



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS  
*OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL*

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Office of Inspections

May 2013

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# Inspection of Embassy Juba, South Sudan

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## **PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION**

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

### **PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### **METHODOLOGY**

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

*Office of Inspector General*

## **PREFACE**

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability, and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Harold W. Geisel". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "H" and "G".

Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General

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## Key Judgments

- The Department of State (Department) has been unable to staff Embassy Juba adequately, preventing the embassy from functioning as effectively as it should.
- The Embassy Juba chancery is too small, (b) (5). Until the Department renovates or expands the existing facility or constructs a new embassy compound (NEC), there will be no easy way to accommodate additional staff. A new embassy is scheduled for construction in 2018.
- Officers from the Department and other agencies are dedicated and work together collegially, but 1-year tours weaken embassy reporting. Embassy Juba can enhance the quality and volume of its reporting by improving information sharing, hiring a protocol specialist, and adjusting political/economic section staffing.
- The Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan (S/USSESSS) and Embassy Juba share responsibility for U.S. policy toward South Sudan. There is no U.S. Government multiyear strategy to guide policy and programmatic engagement with South Sudan, however. The overlap of command and control between S/USSESSS and the Ambassador has resulted in occasional S/USSESSS guidance on bilateral issues that conflicts with chief of mission priorities.
- Embassy Juba has an active outreach program that has the Ambassador's full participation. With the anticipated arrival of a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) public affairs staffer, the public affairs officer (PAO) should conduct a broader outreach effort.
- The consular section has insufficient staff and facilities. The Department needs to provide additional support.
- Embassy Juba's reliance on Embassy Khartoum for management support is not a viable strategy. The Department needs to establish alternative support systems.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 7 and 30, 2013, and in Juba, South Sudan, between January 31 and February 16, 2013. (b) (6)

conducted the inspection.

## Context

About the size of Texas, South Sudan is the world's newest country. South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011, after being at war with Sudan for nearly 40 of the past 57 years. The United States invested significant high-level energy and funding in the process that led to South Sudan's 2011 referendum and subsequent independence. The South Sudan Government and people have a positive opinion of the United States for its role in their independence. However, the country faces severe and long-standing security, economic, and development challenges supplemented by worrisome government measures to restrict human and civil rights.

South Sudan is among the world's poorest countries. The literacy rate is 27 percent, and half the population of 10.6 million is under the age of 18. The population of Juba has expanded to 1 million, a tenfold increase over the past decade. Although South Sudan has substantial oil reserves, exploitation requires trans-shipment of the crude oil to the Red Sea via Sudanese pipelines. The economy has deteriorated since January 2012, when the government shut down oil production as the result of disputes with Sudan. There is very little manufacturing or commercial farming, and most products are imported. The country suffers from a severe shortage of foreign currency. The United States and South Sudan have no significant bilateral trade.

The United States is the largest bilateral donor to South Sudan, providing \$632 million in FY 2012. Since 2005, the United States has provided \$10 billion in humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance to South Sudan and eastern Chad. In South Sudan there are an estimated 212,000 refugees, 114,000 of them displaced, and since 2010, 691,000 returnees from Sudan. Fighting across the borders continues, resulting in new refugee flows.

The embassy operates from a USAID office compound. Embassy employee housing is mostly on a residential compound, about 500 yards from the office compound. The environment is austere, with few opportunities for recreation. The chancery is of cinder block construction

(b) (5)



The embassy, with 57 U.S. direct-hire employees, set a number of ambitious goals in its 2014 Mission Resource Request,<sup>1</sup> including the elimination of conflicts in flashpoint areas. Another focus is strengthening governance and improving essential services, such as health, education, nutrition, water, and sanitation. Expansion of agricultural-based economic opportunities is also a goal. The Mission Resource Request also focuses on security cooperation that supports democratic institutions and regional stability. The embassy will cultivate partnership with people and youth by informing them about American values and foreign policy. Other goals are enhancing secure facilities for a growing U.S. Government presence in South Sudan and establishing basic consular services to support U.S. citizens.

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<sup>1</sup>In December 2011, the Department issued 11 STATE 124737, which discontinued the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan. The Mission Resource Request (3-year strategic plan, with shorter annual resource requests) replaced the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan beginning with the FY 2014 budget cycle.

