation of Embassy Tripoli will add 11 U.S. direct-hire employees. If the embassy's request for a return to fully accompanied status and the elimination of the staffing cap were approved, post would see an increase in U.S. direct-hire employees as well as dependents and TDY visitors. Another study to assess LE staffing needs is warranted and should be addressed per 6FAH-5H-222.5.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Tunis should convene an International Cooperative Administrative Support Services working group to study the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services locally employed staffing needs of the mission. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***No Locally Employed Staff Certifying Officer***

The senior financial specialist is not a certifying officer. Language in 4 FAH-3 H-065.2-2 describes the criteria for training and designating LE staff members as certifying officers. This would allow the American financial management officer to perform other financial duties and relieve the officer of a routine responsibility. During the previous OIG inspection in 2007, Embassy Tunis had an LE financial management specialist certifying vouchers up to \$35,000.

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Tunis should complete all the requirements needed to designate the senior financial specialist as a locally employed staff certifying officer. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### ***Cashiering***

A cash reconciliation was performed during the inspection. The cashier had \$10 in additional funds over and above his accountability, and this was accurately noted in the verification report sent to Bangkok.

A cashier monitor from Bangkok visited Embassy Tunis in July 2014. All outstanding recommendations from the monitor's report were addressed by the end of that month. The cashier has a [Redacted] (b) (5) advance of which [Redacted] (b) (5) is provided to the alternate cashier as a temporary increase to be used for an emergency evacuation contingency. Retention of this amount should be continually monitored and returned to Bangkok if it is determined the need no longer exists. The additional [Redacted] (b) (5) over and above what the cashier needs for daily activities increases his vulnerability.

### *General Services Operations*

Before the 2012 attack, the general services office had three American positions: a supervisory general services officer, an assistant general services officer, and an eligible family member general services office assistant. At the time of the inspection, only the assistant general services officer position was filled by a regular assignment. A TDY employee covered the supervisory position, and the eligible family member position remains vacant.

### *Procurement*

In early 2015, the procurement section completed implementation of e-filing in the Integrated Logistics Management System<sup>5</sup> for paperless procurement records. In ICASS and OIG surveys, customers asked for more proactive updates on the status of their procurements. The OIG team discussed with general services operations staff members strategies to meet customer expectations, such as sending regular updates after items are ordered.

### *Annual Purchase Card Reviews Are Delinquent*

The program coordinator has not conducted annual reviews of the purchase card program for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, as required by 4 FAM 455.3 a (4). Without the additional oversight of annual reviews, fraud and misuse of the purchase cards could go undetected. After the attack on the embassy in 2012 and the rotation of personnel, post neglected to designate a new program coordinator through the purchase card program office in the Department.

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Tunis should conduct annual purchase card program reviews for FYs 2012, 2013 and 2014. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *Contracting Officer's Representatives Not Certified*

Embassy contracting officer's representatives have not been certified through the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive's Federal Acquisition Certification online system before appointment, as specified in Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-15. The certification process by the Office of the Procurement Executive checks that the designated

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<sup>5</sup> The Integrated Logistics Management System is a unified, Web-based information system designed to upgrade the Department supply chain by improving operations in areas such as purchasing, procurement, warehousing, transportation, property management, personal effects, and diplomatic pouch and mail.

contracting officer's representative meets the necessary level of training and experience to administer a specific contract. Without certified contracting officer's representatives, oversight of contracts could be inadequate, creating a management control vulnerability. Embassy staff members were unaware of the requirement.

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should register all contracting officer's representatives in the Federal Acquisition Certification Program online system. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with A)

### *Motor Pool*

At the time of the inspection, Embassy Tunis managed a fleet of 71 vehicles, including 37 fully armored vehicles, which have special handling and maintenance requirements. In addition, the motor pool assumed maintenance responsibility for 26 Embassy Tripoli vehicles left in Tunis after the overland evacuation through Tunisia of Embassy Tripoli personnel in July 2014.

