



OIG HIGHLIGHTS

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June 2015
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

Inspection of Embassy Amman, Jordan

What OIG Found

What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the U.S. Embassy in Amman from February 1 to 26, 2015.

What OIG Recommended

OIG made 37 recommendations to U.S. Embassy Amman and U.S. State Department offices. About half concern management and information technology. Many of the management recommendations reflect a well-run embassy straining to keep up with rapidly growing responsibilities and staff. Six recommendations concern overseeing foreign assistance and managing grants, and six others concern consular affairs.

Authorities and Methodology

This report was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

- Growth in Embassy Amman's support staff has not kept pace with the embassy's transformation over the past 5 years from a midsized embassy to a large, front-line operation. Permanent American staff grew more than 60 percent in the past 5 years, and on most days the number of additional temporary-duty (visiting) staff equals that of permanent hires. Management staff grew less than 10 percent during the same period and is straining to fulfill requirements.
- Embassy Amman grew because it is an increasingly rare platform in the Middle East, from which the United States can advance key national security objectives. Jordan is a stable country in a tumultuous region, and the United States and Jordan cooperate closely to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, oppose terrorism, and achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
- The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission provide strong and focused strategic direction to an embassy that functions well, despite an intense work pace that stems from coalition efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and from frequent senior U.S. visitors. Cooperation among agencies is excellent, and agency chiefs describe outstanding leadership by the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission.

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ISP-I-15-29A

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BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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KEY FINDINGS

- Growth in Embassy Amman's support staff has not kept pace with the embassy's transformation over the past 5 years from a midsized embassy to a large, front-line operation. Permanent American staff grew more than 60 percent in the past 5 years, and on most days the number of additional temporary-duty (visiting) staff equals that of permanent hires. Management staff grew less than 10 percent during the same period and is straining to fulfill requirements.
- Embassy Amman grew because it is an increasingly rare platform in the Middle East, from which the United States can advance key national security objectives. Jordan is a stable country in a tumultuous region, and the United States and Jordan cooperate closely to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, oppose terrorism, and achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
- The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission provide strong and focused strategic direction to an embassy that functions well, despite an intense work pace that stems from coalition efforts against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and from frequent senior U.S. visitors. Cooperation among agencies is excellent, and agency chiefs describe outstanding leadership by the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission.

CONTEXT

The work pace of Embassy Amman accelerated with the outbreak of conflict in Syria in March 2011 between government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and armed opposition groups. The workload increased further as neighboring U.S. embassies curtailed operations and Embassy Amman had to host some of their programs. The Syrian civil war and the growing aggression and occupation of neighboring Syrian and Iraqi territory by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have created an urgent situation within Jordan. Embassy Amman has become a main conduit for the provision of assistance to the Jordanian Government and refugees fleeing ISIL and the Syrian civil war, both within Jordan and throughout the region. The embassy plays the primary role in facilitating Jordan's support of the multinational anti-ISIL coalition and also is an important platform for U.S. Government efforts to counter ISIL.

Embassy Amman is among the 10 largest U.S. missions worldwide, with 354 U.S. direct-hire employees, total employment of 865, and an embassy community of 1,400, including family members. In addition, on a typical day, the number of official personnel in Amman on temporary duty exceeds the number of U.S. direct hires; the embassy hosts an average of one high-level visiting delegation every 3 days. The American staff has increased by more than 60 percent in the past 5 years, without corresponding growth in management support staff. As U.S. efforts to combat ISIL continue to intensify, the embassy's already grueling work pace is likely to continue.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a stable country in a tumultuous region. Jordan faces growing terrorist threats as well as domestic tension arising from the Syrian civil war, ISIL, political instability in Iraq, the unresolved question of Palestinian statehood, and a refugee burden. Although its per-capita gross domestic product of about \$5,000 ranks it as an upper-middle-income country, Jordan is relatively resource poor, lacking water and domestic energy sources. Jordan has a native population of approximately 8 million; the country now hosts more than 600,000 United Nations-registered refugees, mostly from Syria.

The United States and Jordan have cooperated for decades on shared interests, which include opposition to terrorism, regional stability, and a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinians. A major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, Jordan has been a crucial partner in the fight against ISIL. Ensuring Jordan's security and internal stability remains an overriding U.S. national security interest. Since 2012, the United States provided \$1 billion annually in a wide range of security, economic, social, and humanitarian assistance, as well as more than \$2 billion in loan guarantees. A U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, the United States' first with an Arab state, entered into force in 2001 and eliminated nearly all tariffs as of 2010. U.S.-Jordan bilateral trade totaled \$3.3 billion in 2013, a 10-fold increase over preagreement levels.

Inaugurated in 1992, the U.S. Embassy compound in Jordan was one of the first built to Inman security standards. Construction of a new office annex on the compound, scheduled to begin in 2015, will significantly disrupt staff and embassy operations. The inspection team assessed embassy security programs, covered in a classified annex to this Sensitive but Unclassified

inspection report. The annex comprehensively reviews the conduct of the security program and issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities.

LEADERSHIP

The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission (DCM) provide strong and focused strategic direction to an embassy that functions well, despite an intense work pace that stems from coalition efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL and from frequent senior U.S. visitors. The OIG inspection team based the following assessments of the embassy's leadership on results from 135 electronic personal surveys returned by U.S. direct-hire personnel and on approximately 100 documented interviews that touched on front office performance.

Senior Department officials told the OIG team of the Ambassador's early successes in her first 6 months in Jordan. These successes include gaining Jordanian Government and public support for a strategy to diversify its energy imports, since Jordan has experienced disruptions in its supplies from Egypt and increased energy demand from refugees fleeing ISIL. This diversification strategy underpins one of the embassy's overarching Integrated Country Strategy goals—helping energy-poor Jordan stabilize its economy. A Department officer described the Ambassador's approach to the politically sensitive issue of Syrian refugees' entry into Jordan as engaged, evidence-based, and effective. Embassy staff across sections and agencies noted the Ambassador's keen policy and strategic sense and decisiveness, as described in 3 *Foreign Affairs Manual* (FAM) 1214 b. (2) and (3), for example, in the Ambassador's foresight focusing the embassy's work on ISIL, before it rose to the top of the United States' agenda with Jordan.

A strong DCM complements the Ambassador. In a wide range of survey questionnaires and personal interviews with the inspection team, staff across the embassy praised the DCM as knowledgeable, approachable, supportive, and decisive, attributes of leadership emphasized in 3 FAM 1214 b. Management staff praised the DCM's involvement in their issues and her belief in customer service. An agency head lauded the DCM for successfully intervening with a Jordanian ministry when it was not cooperating with the agency's program. When she was serving as chargé d'affaires, the OIG team observed her lead an emergency action committee meeting the day after ISIL released a video of a Jordanian pilot's immolation. The chargé led the committee through all issues and to consensus. Her steady and sure approach helped ease an emotional and stressful day.

Country Team and Interagency Cooperation

Officials in Washington and staff in Amman describe excellent cooperation among agencies. Heads of the Regional Affairs Office, U.S. Department of Defense offices, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all describe productive relationships with the Ambassador, in keeping with the principles in 3 FAM 1214 b. (7) that leaders establish constructive working relationships with all mission elements to further goals. The head of a key non-Department agency told the OIG team that the embassy is blessed with "phenomenal" leadership from the

Ambassador and the DCM. The head of one of the largest agencies in Embassy Amman described the Ambassador as “outstanding,” the best Chief of Mission with whom he has worked. The OIG team watched the Ambassador employ regularly scheduled senior staff meetings as key tools to provide agencies with policy insights, ensure collaboration, and coordinate the embassy’s work.

Attention to Security and Emergency Preparedness

The Regional Security Office and other embassy staff members told the OIG team the Ambassador promotes security awareness. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security designates Amman a high-threat post for terrorism and political violence. Jordan’s growing direct involvement in defeating ISIL raises stress among American and locally employed (LE) staff members. The Ambassador emphasizes to employees that security is a priority. In response to a heightened threat environment during the inspection, the DCM began leading monthly emergency action committee meetings and others when circumstances warrant.

Public Diplomacy

Embassy public affairs staff members told the OIG team the Ambassador is very good at public diplomacy. During the inspection, she hosted a lunch for Jordanian columnists and delivered a major speech on U.S.-Jordan relations. Jordanian media covered the speech extensively and positively. The Ambassador is comfortable employing social media. An embassy post on Facebook of the Ambassador opening a U.S. chain’s largest restaurant in the Mideast reached 100,000 readers. The public affairs section leverages interest the Ambassador generates on social media to advance its public diplomacy agenda.

Engagement with Jordanians

Observers in Washington praised the Ambassador’s engagement with a wide range of Jordanian officials and the insights it provides. Embassy staff members described the Ambassador’s dedication to meeting with existing contacts and developing new ones. During the month the OIG team was in Amman, the Ambassador hosted nine representational events in her residence. A senior Department official with long experience in Jordan who has attended many meetings with King Abdullah II told the team he observed good interaction between the King and the Ambassador.

Connecting to Staff

The Ambassador’s drive in her first 6 months in Jordan to establish relationships outside the embassy and learn her portfolio came at the expense of fully tuning in to the overall attitude, morale, and workload of her staff, in accordance with 3 FAM 1214 b (4) and (6). Staff members reported in questionnaires and interviews they do not feel connected to her. The Ambassador told the OIG team that she intends to rebalance, get out of the front office more often, engage informally with the staff, and make sure they know she understands and values an appropriate work/life balance.

Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leaders

First- and second-tour (FAST) officers praised to the OIG team the embassy's FAST program. FAST officers told the team that their supervisors, including the Ambassador and the DCM, are good at mentoring and provide career development assistance to them, in accordance with 3 FAM 1214 b 8. Embassy managers give FAST officers opportunities to handle important responsibilities outside their normal duties: they work on the embassy's many high-level visits; they fill in as staff assistants; and they coordinate the Integrated Country Strategy and Mission Resource Request processes.

Integrated Country Strategy and Mission Resource Request

The embassy employed a collaborative process to develop its first Integrated Country Strategy, which it submitted in January 2015. It formed interagency working groups that developed themes. The Ambassador then hosted an off site at her residence to discuss themes and generate concrete goals. At the time of the inspection, the embassy was developing its Mission Resource Request to align with the Integrated Country Strategy themes and narrative.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Foreign Assistance

A 2015 Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership between the United States and Jordan sets a goal of \$1 billion per year in U.S. assistance over 3 years, 2015–2017, about the same level provided annually since 2012. Department-managed assistance programs represent about \$150 million per year. The U.S. Department of Defense and USAID manage most of the remaining assistance. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration funds the largest Department-managed program—\$135 million in 2014—to support refugees in Jordan. The Bureau gives about 90 percent of this assistance to international organizations. Department bureaus manage programs with varying degrees of assistance from the embassy, depending on the program. The \$1 billion does not include assistance to southern Syria, which several embassy personnel in a special unit help manage.

OIG is undertaking three audits of Department-funded assistance programs that include, but are not limited to, activities in Jordan.¹ The inspection team avoided duplicating those reviews.

¹ *Audit of Department of State Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syrian Crisis*, Report No. AUD-MERO-15-22, March 2015; *Audit of Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Administration and Oversight of Foreign Assistance Funds Related to the Export Control and Related Border Security Program*, Report No. AUD-FM-15-06, April 2015; *Audit of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Middle East Partnership Initiative*, in proposal stage.

Some Washington-Managed Programs Elude Chief of Mission Control

Embassy Amman experiences recurring difficulties with Department bureaus and other agencies issuing requests for proposals and implementing assistance programs in Jordan either without informing the embassy or against the embassy's advice. One event planned from Washington without the knowledge of the embassy or Jordanian Government had to be canceled because of local sensitivities. In another instance, an agency sent four contractors to train three Jordanians, which the embassy thought was wasteful.

The embassy has worked to build relationships with program agencies and bureaus and to make clear that they must consult the embassy before launching programs in Jordan, but problems persist. During the inspection, the embassy learned of two grants—one from the Department and one from another agency—concluded without informing the embassy.

The Ambassador approves which foreign assistance programs operate in Jordan through her approval of the embassy's annual Mission Resource Request and Foreign Assistance Operational Plan. Those documents do not capture all activities, include regional assistance programs, or cover all agencies. No process is in place for the Ambassador to approve a program when the funding bureau or agency does not have a resident representative in the embassy or when programs are not part of the Mission Resource Request or Foreign Assistance Operational Plan.

Foreign assistance programs that the Ambassador does not approve risk duplication, waste, lack of support to the mission's strategic goals, or overburdening the embassy if it is asked to help monitor the program. The FAM² assigns chiefs of mission responsibility for strategically integrating and coordinating programs and managing foreign assistance resources optimally.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, should establish a procedure that requires the Ambassador to approve all foreign assistance programs that will conduct activities in Jordan not included in the embassy's Mission Resource Request or Foreign Assistance Operational Plan. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with NEA)

Embassy Helps Develop Conditionality for Foreign Assistance

The embassy contributes to U.S. Government policy oversight of two major foreign assistance programs for Jordan: cash transfers (\$436 million in FY 2014) and loan guarantees (\$1 billion in 2013, \$1.25 billion in 2014, and another in the planning stage). The embassy leads or participates in processes to determine conditions Jordan should meet to receive this aid. Specifically, the embassy participates in a Washington-based interagency process developing conditionality for loan guarantees. USAID in Amman manages an interagency process that develops and implements conditions for the cash transfer program. Examples of conditions in

² 18 FAM 005.1-7(F) and (G).

2014 were measures to recover costs in the electricity sector and to establish a shelter for victims of trafficking.

Risk of Overlapping Assistance to Refugees

In Washington and Amman, the OIG team heard differing views on whether duplication exists among implementing partners providing assistance to Syrian refugees. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID both assist Syrian refugees in some of the same host communities. For example, the bureau's refugee coordination staff resident in the embassy and USAID learned that both organizations funded three of the same implementing partners. They took steps to guard against duplicating assistance. Nonetheless, the OIG team suggested that staff determine whether duplication still exists and, if it does, eliminate it.

Sustainability and Management of Antiterrorism Assistance Program

A 2014 Bureau of Diplomatic Security capabilities assessment concluded that Jordanian law enforcement organizations lack budgets to sustain capabilities developed through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. This program is the largest Department-funded bilateral assistance program for Jordan, budgeted at \$5 million for FY 2015. In FY 2015, the program will train some 600 Jordanians in courses ranging from critical incident management to airport security to cyber infrastructure protection. Program staff members in Washington and Amman praise Jordanian expertise across the range of skills that the program develops. They anticipate that Jordan soon will be able to train police from third countries and have begun to configure the curriculum accordingly.

The program's country assistance plan contemplates higher U.S. funding levels in FYs 2016 and 2017 for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program but does not address how to sustain the program, which has assisted Jordan since 1987. After 27 years of program investments, the risk remains that Jordanian organizations' capabilities will erode without a plan to sustain capabilities at the institutional level.

The Department's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review establishes sustainability as a principle of foreign assistance effectiveness, and a 2013 White House policy on security sector assistance sets as a principal goal helping partner nations build sustainable capacity.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Amman and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, should introduce sustainability goals and benchmarks into the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Jordan. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Amman and CT)

Antiterrorism Assistance Workload Creates Management Control Vulnerabilities

The regional security officer's responsibilities for managing the embassy's security programs keep him from adequately overseeing financial management of the Antiterrorism Assistance

Program. The program trains participants from Jordan and four other countries at five Jordanian facilities. The regional security officer approves payments that reimburse Jordan- and U.S.-based contractors for a variety of goods and services, including travel, lodging, medical expenses, fuel, maintenance, and some physical upgrades.

Staffing shortages and other priorities do not allow the regional security officer to travel to training facilities to oversee the program properly, especially its financial management. His oversight responsibilities for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program are set to grow, as the program's country assistance plan contemplates expanding to as many as 40 the countries that may send trainees to Jordan.

Department standards for effective management controls require reasonable assurance to prevent and detect errors, irregularities, and mismanagement.³

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Amman, should assign financial oversight responsibilities for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program to someone who is able to discharge them in accordance with Department of State standards. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Amman)

Middle East Partnership Initiative Grants

Grants officers and grants officer representatives in regional offices in Abu Dhabi and Tunis are responsible for all Amman grants by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Embassy project officers assist in oversight by providing periodic feedback to the grants officers on grantee performance and issues such as sustainability. The project officers appropriately provided this feedback to the grants officers but did not maintain well-organized records of their oversight responsibilities and activities.

The OIG team reviewed the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs "MEPI Database" and Amman-based files for the 16 MEPI grants that Embassy Amman administers, with an approximate value of \$1.6 million. In some instances, documents needed for oversight were missing from the MEPI Database and the team was unable to find them in Embassy Amman's files, which lack a systematic ordering methodology. Embassy Amman's MEPI coordinator agreed to improve the local MEPI files to facilitate information retrieval and review.

Initiative Project Officers Not Receiving Training

Embassy Amman does not require new MEPI project officers to take the Foreign Service Institute's online course designed for them.⁴ Embassy Amman developed and provides a 1-hour orientation briefing for new MEPI project officers that it believes is sufficient. Regional grants offices in Tunis and Abu Dhabi also do not consistently require newly designated MEPI project

³ 2 FAM 021.1 b.

⁴ PP450, MEPI Project Officer Course.

officers to take the Foreign Service Institute course. Thus, new project officers may lack knowledge necessary to manage grants effectively.

Department policy⁵ makes supervisors responsible for ensuring their employees have current and up-to-date training needed to perform their jobs effectively. Taking the Foreign Service Institute's MEPI-specific course ensures officers know requirements and consistent practices that are developed on the basis of regionwide experience with MEPI grants.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Amman should require newly designated Middle East Partnership Initiative project officers to take the Initiative-specific online course and maintain records of which employees have taken the course. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Women in Science Hall of Fame Grant Did Not Meet Department Requirements

Embassy Amman awarded a grant to a Jordanian institution for a regional Women in Science Hall of Fame that did not meet Department requirements. The embassy received end-of-fiscal-year funds for FY 2012 and executed the \$60,000 grant. The official grant file indicated the grant was not competed, and the file contained no evidence of an assessment of the grantee's capacity to accomplish the grant's objectives. The statement of work and budget provided insufficient guidance for the first-time grantee, and the grantee undertook almost no activity during the first year of the grant. In the first year, the embassy advanced 75 percent of the grant funds, which came from the Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science. It received no financial or progress reports demonstrating performance for more than a year after the advance, nor did the grantee actually perform during that period. The Department did not hold the grantee accountable for funds advanced or for performance.

Department policy requires offices offering foreign assistance awards to compete them or provide a justification if they choose not to.⁶ Grantors must assess prospective grantees' capacity to perform the required work as well as implement mitigation measures appropriate to the assessed risk.⁷ Grant statements of work and budgets must be sufficiently detailed to enable monitoring in accordance with an explicit monitoring plan.⁸

Embassy Amman's current grants officer and project officer have been "substantially involved" in providing the first-time grantee detailed performance directions and intensive monitoring, even though the grant was not a cooperative agreement. An amendment that Embassy Amman grant managers negotiated and executed in July 2014 addressed deficiencies in the statement of work and budget, and the grant managers' extensive engagement with the grantee recently resulted

⁵ 13 FAM 022.5 and 13 FAH-1 H-131.3(a).