## Executive Direction

### *Leadership*

The Ambassador, who arrived in December 2011, acquired expertise about South Sudanese politics and society from her participation in the negotiation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement with Sudan. She has strong contacts that she uses well. Washington policymakers are generally pleased with her advocacy. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) arrived in 2012 and focuses on management and security partly out of necessity, as the management officer is not scheduled to arrive until March 2013. The DCM has a limited role in coordinating and communicating policy objectives to the mission.

### *Rightsizing*

The embassy compound is too small and operates under waivers for a number of security standards. The embassy cannot accommodate the personnel necessary to advance U.S. interests effectively and to manage and monitor the \$1.6 billion development program—the largest in Africa. A recent USAID/South Sudan staffing review found the need for 27 new positions to oversee programs properly. Staffing on the policy side is also insufficient to meet Washington's high demand. All reporting offices work long hours trying to keep up with questions from the National Security Council Staff, S/USSESSS, the Department, and the Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM).

The current facility puts embassy employees at risk. The inability to add more staff leaves assistance programs vulnerable to failure or misuse of funds. The Department has decided to keep the mission with its current footprint until construction of a new embassy. It will be a number of years, however, until the new embassy is ready. In the meantime, personnel and the integrity of our programs are at risk. Earlier this year, an Interagency Security Assessment Team visited the embassy and recommended security improvements. Even if these recommendations are implemented, deficiencies will remain. The classified annex to this report contains recommendations addressing these issues.

### *Policy Direction and Strategic Planning*

South Sudan and Sudan attract considerable U.S. Government attention, which has led to the creation of S/USSESSS. High-level officials from the White House, National Security Staff, Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies are actively involved in U.S. policy toward the two countries. S/USSESSS communicates policy to Embassy Juba, including decisions made at weekly National Security Staff-chaired interagency meetings. Competing views exist on how to foster the appropriate role of the South Sudan military in governance and the best way to pursue U.S. human rights goals and their saliency in the policy mix. At times, AFRICOM approaches Embassy Juba directly on policy matters, bypassing this National Security Staff-chaired coordination process. The strong, activist role of S/USSESSS and other Washington offices leaves little room for the Chief of Mission to exercise the role set out in 2 *Foreign Affairs Manual* (FAM) 113.1 to represent U.S. interests in South Sudan. A number of embassy employees do not know what activities to prioritize to achieve U.S. objectives; some expressed concern their work duplicated efforts by S/USSESSS staff. Although the excellent working

relationship of the outgoing Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and the departing Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan (Special Envoy) improved relations between their organizations, it is important for S/USSESSS and Embassy Juba to delineate more clearly their respective responsibilities for implementing policy.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and the Bureau of African Affairs, should develop clear policy goals and objectives to guide policy engagement. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with S/USSESSS and AF)

In this Special Envoy-bilateral mission relationship, like others of its kind, there is overlap of command and control between S/USSESSS and the embassy. The Department's desks for Sudan and South Sudan report to S/USSESSS, which works on Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation, other negotiations, and bilateral issues, such as human rights. There is a notable difference in resources between the two entities, with S/USSESSS having 21 positions, some of which are contractors, and exceeding the combined size of the political/economic and public diplomacy sections of Embassies Juba and Khartoum. The most recent Special Envoy improved coordination with both embassies, but there remains a significant overlap, and some gaps, in roles. S/USSESSS and the embassy are both heavily engaged in advancing human rights. Despite its size, S/USSESSS does not provide Embassy Juba with the full range of policy and program management support that Bureau of African Affairs offices provide their posts. Embassy personnel feel that S/USSESSS is not actively engaged in shaping donor conferences, providing policy guidance to address the looming economic crisis, or supporting the full range of consular and public diplomacy activities. The Bureau of African Affairs does not provide Embassy Juba this support either, deferring instead to S/USSESSS. The Bureau of African Affairs does not have a deputy assistant secretary to coordinate South Sudan and Sudan policy with broader bureau activities. Embassy officers also note unclear lines of authority that result in frustrating duplication of effort and occasional conflict between S/USSESSS guidance on bilateral issues and the Ambassador's priorities. On March 15, 2012, the Bureau of African Affairs approved an action memo that sets out the process for establishing an Office of Sudanese Affairs within the Bureau of African Affairs, once certain conditions are met. This positive step would reposition the Sudan and South Sudan desks to report directly to the Bureau of African Affairs and lead to more effective U.S. foreign policy implementation.