### *Drivers Lack Armored Vehicle Training*

Not all LE drivers who regularly drive armored vehicles have received required training. Only 3 out of 14 drivers, including the chief of mission drivers, have taken armored vehicle driver training offered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Training Center as required by 12 FAM 389 a. Guidance in 12 FAM 389 b states that supervisors must ensure that armored vehicle drivers have the opportunity to attend the Diplomatic Security Armored Vehicle Training Course (SB102). In 2013, the Diplomatic Security Office of Mobile Security Deployments conducted driver training in Tunis, but seven new drivers have joined the motor pool since that time. Lack of proper training creates an increased risk of accidents. The cost of sending drivers to the Diplomatic Security Training Center in the United States has limited the embassy's participation at that training venue.

**Recommendation 28:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should implement a driver training program for Embassy Tunis employees who drive armored vehicles. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

### *Property*

#### *Inventory Spot Checks Not Documented*

The accountable property officer is not conducting and documenting periodic, unannounced spot counts of expendable and nonexpendable property in storage, as required by 14 FAM 411.2-2 c. The accountable property officer has a heavy workload with competing responsibilities, and property is stored at multiple locations, making it difficult to monitor all sites. Without regular spot checks, stolen property or inaccurate property records may not be detected. Problems may not be discovered until the annual inventory is conducted, when corrective action is more difficult.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Tunis should conduct and document periodic, unannounced spot checks of expendable and nonexpendable property. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *Warehouse Space Not Consolidated*

The leased warehouses are almost empty. The embassy leases two off-site warehouses in addition to the government-owned warehouse on the embassy compound. Leased warehouse space is unnecessary if the embassy conducts disposal sales regularly and if the security situation allows sales to be conducted on the embassy compound. According to 14 FAM 413.7, the property management officer must implement an efficient and economical warehousing program.

Dropping the leased warehouses would save the embassy \$36,500 per year and improve oversight of property management. Trips to the off-site warehouses take employees away from other responsibilities. Continued storage and handling of unneeded property is a waste of time and space. The embassy was storing a backlog of property for disposal while it renewed an agreement with the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on property sale procedures.

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Tunis should consolidate storage in the embassy compound warehouse. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *Undefined Responsibilities for American Forces Network Television Systems*

The embassy does not have a written policy defining responsibilities for the installation, maintenance, and replacement of the American Forces Network television systems provided in all employee residences. In 2013, the embassy received 75 decoders free through a special program offered by the Department of Defense American Forces Radio and Television Service. Under 5 FAM 571 a and 15 FAM 723 b, residential television services are a personal expense for all employees except the principal officer, DCM, and public diplomacy officers, who may be authorized satellite television equipment required for performance of job-related functions. General services operations and information management employees are uncertain of their responsibilities to support these television systems.

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Tunis should disseminate a management policy defining ongoing responsibilities for the installation, maintenance, and replacement of American Forces Network television systems in employee residences. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

### *Facilities Management and Safety, Health, and Environmental Management*

Embassy Tunis moved into the current new embassy compound in 2002, and construction of an adjacent recreation center compound was completed in 2005. In the 2012 attack, the embassy suffered \$7.8 million worth of damage. Attackers damaged 14 forced-entry/ballistic-resistant doors and 117 forced-entry/ballistic-resistant and blast windows. They ransacked and burned the recreation center, gym, and pool areas. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the embassy have completed all post-attack repairs and security upgrades.

The safety, health, and environmental management committee meets quarterly, exceeding the Department's requirement for at least two meetings per year. One hazard identified in the 2012 Technical Support Visit from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management remains outstanding: the lack of forklift training. The facilities office is working with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to schedule a trainer to provide forklift operator training to meet this requirement.

## **Information Management and Information Security**

Embassy Tunis's information management program meets the mission's daily operational needs but has not established effective processes for long-term management of the program. Staffing gaps resulted in a lack of consistency in leadership and information technology management. Processes for information technology configuration, inventory, and information security management were either not followed or not fully developed. The information management staff focused on meeting day-to-day operational needs.

The program has not been fully staffed since the 2012 attack. In 2014, an entry-level information management specialist assumed the information management officer role for 8 months while at the same time performing his primary duties of managing the classified information management operation. Until the arrival of the current information management officer in August 2014, long-term TDY assignments from the Regional Information Management Center in Frankfurt assisted the sole information management staff member. The information systems center, which handles unclassified information processing services, has not had a dedicated direct-hire supervisory information systems officer since 2013. The position was not filled because of the staffing cap.

