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(U) *OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL*

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## (U) Evaluation of Emergency Action Plans for U.S. Mission Afghanistan

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United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

*Office of Inspector General*

(U) PREFACE

(U) This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

(U) This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

(U) The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

(U) I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel", written in a cursive style.

(U) Harold W. Geisel  
(U) Deputy Inspector General

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**(U) Acronyms**

(U) COM	Chief of Mission
(U) DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(U) EAC	Emergency Action Committee
(U) EAP	Emergency Action Plan
(U) FAH	<i>Foreign Affairs Handbook</i>
(U) ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
(U) MOU	memorandum of understanding
(U) OIG	Office of Inspector General
(U) PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
(U) RSO	Regional Security Office

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## (U) Executive Summary

(SBU) The *Foreign Affairs Handbook*<sup>1</sup> (FAH) requires U.S. embassies throughout the world to maintain an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) that provides procedures to respond to emergency situations such as bombs, fires, civil disorder, and evacuations. The Department of State (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), conducted this evaluation to determine whether U.S. Mission Afghanistan personnel were aware of the emergency procedures contained in the EAP, sufficient resources were available to respond to the emergencies addressed in selected EAP annexes, and the EAP was up to date and included all personnel under Chief of Mission (COM) authority. The scope of the evaluation was limited to five EAP annexes and supporting appendices.

(SBU) OIG determined that the five annexes (C, “Civil Disorder;” D, “Internal Defense;” E, “Destruction of Sensitive Material;” G, “Hostage Taking;” and K, “Drawdown and Evacuation”) were approved by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in May 2011 and that Embassy Kabul had made personnel aware of the EAP and had held the required EAP drills. However, Embassy Kabul’s Emergency Action Committee<sup>2</sup> (EAC) had not ensured that the EAP was appropriately updated and that certain resources, including adequate emergency shelters, food and water rations, communications equipment, and medical supplies were available to effectively respond to Annex D emergencies. Further, the embassy lacked the capacity to fight fires that might result from Annex D emergencies and lacked an agreement with non-Department law enforcement agencies on their roles and responsibilities in responding to emergencies. In addition, Embassy Kabul had not compiled a comprehensive list of all sensitive materials that should be destroyed in the event of an emergency, as required by EAP Annex E. Lastly, OIG determined that DS’s approval process for EAPs did not include a requirement to validate EAP information or ensure that EAP resources were adequate to respond to emergencies. As a result, the embassy’s risk of injury to personnel and loss of sensitive materials was unnecessarily increased, as evidenced in part during the September 2011 attack on the embassy.

(SBU) OIG also determined that as of December 1, 2012, the U.S. Consulate in Herat did not have an approved EAP and the Qala-e-Naw Provincial Reconstruction Team<sup>3</sup> (PRT) did not have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for emergency support. Although Embassy Kabul generally has MOUs with ISAF to provide emergency support for COM personnel<sup>4</sup> located outside the embassy, once Consulate

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<sup>1</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-031.

<sup>2</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-231. An Emergency Action Committee is composed of senior embassy staff responsible for emergency preparedness, including preparing and updating the EAP.

<sup>3</sup> A Provincial Reconstruction Team is a relatively small operational unit comprised of diplomats, military officers, development policy experts from the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other specialists (in fields such as rule of law, engineering, and commerce) who work closely with provincial leaders and the communities that they serve to create stability across Afghanistan at the grass-roots level. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are supported by militaries of the International Security Assistance Force.

<sup>4</sup> COM personnel in Afghanistan are the U.S. Government employees, contractors, local staff, and third-country nationals that operate under the authority of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan.

Herat officially was opened, the consulate should have had a formal EAP in place. The Herat MOU expires when ISAF forces depart Herat, which may occur as early as mid-2013. The lack of an EAP at that time could adversely affect the safety and security of COM personnel should an emergency situation occur. Embassy Kabul did not have an MOU with ISAF for the Qala-e-Naw PRT, which could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities in the event of an emergency, potentially placing COM personnel at unnecessary risk.

(SBU) OIG recommended that Embassy Kabul ensure its EAP and the resources that support it reflect changes in size and threat at the post, establish formal agreements with non-Department law enforcement agencies concerning emergency response, and compile and periodically update an inventory of all classified and sensitive materials that require destruction during certain emergencies. OIG also recommended that Consulate Herat finalize an EAP and ensure that consulate staff are trained on it before ISAF withdraws from Herat and that Embassy Kabul establish an MOU with the ISAF commanders who manage the Qala-e-Naw PRT that defines the roles and responsibilities for emergency response. Finally, OIG recommended that DS validate the adequacy of EAPs at high-threat posts such as Embassy Kabul.

(SBU) Although Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence in its February 9, 2013, response to the draft report (See Appendix C), it described actions it had taken to implement seven of nine recommendations made to the embassy. OIG considers six of those recommendations resolved, and they can be closed upon receipt and approval of documentation showing that the recommendations have been fully implemented. Although Embassy Kabul stated that it had taken actions to implement the recommendation to establish agreements with non-Department law enforcement agencies concerning emergency response, the action taken did not constitute a formal agreement with those agencies, and therefore the recommendation is unresolved.

(SBU) Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its non-concurrence with the recommendation to establish and periodically update an inventory of classified and Sensitive But Unclassified materials that require destruction during an Annex E emergency. However, the embassy stated that it maintains a partial list of classified materials and works with all agencies to ascertain which sensitive materials require destruction. OIG acknowledges that the embassy maintains a list of some of the materials that require destruction; however, that list was not complete. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.

(SBU) Embassy Kabul also did not explicitly state its non-concurrence with the recommendation that it should seek a formal security agreement with ISAF commanders managing the Qala-e-Naw PRT. However, the embassy stated that it “does not find value or practical benefit in engaging the Spanish government” since the PRT is scheduled to close in June 2013. OIG does not consider Embassy Kabul’s comments to be responsive as Department guidance requires that all COM staff be covered by the embassy’s EAP or by a support agreement with ISAF. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved.

(U) DS did not provide a formal response to the draft report.

## (U) Background

(SBU) The FAH<sup>5</sup> requires that all U.S. embassies and posts prepare an EAP that provides procedures for responding to foreseeable emergency situations. The emergency situations can differ depending on location and political stability in a particular region, so an EAP must be tailored to the specific post. An EAP generally consists of seven chapters, 12 annexes, and nine appendices.

(SBU) The EAP chapters focus on the legal basis for the authorities and responsibilities for emergency planning and on the organization and identification of personnel designated to fill leadership roles for emergency response. The annexes contain information on how posts should prepare for different types of emergency situations, which may differ from plan to plan based on the post security environment. The appendices contain information such as command and control locations, logistics and transportation, and facility information. (Titles of chapters, annexes, and appendices for the Embassy Kabul EAP are listed in Appendix B.)