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of African Affairs should fold the Sudan and South Sudan desks back into the bureau, once the conditions in the March 15, 2012, memo are met. (Action: AF)

The S/USSESSS program office oversees programs funded at more than \$10 million annually. The office does not routinely coordinate its plans with USAID, other agencies in Washington, and Embassy Juba before implementing them. As a result, the office cannot determine whether a program is duplicative, would benefit from synergies with another program, or needs to be coordinated with the Government of South Sudan in a certain way. For example, the embassy had to arrange an urgent meeting with a minister who threatened to block a program aimed at monetizing and regularizing the cattle industry, because the S/USSESSS implementer had not seen the need to handle this coordination. In another case, the embassy had to arrange a teleconference and seminar with South Sudanese officials when the implementer lacked the capacity to make those arrangements. The program office has improved the flow of information,

with some program contractors emailing reports to embassy staff. However, embassy staff members still do not have ready access to all program status reports, which S/USSESSS does not post on its SharePoint site. Lack of embassy input and coordination on planned projects jeopardizes the success of U.S. foreign policy goals for this region.

**Recommendation 3:** The Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should implement procedures for obtaining embassy concurrence on planned foreign assistance projects. (Action: S/USSESSS, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

### ***Tour of Duty***

When Consulate General Juba became an embassy in July 2011, the Department specified that tours of duty would be unaccompanied and 1 year in duration, with two rest and recuperation trips. The Ambassador has developed policies to increase time on the ground, including a November 2012 policy setting a maximum of 33 days that an officer could be away from post. Frequent absences due to illness further reduce time in the office. The 1-year tour of duty has a number of negative consequences. Officers find it difficult to conduct policy advocacy effectively, because it takes so long for them to learn their portfolios and establish personal contacts with South Sudanese officials. They often do not have time to understand, oversee, and shape foreign assistance programs. Frequent rotations also result in ineffective management of locally employed (LE) staff, causing them to take less initiative due to shifting priorities.

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should assign at least some incoming political/economic and public diplomacy officers to Embassy Juba to 2-year assignments, with the first year in either the Bureau of African Affairs or the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF)

The Ambassador has an unwritten, but broadly targeted, “normalization” policy to expand the length of a tour of duty. Allowing eligible family members with employment offers to accompany officers could increase morale, bidder numbers, and extensions. The OIG team notes that the embassy will not need the proposed consular eligible family member position when the vacant consular LE staff slot is filled and recognizes the importance of allowing Embassy Juba some flexibility to alter job positions based on need.

**Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should approve Embassy Juba’s FY 2014 Mission Resource Request for three eligible family member positions. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF)

### ***Entry-Level Officer Program***

There is no entry-level officer development program at Embassy Juba. The two entry-level officers interact with the DCM on a regular basis, but there are no activities directed to their long-term career development.

***Informal Recommendation 1:*** Embassy Juba should implement a plan for entry-level officer development.

***Equal Employment Opportunity/Federal Women's Program***

Four months ago, a visiting management officer from Khartoum asked the Juba International Law Enforcement (INL) director, who had Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) training via a previous post, to be the Juba EEO counselor. Although she agreed, the Office of Civil Rights never notified her officially, and so the embassy has been without an EEO counselor for the past 4 months. There is also no formal EEO LE staff liaison because the individual who volunteered, and who is a member of the LE staff organization, never received official confirmation.

No EEO material is posted anywhere in the embassy office buildings. The last management notice on record concerning EEO issues is dated March 2012, when there was a different EEO counselor and LE staff liaison. There is no EEO information on the embassy's SharePoint Web site. No one at the embassy, including the EEO counselor designate who has been at the embassy for 17 months, could recall EEO issues being discussed at an embassy town hall meeting. There is an Locally Employed Staff Handbook with a section on "Equality in the Workplace" that underscores the mission's responsibility for briefing all employees on EEO issues.

The invisibility of the EEO counselor at a post with many junior officers and new LE staff members could account in part for the lack of EEO complaints. Local guard force personnel indicated on questionnaires and interviews that they had been victims of tribalism, favoritism, and other discrimination. Without the guidance of certified, trained personnel and ready access to pertinent information, mission employees cannot resolve EEO issues and are vulnerable to workplace discrimination.

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Juba should contact the Office of Civil Rights to gain official appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. (Action: Embassy Juba)

***Informal Recommendation 2:*** Embassy Juba should, after the official appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor, post information concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity program on its SharePoint Web site.