The OIG team reviewed the full range of information management programs—computer networks, pouch, telephone, radio, and mail operations—and found deficiencies in key areas, including the [Redacted] (b) (5)

These deficiencies are discussed in the classified annex to this report. Deficiencies in mobile devices inventory and dedicated Internet network management are discussed below. The OIG team also advised the information management staff on issues such as help desk operation, media storage and labeling, systems maintenance log keeping, mail room configuration, and server and telephone frame room access control. The section corrected some of the deficiencies on the spot during the inspection and is working to correct others.

### ***Incomplete Mobile Devices Inventory***

Embassy Tunis has not completed its annual inventories of its mobile devices and does not have a complete mobile devices inventory tracking list. According to 5 FAM 881 b, embassies have to reconcile their laptop inventories annually. Additionally, 14 FAM 416.1 b recommends frequent inventories of equipment such as laptop computers, cellular telephones, cameras, and lenses as a valuable management practice. The mobile devices inventory list showed that embassy cell phones are not always recorded in the inventory tracking list. Inadequate inventory controls

create the potential for fraud and mismanagement of government property, as well as potential security vulnerabilities. The information management staff did not have consistent management oversight to institute effective inventory control. The staff was addressing this issue during the inspection.

[Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) (5)

Recommendation 32: [Redacted] (b) (5)

## MISSION SUPPORT SERVICES

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### Community Liaison Office

The community liaison office operates under the special circumstances of an unaccompanied post with a cap on permanent U.S. direct-hire staff and a large number of rotating short-term TDY personnel. In addition, embassy security guidelines place restrictions on the location, frequency, and number of participants for community events. The new coordinator, who arrived in summer 2014, restarted the newsletter, sponsor, and orientation programs for new arrivals, which lapsed during an almost 2-year gap in the position after the 2012 attack. As a result of the gap, both the 2015 customer satisfaction survey score of 3.71 and the OIG survey score of 3.09 for the Tunis community liaison office lagged behind the worldwide averages of 4.12 and 3.89, respectively.

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (6)

Because of the embassy's unaccompanied status, dependents do not currently attend the Department-sponsored [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (6) but the embassy maintains its relationship with the school. For example, the school's children continue to use the embassy's recreation center pool during scheduled hours, and an embassy representative sits on the school board.

The school compound was attacked the same day as the embassy in September 2012. Although no students or staff were injured, the attackers looted and destroyed school property, including

burning the elementary school building. With the support of \$5.9 million in grant funds from the Department's Office of Overseas Schools, the school replaced vehicles, equipment, instructional materials, furniture, and supplies. During the inspection, the DCM and the visiting Office of Overseas Schools regional education officer attended a ground-breaking ceremony for construction of a new building, partially funded by the grant, on the site of the destroyed building. Scheduled for completion in summer 2016, the new building will include classrooms, administrative offices, and a 400-seat auditorium.

In coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, the embassy is negotiating an agreement with the Government of Tunisia for the transfer of the school's parcel of land to the Department as compensation for damages suffered by the embassy and school in the 2012 attack. The embassy plans to lease the land back to the school for continued operations.

## **Medical Unit**

The Medical Unit is staffed by a Foreign Service health practitioner, an LE doctor, and an administrative assistant. The unit is spacious and well equipped. Drugs are regularly checked for expiration dates and destroyed when necessary. Controlled substances are inventoried as required. Customer satisfaction with the health unit is high, as reflected in both ICASS and OIG work and quality of life questionnaires.

The return of dependents (adults as well as children) to post would require a reassessment of the staffing levels because adding either a full-time or part-time local or eligible family member nurse to the staffing complement may be necessary.

## **Employee Association**

The U.S. Government Employee Recreation Association's charter and by-laws are dated March 2010 and September 2009, respectively. After the September 2012 attack on the embassy, the association has operated under the trusteeship of the management officer per 6 FAM 558.1, in accordance with the Office of Commissary and Recreational Affairs guidelines.