(SBU) FAH guidance<sup>6</sup> requires that a post's EAP be reviewed and approved by DS. The post is required to update the EAP annually<sup>7</sup> and "on a continuous basis," as applicable. The guidance also requires each post to have an EAC, which includes subject matter experts representing key functions from the mission. The committee members are appointed by the COM, who also selects the chairperson. The EAC's specific responsibilities include the following:

- (SBU) Conducting vulnerability assessments to identify the post's critical infrastructure assets to be protected.
- (SBU) Assessing the post's and the host government's capabilities and limitations for emergency response.
- (SBU) Using the results of the capabilities and limitation assessments to draft the EAP.
- (SBU) Developing the tripwires<sup>8</sup> and actions to take when those events are met.
- (SBU) Updating the EAP as required.

(SBU) To ensure uniformity, posts are required to use the Crisis and Emergency Planning Application when preparing and updating their EAP. The Crisis and Emergency Planning Application is a Web-based application designed to assist in EAP development and ensure FAH compliance. The Crisis and Emergency Planning Application allows embassies to copy and paste language from the FAH to their respective EAPs.

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<sup>5</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-031.

<sup>6</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-030.

<sup>7</sup> The due date for the annual review is 1 year from the date of the initial plan's last approval.

<sup>8</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-751. Tripwires are events that activate, initiate, or set in motion plans to prevent harm to the post, its personnel, the U.S. citizen community, or other U.S. national interests.

(SBU) Once the EAC certifies in the Crisis and Emergency Planning Application that the EAP is complete and accurate, the Application automatically sends a copy of the EAP to DS for review. After completing its review, DS notifies the post of the results. Once the post addresses any substantive issues, DS publishes the unclassified portions of the EAP on the DS Web site. The EAPs, including any classified portions, are posted to the DS Secure On-line User Resource and Communication Environment Web site.

#### **(U) Emergency Action Plan Guidance**

(SBU) The specific information to be included in EAP Annexes C, D, E, G, and K is contained in the respective annexes of 12 FAH-1, which requires the annexes to contain the following information.

- (SBU) Annex C, “Civil Disorder,” provides guidance for situations such as general strikes, anniversaries of highly emotional incidents, major holidays drawing large crowds, demonstrations, civil wars, states of siege, curfews, or any other politically inspired activity that has the potential for violence, whether or not it is directed against U.S. personnel or premises.
- (SBU) Annex D, “Internal Defense,” provides guidance to safeguard embassy or consulate employees when an incident requires an internal defense response. Such incidents include terrorism, mob action, or political unrest, and they may occur without warning or as a result of days or weeks of increasing tension.
- (SBU) Annex E, “Destruction of Sensitive Materials,” provides guidance aiming to prevent classified national security information, as well as Sensitive But Unclassified information and materials,<sup>9</sup> from being compromised by reducing the quantity of classified and Sensitive But Unclassified material held at posts.
- (SBU) Annex G, “Hostage Taking,” provides guidance for dealing with a kidnapping or hostage taking of any U.S. citizen, as well as dealing with a hostage barricade situation other than an aircraft hijacking.
- (SBU) Annex K, “Drawdown and Evacuation,” provides guidance for posts when a drawdown of post personnel or options for evacuation situations occur. These options include standing fast, allowing employees and eligible family members to depart post, limiting the number of incoming staff, and evacuating under Authorized Departure or Ordered Departure.

(SBU) EAP appendices are intended to provide information on the resources, locations, and other logistics used to support implementation of EAP Annexes. Specific information the


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<sup>9</sup> 12 FAM 541. Sensitive But Unclassified information is information that is not classified for national security reasons but that warrants administrative control and protection from public or other unauthorized disclosure for other reasons. Sensitive But Unclassified material could include personal information, such as social security numbers, proprietary information, and law enforcement information.

appendices address include, among other items, points of contact, emergency shelter locations, medical services, communications, and command structures.

**(U) Embassy Kabul Configuration**

(U) Embassy Kabul is situated on a large compound separated into two sides, the east side and the west side, [Redacted] (b) (5)



**(U) Evaluation Objective**

(U) The evaluation objective was to determine whether U.S. Mission Afghanistan personnel were aware of the emergency procedures contained in the EAP, sufficient resources were available to respond to the emergencies addressed in selected EAP annexes, and the EAP was up to date and included all personnel under COM authority.

(U) This report, one of three reports concerning EAPs, focuses on the U.S. Mission Afghanistan EAPs. A January 2012 OIG evaluation report<sup>10</sup> focused on the U.S. Mission Iraq EAPs, and a subsequent report will focus on the U.S. Mission Pakistan EAPs.

(U) The evaluation was limited to EAP Annexes C, D, E, G, and K, and their supporting appendices, as these are the areas that are most relevant to recent events in the Middle East.

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<sup>10</sup> *Evaluation of Emergency Action Plans for Embassy Baghdad and Consulates General Basrah and Erbil* (AUD/MERO-12-18, Jan. 2012).

## (U) Evaluation Results

### **(SBU) Finding A. Embassy Kabul Emergency Action Plan Annexes Were Approved, but Certain Resources Were Not Available To Respond Effectively to Annex D and E Emergencies**

(U) Embassy Kabul's EAP Annexes C, D, E, G, and K were approved by DS's Emergency Planning Branch in May 2011, and the EAC made embassy personnel aware of the EAP and held the required EAP drills. However, the EAC had not ensured that certain resources were available to respond effectively to EAP Annex D emergencies.<sup>11</sup> Specific instances are as follows:

[Redacted] (b) (5)

- (U) Some embassy emergency shelters lacked a sufficient amount of supplies, including food and water rations and medical supplies.

[Redacted] (b) (5)

(SBU) In addition, Embassy Kabul had not developed a comprehensive list of all sensitive materials that should be destroyed in the event of an emergency, as required by EAP Annex E.

(U) These deficiencies occurred because emergency planning did not fully reflect the increased threat in Kabul or the significant growth in staffing levels at Embassy Kabul from 2009 through 2012. In addition, DS's EAP approval process did not include a requirement to validate the adequacy of EAPs or ensure that resources were available to respond to EAP-related emergencies. As a result, the risk of injury to embassy personnel and of the loss of sensitive documents and materials was unnecessarily increased, as evidenced in part during the September 13, 2011, attack on the embassy.