## Policy and Program Implementation

### Coordination and Communication

Embassy Juba's staff loses significant amounts of time because of inadequate information-sharing systems. Although officers from different agencies frequently share information on short-term activities, visits, and reports, this communication would yield greater dividends if staff could devote more time to looking ahead, sharing analysis, and brainstorming. This leap cannot happen without improving the embassy's rudimentary information-sharing systems. The embassy's limited computer platform leaves officers tracking upcoming visitors and reports on dry-erase whiteboards. Department-issued BlackBerry devices do not work in South Sudan. There is no missionwide visitor or event calendar. Few employees use the embassy SharePoint site, inaugurated in October. Instead, they email documents to one another, inevitably missing some employees and spawning multiple requests for updates. After training by the inspection team, the embassy started using shared Outlook calendars more effectively to facilitate scheduling and began working on an Outlook calendar to track visitors and mission-relevant events.

The shared drive is a hodgepodge of folders with files arranged by idiosyncratic filing systems, only one of which features Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject.<sup>2</sup> Staff members rarely use files from previous officers and, when they try, are not sure they are using final documents. Although the embassy has not yet attempted to archive records, it would be almost impossible under these circumstances.

The embassy does not have the necessary computer platform to support Department-standard electronic administrative applications such as the WebPASS suite, the Visitor Access program, the LE after-hours access request program, and the Contact Management Database. Simple tasks thus consume inordinate amounts of time. For example, it takes a chain of five emails to arrange access for a visitor or for LE staff to work after hours. When asked how they track contacts, officers showed inspectors piles of business cards. These stacks are practically meaningless without context, which officers lack because of complete turnover in American staffing each summer. At the suggestion of the inspection team, the embassy requested that the Frankfurt Regional Support Center and the Bureau of African Affairs install the Contact Management Database during the March 2013 computer upgrade and provide training. The inspection team suggested the embassy request Web-based installation instead of locally based versions of the four software products if customer performance measurement permits.

**Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should install and provide training on information-sharing systems, including SharePoint, contact management, and records management systems, at Embassy Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

### Policy Advocacy and Reporting

Given the importance of South Sudan to U.S. policy, Washington has a substantial appetite for embassy reporting. The paucity of media increases policymakers' and analysts'

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<sup>2</sup> Standardized set of labels assigned to files to indicate their content and make them easy to locate and retrieve.

reliance on embassy reporting. Washington consumers praised the embassy's reporting, given its staffing limitations and severe operating constraints. However, a number of consumers recommended the embassy provide more analysis.

The embassy faces a number of obstacles that impede increasing analytical reporting. In addition to the 1-year tours, there is the confusion over U.S. policy and occasional conflicts between ambassadorial and Washington priorities, described earlier. The embassy also lacks the infrastructure to coordinate mission reporting effectively. There are no working groups to integrate and track interagency policy and programmatic efforts to achieve mission objectives. There is no active law enforcement working group. Although the public diplomacy and political/economic sections both have notional reporting plans, the embassy does not have a mission reporting plan, mission travel plan, or mission representational plan. Reporting officers on 1-year tours have trouble making good contacts because so many officials already have strong links with S/USSESSS and/or USAID. The political/economic section began convening weekly interagency reporting meetings in January 2013 to solicit input from other sections and agencies. However, some non-political/economic officers found the meetings overly focused on political and economic issues. Creating an agenda on SharePoint to which all agencies can contribute and focusing on specific topics would make these meetings more effective. Some of these meetings could be dedicated to Mission Resource Request working group discussions.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, should develop a missionwide reporting plan. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with S/USSESSS)

*Informal Recommendation 3:* Embassy Juba should establish working groups for each Mission Resource Request objective.

Washington analysts called for increased data on conflict areas and refugees so that they can better predict and report on humanitarian developments. The limited number of reporting officers makes it unfeasible to report on this level of detail in cables. Embassy Juba and regional staff include some of the information analysts need in informal media reports, emails, and programmatic documents, including trip reports and contractor updates. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research can advise the embassy on how to post this information to a content management system like SharePoint to make it available to analysts. To prevent raw data from being taken out of context, the embassy could note when analysts need to contact the originating agency or section before using the data in a report.

*Informal Recommendation 4:* Embassy Juba should start uploading informal reports on humanitarian developments to a content management system.