⁶ Grants Policy Directive 5.

⁷ Grants Policy Directives 37, 42, 47, 57, and 58. All these Grants Procurement Directives were in effect at the time of the inspection but were superseded as of March 13, 2015, by the U.S. Department of State Federal Assistance Policy Directive.

⁸ Grants Policy Directive 42.

in positive grantee performance. However, no plan exists for sustaining the Women in Science Hall of Fame beyond the grant's completion date of December 2015. This could lead to the program's dissolution, which would be a waste of U.S. Government investment.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, should develop and implement a plan that prescribes how to sustain the Women in Science Hall of Fame grant's goal after the current grant ends. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OES)

Export Control and Related Border Security Program

A recent OIG audit report⁹ on the Department's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Affairs' global Export Control and Related Border Security program found the program in Jordan does not comply with the bureau's end-use monitoring policies. The program is intended to help Jordan implement a strategic trade control regime and strengthen law enforcement agencies' abilities to interdict illicit items that could facilitate proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. An advisor based in Turkey manages the program with the help of an LE staff member in Embassy Amman. The bureau requires that advisors submit an annual end-use monitoring report for the prior year. Embassy Amman submitted the FY 2014 report during the inspection.

Advocacy and Reporting

The embassy's Washington stakeholders broadly praise the quality of the embassy's reporting, policy advocacy, and support on their issues. The OIG team consulted 20 offices in the Department and other agencies. Embassy political and economic officers routinely work substantial overtime hours, reflecting a broad surge in embassy activity to support Jordan's contribution to confronting regional threats.

Examples of the embassy's recent accomplishments are facilitation of a long-term solution for Jordan's energy diversification, establishment of a unit to provide humanitarian assistance to southern Syria, help for Jordan to cope with a surge of refugees fleeing ISIL and other threats, and support for Jordan's leadership in the anti-ISIL coalition. The embassy's support for a steady stream of high-level visitors and its assessments of Jordan's materiel needs illustrate close collaboration between the political section and the office of the U.S. senior Defense official/Defense attaché.

The political and economic sections both produce substantial quantities of reporting. In the 6 months prior to the inspection, the political section produced more than 130 substantive cables; the economic section, which is smaller, produced more than 70. The OIG team reviewed the cables and judged that reporting is relevant and covers the embassy's strategic goals.

⁹ *Audit of Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Administration and Oversight of Foreign Assistance Funds Related to the Export Control and Related Border Security Program*, Report No. AUD-FM-15-06, April 2015.

Meetings with Jordanian officials by senior U.S. Government visitors or the Ambassador drive much reporting and reflect excellent access to host country officials. Cables reporting on meetings are well organized by theme and provide context and useful analytical comments. Some Washington readers, as well as the Ambassador, would like additional analytic reports less tied to meetings and events. Both sections have prepared reporting plans. The OIG team concluded that the plans and dialogue between the sections and the front office will generate more analytic reporting.

Leahy Vetting

Delays in the vetting process for Jordanian security forces under the Leahy Laws lead occasionally to postponing or canceling training. The laws prohibit U.S. Government-funded training for forces involved in human rights violations. Among the causes of problems are Jordanian authorities' late submission of names of trainees and last-minute requests for more information from the Department's Bureau of Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights. As the U.S. security relationship with Jordan deepens, the embassy expects the Leahy vetting workload to increase, along with additional disruption of training.

Embassy Amman is addressing the problems. The embassy, with the assistance of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, is attempting to identify Jordanian units well in advance of scheduled training to allow sufficient time to flag potential problems or respond to requests for additional information. During the inspection, the employee who coordinates Leahy vetting completed the Foreign Service Institute's online course on the Department's International Vetting and Security Tracking system. The OIG team concurs with these proactive measures.

Trade Promotion

The economic section, the U.S. Commercial Service office, and USAID lead coordinated, multiagency efforts to assist U.S. businesses and promote U.S. exports. Those offices meet weekly. The Foreign Agricultural Service joins them in a monthly meeting to look at promoting business and economic development more broadly. The Ambassador and the DCM support this effort, as required by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and the FAM. Since the Ambassador arrived in summer 2014, she or the DCM has participated in 12 events to support U.S. business. In recent months, the DCM has participated in the monthly meeting when her schedule permits. Recent examples of advocacy include successfully intervening with Jordanian authorities on behalf of U.S. energy and trucking firms and lobbying the Jordanian Government to change a technical standard that presents a barrier to imports of U.S. poultry.

Public Diplomacy

Embassy Amman's public diplomacy planning and management are well organized and strategic. Activities focus on mission priorities. Embassy Amman is one of the few in the region that conducts the full range of public diplomacy programs and activities. This programming load, coupled with Jordan's importance in the fight against ISIL and terrorism, places heavy

demands on the public affairs section. Reaching youth is a priority in a country where 70 percent of the population is under age 30, and the public affairs section reaches out to youth through cultural programs and social media.

The section instituted a planning spreadsheet in fall 2014 that tracks all public diplomacy activities, deadlines, and goals. In 2014 it systematized its small grants program to promote open competition and objective grantee selection. The section promoted a positive image for the new Ambassador through public events and social media. The embassy has improved information flow between public affairs and other sections and agencies by starting or reviving working groups on countering violent extremism and publicizing American assistance. Volunteers from other sections participate in the embassy speaker program, a public outreach effort that had lagged but gained renewed emphasis in early 2015 with the addition of a new staff person.

Information Programs

Countering terrorist propaganda is a key Department goal, but officers told the OIG team that much of the anti-ISIL and antiterrorism messaging from Washington is generic; embassy staff must tailor it to suit Jordanian concerns and sensitivities, using multiple sources of information. Recognizing that local voices can be more effective than foreign voices, the public affairs section conducts speaker and exchange programs to build the capacity of Jordanian Government and public affairs officials to develop and coordinate messages.

Social Media and Digital Outreach

The public affairs section emphasizes social media because of its importance in reaching the Jordanian public, especially youth. Jordan has a population of 8 million, of which 3.4 million are Facebook users. The embassy Facebook page had more than 250,000 fans in February 2015, making it one of the largest embassy Facebook sites in the Near East region. The embassy Twitter site reaches more than 10,000 followers. The public affairs section manages social media according to its social media strategy and uses weekly plans to ensure a steady supply of precleared material from embassy offices. The section has proposed reestablishing a social media working group to encourage more missionwide participation; the OIG team endorses that idea.

In addition to the public affairs section's social media sites, the consular section, the American Language Center, and USAID also have sites, but the sites do not all link to each other or have a featured link on the embassy Web site home page. The OIG team suggested cross-linking all embassy digital sites so readers of one are directed to the others.

Arabic Book Program

Although interest levels vary, 2,500 copies are printed of every American book the embassy publishes in Arabic translation, so some books run out and others pile up in the warehouse. With a \$50,000-per-year allocation from the Bureau of International Information Programs, the public affairs section selects and funds the translation and printing of 6–10 American books per

year and offers them to embassies throughout the Arabic-speaking world. The section gathers diverse suggestions for titles from within and outside the embassy and coordinates with Embassy Cairo, which has the only other Arabic book program. The OIG team suggested polling other embassies to gauge interest and adjusting the print run accordingly.

Cultural, Educational, and Exchange Programs

The public affairs section publicly advertises exchange opportunities for most of its 16 exchange programs to broaden participation and increase transparency. Staff members from other Department sections and other agency offices sit on selection panels, and nearly every embassy element nominates candidates for the International Visitor Leadership Program.

Fulbright Program

During the 2014–15 academic year, 33 American Fulbrighters were studying or teaching in Jordan. The independent, binational Fulbright Commission and the embassy carry out the provisions of 12 State 87602 regarding Fulbrighters' security in a crisis. The OIG team advised the embassy to consult with the commission to update its 2002 Emergency Procedures Crisis Management Guidelines manual.

The Fulbright commission runs the \$2.6-million program, which receives high-level support—about 44 percent of the costs—from the Jordanian Government. A new bilateral agreement takes effect in 2015. The embassy has two seats on the board and maintains frequent communication with the long-time director.

Alumni Engagement

Hiring a new alumni coordinator in December 2014 enabled the section to increase its engagement with participants of previous U.S. Government exchanges. Maintaining contact with these alumni increases the long-term benefit to the United States of these programs. The section plans to launch an alumni association. The coordinator is systematically adding all alumni to the embassy's contact database. At the time of the inspection, the database included more than 1,000 alumni records. Alumni from a number of programs remain to be entered. The OIG team encouraged the planned expansion of alumni records and alumni participation in embassy programs.

American Spaces

Embassy Amman and Washington public diplomacy leaders envision turning the American Language Center in Amman into a full-fledged, multifunctional American Center, but they remain far from that goal. The center, which has historically focused on teaching English, is a three-story stand-alone facility 4 miles from the embassy, which the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations leases. Teachers and all other employees are LE staff members, and the center's annual budget for salaries and other costs—about \$350,000 in FY 2014—comes from

English-language course fees it collects locally and recycles¹⁰ through Washington back to a separate account at the embassy. Reflecting the center's potential importance for public outreach, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs designated the center as a Tier 1¹¹ American Space, giving it high priority for additional funding. However, the current building would need significant upgrades for security and increased public use to become a full American Center. The embassy requested, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations agreed, to find a new space to lease.