(SBU) After the attack, referred to as the "9/13 attack," the embassy immediately established a working group to collect lessons learned. The group is composed of officials from the Management section, Regional Security Office (RSO), the U.S. Agency for International Development, Consular section, Political-Military Affairs, Public Affairs, Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Executive Secretariat and is co-chaired by the Management Counselor and the Deputy RSO. The group identified a number of deficiencies concerning EAP resources and implementation, including limited protective cover for buildings, an insufficient amount of

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<sup>11</sup> This review focused on the 2011 version of the EAP, which was in effect during the September 2011 attack on Embassy Kabul. As in the 2011 version, the 2012 version did not adequately reflect the resource requirements for the embassy.

rations and supplies, and inadequate communications. As of December 2012, the embassy had taken some actions intended to address those deficiencies, including acquiring additional rations and issuing a communications policy for embassy personnel during an emergency.

**(U) EAP Approved and Tested**

(SBU) Embassy Kabul's EAP Annexes C, D, E, G, and K were approved by DS's Emergency Planning Branch in May 2011. Embassy Kabul kept staff informed of the EAP and emergency procedures by briefing new staff on the EAP when they arrived at post, publishing the EAP on the embassy Web site, and issuing regular management and security notices to keep staff informed. The embassy also conducted periodic EAP planning, training, and drills, which identified areas for improvement. For example, during OIG's fieldwork, the embassy was working to improve and extend the speaker coverage of the public address system and had ordered additional personal protective equipment when the results of drills demonstrated communication problems and a shortage of protective gear.

**(U) EAP Not Properly Resourced**

(SBU) Although the EAP had been approved by DS, the EAC had not ensured that certain resources were available to effectively respond to Annex D emergencies. Specifically, there were inadequate [Redacted] (b) (5) there was an inadequate amount of rations and medical supplies available for personnel to withstand extended attacks; there were insufficient communications [Redacted] (b) (5) [Redacted] Further, the EAP appendices, which are meant to provide updated information such as on the amounts and locations of resources for use in emergencies covered by the annexes, did not reflect the size, layout, and resource needs of the embassy compound.

(U) Some of the deficiencies OIG identified were highlighted during the 9/13 attack on Embassy Kabul. During that attack, armed Afghan militants fired small arms into Embassy Kabul from a high-rise building located near the embassy. The 9/13 attack caused minor injuries to one embassy guard and one Afghan national conducting business at Embassy Kabul and disrupted embassy operations for approximately 20 hours.

**(U) Emergency Shelters**

(SBU) [Redacted] (b) (5) The FAH<sup>13</sup> requires embassy compounds to maintain safe havens or safe areas, which are the most secure

[Redacted] (b) (5)

types of emergency shelter. The FAH states that qualifying safe havens and safe areas must be equipped with [Redacted] (b) (5) [Redacted] (b) (5) communications equipment. [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) (5)

### (U) Rations and Medical Supplies

(SBU) Embassy emergency shelters lacked sufficient supplies and equipment as required by Department guidance and the EAP. The FAH and EAP require that, in advance of an actual emergency, the embassy ensure that sufficient supplies and equipment are placed in emergency shelter locations where embassy staff would take cover during an emergency. OIG determined that some emergency shelters did not contain adequate amounts of pre-positioned food, water, and medical supplies and that some of the supplies were expired, unsecured, or inaccessible.

(U) During a June 2012 inventory, OIG determined that [Redacted] (b) of the [Redacted] (b) emergency shelters did not contain meals and that the other [Redacted] (b) shelters contained a total of approximately [Redacted] (b) meals. With an embassy population of around [Redacted] (b) personnel, this equates to approximately [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) Further, of the [Redacted] (b) emergency shelters that contained meals, [Redacted] (b) (5) [Redacted] (b) as required by safety guidelines. OIG also determined, as exemplified in Figure 1, that the food and water supplies were unsecured in [Redacted] (b) of the emergency shelters. According to embassy officials, the unsecured water supplies were often removed and consumed by embassy personnel during their normal course of business, thereby reducing the supplies available during an emergency.

[Redacted] (b) (5)

<sup>14</sup> 12 FAH-5 H-40.

[Redacted] (b) (5)



**(U) Figure 1.** An unsecured rations and supplies container at an emergency shelter. (OIG photograph)

(SBU) OIG also determined that not all emergency shelters contained adequate medical supplies, specifically [Redacted] (b) (5). Of the [Redacted] emergency shelter locations, only [Redacted] (b) (5) of the [Redacted] shelters that [Redacted] (b) (5). In addition, the number of [Redacted] (b) (5).

(U) According to officials in the embassy's General Services Office, who are primarily responsible for obtaining, stocking, and maintaining the prepositioned inventories, additional food and water were stored [Redacted] (b) (5). However, obtaining those supplies during an attack would be difficult and potentially dangerous—especially for those individuals [Redacted] (b) (5). During the 9/13 attack, some of the emergency shelters quickly ran out of water, and RSO personnel put themselves at further risk to obtain and distribute additional water supplies. Other personnel went without water until they were moved to locations that had water.

### **(U) Communications**

(SBU) The embassy's ability to communicate emergency messages to its personnel was hindered by a limited [Redacted] (b) (5) and unreliable emergency alarm and voice broadcasting equipment. The FAH encourages redundancy in communication methods and advises a post to consider the communication methods that are available given the hazards

<sup>17</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-735 and 12 FAH-1, app.7.

the post faces. High- and medium-threat posts, such as Embassies Baghdad, Iraq, and Cairo, Egypt, [Redacted] (b) (5). However, prior to the 9/13 attack, most Embassy Kabul staff were provided only with [Redacted] (b) (5) while only RSO personnel and other senior staff involved in organizing emergency response received [Redacted] (b) (5).

According to embassy officials, [Redacted] (b) (5) the embassy relied on the public address system to communicate information to staff; however, the public address system provided only one-way communication, and the embassy had experienced problems with system announcements reaching all parts of the embassy compound. In addition, during the attack, personnel were unclear as to when, and for what purposes, they should use their cell phones. Subsequent to the attack, the embassy expanded [Redacted] (b) (5).

(U) [Redacted] (b) (5) **Capabilities and Law Enforcement Agreements**

(SBU) [Redacted] (b) (5) currently relying on ISAF, which is scheduled to depart Kabul in 2014. In addition, the embassy has not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of non-Department law enforcement personnel during an Annex D emergency. Although EAP Annex D does not specifically address fires, a fire could result from an Annex D emergency event. [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) (5) Management officials stated that the embassy had [Redacted] (b) (5) and has had an agreement with ISAF, located near the embassy compound, to provide [Redacted] (b) (5) support if needed. However, ISAF is scheduled to depart in 2014, at which time the embassy will be left with [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) (5) Further, until 2014, if both the embassy and ISAF compounds have [Redacted] (b) (5) for example, if they are both under attack as they were during the 9/13 attack, ISAF might not be able to assist the embassy, and the embassy would not have the ability to [Redacted] (b) (5)

(U) During the 9/13 attack, personnel from non-Department law enforcement agencies provided ad hoc assistance to the RSO. For example, one of the non-Department agents assisted the RSO by escorting medical staff between buildings and accompanying RSO agents as needed. In addition, law enforcement agents from the Department of Homeland Security, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and OIG assisted in securing some emergency shelters. However, while some of the law enforcement agents stated that they were prepared to assist, they were unsure as to what emergency response role they were expected to play, if any. One law enforcement agent stated that his agency preferred to not have an emergency response role because that agency considered emergency response to be strictly an RSO responsibility.