The embassy faces significant operational hurdles to increasing reporting. As described in the classified annex to this report, classified terminals are not in the chancery and are too few and slow to meet the embassy's needs. Washington analysts stressed that the embassy cannot shape or participate in policy discussions effectively because of these limitations. In addition, Embassy Juba's inability to access the full range of reporting prevented staff from seeing important information on South Sudanese officials that would have improved reporting and permitted more efficient Leahy vetting.

**~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~**

The embassy can improve the timeliness of its reporting. The political/economic section drafts cables quickly but does not always clear them with the public affairs section at the proper time. The DCM recently required the section to clear reporting on media freedom, culture, and higher education with the public affairs section and directed the public affairs section to clear reporting on media freedom with the political/economic section. The Ambassador often takes a few days to clear longer cables. At the OIG team's suggestion, the Ambassador agreed to devote a block of time each day to work on cables to speed their transmission. The team further suggested that the Ambassador's office management specialist track and prioritize cables the Ambassador needs to clear so none fall through the cracks. Reporting officers agreed to begin sending reporting in record emails to S/USSESS and other offices to facilitate proper distribution and archiving.

The Ambassador and reporting officers are increasing advocacy efforts to address the deterioration in the human rights and economic situation over the past year. Political/economic officers' position descriptions focus on reporting, and the OIG team counseled section management on the need to update descriptions to reflect this shift in focus.

The embassy has a biographic information coordinator, includes biographic information in many of its cables, and has a few biographies saved on the shared drive. However, there is no functioning central biographic file for information on foreign nationals, official or private, who directly or indirectly influence domestic and foreign policy in their countries, as specified in 2 FAM 113.3 b. The inspection team suggested that the embassy develop a template and a procedure for which biographic files each section and agency is responsible for updating and that it post biographic files to Diplopedia to make them broadly available.

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Juba should create a central biographic file that is accessible to Department of State personnel. (Action: Embassy Juba)

In 2011 the embassy converted its protocol specialist position to a human resources, consular, and administrative assistant, making the political/economic officers and the sole LE staff specialist responsible for scheduling meetings and performing other related protocol work. Reestablishing the protocol specialist position would allow section staff to devote more time to advocacy and reporting.

***Informal Recommendation 5:*** Embassy Juba should recreate a dedicated FSN-09 protocol position and hire an experienced specialist with strong local contacts and English language skills.

Embassy travel within South Sudan has decreased significantly since the change from a single annual request for air travel to requests for individual charter flights for each trip. The number of steps required to arrange and request each charter flight outstrips current staffing resources, sometimes preventing necessary travel. This practice has had a particularly negative effect on INL monitoring of projects outside Juba.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Juba should review the amount of in-country travel embassy staff has performed since the embassy changed its practice on chartering planes, identify reasons for the decrease, and adjust procedures as necessary. (Action: Embassy Juba)

## **Political/Economic and International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Sections**

The political/economic section has three full-time reporting officers, one part-time officer, and one LE political specialist, and will soon recruit an LE economic specialist. The section does not have adequate staffing to meet workload requirements and is not structured properly. The INL section has one U.S. direct-hire employee and one LE staff member.

### ***Workload***

There is insufficient political/economic staff to meet workload requirements. Officers average more than 20 hours of overtime a week. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration expects the Sudanese refugee influx to become a protracted refugee situation requiring long-term, substantial funding. The bureau contributed more than \$53 million for assistance to Sudanese refugees in South Sudan and the region in FY 2012. The bureau therefore seeks greater political/economic section engagement on refugee and other humanitarian issues from Embassy Juba to complement the work of the regional refugee coordinator based in Addis Ababa. The political/economic section cannot provide the desired level of engagement due to its short staffing and relies heavily on USAID for information. The current staffing pattern lists a vacant FS-02 political/economic position (number 10-125006) that the Bureau of African Affairs says has been abolished, which the embassy could use to establish a new position. The inspection report for Embassy Khartoum recommends transferring one excess position from Khartoum to Juba, which would be another way to redistribute the workload and meet increasing reporting demands.