The association operates a commissary, gift shop, cafeteria, swimming pool, and dry cleaning and tailor concessions, among other activities. Seven mission board members are assisting the trustee, striving to keep the association afloat despite large debts and questionable profitability. The cap on American employees, the absence of spouses and dependents, and the limit on TDY visitors have hampered the recovery process. Continuation of these conditions could lead to the association running out of money. The association lost an estimated \$33,000 in the first 9 months of 2014, and numerous invoices remain outstanding.

The embassy identified the employee association as one of seven material weaknesses in its 2014 chief of mission statement of assurance. A May 2014 management letter provided by a local accounting firm noted considerable weaknesses in the operation, particularly with regard to cash and inventory control, revenues, payroll tax withholding, and the financial statement closing process.

The document supporting the material weaknesses of the association activities included a corrective action plan of five items. Limited progress has been made to implement these recommendations since the plan was developed. The installation of an accounting and inventory system scheduled for October 2014 has been delayed until March 2015. The general manager resigned in January 2015 because of her inability to provide accurate financial statements, and the committee is in the process of selecting a new general manager.

The option of suspending or terminating operations until dependents return to post has been discussed by the board and management. However, current thinking is to try to keep the association operational by finding better and different ways to increase revenue.

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Tunis should update and submit to the Office of Commissary and Recreational Affairs a plan to maintain the operation of the U.S. Government Employee Recreation Association. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

## Equal Employment Opportunity

Embassy Tunis has two Equal Employment Opportunity counselors and five LE staff liaisons. One of the two counselors is the acting human resources officer and has disqualified herself from active participation in the program. The other counselor has provided training to some American officers and English-speaking LE staff members and was training the non-English-speaking staff during the inspection. In addition, the Office of Civil Rights sent a team to Tunis in spring 2014 to conduct training. No complaints were pending.

The embassy has the necessary Equal Employment Opportunity information posted on bulletin boards throughout the corridors. The DCM meets with the counselor on a monthly basis, and the counselor meets with the LE staff liaisons periodically. Both counselors depart this summer, and the embassy needs to identify and train a new counselor as soon as possible.

## MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

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The chief of mission management control statement of assurance for 2014 identified seven areas with management control vulnerabilities caused by insufficient oversight due to staffing gaps: grants monitoring in the political/economic section; grants oversight in the public affairs section; end use monitoring for security assistance; oversight of residential leasing; management of the local guard force contract; verification of required security training; and employee association operations. In the 2013 statement of assurance, the Ambassador also discussed the cap on staffing as a management control vulnerability, along with deficiencies in recreation association operations.

The embassy has corrected deficiencies in residential leasing, verification of security training, and management of the local guard force contract. However, as discussed in related sections of the report, grants oversight, end use monitoring, and employee association operations are still ongoing areas for improvement, along with additional areas identified during the inspection.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

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**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should require the Ambassador to enroll in the individualized leadership coaching program offered by the Foreign Service Institute's Leadership and Management School. (Action: NEA)

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should require that the deputy chief of mission enroll in the individualized leadership coaching program offered by the Foreign Service Institute's Leadership and Management School. (Action: NEA)

**Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should initiate a Vital Presence Validation Process decision memorandum for the approval of the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources prior to modifying current staffing levels at Embassy Tunis. (Action: NEA, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should establish a formal policy to document all Embassy Tripoli Libyan locally employed staff members working at Embassy Tunis. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination NEA)

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, should establish a process to comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements for grants recipients for the Tunisian American Enterprise Fund. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with F)

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, should review the results of the U.S. Agency for International Development assessment of Tunisia's democracy and governance needs and provide the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs with a recommended course of action on how to use Middle East Partnership Initiative funding effectively. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with NEA and F)

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Tunis should require that employees adhere to Department of State guidance related to preserving record traffic by using record email. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 8:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, the Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, and the Bureau of Budget and Planning, should conduct an evaluation in FY 2016 of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program in Tunisia to identify areas of applicability and use. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, F, and BP)

**Recommendation 9:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should establish performance indicators for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs program in Tunisia. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 10:** The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, should provide Embassy Tunis with guidance on the proper handling, storage, and monitoring of donated items subject to defense trade controls. (Action: INL, in coordination with PM)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Tunis should establish a mission speakers program for direct-hire employees, including first- and second-tour officers, to conduct outreach to Tunisian audiences. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Tunis should keep its official Web site information accurate and up to date. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Tunis should designate and train at least one certified grants officer representative. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Tunis should establish a structured orientation and training program for consular section employees. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Tunis should conduct regular outreach, including town hall meetings, with resident American citizens to recruit additional wardens and better inform current wardens of their responsibilities and their role in protecting U.S. citizens. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 16:** [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