**(U) Identification of Sensitive Material Incomplete**

(SBU) The embassy did not have a complete inventory of documentation, electronic data, and sensitive equipment that would require destruction during an emergency. Annex E of 12 FAH-1 and the Records Management Handbook<sup>18</sup> require that embassies plan for the destruction of classified and Sensitive But Unclassified records and materials. However, although the embassy had identified some of the materials that would require destruction, the EAC had not established and maintained an inventory of all of the sensitive materials located throughout the embassy. In June 2011, OIG visited six different section offices and saw substantial amounts of sensitive records that could require destruction. For example, in the consular section, OIG observed [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] (b) (5) According to the head of consular section, these sensitive materials included [Redacted] (b) (5) which would be difficult and time consuming to destroy in a shredder. Other embassy officials stated that they had not been contacted regarding the amount of records and data that could require destruction and that their offices had not developed individual plans for doing so.

**(U) Emergency Planning an Inadequate Reflection of Threat or Staffing Levels**

(SBU) The EAC did not ensure that emergency planning fully reflected the increased threat in Kabul or the significant growth in staffing levels at Embassy Kabul from 2009 through 2012. For example, according to the Bureau of Counterterrorism's 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism, the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan increased from 1,122 in 2007 to 2,872 in 2011. In addition, six of the 10 major attacks in Afghanistan during 2011 were in Kabul, and two of those attacks were on U.S. diplomatic facilities. Other targets in Kabul were locations frequented by Westerners, including the Intercontinental Hotel and the British Council.<sup>20</sup> In addition to the increased security threat, the staffing levels at the embassy increased from approximately [Redacted] in 2009 to approximately [Redacted] in 2012, and the embassy began constructing additional working and living space [Redacted] (b) (5). However, the EAP approved by DS in May 2011 did not fully reflect the increased threat or staffing levels. In addition, as previously stated (see Background section of this report), the FAH requires that EAPs be updated on a continuous basis, not just when a new version of the EAP is due to be submitted to DS for approval. However, the 2011 EAP was not adequately updated between the May 2011 version approved by DS and the June 2012 annual update made by the embassy. Similarly, the resource requirements in the 2012 version of the EAP were not adequately updated.

(SBU) As construction has occurred on the [Redacted] (b) (5) compound, changes to the layout were not included on EAP maps, nor were updates made to appendices that listed the emergency shelter locations and listed the amount of supplies and equipment to be stocked in

<sup>18</sup> 5 FAH-4 H-315 2-2

[Redacted] (b) (5)

<sup>20</sup> The British Council is the United Kingdom's international organization for cultural relations and educational opportunities.

each. Further, as the compound grew in size and staff, the EAC had not made considerations concerning other emergency issues, such as [Redacted] (b) (5) capabilities. Although some actions were taken after the 9/13 attack to enhance the emergency resources on the compound, including increasing food and water rations in emergency shelters, as of December 2012, the EAP had not been updated to fully reflect the resource needs for the current staffing, layout, or threat level. Further, some embassy officials in the office responsible for stocking the emergency shelters stated that they did not maintain a list of all of the shelters and were unaware of all of the shelter locations until they had accompanied OIG team members during OIG's June 2012 inventory of the shelters and the supplies and equipment contained in those locations. The EAC needs to ensure that the EAP is periodically updated as required to ensure that all personnel have adequate shelter, supplies, and access to equipment during an emergency situation. The EAC should also ensure that current inventory amounts listed in the EAP are maintained and should conduct periodic inspections to adjust the inventories if needed.

**(U) EAP Approval Process Not Adequate for High-Threat Posts**

(U) The DS approval process for EAPs did not include a requirement to validate the EAP information or ensure that resources needed to implement the EAP were adequate to respond to EAP-related emergencies. For example, the approval process did not include a physical inspection of the resources available to implement the EAP. Further, even an embassy that was adequately resourced at the time the EAP was submitted for approval could become under-resourced as the year passed, for example, through the expiration of rations or medicine or an increase in the number of staff or facilities. However, the EAP approval process did not include a requirement for DS to follow up with posts to ensure that they were keeping resources current over the course of the year. These issues are exacerbated at the high-threat posts, since the threat levels are also subject to constant change. Therefore, DS should establish a process to periodically conduct physical inspections at high-threat posts to ensure that the EAP adequately reflects size, staffing, and threat levels.

**(SBU) Risk of Injury to Personnel and of Loss of Sensitive Material Increased**

(SBU) The lack of adequate emergency shelters [Redacted] (b) (5) the lack of sufficient emergency supplies and equipment, the lack of redundancy in communications, the [Redacted] (b) (5) absence of an agreement with non-Department law enforcement on emergency assistance, and the inability to identify and destroy sensitive material unnecessarily increased the risk of injury to embassy staff and of compromising sensitive material during an emergency situation. While there were no deaths or serious injuries in the 9/13 attack, there was unnecessary risk to staff during the 9/13 attack because of a lack of these resources and protections. Furthermore, in a more protracted attack, the lack of certain resources and protections could become more of a problem. [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] In a more protracted attack, water and food rations could become more important and RSO staff might be otherwise occupied and unable to bring

**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**

rations out to some emergency shelters that needed them. In addition, the lack of redundant personal communications equipment could prevent security officers from ensuring that all embassy staff received detailed information on the nature of the emergency, how staff should respond, and where staff should seek shelter. Moreover, embassy personnel's use of cell phones to contact people outside the embassy during an attack could potentially compromise operational security and place embassy personnel at higher risk of injury or death.