In the meantime, with about \$784,000 in funding from the Bureau of International Information Programs in FY 2014, the public affairs section purchased new equipment and is attempting to transform the current center into a multifaceted public diplomacy facility. The section expanded the center's programming uses beyond language training. However, the center does not meet all the standards¹² for open-access U.S. Government American Spaces. It has little walk-in traffic, and its audience is still primarily English-language students. In early 2015, it was not conducting regular EducationUSA programming and the educational adviser position was vacant. A Smithsonian Institution design team described the space as not welcoming or attractive. Uncertainty over the facility's location has hampered planning. A long-term strategic plan would facilitate better use of the current space as well as lay the groundwork for expansion to a full-fledged center that meets the highest standards.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should develop a long-term strategic plan to transition the American Language Center into a fully functioning American Center that meets the highest levels of the Standards Matrix for Open Access U.S. Government-Owned American Spaces. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with IIP, OBO, and DS)

The center has acquired its books and videos over the years, and the collection is small, outdated, and disorganized, which makes the center less attractive to its audience. The standards matrix for open-access U.S. Government American Spaces includes requirements for books and materials for public use and specifies a collection development plan for spaces in the highest category.

¹⁰ As defined in 10 FAM 228.3-1, "recycling" is a means by which posts can recover and reuse nonappropriated funds from English-language activities, which ordinarily would have reverted to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

¹¹ In February 2014, the Bureau of International Information Programs asked each regional geographic bureau to identify its 10 most strategically important American Spaces based on foreign policy priorities. The bureau designated these facilities as "Tier 1" Spaces.

¹² The Bureau of International Information Programs' "Standards Matrix for Open Access USG Owned American Spaces," which also covers spaces leased by the U.S. Government.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement a materials collection development plan for the American Language Center. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with IIP)

Many center staff members (all of whom are LE staff members) told inspectors they feel isolated from the embassy and public affairs section. Their names were not on the section staff list provided to the OIG team. The center has no OpenNet terminal, so staff members cannot access the public affairs section's program matrix or embassy eServices. The transition from a language-teaching center to a true American Center requires changing the relationship between the center and the public affairs section. The OIG team suggested to the public affairs section and management section several solutions to address this situation.

The Amman-based regional English-language officer has limited involvement in the center. The officer covers four countries and the Palestinian territories, focusing primarily on programs the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs funds. Per 10 FAM 228.5-4 c., this position's role includes assisting in maintaining English-teaching standards. The OIG team urged the public affairs section and the English-language office to work together to help the center staff develop professionally, incorporate newly purchased technology, and increase American cultural content in the curriculum.

The center in Amman is one of the few U.S. Government-operated centers in the world that recycles English-teaching revenues, and it is doing so under a lack of official guidance. The OIG team could find no recent instruction cables for the recycling program. Responsibility for the program shifted from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to the regional bureaus in FY 2004, but the recycling procedures in 10 FAM 229.3 remain unchanged and no longer reflect current practice. Lack of official guidance creates a potential for confusion or mistakes.

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should provide Embassy Amman with official guidance on recycling authorization and procedures for English-teaching funds. (Action: NEA, in coordination with ECA)

More important, the public affairs section lacks clear operating procedures to separate English-language program expenses (for which nonappropriated funds from recycled English-teaching fees can be used, per 10 FAM 229.3-2) from other public diplomacy program costs (which must be funded consistent with the public diplomacy matrices in 4 FAH 3 H-160). The need for these procedures has just begun to arise; clearly defined budget categories will be necessary to avoid the misuse of funds as the center hosts a growing number of activities unrelated to teaching English.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should provide Embassy Amman with official guidance on the use of recycled English-teaching funds and regular public diplomacy funds in a mixed-use facility. (Action: NEA, in coordination with ECA)

Public Affairs Grants Management Is Improving

Current grants files show that the public affairs section is issuing grants in line with public diplomacy priorities and generally following proper grants procedures. The section tightened grants management in September 2014 by instituting formalized grant monitoring plans and grantee risk assessments, awarding more grants through open competition, better documenting the justification for noncompetition, entering grants more quickly in the Grants Database Management System, and establishing proper grant period dates. However, in examining 19 grants files out of 37 for FY 2014, the OIG team found some procedural problems in grants that predated October 2014. The team found three examples of FY 2014 grants, plus one FY 2013 grant, with short grant periods that covered only the program dates, not the period in which grant funds could be spent, resulting in expenditures outside the grant periods, contrary to grants management regulations.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Amman should examine all open public diplomacy grants and amend any whose period of performance dates do not cover all grant expenditures. (Action: Embassy Amman)

The OIG team found four examples of fixed amount award grants¹³ written for programs whose complexity or uncertain expenses made them poor candidates for this type of grant, which is designed for simpler activities with predictable expenses. The OIG team advised the grants staff on the proper use of the fixed amount award grants. The documents in one case contained no mention of the Fly American Act, and the grantee flew on a non-U.S. carrier. The grantee told the embassy she did not receive information about grant terms and conditions. The section increased supervision of the issuing office's grants, and the OIG team emphasized the importance of informing grantees of grant regulations. The team found an example of imprecise language in correspondence with a grantee that could have led to an unauthorized commitment. The OIG team gave advice on the use of proper terminology when discussing proposed grants.

Consular Management

The Bureau of Consular Affairs cites Amman's consular operation for its range and depth of expertise and professionalism and its regular, focused communication. Embassy Amman is a primary resource for the Department when crises in neighboring countries interrupt consular operations. It played an essential role in providing visa and American citizens services to persons from Syria during and after the Arab Spring in 2011 and to persons from Iraq after the reduction of consular services in Baghdad in 2014. After the U.S. embassy in Tripoli suspended visa services in September 2012, Amman became the primary nonimmigrant visa adjudicating post for Libyans. The embassy makes frequent demands on consular FAST officers to help manage

¹³ The fixed obligation grant is a simplified award instrument for a definable short-term program where costs can be reasonably determined at the time of award and where performance is verifiable (Grants Policy Directive Number 35). After December 26, 2014, such grants were renamed fixed amount award grants.

the constant flow of high-level embassy visitors. Consular managers recognize the importance of this work to the mission and to officers' professional development and supported a FAST officer initiative to create a consular work schedule that fixes reliable blocks of time for consular duties and outside activities.

Volume and Complexity of Workload

Embassy Amman is experiencing rapid growth in both nonimmigrant and immigrant visa workloads, related in part to instability in the region. Nonimmigrant visa applications grew from almost 20,000 cases in FY 2010 to more than 37,000 in FY 2014, an 86-percent increase. Jordanians represent 69 percent of the growth. Almost all the rest was applicants from Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where consular operations were problematic or suspended. Amman is also the designated processing center for Syrian immigrant visas. Immigrant visa applications increased by 23 percent between FYs 2010 and 2014 to 5,273 cases. Syrian applicants now account for approximately 30 percent of immigrant visa cases. Immigrant visa processing for Syrian cases is more time consuming than that for Jordanian cases because of problems communicating with, obtaining documentation from, and scheduling appointments for Syrian applicants.

Amman's overall American citizens services workload remained relatively stable during the past 5 years. Caseload shifted, however, from high-volume but routine notarial services and passport page additions to more complex cases involving deaths, welfare and whereabouts, repatriation, and children's issues. The embassy plays a critical role in periodic evacuations from the West Bank where the Israeli Government does not permit Palestinian-Americans to depart from Israeli airports. Amman is the designated post for adjudication of U.S. citizenship cases submitted through the Czech Embassy in Damascus, which represents U.S. Government interests in Syria.

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Recommendation 11: [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Visa Referrals Not Compliant with Worldwide Visa Referral Policy

The embassy is not handling visa referrals from embassy officers in accordance with worldwide visa referral policy. Inspectors reviewed more than 140 referrals from 2014 and found that

although almost all met the 9 FAM Appendix K Exhibit I, Class B criteria requirement to “advance U.S. national interests or mission priorities,” approximately half did not clearly meet the additional requirement that referred persons fall into at least one of six specified categories.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Amman should require consular managers and supervisors to adjudicate visa referrals in accordance with Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Referring and approving officers submitted noncompliant referrals based upon erroneous guidance. Consular managers performed “visa school” briefings for all authorized referring and approving officers, as required in the worldwide referral policy, on the basis of their erroneous interpretation that the policy required only the statement of U.S. Government national interests or mission priorities.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should develop a detailed briefing on requirements of the most recent worldwide visa referral policy and brief all officers authorized to submit or approve visa referrals. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with CA)

Consular staff made data entry errors in approximately 15 percent of reviewed visa referrals. Errors include category of referral, information about the referring or approving officer, description of documents, and failure to scan required documents into the record. Inspectors advised consular managers to monitor and correct data entry errors.