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Bureau of African Affairs, should add one mid-level political/economic officer position to increase reporting on refugee and other humanitarian issues by either creating a new position or transferring a position from Embassy Khartoum. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with DGHR and AF)

### ***Structure***

The combined political/economic section is not structured properly. In addition, the conal designations of all four positions in the section are inaccurate on the staffing pattern, misleading bidders about what their actual duties would be. Two FS-02 officers colead the section. Although they work together harmoniously, previous incumbents did not. Upgrading FS-02 political/economic position number 10-004075 to FS-01 and making it solely political would clarify supervisory relationships, give the section more depth of experience, and streamline embassy operations by creating a less cumbersome management structure. Although the section's political workload is greater than its economic workload, the section has more staff dedicated to economic issues. The human rights officer in FS-04 political position number 10-004077 spends more than half his time on consular work, which the staffing pattern does not reflect. To accommodate the unpredictability of both consular and human rights work in South Sudan, it is important to shift the other half of the FS-04 position from political to economic. The FS-03 political position (number 10-004076) could then revert to political, including human rights, from its current economic portfolio. The FS-02 political officer position (number 14-121002) could then be designated economic to reflect the position's actual duties. The staffing pattern includes FS-02 international officer general position number 10-125006, which the

Bureau of Africa Affairs said it abolished in 2012. Finally, although INL is a separate subsection, it coordinates closely with the political/economic section. INL is not included in the morning meeting of section and agency heads, and its staff members travel frequently. Making INL formally part of the political/economic session could enhance reporting, advocacy, and management.

**Recommendation 12:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should upgrade position 10-004075 to FS-01, make FS-04 position number 10-004077 economic/consular, make FS-02 position number 14-121002 economic, and remove FS-02 position 10-125006 from the staffing pattern. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba and CA)

### ***Program Management***

*Leahy Vetting:* The embassy vetted more than 9,000 applicants in FY 2012; hundreds were turned down initially. An S/USSESSS detailee worked closely with South Sudanese officials and U.S. Government-supported contract advisors in the Sudan People's Liberation Army to get more information. Lack of detailed information on alleged human rights violations greatly complicates Leahy vetting. For example, units that identified and mustered out child soldiers have been disqualified, whereas units that did not are still eligible for training.

*INL Justice Sector Program:* INL has a \$29 million Justice Sector Program managed by the INL U.S. direct-hire director and LE program director at Embassy Juba. INL Washington helpfully performs almost all grant, contract, and financial management functions, a model practice for this understaffed post. Grantees/contractors provide reports to the INL director, who performs site visits as regularly as transportation arrangements permit. The director conducts physical inventories of vehicles, tents, mosquito nets, and miscellaneous equipment when possible; when these visits are not feasible due to staffing and transportation constraints, she relies on verification by contractors and host-government counterparts. She is establishing a more formalized end-use monitoring system. After the inspection team identified that the LE staff member's performance report did not have the proper review, the embassy worked with the human resources office in Embassy Khartoum and remedied the oversight.

*President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief:* In FY 2012, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funded \$14 million in programs implemented by USAID, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and DOD. The USAID and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention teams on the ground work cordially and hold weekly meetings. The absence of political/economic section staff and nonresident DOD representatives in these meetings reduces awareness of one another's activities. The embassy could partially address this through the new health working group. The embassy does not have a PEPFAR coordinator to focus on the big picture. The OIG team suggested that the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator increase its strategic planning support to the PEPFAR team.

*Bureau of African Affairs-Managed Women, Peace, and Security Initiative Grants:* The FS-03 economic officer was the designated grants officer's representative for one FY 2011 grant and expected to be designated on a second grant, in the amounts of \$200,000 and \$700,000, respectively. The economic officer agreed to take online grants training. In view of the section's limited staffing and 1-year tours, the Bureau of African Affairs concurred with the OIG team's

suggestion to designate a grants officer's representative in Washington for the second grant immediately and for the first grant after the economic officer departs post in summer 2013.

### **Public Diplomacy**

The public affairs section engages in a wide spectrum of activities. Though small—one officer and two LE staff members—the section functions well in the face of numerous obstacles relating to the newness of the embassy and the lack of established procedures. The shaky economy and political situation add another element of uncertainty. The section's primary strength is the staff members' perseverance.

Other obstacles include lack of dedicated storage space. All financial matters, including grants processing and procurement, are handled through Embassy Khartoum, causing delays and occasional miscommunication. Officers on 1-year tours working with inexperienced LE staff have difficulty developing contacts and maintaining program continuity. There is strong pressure to contribute to embassy reporting requirements, taking time away from public diplomacy work. The traditional one-stop desk officer who is responsible for South Sudan focuses on press operations of S/USSESSS rather than on supporting embassy public diplomacy programs.