**(U) Management Actions Taken**

(SBU) After the 9/13 attack, the embassy established a working group to collect lessons learned. Based on the results of that working group, the embassy installed additional [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] Embassy officials stated that they planned to provide additional walled coverage with a controlled access entrance for new one-story [Redacted] office buildings that opened in early 2012. [Redacted] (b) (5)

(SBU) The embassy also added food and supplies to emergency shelters. However, based on OIG's June 2012 inventory of pre-positioned supplies, OIG found that the embassy [Redacted]

[Redacted] Furthermore, as of June 2012, the embassy did not have a sufficient [Redacted] (b) (5) Even with its latest 2012 version of the EAP, the embassy had not updated all the information on shelter rations and supplies contained in the EAP appendices, which are intended to track what supplies will be kept in different facilities on the embassy compound. The embassy issued a new policy for communications<sup>21</sup> on September 21, 2011, that included restricting the use of cell phones during an emergency. In addition, the embassy acquired [Redacted] (b) (5) for all senior embassy personnel, including section heads, but not for all embassy personnel. [Redacted] (b) (5) [Redacted] makes these personnel dependent on either cell phones or on the voice broadcast system, which is only one-way communication and continues to be unreliable in some locations across the embassy compound.

(U) **Recommendation 1.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish a process to ensure that its Emergency Action Plan and the resources available to implement it reflect the changing size and threat level at the post, including adjusting the amount of supplies and equipment listed in the Emergency Action Plan and stocked at the embassy based on

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<sup>21</sup> Management Policy #11-49, "Cell Phone Usage During An Emergency."

the size of the embassy population, the length of time that the embassy could experience an emergency, and the severity of that emergency.

**(U) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it updates the EAP on a continuous basis and that in the summer of 2012, the RSO began an effort to adjust the amounts of supplies and equipment and to update the appropriate EAP sections.

**(U) OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG reviews and accepts documentation indicating that a process has been established to ensure that planning and resources continually reflect the evolving emergency response needs at Embassy Kabul.

**(U) Recommendation 2.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish, update, and periodically inspect the inventory of emergency supplies and equipment for each emergency shelter within the embassy compound to ensure that supplies and equipment on-site reflect the amounts noted in the Emergency Action Plan and remain useable during emergencies.

**(U) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it has begun periodic inspections of rations and supplies in the emergency shelters and that it will develop and implement a comprehensive program to ensure that there are **[Redacted] (b) (5)**  for the embassy population.

**(U) OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed once OIG reviews and accepts documentation showing that the embassy has implemented a process to establish, update, and periodically inspect the inventory of emergency supplies and equipment for each shelter.

**(SBU) Recommendation 3.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul identify the total number **[Redacted] (b) (5)** 

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it has opened **[Redacted] (b) (5)**  of the compound and included their locations and other pertinent details in the EAP. The embassy also stated that, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, it has begun phased construction of sidewall and overhead protection **[Redacted] (b) (5)** 

**(SBU) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation resolved. OIG confirmed that the embassy has recently opened [Redacted] (b) (5) the compound. The recommendation can be closed once OIG reviews and accepts documentation showing that the [Redacted] (b) (5) and that the the EAP has been updated to show the location of [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(SBU) Recommendation 4.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul provide all embassy staff with radios for use in responding to emergencies.

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it has greatly expanded the radio communications infrastructure on the compound, [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(U) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed once OIG reviews and accepts documentation demonstrating that all [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(SBU) Recommendation 5.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish or acquire the capacity for [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it is coordinating with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and ISAF concerning [Redacted] capabilities. The embassy stated it had requested its current operations and maintenance contractor to provide a cost estimate [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(SBU) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed once OIG reviews and accepts documentation showing that Embassy Kabul has a acquired [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(U) Recommendation 6.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish formal agreements on the roles and responsibilities of non-Department of State law enforcement agencies during events requiring implementation of the Emergency Action Plan.

**(U) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that Department and other law enforcement agencies in Kabul have participated in compound familiarization tours, coordination meetings, emergency drills, and major events. The embassy stated that it had drafted an information memorandum entitled “The Role of Internal Defense Team and Other Federal Law Enforcement Personnel in the Event of an Internal Defense

Situation,” which describes the roles and responsibilities of all law enforcement agencies during emergencies.

**(U) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation unresolved. OIG acknowledges that it reviewed and accepted the memorandum the embassy cites, which was finalized on January 28, 2013. However, the memorandum does not formalize agreements between the embassy and non-Department law enforcement agencies. Therefore, Embassy Kabul is requested to provide additional comments.

**(SBU) Recommendation 7.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish and periodically update an inventory of all classified and sensitive materials that require destruction during an emergency that requires implementing Annex E of the Emergency Action Plan.

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its non-concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that it already fulfills the Annex E requirements by maintaining a classified materials destruction list, routinely sending management notices discussing handling and destruction requirements for classified materials, and working with all embassy agencies and sections to ensure updated inventories of all classified and Sensitive But Unclassified materials are included in destruction planning.

**(SBU) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation unresolved. OIG acknowledged in the draft report that the embassy maintains a list of some materials it must destroy in an Annex E emergency. However, officials from six offices with substantial amounts of Sensitive But Unclassified materials stated that they had not been contacted about the amount or nature of the materials in their offices’ possession that could require destruction nor had they been included in any planning for destroying those materials. Therefore, Embassy Kabul is requested to provide additional comments.

**(U) Recommendation 8.** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security establish a process to validate the adequacy of Emergency Action Plans at high-threat posts, such as Embassy Kabul, by reviewing and assessing the resources listed in the plans for addressing each type of Emergency Action Plan emergency.

**(U) DS Response:** DS did not provide formal comments to the draft report.

**(U) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation unresolved, and DS is requested to provide comments.

## **(SBU) Finding B. U.S. Consulate and Provincial Reconstruction Team Lacked Emergency Plans**

(SBU) U.S. Consulate Herat did not have an approved EAP, and the Qala-e-Naw PRT did not have a formal agreement with local ISAF commanders to provide assistance during an emergency situation. (The locations of Herat and Qala-e-Naw are shown in Figure 2.) As of December 2012, RSO officials in Herat had drafted sections of an EAP but had not completed it. Although ISAF formally agreed to provide security and emergency response for Herat, ISAF plans to withdraw from the region in mid-2013. Embassy Kabul officials stated that the ISAF commanders supporting the PRT in Qala-e-Naw, for unknown reasons, were unwilling in 2010 to sign a formal agreement to provide assistance to COM personnel in the event of an emergency. The lack of emergency plans at posts in Herat and Qala-e-Naw could adversely affect the safety and security of COM personnel should an emergency situation occur.



(U) **Figure 2.** Map of Afghanistan. (State map)

**(SBU) U.S. Consulate Herat Lacked an Emergency Action Plan**

(SBU) As of December 1, 2012, U.S. Consulate Herat, which opened in March 2012, did not have an approved EAP. The FAH<sup>22</sup> requires that each U.S. Embassy or consulate have an EAP. According to RSO staff in Herat, the EAP was “mostly” drafted and some sections were awaiting approval by senior consulate officials; senior Embassy Kabul officials; and DS officials from Washington, DC. DS officials stated that Consulate Herat had drafted only about two-thirds of the required EAP sections. Although DS has reviewed these sections, it cannot formally approve and issue the EAP until all sections are completed.