**Recommendation 17:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should conduct validation studies for 2013 and 2014 for the annual referral study and a second study as required. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with CA)

**Recommendation 18:** Embassy Tunis should require that all agencies fully participate in and contribute to the Visas Viper Program. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 19:** Embassy Tunis should develop a formal check-in/check-out policy and create a system to enforce the policy for both permanent direct-hire and temporary duty employees. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Tunis should develop and enforce a policy requiring employees to report detailed arrival dates and times from post to their timekeepers in order to adjust post allowances accurately. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 21:** The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs should remind its posts, on an annual basis, to review and update their post reports. (Action: NEA)

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Tunis should designate one of its management staff members to update the post report annually. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 23:** Embassy Tunis should establish a locally employed staff orientation program. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Tunis should convene an International Cooperative Administrative Support Services working group to study the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services locally employed staffing needs of the mission. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 25:** Embassy Tunis should complete all the requirements needed to designate the senior financial specialist as a locally employed staff certifying officer. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 26:** Embassy Tunis should conduct annual purchase card program reviews for FYs 2012, 2013 and 2014. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 27:** Embassy Tunis, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should register all contracting officer's representatives in the Federal Acquisition Certification Program online system. (Action: Embassy Tunis, in coordination with A)

**Recommendation 28:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Tunis, should implement a driver training program for Embassy Tunis employees who drive armored vehicles. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Tunis should conduct and document periodic, unannounced spot checks of expendable and nonexpendable property. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Tunis should consolidate storage in the embassy compound warehouse. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Tunis should disseminate a management policy defining ongoing responsibilities for the installation, maintenance, and replacement of American Forces Network television systems in employee residences. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

**Recommendation 32:** [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Tunis should update and submit to the Office of Commissary and Recreational Affairs a plan to maintain the operation of the U.S. Government Employee Recreation Association. (Action: Embassy Tunis)

## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

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Title	Name	Arrival Date
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Ambassador	Jacob Walles	7/2012
Deputy Chief of Mission	Kathleen Hanson	9/2013
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Management	Daniel Hirsch	9/2013
Consular	Stephanie Hoostal	5/2013
Political/Economic	Rich Michaels	9/2014
Public Affairs	Michael Macy	7/2014
Regional Security Officer	Michael Coady	5/2014
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	Richard C. Hinman	10/2014
<b>Other Agencies:</b>		
Department of Defense (DATT)	Hashem Bayatpoor	7/2014
Military Liaison Office/ODC	LT. Col. Stephen Shore	7/2013
Department of Agriculture	Sarah Hanson (res. in Rabat)	8/2012
Department of Justice LEGATT	(TDY) Bryan Zinn	9/2014
Internal Revenue Service	Aziz Benbrahim (res. Paris)	8/2012
Federal Aviation Authority	Patricia Stacey (res. Paris)	8/2014
U.S. Agency for International Development	Vacant	
American Battlefield Monument Cemetery	Vacant	

## APPENDIX A: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

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This report was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

### Purpose and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### Methodology

The inspection team's primary assessment criteria are regulations contained in the FAM and FAH, Department instructions, applicable law and generally accepted management principles. The Office of Inspections solicits reviews of the content of inspection reports from interested offices, individuals, organizations, and activities.

For this inspection, inspectors conducted 100 formal interviews in Washington, DC, and 198 in Tunis, Tunisia. They reviewed 191 surveys from Embassy Tunis American and LE staff members.

## ABBREVIATIONS

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DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	U.S. Department of State
FAH	<i>Foreign Affairs Handbook</i>
FAM	<i>Foreign Affairs Manual</i>
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
LE	Locally employed
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
RMO/P	Regional medical officer/psychiatrist
SAWG	Security assistance working group
SMART	State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset
TDY	Temporary duty
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VP2	Vital Presence Validation Process

## INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

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