Visa Policy Guidance Is Insufficient

A majority of consular FAST officers expressed a desire for more guidance about nonimmigrant visa adjudication policy, citing a variance in refusal rates among officers as one concern. Some officers said managers schedule meetings to discuss cases but expect officers to determine appropriate policy themselves. Language in 3 FAM 1214 b. (8) urges Department leaders to encourage professional development through mentoring, coaching, and other opportunities.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Amman should require consular managers to provide additional guidance on visa adjudication policy by meeting regularly with entry level officers to discuss cases and explain Department of State policy. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Consular managers review visa adjudications weekly but do not regularly use these reviews as instructional tools to discuss visa issuances and refusals, as required by 9 FAM 41.113 PN17 and 9 FAM 41.121 N2.3-7. As a result, nonimmigrant refusal rates vary widely among adjudicating officers.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Amman should require consular managers to use adjudication reviews as instructional tools, directly engaging with line officers to maintain the highest adjudication standards, as required by Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

No Continuous Training Program

Officers and LE staff members indicate that the section schedules monthly administrative days but often uses them to catch up on work. No program of regularly scheduled continuous consular training or professional development exists, making it difficult for staff to remain up to date on regulations, policies, and procedures.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Amman should develop, schedule, and conduct consular training and professional development programs on monthly administrative days. (Action: Embassy Amman)

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Table 1: FY 2014 Staffing and Funding, by Agency

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff (authorized)	U.S. Locally Employed Staff (authorized)	Foreign National Staff (authorized)	Total Staff (authorized)	Total Funding FY 2014
U.S. Department of State					
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	160	3	11	172	\$11,072,591
ICASS	11	30	168	209	\$18,187,500
Public Diplomacy	6	2	19	27	\$2,068,389
Diplomatic Security	11	6	48	65	\$2,458,411
Consular affairs	9	4	17	30	\$1,405,003
Marine Security Guard	11			11	\$228,799
Overseas Buildings Operations	8		1	3	\$7,435,136
Anti-Terrorism Assistance		1		1	\$500,000
Office of Inspector General	1		1	2	nonserviced
American Language Center			24	24	\$396,758
Iraq Support Unit	4	3	27	34	\$1,200,000
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration	3		2	5	\$509,120
Regional English Language Office	1		1	2	\$272,851
Language Students	6			6	nonserviced
Representation				0	\$56,665
U.S. Department of Agriculture					
Foreign Agriculture Service			1	1	\$100,000
U.S. Department of Defense					
Military Assistance Program	35		9	43	\$2,252,350
Defense Attaché Office	11	1	2	14	\$689,932
Force Protection Detachment	3	1		4	\$435,000
Foreign Affairs Officers	5			5	nonserviced
Corps of Engineers	6		4	10	nonserviced
Students	4			4	nonserviced
U.S. Department of Justice					
Legal Attaché Office	4			4	\$267,453

U.S. Department of Homeland Security					
Citizenship and Immigration Services	1		1	2	\$178,116
Customs and Border Protection			2	2	\$123,400
Immigration and Customs Enforcement	2		1	3	\$234,872
Transportation Security Administration	1	1	1	3	nonserviced
U.S. Department of Commerce					
U.S. Commercial Service	1		3	4	\$321,139
USAID (Operating Expenses only. Program budgets total \$800,000,000)	42	2	86	128	\$10,000,000
Millennium Challenge Corp.	1		3	4	\$255,571
Open Source Center	4		34	38	nonserviced
Peace Corps	3		2	5	\$1,700,000
Totals	354	54	468	865	\$62,349,056

Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by Embassy Amman.

MANAGEMENT

Despite a lack of resources and an overwhelming workload, the management section capably delivers administrative support services to mission agencies. The inspection team identified a number of procedural deficiencies requiring correction, which represent potential vulnerabilities if left unaddressed.

The management section exceeded both regional and worldwide overall International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) customer satisfaction scores in 2014, despite the mission's dramatic transition in recent years from a midsize embassy to a large front-line operation. This expansion of operations and staff has occurred without commensurate growth in the management section support staff, which is now straining to fulfill requirements. The number of American employees assigned to the mission increased by 122 (more than 60 percent) between 2009 and 2014, but management LE support staff increased by only 8 percent. The management section American staff increased by two positions during the same period.

Visitor support significantly affects workload. In 2013, the embassy recorded more than 17,000 temporary-duty visitors who required some level of support from the management section. The

embassy reports that, on any given day, more American temporary-duty personnel are present in the mission than assigned U.S. employees. In 2014, the management section fully supported 129 high-level visits (an average of 1 every 3 days, with as many as 4 delegations arriving on a single day), totaling approximately 1,400 individual visitors. The management section provided partial support (such as motor pool operations, hotel arrangements, and information technology support) to numerous high-level visits controlled by other agencies in the embassy.

To meet customer demands, the management section resorted to 41,900 hours of American and LE staff overtime in FY 2014 at a cost of \$457,722, nearly twice the cost of overtime paid in FY 2010. Embassy employees, both American and LE staff members, frequently mentioned exhaustion and stress related to workload as themes during the inspection. The ICASS council recently approved establishing 14 new LE staff positions in management, and the embassy is hoping for further LE staff increases for the management section. The embassy requested five new American positions in recent Mission Resource Request submissions. The Department's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation recommended creating those new American management positions in its 2013 report. The OIG team concurs with those recommendations.

Financial Management

Although he is serving in a "stretch" position above his assigned grade level, the financial management officer has brought stability to the unit since his arrival in August 2013. Prior to his arrival, the unit endured a string of nine consecutive temporary-duty financial management officers with tenures ranging from 6 months to 1 week. Despite this, the unit received "good" (4 on a scale of 1–5) 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey scores and exceeded regional averages in four of the five cost centers.

The OIG team advised the financial management officer on the need to update several of the unit's process and policy documents and to communicate those updates to financial LE staff and embassy customers. The financial management office began publishing updated policy documents during the inspection.

The team advised the financial management officer to adhere to and enforce emergency cash payment regulations, which define any cash payments between \$500 and \$3,000 as emergency cash payments that must be justified as bona fide emergencies, per 4 FAH-3 H-394.2. In February 2015, the embassy released an updated management policy on cashier services, which includes a clause on emergency cash payments.

Internal Control Deficiencies and Noncompliance with Regulations.

The financial management office's previous lack of permanent oversight contributed to internal control deficiencies that, if left unaddressed, could lead to vulnerabilities in the section.

Improper Payment of Official Residence Employees

The embassy pays the Ambassador's and the DCM's official residence employees' salaries directly via electronic funds transfer to their bank accounts. Direct payment of official residence staff salaries with U.S. Government funds, including electronic funds transfer, establishes a potential employer-employee relationship between the staff and the U.S. Government, with resulting potential liabilities.¹⁴ Per 3 FAH-1 H-3252.2 a., staff members who work as official residence employees are neither Federal employees nor employees of the U.S. mission but rather are personal employees of the principal representative in whose house they work. The principal representative is responsible for paying personal employees. The Government may reimburse a principal representative for a portion of the official residence staff's salaries, per 3 FAH-1 H-3252.3 and 3 FAM 3255.6. Department of State Standardized Regulation 456 allows the agency to provide an advance of funds to principal representatives eligible to receive reimbursements for such expenses.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Amman should discontinue electronic funds transfer salary payments to official residence staff members and require the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission to pay the official residence staff directly. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Unauthorized Use of Suspense Deposit Abroad Account

Embassy Amman is incorrectly using a suspense deposit abroad account to pay lease and utility payments on behalf of an eligible family member of a nonDepartment embassy employee, who is staying in a government-leased apartment. The family member's spouse left post for a 1-year overseas assignment. The spouse's agency approved an exception to its safe-haven policy and provided a housing allowance directly to the family account, from which the family member pays the embassy. The embassy deposits the funds into a suspense deposit abroad account and then pays rent and utilities directly. This is an unauthorized use of a suspense deposit abroad account, per 4 FAH-3 H-326.2. Using a suspense deposit abroad account for unapproved purposes reduces the embassy's control and oversight of funds.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Amman should discontinue unauthorized use of a suspense deposit abroad account or request an exception from the Office of Financial Policy. (Action: Embassy Amman)

¹⁴ OIG issued a Management Assistance Report (ISP-I-14-08, April 3, 2014) regarding payment of official residence expense (ORE) staff salaries directly by U.S. missions abroad. OIG found that, at a number of missions, the Department, rather than the principal representatives, paid ORE staff salaries directly and noted that this practice presents a potential liability for the U.S. Government by creating the appearance of an employer-employee relationship between the government and ORE employees. Per 3 FAH-1 H-3252.2 a., ORE employees are defined to be employees of the principal representative in whose home they work and not employees of the U.S. Government or the mission. In the Management Assistance Report, OIG recommended that the practice be discontinued.

Inconsistent Unannounced Verifications of Subcashier Funds

The embassy does not consistently conduct unannounced monthly and quarterly cash verifications for some of its 15 subcashiers. According to 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3 f., the subcashier's U.S. citizen supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the verifications are performed in a timely manner. Failing to oversee subcashiers and adhere to FAH regulations could result in the misuse of government funds.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Amman should establish and enforce formal procedures to conduct monthly and quarterly cash verifications of all 15 subcashier funds and submit the required documentation to the Class B cashier. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Occasional Money Holders Not Reconciling Advances in a Timely Manner

Occasional money holders are not returning and reconciling their advances within a maximum of 3 business days, as 4 FAH-3 H-394.4 c. requires. The lack of an enforced policy at post means that occasional money holders are not adhering to the rules and regulations governing such advances. Noncompliance could lead to lack of control and possible misuse of government funds.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Amman should establish and enforce a policy that limits all occasional money holder advances to a maximum of 3 business days. (Action: Embassy Amman)

No Approved Financial Procedures for American Language Center Collections

The American Language Center subcashier is collecting, processing, and depositing tuition fees in a manner inconsistent with 4 FAH-3 H-396.5 d., which states that collections above an equivalent of \$5,000 must be deposited on a daily basis. However, no documented financial management guidelines are in place to deal with the oversight and unique nature of the American Language Center collections. The lack of documented internal controls could result in the mismanagement and abuse of government funds.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Amman should develop and enforce a specific set of procedures for all American Language Center collections that adhere to regulations on collections specified in the *Foreign Affairs Manual* and the *Foreign Affairs Handbook*. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Inadequate Phone Bill Tracking and the Prompt Payment Act

The financial management office does not monitor cell phone and landline telephone bill due dates to assist in compliance with the Prompt Payment Act, per 4 FAH-3 H-311.5 b. No control or procedure is currently in place to track accurately the dates of receipt or payment of these invoices.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Amman should implement a tracking system to monitor cellular and landline telephone invoice payments to comply with the Prompt Payment Act. (Action: Embassy Amman)

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

Capturing Temporary-Duty Personnel Costs

The financial management office tracks temporary-duty visitors via information gathered through the badging process in order to track the services they receive under the ICASS system. Every person who enters the embassy—whether permanent, temporary, or visitor—must have a badge. In addition, the management section uses information that sections submit on services they provide to temporary-duty personnel to cross check the database.