(SBU) Embassy Kabul generally has MOUs with ISAF units to provide emergency support for COM personnel located outside the embassy. However, once Consulate Herat officially opened, it was required to have an approved EAP and ensure that consulate personnel were trained on their EAP responsibilities. The current MOU for Herat expires when ISAF forces depart from Herat, which may occur as early as mid-2013. Without a finalized EAP, the consulate staff at Herat could be unprepared to respond to emergency situations, thereby increasing the risk of injury or death.

**(SBU) PRT in Qala-e-Naw Lacks an MOU for Emergency Support**

(SBU) The Qala-e-Naw PRT is not covered by an MOU with ISAF for support during an emergency. Security and life support for COM staff in PRTs are provided through a series of MOUs signed in 2010 between Embassy Kabul and ISAF. The agreements generally state that ISAF will host and provide security for COM staff in Afghanistan who are working and living outside COM facilities. Specifically, the MOUs identify ISAF’s role in providing life support, supplies, and services, personnel protection on compound and for ground movements, and emergency medical care for COM staff.

(SBU) However, the Qala-e-Naw PRT is not covered by an MOU. According to embassy officials, commanders in 2010 from the Spanish military, which provides security for the PRT, initially declined to sign an MOU for unknown reasons. Embassy officials stated that they had no plans to reach out to Spanish commanders again and that the Spanish commanders had generally agreed verbally to provide emergency support to U.S. COM personnel in Qala-e-Naw. However, the absence of a formal MOU could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities in the event of an emergency, potentially placing COM personnel at unnecessary risk until the PRT’s operations are scheduled to end sometime between May and late June 2013.

**(SBU) Recommendation 9.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul and Consulate Herat finalize and issue an Emergency Action Plan and ensure that consulate personnel are trained on the plan before the drawdown and departure of the International Security Assistance Force from Herat.

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that Consulate

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<sup>22</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-031.

Herat had finalized its EAP in December 2012. The embassy also stated that the consulate had opened in March 2012 and that newly established posts are generally given about 1 year to complete their EAPs.

**(SBU) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation resolved although OIG disagrees that newly established posts are generally given about a year to complete their EAP. The FAH clearly states that all posts are required to have an approved EAP,<sup>23</sup> and it provides no grace period for newly established posts. However, since the Consulate Herat EAP was finalized in December 2012, Embassy Kabul has met the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation can be closed once OIG reviews and accepts documentation demonstrating that the EAP has been completed and approved and that the Consulate Herat staff have received training on the plan.

**(SBU) Recommendation 10.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul seek a formal agreement with the International Security Assistance Force commanders who manage the Qala-e-Naw Provincial Reconstruction Team to ensure that Chief of Mission personnel working in Qala-e-Naw are supported in the event of an emergency until the Provincial Reconstruction Team's operations are ended.

**(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response:** Embassy Kabul did not explicitly state its non-concurrence with the recommendation. However, the embassy stated that the Qala-e-Naw PRT is scheduled to close in June 2013, with COM personnel departing 30-60 days prior to the scheduled closure. The embassy also stated that there are important national and policy perspectives to warrant continued presence in Qala-e-Naw, but that it does not see value or practical benefit to engaging the Spanish government in negotiation of such an agreement.

**(SBU) OIG Reply:** OIG considers this recommendation unresolved. OIG appreciates the difficulty in negotiating a formal agreement with a foreign government; however, a formal support agreement could prevent COM staff and others from properly responding to an emergency, thereby increasing unnecessary risk and confusion. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and Embassy Kabul is requested to provide additional comments.

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<sup>23</sup> 12 FAH-1 H-031.

**(U) List of Recommendations**

**(U) Recommendation 1.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish a process to ensure that its Emergency Action Plan and the resources available to implement it reflect the changing size and threat level at the post, including adjusting the amount of supplies and equipment listed in the Emergency Action Plan and stocked at the embassy based on the size of the embassy population, the length of time that the embassy could experience an emergency, and the severity of that emergency.

**(U) Recommendation 2.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish, update, and periodically inspect the inventory of emergency supplies and equipment for each emergency shelter within the embassy compound to ensure that supplies and equipment on-site reflect the amounts noted in the Emergency Action Plan and remain useable during emergencies.

**(SBU) Recommendation 3.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul identify the total number [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(SBU) Recommendation 4.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul provide all embassy staff with radios for use in responding to emergencies.

**(SBU) Recommendation 5.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish or acquire the capacity for [Redacted] (b) (5)

**(U) Recommendation 6.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish formal agreements on the roles and responsibilities of non-Department of State law enforcement agencies during events requiring implementation of the Emergency Action Plan.

**(SBU) Recommendation 7.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish and periodically update an inventory of all classified and sensitive materials that require destruction during an emergency that requires implementing Annex E of the Emergency Action Plan.

**(U) Recommendation 8.** OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security establish a process to validate the adequacy of Emergency Action Plans at high-threat posts, such as Embassy Kabul, by reviewing and assessing the resources listed in the plans for addressing each type of Emergency Action Plan emergency.

**(SBU) Recommendation 9.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul and Consulate Herat finalize and issue an Emergency Action Plan and ensure that consulate personnel are trained on the plan before the drawdown and departure of the International Security Assistance Force from Herat.

**(SBU) Recommendation 10.** OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul seek a formal agreement with the International Security Assistance Force commanders who manage the Qala-e-Naw Provincial Reconstruction Team to ensure that Chief of Mission personnel working in Qala-e-Naw are supported in the event of an emergency until the Provincial Reconstruction Team's operations are ended.

## (U) Scope and Methodology

(SBU) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this work under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, to determine whether U.S. Mission Afghanistan personnel were aware of the emergency procedures contained in the Emergency Action Plan (EAP), sufficient resources were available to respond to the emergencies addressed in selected EAP annexes, and the EAP was up to date and included all personnel under Chief of Mission (COM) authority. This evaluation was limited to five annexes and supporting appendices contained in the U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, EAP. The five annexes evaluated were those on civil disorder (Annex C), internal defense (Annex D), destruction of sensitive material (Annex E), hostage taking (Annex G), and drawdown and evacuation (Annex K), as these are the areas that are most relevant to recent events in the Middle East.

(U) OIG reviewed the relevant Department of State agreements with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) militaries for ISAF to provide security and support for COM personnel serving in the provinces. OIG also verified that the embassy briefs all incoming personnel on emergency procedures and informs staff of the location of the EAP.