### ***Need for Strategic Planning***

The PAO does not hold regular planning meetings with the Ambassador or the DCM, and there is no mission public diplomacy strategy. Other than the daily "gaggle" in the Ambassador's office, which concentrates mostly on the agenda of the day, the only planning meeting is the weekly extended political section meeting once a week on Fridays. That meeting does not lend itself to an exchange of information on how the public affairs section can support mission objectives.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Juba should draft a public affairs plan to address mission priorities. (Action: Embassy Juba)

The USAID mission has a budget of more than \$600 million, but USAID public affairs support is located in Washington. The Ambassador is an active promoter of USAID activities and often opens projects for them. USAID has brought on board an LE staff member in public affairs and is now in the process of hiring a documentation, outreach, and communications U.S. direct hire. It is important for the PAO to think ahead about how best to coordinate her work and that of the USAID documentation, outreach, and communications officer. As is, according to one interviewee, "the man on the street has no idea that the United States is contributing more than \$600 million in assistance to South Sudan."

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Juba should draft a mission media plan for informing the South Sudanese public of the extent of U.S. Government assistance and of the efforts of the embassy. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### ***Section Management***

Morale is high in the section. The two LE staff members say that the workload is fair, especially now that a second local staff member is in place. They also indicate that there is esprit

de corps among U.S. and LE staff members and virtually no anti-Americanism. However, the position descriptions for both LE staff members lack sufficient specificity, stating simply that they “serve as [the] PAO’s principal advisor on South Sudan’s media environment and on a wide range of public policy issues.”

***Informal Recommendation 6:*** Embassy Juba should revise position descriptions for local employees in the public affairs section to define more accurately their cultural and information duties.

### ***Grants Management***

Inexperienced LE staff and the continuing reliance on Embassy Khartoum for some tasks have led to communications difficulties and incomplete grants files. Embassy Juba manages very few grants, but no grants have been registered in the Grants Database Management System since January 2012. Federal law requires that grants be registered in accordance with Grants Policy Directive 21. Embassy Khartoum had been registering the grants but now assumes that Juba has taken over. The PAO has no access to the Grants Database Management System.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Juba should update the registration of its grants to comply with Federal law. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Since the arrival of the current PAO, the public affairs section has written four grants. The grants files lack certain documents, such as completed DS-4012 (Federal Assistance File) forms, grants officer’s representative letters, final reports and accounting, and evidence of monitoring and of compliance with dates of the grant. These documents are essential to the proper expenditure and accounting of funds.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Juba should close all grants files with accurate and complete documentation. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### ***Cultural Affairs and Educational Exchanges***

The PAO uses a broad range of programs that demonstrate cultural sensitivity and showcase culture in the United States in the best light. Lack of venues and partners for cultural programs limits cultural programming, but the public affairs team has found innovative solutions. They have organized sports diplomacy programs (including an exchange of basketball coaches between the United States and South Sudan) and cultural groups such as Step Afrika, who performed with art history students and undergraduates in the visual arts.

Fulbright is the Department’s flagship graduate-level academic exchange program. Previous PAOs decided that conditions were not suitable to undertake this important program in South Sudan. The current PAO makes a convincing case for starting this program at any of four universities in the country. The educational benefits of a Fulbright program in the developing country of South Sudan justify further exploration of this option.

**Recommendation 17:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should assess whether to establish a Fulbright program in South Sudan and, if feasible, take such action. (Action: ECA, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

### ***Regional English Language Office***

A regional English language officer (RELO) based in Dar es Salaam supports Embassy Juba. The RELO covers 16 countries and was last in Juba in August 2011. The RELO report for that visit recommended a followup visit at the end of FY 2011 or early in FY 2012, but scheduling and visa difficulties have delayed a visit. The South Sudanese Government is eager to improve literacy in general and English language usage in particular. The RELO's support is essential to achieving this goal.

**Recommendation 18:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should fund a visit to Juba by the regional English language officer for South Sudan to do a needs analysis of English language programs. (Action: ECA)

### ***Regional Educational Advising Coordination***

A regional educational advising coordinator based in Accra supports Embassy Juba. The coordinator supports post's educational adviser, whose main task is to steer students toward higher education in the United States. The regional educational advising coordinator has not visited Juba, a necessary step to start an advising program.