No Uniform Service Standards to Measure Financial Management Performance

The financial management office is not using any uniform service standards, and the unit has not developed any metrics to measure its financial services performance in the section, as required by 6 FAH-5 H-013.5 and 6 FAH-5 H-222.6-1 d. Consequently, the section is not able to measure its performance in delivering financial services to its ICASS customers and improve its accountability for service delivery.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, should establish measurable uniform service standards to evaluate the financial management section's performance servicing the clients under International Cooperative Administrative Support Services. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with M/PRI)

Nonserviced Agencies Not Paying for Some ICASS Services

The embassy is not capturing ICASS workload counts for all agencies. Approximately 17 nonserviced agencies are subscribing to accounting and records services under ICASS. Embassy accountants must manually enter fiscal strip codes for these agencies for voucher payments because the agencies' fiscal data are unavailable in the Department's Consolidated Overseas Accountability Support Toolbox accounting system. With manual fiscal data entry, the embassy is not capturing workload counts for these agencies, which therefore are not paying their share of post administrative costs, as required by 6 FAH-5 H-013.2.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Amman should manually calculate the workload counts of all nonserviced agencies that subscribe to the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services accounting and records services but do not have fiscal data in the Department of State's accounting system and distribute the associated costs equitably. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Human Resources

An experienced officer leads the human resources office, which scored above worldwide and regional averages in the 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey. Employee travel orders are pre-prepared in the event of emergency departure from post, detailed human resources guidance is disseminated to customers, the 2014 Local Employee Handbook and Local Compensation Plans are up to date, and procedures are in place to manage recruitment and track American and LE staff evaluations. The office's staff is organized by customer rather than by function, an atypical arrangement that provides both benefits and built-in inefficiencies.

Delinquent Performance Evaluation Reports

At the time of the inspection, two American and five LE staff performance evaluations were delinquent. Language in 3 FAM 2813.4, and 3 FAH-2 H-135.5 A (2) requires supervisors to complete annual evaluations. Delinquent evaluations can impact tenure and promotion and can delay within-grade increases.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Amman should require all supervisors to complete performance evaluations within the mandated timeline. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Mission Classification

Embassy Amman classifies and grades LE staff positions in house rather than outsourcing to regional centers. Five LE staff members spend up to 35 percent of their time on this duty but do not accurately monitor the time they spend on the function or the total number of positions they classify or reclassify. Packets that supervisors submit to the human resources office do not always provide required documents, and employees do not always understand the process. The OIG team advised the office to issue guidance on mission classification as well as the supervisor's and job evaluator's responsibilities and to establish a system to monitor performance. The OIG team discussed the pros and cons of outsourcing the classification function to a regional center.

Emergency Evacuation Roster, Formal Staffing Not Capturing All Positions

Because of the constant arrival and departure of U.S. Government personnel, Embassy Amman is not certain how many U.S. personnel are in Jordan on any given day. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs requires a daily reporting of individuals in country, including temporary-duty personnel, in case of an evacuation. Mission agencies provide the temporary-duty information on an honor system. Management admits it cannot confirm the reliability of the figures that various agencies at post provide. This lack of independent data makes it difficult to track "serial temporary-duty" personnel who may perform ongoing functions for which, by regulation, a position should be created through the National Security Decision Directive-38 process. The embassy is unable to capture serial temporary-duty personnel in the Post Personnel Application database that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations uses to calculate the capital security/maintenance cost-sharing charges for the Department and all agencies, in preparation of the FY 2017 budget.

Hardship Differential Survey and Danger Pay Reports Are Overdue

The mission is delinquent in submitting its updated Danger Pay Survey and Post Hardship Differential Questionnaire, both due in September 2014. Department direct-hire employees receive 15-percent danger pay and a 5-percent hardship allowance in Amman. Department of State Standardized Regulations 513.2 and 653.3 require a review of conditions at differential and danger pay posts every 2 years to justify the allowance.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Amman should submit an updated Post Hardship Differential Questionnaire and Danger Pay Survey to the Bureau of Administration, Office of Allowances for review. (Action: Embassy Amman)

General Services Operations

Heavy workload associated with mission growth and turnover in LE staff positions has disrupted the general services office. American direct-hire positions experienced curtailment as well as gaps that consecutive temporary-duty personnel filled. American general services staff assigned to Amman are relatively inexperienced.

Motor Vehicle Operations

A recently hired Professional Associate supervises the motor pool. Inspectors observed that the unit uses the Department's Fleet Management Inventory System to track vehicle use. LE motor pool drivers completed required safe driver training and medical exams.

Driver Shifts in Excess of 10 Hours

Workload, exacerbated by the need to support high-level visits, is placing demands on the motor pool beyond its capacity. As a snapshot: on the day the OIG team visited the motor pool, 9 of 13 available motor pool drivers were dedicated to a high-level visit, another was dedicated to the DCM, and only 3 drivers were available to handle the full range of embassy demands.

The team reviewed LE driver time and attendance records for the period September to December 2014 and noted that the drivers' recorded shifts were regularly in excess of 10 hours. Drivers who do not get proper rest are less alert and more prone to accidents. Per 15 FAM 957.3, Bureau of Overseas Buildings Safety Health and Environmental Management guidelines and Embassy Amman's Motor Vehicle Safety Policy limit a driver's shift to a maximum of 10 hours and require a minimum 8-hour rest period prior to starting a new shift.

Recommendation 27: Embassy Amman should not schedule or permit drivers to work a shift in excess of 10 hours and should require a minimum 8-hour rest period for drivers between shifts. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Deputy Chief of Mission Vehicle Use Authorizations Incomplete and/or Out of Date

The OIG team noted that the DCM has a dedicated motor pool vehicle and driver and receives home-to-office transportation in an armored vehicle at no charge. However, documentation required to authorize the provision of these services was incomplete or out of date. Embassy Amman completed the required documentation during the inspection.

Procurement and Contracting

The procurement and contracting unit of the general services office exceeded both worldwide and regional averages in the 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey. It operates in a high-stress environment. The 2014 ICASS survey workload statistics noted that workload per LE staff member was 40 percent higher than the worldwide average. LE staff turnover exacerbated the workload problem. The inspection team reviewed five of eight large contracts. Files were in order, had fully documented competition, and included Trafficking in Persons language.

High Percentage of Sole-Source Procurements

The unit processes a high percentage of sole-source, noncompeted procurements, mostly on behalf of one particular program. Prior to summer 2014, the sole-source justifications provided by that program were weak and generic. In summer 2014, a new American procurement supervisor researched the issue and found that the primary sole-source vendor was, in many cases, the only entity that the host government permitted to provide such services to the program. With this documentation, the unit supervisor strengthened the sole-source procurement justification.

Deficiencies in Purchase Card Program

The general services office procurement unit's 2014 monthly purchase card records were complete and included cardholder and approving official signatures. In embassy sections outside the general services office, cardholder files for some months were incomplete, lacking approving official signatures. Some sections send cardholders' monthly credit card statements to the general services office for approval rather than approve the statements themselves. Purchase card instructions from the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive state that the approving official is "normally the supervisor to whom the cardholder reports for authorization to purchase required supplies and services," that is, the cardholder's American supervisor. These instructions require the approving official to review, reconcile, approve, sign, and date the statements monthly.

Embassy cardholders were not aware of a document designating them with purchase card authority. Some cardholders were unaware of—and therefore not compliant with—the requirement to complete ethics training annually rather than just one time. The embassy's last purchase card program coordinator annual review on record was in February 2011, for 2010. Office of Procurement Executive purchase card instructions require the embassy purchase card program coordinator to designate and delegate purchase card authority to others in the

mission, ensure that all participants receive initial and refresher training, and conduct a required annual review of post's purchase card program activities in the first quarter of each new fiscal year for the prior year.

The OIG inspection team discovered no evidence of credit card misuse. The deficiencies began before the arrival of current American management staff. Cardholders in all sections take their responsibilities seriously. However, incomplete files, failure to have a direct supervisor perform the monthly approval review of purchase card bills, and a lack of program coordinator oversight create potential management control weaknesses that could result in inappropriate use of the credit cards. The inspection team advised the embassy to review comprehensively the purchase card program to identify and correct all deficiencies.

Recommendation 28: Embassy Amman should bring all elements of the purchase card program at post into full compliance with requirements of the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Closed Purchase Order Files Are Incomplete

The long-standing issue of the general services office closing purchase order files without including all required documentation remains. OIG's 2010 Embassy Amman inspection¹⁵ also reported this deficiency. Purchase Order File DS-1918 lists the documents the file requires before a purchase order can be closed. The OIG team reviewed 14 closed purchase order files from FY 2014. Only two (14 percent) included the required Certification of Final Payment from the embassy financial management office, and four (28 percent) did not contain the required copy of invoice. The files included other required documentation, and the file covers correctly noted which documents were missing. Incomplete files lack necessary information in the event of a dispute. The procurement unit started using an electronic contract file system that should improve controls and has begun to address the substantial backlog of incomplete, closed purchase order files from prior years.