(SBU) OIG reviewed the relevant EAP annexes, observed deployed resources, and obtained supporting documentation such as reports and memoranda on the numbers and status of equipment and the construction schedule for new hardened office and residential structures. OIG reviewed EAP appendices that support Annex D and conducted an inventory in June 2012 of pre-positioned emergency resources at Embassy Kabul to ascertain the amount and adequacy of these resources. OIG also observed records in various embassy offices and sections that would require destruction under Annex E emergencies.

(U) OIG observed a weapons of mass destruction drill at Embassy Kabul and reviewed after-action and lessons-learned reports related to the attack on the embassy on September 13, 2011.

(U) OIG conducted interviews with key embassy personnel responsible for developing and implementing the EAP from the Regional Security Office, the Management Section—including the General Services Office, the Facilities Office, and the Medical Office—and the Assistant Chief of Mission. OIG also met with officials from various sections of the embassy, including the consular, political, and economic sections, and officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. OIG also interviewed officials at Consulate Herat and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif and reviewed memoranda of understanding between Embassy Kabul and ISAF militaries regarding emergency support for COM staff serving in PRTs throughout Afghanistan. In Washington, DC, OIG met with officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on EAP

guidance and requirements and with officials from the Foreign Service Institute to discuss crisis management training.

(U) OIG conducted this evaluation from June 2011 to January 2013 in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, issued in January 2011 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. OIG believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the evaluation objective.

**(U) Review of Internal Controls**

(U) OIG performed steps to assess the adequacy of internal controls for resources the embassy maintained for emergencies, including processes for pre-positioning food, water, and medical supplies in emergency shelters and maintaining, inspecting, and updating inventories of these supplies. For example, OIG completed an inventory of emergency equipment, rations, and supplies to determine the extent to which the items were secured and tracked.

**(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) OIG did not use computer-processed data to conduct this evaluation.

**(U) Contents of Embassy Kabul Emergency Action Plan**

**(U) Chapters**

- (SBU) 100 - Legal
- (SBU) 200 - Organization
- (SBU) 300 - Consular Services
- (SBU) 400 - Public Affairs
- (SBU) 500 - Medical
- (SBU) 600 - Mission Security
- (SBU) 700 - Crisis Preparedness

**(U) Annexes**

- (SBU) Annex A - Bomb
- (SBU) Annex B - Fire
- (SBU) Annex C - Civil Disorder
- (SBU) Annex D - Internal Defense
- (SBU) Annex E - Destruction of Sensitive Materials
- (SBU) Annex F - Weapons of Mass Destruction
- (SBU) Annex G - Hostage Taking
- (SBU) Annex H - Hijacking
- (SBU) Annex I - Assistance to U.S. Citizens in a Major Accident or Disaster
- (SBU) Annex J - Assistance to Host Country in a Major Accident or Disaster
- (SBU) Annex K - Drawdown and Evacuation
- (SBU) Annex L - Receipt of Evacuees
- (SBU) Annex M - Regional Reconstruction Team-Erbil
- (SBU) Annex N - Crisis Preparedness for Americans under COM Authority

**(U) Appendices**

- (SBU) Appendix 1 - Master Contact List
- (SBU) Appendix 2 - Mission Organization for Emergencies
- (SBU) Appendix 3 - Command and Control Locations
- (SBU) Appendix 4 - Assembly and Movement Surveys
- (SBU) Appendix 5 - Medical Services Surveys
- (SBU) Appendix 6 - Logistics and Transportation
- (SBU) Appendix 7 - Communications
- (SBU) Appendix 8 - Unified Command
- (SBU) Appendix 9 - Facility Information

(U) Embassy Kabul Response\*



*Embassy of the United States of America*

*Kabul, Afghanistan*

February 9, 2013

Dear Mr. Geisel;

Embassy Kabul's number one priority is the safety and security of COM personnel – a never ending task in this non-permissive environment. As illustrated by the insurgent attacks against major U.S. and Coalition military bases in the past months, it is impossible to provide 100 percent security for personnel in a war zone. Expecting non-combatant civilians to do this is demanding much – yet the brave and dedicated men and women of Mission Afghanistan do this on a daily basis. They are to be lauded.

There have been two direct insurgent attacks against our compound since September 2011. Because of our professional and robust security program, we quickly brought over 1,000 personnel to safety without incident. This was accomplished in the face of mortars, RPGs and concentrated small arms fire over several hours. The emergency drills we conducted in the days leading up to these attacks proved prescient. We have the best RSO Office in the Foreign Service.

Towards this end, as a war zone Embassy, we have assets not available to most posts. As outlined in 13 Kabul 59, we have implemented security countermeasures and programs which could become best practices at other contingency zone posts. Ultimately, to do our job and conduct critical national diplomatic outreach in these harsh environments, the USG accepts significant risk to our personnel and facilities. We manage that risk in accomplishing our mission.

Recommendation 1: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish a process to ensure that its Emergency Action Plan, and the resources available to implement it, reflect the changing size and threat level at the post, including adjusting the amount of supplies and equipment listed in the Emergency Action Plan and stocked at the embassy based on the size of the embassy population, the length of time that the embassy could experience an emergency, and the severity of that emergency.

Embassy Kabul Response: RSO Kabul has personnel dedicated to emergency planning which includes updating the Emergency Action Plan. This update process is continuous and RSO had already begun a

\*[OIG completed portion marking of Embassy Kabul's response per 12 FAM 541.]

concentrated effort in summer 2012 to adjust the amount of supplies and equipment and to update the appropriate sections of the plan.

(U) Recommendation 2: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish, update, and periodically inspect the inventory of emergency supplies and equipment for each emergency shelter within the embassy compound to ensure that supplies and equipment on-site reflect the amounts noted in the Emergency Action Plan and remain useable during emergencies.

(U) Embassy Kabul Response: In the spring of 2012, RSO Kabul began periodic inspections of emergency supplies and equipment to include supplemental duck and cover bunker locations intended for short-term use. During the summer of 2012, RSO and Management began an initiative to better identify and secure supply containers.

(SBU) Post will continue to conduct complete and thorough reviews of the emergency food and shelter program. GSO will work in partnership with the post Health Unit, Regional Security Office, and the DOD Veterinarian Unit to develop and implement a comprehensive program to ensure food, water and medical supplies are adequate in accordance with the EAP and embassy population and refreshed as required.

(SBU) Recommendation 3: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul identify the total number [Redacted] (b) (5)

(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response: In early 2012, hardened temporary emergency shelters opened [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted]

RSO is updating the locations and other pertinent details of these structures in the Emergency Action Plan.