Recommendation 29: Embassy Amman should correct the backlog of incompletely closed purchase order files so that all closed purchase order files include all required documentation. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Customs and Shipping

The workload for the customs and shipping unit is disproportionate to its size. The 2014 ICASS LE staff workload survey noted that the unit's workload count per position was more than twice the worldwide average. Despite this, the unit's 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey scores were higher than both worldwide and regional averages.

¹⁵ *Report of Inspection, Embassy Amman, Jordan*, Report No. ISP-I-10-35A, March 2010.

Property Management

Inventory

Washington, DC, property managers termed Embassy Amman's inventory performance a "shining jewel." The property management unit met or exceeded worldwide and regional averages in the 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey for its cost centers.

Warehouse Fire Safety Issues

The inspection team toured the embassy's on-compound primary warehouse and the leased secondary warehouse. Both are overcrowded. Although reorganization might alleviate some space issues, the situation primarily reflects the embassy's expansion in recent years and the subsequent need for additional furnishings and supplies. In 2010–2011, the embassy got rid of four agency-leased warehouses totaling approximately 2,750 square meters (29,600 square feet) and consolidated their contents into the already-stocked 1,332-square-meter (14,337 square feet) secondary warehouse—more items shoehorned into less space. In March 2015, the on-compound warehouse will lose more floor space to other embassy uses, further exacerbating the situation.

In both warehouses, boxes, mattresses, and other items are stacked closer to fire sprinklers than 14 FAH-1 H-318.8-7 permits. Aisles should be kept clear for clear and easy access to all interior storage areas as required for fire fighting purposes by 14 FAH-1 H-318.8-8. These conditions, noted during a 2014 visit to Amman by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, Office of Fire Prevention, would serve to make any fire more dangerous and difficult to fight and would increase the potential for property loss, injury, or loss of life. The OIG team inspected both warehouses and was unable to identify additional space on site to offset the fire safety hazards. A 16-unit on-compound container farm is full and offers no additional storage. The new office annex, just starting construction, will eventually add 25 percent to on-compound storage. However, completion is years away and the fire safety hazards exist now.

Recommendation 30: Embassy Amman should eliminate warehouse fire hazards through reorganization, inventory reduction, and/or by expanding leased warehouse space. (Action Embassy Amman)

Facilities Management

The facilities management office benefits from the leadership of a seasoned facilities manager since summer 2014, after several years of less experienced leadership. The embassy compound is attractive and well maintained but overcrowded. Construction of a new office annex will soon begin. When completed, it will alleviate overcrowding in unclassified areas of the embassy.

Classified office space is at a premium. A courtyard of the north chancery was "in-filled" with a windowless classified office space. These offices are severely overcrowded with people and electrical equipment, with insufficient egress in case of an emergency, as cited in a 2014 Fire

Inspection Report from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. Given staffing levels of the offices within this classified space, no readily available means exist to mitigate this dangerous condition. Inspectors advised occupants to hold regular and frequent fire and evacuation drills. The general services office leases residential properties, and the facilities maintenance office maintains them in conjunction with the landlords. The housing pool has doubled in size over several years without any increase in the size of the residential maintenance crew. Nonetheless, the unit received residential building operations scores above the regional and worldwide averages in the 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey. This was accomplished primarily through the use of extensive overtime, which, while welcomed by employees, can lead to fatigue and potential safety risk in dangerous building trades.

Embassy Safety and Health Standing Committee Noncompliant with Requirements

The facilities manager is the post occupational safety and health officer, and the facilities unit has a dedicated health and safety LE staff employee, whom the Department recently named assistant post occupational safety and health officer of the year. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations advised the inspection team that the embassy rectified all Priority 1 recommendations from the last safety inspection. Safety inspectors will next visit in spring 2015. Residential safety is currently a major area of emphasis for embassy management. The facilities unit inspects prospective leased properties and requires that landlords perform upgrades before the embassy signs the lease. The unit is now upgrading residential safety features for properties already in the housing pool.

Per 15 FAM 933.2 a., the embassy safety, health, and environmental management standing committee should meet at least twice a year to review safety programs and practices. That committee only met once a year in 2013 and 2014. Failure to meet regularly could result in safety weaknesses going undiscovered and/or unaddressed, creating an increased potential for damage to property, personal injury, or loss of life.

Recommendation 31: Embassy Amman should convene the safety, health, and environmental management standing committee at least twice a year. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Information Management

Embassy Amman's information management program meets the mission's communication needs, despite some ongoing challenges. The embassy's number of users and supported customers increased to that of a large mission, but information management staffing has not kept pace. ICASS customer satisfaction scores, nevertheless, were comparable to or higher than worldwide averages. Other growth-related problems include the lack of workspace for technical staff and storage for systems equipment. The information management officer acknowledges the urgent need to refocus support requirements and address staffing needs. The OIG team gave section management advice on several areas, including project management, organizational structure, and best practices.

Information Systems Center – Workload Growth Outpaces Staffing

The number of users (including temporary-duty personnel) the information systems center supports has more than doubled since the 2010 inspection, but the center's staffing has not increased sufficiently to address the added workload. Key departures by the unit's LE programming staff added to the challenges. To their credit, staff members maintain a focus on customer service at the same time they absorb additional support requirements, such as the audio visual program and the mobile computing initiative.

Analysis by the Department's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation found that LE staffing in the information systems center was significantly below similarly sized embassies. The mission's growing tenant agency presence and the volume of high-level visitors requiring support compound this deficiency. Mission leadership and the ICASS council support some of the Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation office's recommendations and have created several new LE positions, but not in the information systems center. The OIG team advised embassy management on the importance of addressing the staffing deficiency in the information systems center and identified some solutions that have worked at other missions.

Help Desk Operations

The information systems center manages a help desk operation that lacks a single focal point to interface with customers and manage service requests. The OIG inspection in 2010 identified challenges with standardizing the help desk and implementing formal processes. Customers request support by submitting eService requests, contacting the staff by phone, or physically entering the information systems center. The OIG team observed significant daily traffic from walk-in service requests that disrupt administrators assigned to project tasks and operational duties. The disruptions increase the time and resources required to complete assigned projects and network operations. Given the information service center's limited staffing, it cannot afford to operate the help desk program informally in reactive mode.

The information systems officer acknowledges this shortcoming and agreed to reconfigure the office to control incoming traffic. The next step is to establish standard operating procedures for the help desk program that management endorses. The OIG team suggested readvertising a vacant eligible family member position that was originally created for help desk support. This help desk position can help coordinate requests and interface with users. This approach has been identified as a best practice at other missions. The help desk's workload cannot accommodate an informal process and requires more structure and additional support.

Recommendation 32: Embassy Amman should establish a standard operating procedure for managing all help desk service requests. (Action: Embassy Amman)

The information systems center does not have a secure work area in which to perform its systems administration duties, such as workstation building and troubleshooting. It completes systems administration work in a cramped office that is constantly competing with heavy foot traffic for helpdesk support. The work area configuration creates the potential for unauthorized

access to systems equipment and other accountable devices. Language in 12 FAM 623.1-1 e. states that the systems manager must control access to areas where systems administration utilities are accustomed to the minimum number of authorized users.

Recommendation 33: Embassy Amman should establish a secure work area in the information systems center for performing systems administration duties. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Network Operations Hampered by Inadequate Bandwidth

The embassy's OpenNet network runs slowly because of inadequate bandwidth and network infrastructure issues, which hinder operations throughout the mission. The embassy's network is contracted to have guaranteed bandwidth speeds of 23 megabits per second. A technical team from the Regional Information Management Center analyzed network limitations and identified that the mission's bandwidth was running at 10 megabits per second, below the contracted speed. The team also found issues with the embassy's network cabling infrastructure and secure tunnel configuration established with the Department. A remediation team is scheduled to address the network's internal infrastructure issues. According to 5 FAM 121.1, the information management officer is responsible for managing all information resources, including the availability and maintenance of data network operations. The OIG team encouraged management to seek a new Internet contract for the mission's network needs. The embassy's Internet contract is not competitive compared to current provider rates that offer more bandwidth at lower costs. A new contract could result in increased network speeds and cost savings for the mission.

Recommendation 34: Embassy Amman should recompete the mission's Internet contract and acquire bandwidth adequate for mission operations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Dedicated Internet Networks Not Consolidated or Registered

Embassy Amman has several unconsolidated dedicated Internet network connections throughout the chancery. The dedicated Internet connections all vary in terms of connection speed, service provider, and service fees. During the inspection, only two dedicated Internet connections were formally registered with the Department's information technology configuration control board, as required under 5 FAM 872.1 b. This took place because of a lack of oversight of information management staff; several offices independently contracted Internet connections with local service providers. The OIG team suggested that Embassy Amman consolidate the mission's dedicated Internet connections under one service contract. The contract can then be recompeted with local providers at a more competitive rate with faster connection speeds. This approach is considered a best practice that has resulted in cost savings at other missions with similar configurations.

Recommendation 35: Embassy Amman should consolidate its dedicated Internet networks and register them with the Bureau of Information Resource Management. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Mail Policy

At the time of the inspection, Embassy Amman had not updated its diplomatic mail program policy since 2009. The constant turnover of temporarily assigned employees warrants a management notice identifying the Department's mail regulations. The OIG team identified a number of instances of unauthorized use and abuse of the mail program. Only authorized personnel who meet the criteria identified in 14 FAM 724.2 may use the diplomatic post office. During the inspection, Embassy Amman issued an updated diplomatic mail policy endorsed by management, informing the mission staff of approved use and regulations.