(SBU) RSO sends frequent reminders of the locations of these structures in security notices to the embassy community and utilizes them during emergency drills – including maps. These structures are currently under review as part of new provisions in 12 FAH-5 H-460 "Safe Havens, Safe Areas, and

Compound Emergency Sanctuaries". Supplemental duck and cover bunkers, intended for very short-term occupation in the event of an Annex D emergency, remain in place as well.

(SBU)

Additionally, as a result of the September 13, 2011 attack on the U.S. Embassy compound, RSO submitted a request for a phased physical security upgrade plan. RSO requested \$42.6 million in funding for the implementation of sidewall and overhead protection for residential, office and dining facilities at the U.S. Embassy, Camp Alvarado and Camp Sullivan. The request was submitted in February of 2012 and funding in the amount of \$27.6 million dollars for upgrades at the Embassy and Camp Alvarado was received in early September of 2012.

(SBU)

Funding for upgrades at Camp Sullivan will be provided in FY13. The funding was transferred from DS/Physical Security Programs to OBO via a Memorandum of Agreement that same month. OBO is working on the final scope of work for the physical security upgrades which will include overhead and sidewall protection for residential and office space on the East side compound. (See 12 KABUL 210 and 13 Kabul 59 for additional information).

(SBU)

Recommendation 4: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul provide all embassy staff with radios for use in responding to emergencies.

(SBU)

Embassy Kabul Response: (SBU) Working with IRM and Bureau, post has greatly expanded the [Redacted] (b) (5) communications infrastructure on compound. In September 2012 four additional repeaters were installed in Staff Diplomatic Apartment A for the E&E and Local Guard Force networks. Also in September 2012, IRM began issuing [Redacted] (b) (5) to all incoming Chief of Mission (COM) staff at the newcomer briefings, held twice weekly. For staff that arrived prior to that date, Management Notice 12-452 was sent out directing all Embassy staff to [Redacted] (b) (5). IRM has been able to meet all requests thus far [Redacted] (b) (5).

Post believes this recommendation is no long applicable.

(SBU)

Recommendation 5: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish or acquire a capacity for [Redacted] (b) (5).

(SBU)

Embassy Kabul Response: Recommendation 5 requires coordination with OBO. Post believes that this recommendation contradicts OBO/OPS guidance [Redacted] (b) (5)

[Redacted] We therefore refer the OIG to OBO/OPS/FIR to determine a path forward for any policy and resource changes that might be required. OBO/OPS/FIR has conducted previous inspections of Kabul and knows the conditions and response capabilities of the ISAF base. We also note that ISAF currently provides a [Redacted] (b) (5) capability that is greater than would be the case at any other overseas post in the developing world. However, in response, we are taking a three pronged approach:

1. Post is conferring with OBO/OPS/FIR on the proper path forward to resolve the issue.
2. We are inquiring of our O&M service provider, Pacific Architects and Engineers, on their approximate costs to assume [Redacted] (b) (5) from ISAF if/when the departure of ISAF personnel is announced. We will also determine the extent of Afghan [Redacted] (b) (5) capabilities.
3. We are checking on our current process with ISAF, to better determine their capabilities for [Redacted] (b) (5)

(U)

Recommendation 6: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish formal agreements on the roles and responsibilities of non-Department of State law enforcement agencies during events requiring implementation of the Emergency Action Plan.


(U)

Embassy Kabul Response: Since early 2012, RSO has involved and received participation from Department of State and non-Department of State law enforcement agencies in compound familiarization tours, coordination meetings, emergency drills, and major events. RSO also drafted an information memo titled "*The Role of the Internal Defense Team and Other Federal Law Enforcement Personnel in the Event of an Internal Defense Situation*" that formally describes the roles and responsibilities of all law enforcement agencies during emergencies. Embassy representatives from the following agencies have cleared the information memorandum: Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Marshals Service, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State Office of Inspector General, USAID Office of Inspector General, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

- (SBU) Recommendation 7: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul establish and periodically update an inventory of all classified and sensitive materials that require destruction during an emergency that requires implementing Annex E of the Emergency Action Plan.
- (SBU) Embassy Kabul Response: As part of identifying the full inventory of classified and sensitive materials that require destruction during an emergency, the Embassy's Information Programs Center (IPC) maintains a destruction list for all COMSEC items. This list is updated periodically, per Annex E of the Emergency Action Plan. Management also routinely sends out notices to COM personnel regarding Records Management to include handling of classified material and appropriate destruction methods. Post continues to work with all embassy agencies and sections to ensure that updated inventories of all classified and Sensitive but Unclassified materials as defined in Annex E and ensure they are included in destruction planning.
- (U) Recommendation 8: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security establish a process to validate the adequacy of Emergency Action Plans at high-threat posts, such as Embassy Kabul, by reviewing and assessing the resources listed in the plans for addressing each type of Emergency Action Plan emergency.
- (U) *No post response. DS Headquarters will address this recommendation.*
- (SBU) Recommendation 9: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul and Consulate Herat finalize and issue an Emergency Action Plan and ensure that consulate personnel are trained on the plan before the drawdown and departure of the International Security Assistance Force from Herat.
- (SBU) Embassy Kabul Response: The U.S. Consulate in Herat opened its doors on March 11, 2012. The Consulate's Emergency Action Plan was 100 percent completed and published on December 18, 2012. Newly established Posts are generally given about one year to complete and publish an Emergency Action Plan since many items are unknown until occupancy. Herat's was published in nine months. Herat completed the bulk of draft plans very early in the process (two to three months after opening). As discussed with the OIG team, the existence of draft plans does not constitute an absence of plans. Herat's Emergency Action Plan was drafted but awaiting final approvals for the remainder of the nine month period.

(SBU) Recommendation 10: OIG recommends that Embassy Kabul seek a formal agreement with the International Security Assistance Force commanders who manage the Qala-e-Naw Provincial Reconstruction Team to ensure that Chief of Mission personnel working in Qala-e-Naw are supported in the event of an emergency until the Provincial Reconstruction Team's operations are ended.

(SBU) Embassy Kabul Response: The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in question is currently scheduled for closure in June 2013. Chief of Mission personnel would typically depart the PRT 30 to 60 days prior to closure. At this juncture, post does not find value or practical benefit in engaging the Spanish government in MOU negotiations. This leaves the option of removing COM personnel from the PRT earlier than planned. However, post finds that the continued presence of COM personnel at PRT Qala-e-Naw remains of sufficient national importance from a policy perspective to warrant a continued presence until the scheduled closure.

(U) Sincerely,  
  
James B. Cunningham  
Chief of Mission

(U) The Honorable  
Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of the Inspector General

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