Mobile Device Management Controls Are Inadequate

Embassy Amman's mobile communications program has been an ongoing challenge and lacks internal controls, as required by 12 FAM 680. Management of the mobile devices is segregated between the information systems center and the telephone billing manager. Although both are under information management, they are not integrated into a balanced solution that incorporates internal management controls and procedures for the mobile devices. No policies and procedures are documented authorizing, issuing, tracking, and inventorying mobile devices such as laptops, BlackBerry devices, and cellular telephones. The embassy acknowledges the problem and recently created an additional mobile device position to address internal controls weaknesses. The OIG team suggested that Embassy Amman create a streamlined process for the mobile device program that integrates the financial management and technical support for the devices.

The information management staff acknowledges that device tracking is not current and accurate because of inconsistent issuance and return practices. The inspection team found laptop computers, BlackBerry devices, and cellular telephones without proper controls. For example, some items were not properly tracked in terms of possession by a customer. Inadequate inventory controls create the potential for fraud and mismanagement of government property, as well as potential security vulnerabilities.

Recommendation 36: Embassy Amman should develop and implement standard operating procedures that include authorization, issuance, tracking, and inventory for managing laptops and mobile devices. (Action: Embassy Amman)

MISSION SUPPORT SERVICES

American Embassy Community Services Association

The American Embassy Community Services Association scored 3 stars out of 4 in a 2014 Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs performance rating of all American employee associations around the world—a "good" rating. The association provides a wide range of services to an ever-growing embassy community.

The Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs last conducted an internal review of the association in December 2013 and identified many operational and financial deficiencies. The OIG team noted that the embassy either resolved or is in the process of resolving these deficiencies, strengthening the association's internal controls and operational procedures.

The OIG team advised the association's general manager to resolve an account mapping issue between the association's point-of-sale system and its QuickBooks accounting system. This disconnect results in time-consuming monthly manual reclassifications necessary to provide accurate financial data.

Association Is Not Submitting Monthly Financial Statements

The association's management does not submit monthly financial statements for the Board of Directors review, as 6 FAM 557 a. requires. The association cannot provide accurate financial statements unless it conducts an inventory of its Oasis restaurant, which it cannot do until the association installs a specific software-based inventory control system. The lack of financial statements hinders the Board of Directors' role in the oversight of the association's activities and financial management.

Recommendation 37: Embassy Amman should require the American Embassy Community Services Association to prepare and present accurate monthly financial statements to the Board of Directors. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Equal Employment Opportunity

The mission has eight LE staff liaisons and three American Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselors. The Department will designate a fourth in spring 2015 after she completes required training. The mission conducted LE staff liaison training in late 2014 and will hold another session in spring 2015. The Ambassador emphasized EEO principles in a meeting with the embassy counselors and liaisons. EEO information, including names and photos of the counselors and liaisons, is posted prominently on the embassy bulletin board. The mission has recently issued two EEO management policy announcements.

Community Liaison Office

The community liaison office received the mission's highest 2014 ICASS customer satisfaction survey ratings and exceeded both regional and worldwide averages. Two community liaison office coordinators, a newsletter editor, and an LE staff community liaison office assistant staff the office. One of the coordinators has not started working yet because she is awaiting her Top Secret security clearance. The other coordinator possesses a Top Secret clearance and attends country team and expanded emergency action committee meetings, as per guidelines.

Health Unit

A regional medical officer, a regional psychiatrist, five nurses, and an administrative assistant staff the health unit. The unit's ICASS customer satisfaction scores were the second highest in

the mission. LE staff workload per position was more than twice the worldwide average, in part a function of the numerous temporary-duty personnel at post. The OIG team noted the current health unit space is cramped, but the unit is scheduled to get additional space when the new office annex is completed. The unit accounts for and stores controlled substances in accordance with regulations.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

In preparation for the 2014 chief of mission statement of assurances on management controls, the embassy completed a written, section-by-section management control checklist. The embassy also used the OIG functional questionnaires as a resource to evaluate management controls.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs, should establish a procedure that requires the Ambassador to approve all foreign assistance programs that will conduct activities in Jordan not included in the embassy's Mission Resource Request or Foreign Assistance Operational Plan. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with NEA)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Amman and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, should introduce sustainability goals and benchmarks into the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Jordan. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Amman and CT)

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with Embassy Amman, should assign financial oversight responsibilities for the Antiterrorism Assistance Program to someone who is able to discharge them in accordance with Department of State standards. (Action: DS, in coordination with Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Amman should require newly designated Middle East Partnership Initiative project officers to take the Initiative-specific online course and maintain records of which employees have taken the course. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, should develop and implement a plan that prescribes how to sustain the Women in Science Hall of Fame grant's goal after the current grant ends. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OES)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should develop a long-term strategic plan to transition the American Language Center into a fully functioning American Center that meets the highest levels of the Standards Matrix for Open Access U.S. Government-Owned American Spaces. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with IIP, OBO, and DS)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, should implement a materials collection development plan for the American Language Center. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with IIP)

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should provide Embassy Amman with official guidance on recycling authorization and procedures for English-teaching funds. (Action: NEA, in coordination with ECA)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, should provide Embassy Amman with official guidance on the

use of recycled English-teaching funds and regular public diplomacy funds in a mixed-use facility. (Action: NEA, in coordination with ECA)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Amman should examine all open public diplomacy grants and amend any whose period of performance dates do not cover all grant expenditures. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 11: [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Recommendation 12: Embassy Amman should require consular managers and supervisors to adjudicate visa referrals in accordance with Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should develop a detailed briefing on requirements of the most recent worldwide visa referral policy and brief all officers authorized to submit or approve visa referrals. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Amman should require consular managers to provide additional guidance on visa adjudication policy by meeting regularly with entry level officers to discuss cases and explain Department of State policy. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Amman should require consular managers to use adjudication reviews as instructional tools, directly engaging with line officers to maintain the highest adjudication standards, as required by Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Amman should develop, schedule, and conduct consular training and professional development programs on monthly administrative days. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 17: Embassy Amman should discontinue electronic funds transfer salary payments to official residence staff members and require the Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission to pay the official residence staff directly. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 18: Embassy Amman should discontinue unauthorized use of a suspense deposit abroad account or request an exception from the Office of Financial Policy. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Amman should establish and enforce formal procedures to conduct monthly and quarterly cash verifications of all 15 subcashier funds and submit the required documentation to the Class B cashier. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Amman should establish and enforce a policy that limits all occasional money holder advances to a maximum of 3 business days. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Amman should develop and enforce a specific set of procedures for all American Language Center collections that adhere to regulations on collections specified in the *Foreign Affairs Manual* and the *Foreign Affairs Handbook*. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 22: Embassy Amman should implement a tracking system to monitor cellular and landline telephone invoice payments to comply with the Prompt Payment Act. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, should establish measurable uniform service standards to evaluate the financial management section's performance servicing the clients under International Cooperative Administrative Support Services. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with M/PRI)

Recommendation 24: Embassy Amman should manually calculate the workload counts of all nonserviced agencies that subscribe to the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services accounting and records services but do not have fiscal data in the Department of State's accounting system and distribute the associated costs equitably. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Amman should require all supervisors to complete performance evaluations within the mandated timeline. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 26: Embassy Amman should submit an updated Post Hardship Differential Questionnaire and Danger Pay Survey to the Bureau of Administration, Office of Allowances for review. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 27: Embassy Amman should not schedule or permit drivers to work a shift in excess of 10 hours and should require a minimum 8-hour rest period for drivers between shifts. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 28: Embassy Amman should bring all elements of the purchase card program at post into full compliance with requirements of the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive. (Action: Embassy Amman)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Amman should correct the backlog of incompletely closed purchase order files so that all closed purchase order files include all required documentation. (Action: Embassy Amman)

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Recommendation 37: Embassy Amman should require the American Embassy Community Services Association to prepare and present accurate monthly financial statements to the Board of Directors. (Action: Embassy Amman)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Ambassador	Alice G. Wells	8/2014
Deputy Chief of Mission	Stephanie T. Williams	1/2013
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Susan B. Niblock	8/2014
Consular	D. Ian Hopper	7/2012
Political	Rohit S. Nepal	7/2014
Economic	Brian M. Grimm	6/2013
Public Affairs	Ragini Gupta	7/2014
Regional Security	Jason R. Kight	8/2013
Inspector General	Karin M. Pacheco	10/2013
Other Agencies:		
U.S. Department of Defense	Col. Robert E. Paddock, Jr.	2/2014
U.S. Department of Homeland Security	James D. Cole	6/2014
Foreign Commercial Service	Geoffrey S. Bogart	8/2013
U.S. Department of Justice/ Federal Bureau of Investigation	Kimberley K. McCarty	1/2013
Millennium Challenge Corporation	Alex J. Russin	9/2011
Open Source Center	John D. Tullius	8/2014
Peace Corps	P. Bryan Butki	10/2011
U.S. Agency for International Development	Beth S. Paige	10/2011

APPENDIX A: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities, as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Purpose and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

In conducting inspections, the inspectors review pertinent records; as appropriate, circulate, review, and compile the results of survey instruments; conduct onsite interviews; and review the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

For this inspection, OIG inspectors conducted 61 formal interviews in Washington, DC, and 213 in Amman, Jordan. They reviewed 413 surveys from Embassy Amman American and LE staff members.

ABBREVIATIONS

BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	U.S. Department of State
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	<i>Foreign Affairs Handbook</i>
FAM	<i>Foreign Affairs Manual</i>
FAST	First- and second-tour
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
LE	Locally employed
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
OIG	Office of Inspector General
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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