**Recommendation 19:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should fund an initial regional educational advising coordinator visit to South Sudan to conduct a needs analysis for establishing an educational adviser position. (Action: ECA)

### **Broadcasting Board of Governors**

In May 2010, Voice of America launched a new program, "South Sudan in Focus." This radio program is supported by an allocation of \$1.5 million of Department funding to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) pursuant to an interagency agreement (IAA) under section 632(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.<sup>3</sup> The IAA pays for a 30-minute FM radio program that is broadcast by satellite to 13 affiliate stations in South Sudan 5 days per week. The funds include training for South Sudanese journalists and town halls that focus on journalism and freedom of speech issues. The stated objective of the IAA for FY 2013 is to build journalism capacity in South Sudan while continuing to broadcast "South Sudan in Focus." The Ambassador has spoken at the training sessions and public events, but the project is not otherwise coordinated with the embassy. BBG/Voice of America works with the Department in Juba and Washington on capacity-building projects for media in South Sudan. The IAA also supports BBG's 5-year strategic plan, *Impact through Innovation and Integration*, goal 11, Spur Development through Targeted Media Initiatives and Training. The current extension of the IAA will expire at the end of FY 2013.

In 2012, BBG pursued an option of installing FM radio transmitters at U.S. embassies to reach local audiences in Africa. This option supports the BBG's 5-year strategic plan, including goal 3, Seize Target Growth Opportunities; goal 5, Rationalize Program Delivery; and goal 9, Engage the World in Conversation about America. A BBG technical team installed a 1 kW radio transmitter on the embassy residential compound grounds with an antenna placed atop a 90-foot

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<sup>3</sup> 22 U.S.C. 2392.

tower. The transmitter will broadcast Voice of America programs in English to an estimated population of 400,000 in the greater Juba area. BBG senior staff commented that placing the transmitter and associated equipment on embassy property is cost effective and more secure than building off compound. In June 2011, BBG acquired the necessary license from the Ministry of Information that paved the way to serve the country in its two official languages, English and Arabic, through affiliates as well as new stations to be built and programmed by the BBG. At the time of the inspection, there were no immediate plans to broadcast in Arabic. BBG completed radiation hazard studies and worked with the embassy so that there is no interference with any embassy communications systems. The BBG FM transmitter became fully operational in Juba on March 7, 2013.

### **Consular Affairs**

Embassy Juba began providing limited consular services in 2012. The consular section processes only official nonimmigrant (A and G) visas, issues emergency passports, provides notarial services, and accepts passport applications.

#### *Consular Staffing*

One part-time entry-level officer on his first tour staffs the section. He has done an outstanding job coping with the difficult environment and lack of consular infrastructure. His position is 40 percent consular and 60 percent political, but he spends the majority of time on consular issues. There is no consular LE staff, so the officer also serves as consular cashier and prints visas and emergency passports. He does not have time to carry out regular consular business, set up consular systems and resources from scratch, prepare the first-ever submissions of the consular package and certification of consular management controls from Juba, and also handle his political workload. Lack of adequate training and operational support has led to deficiencies in internal controls and procedures.

**Recommendation 20:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should send a temporary duty consular officer to Embassy Juba to set up internal control systems and help prepare the consular package. (Action: CA)

As the sole consular officer at Embassy Juba, the entry-level officer is required to handle consular internal controls and accountability issues for which the Department provided him only limited training. To avoid serious consequences at post, it is essential that any sole consular officer receive adequate training prior to beginning his or her assignment.

**Recommendation 21:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should implement a policy requiring that any sole consular officer assigned to Embassy Juba complete the Consular Section Chief Basics Course (PC 550) prior to beginning the assignment. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

*Informal Recommendation 7:* Embassy Juba should work with the Bureau of Consular Affairs to determine what additional job-related training the current consular officer should receive in the months remaining in his tour and to provide this training.

The embassy has not hired any consular LE staff, although it has begun advertising for a position. The section cannot function adequately without a trained LE staff member to handle scheduling, intake, printing, and translation. The consular officer does not have the experience or time to train a new employee, so the individual will need to travel to a nearby post for training. With that position filled, Embassy Juba will not need the consular eligible family member position requested in its 2014 Mission Resource Request.

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Juba should fill the consular locally employed staff position without delay. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide funding for any new consular local employee to travel to a post neighboring Juba for training. (Action: CA)

### *Consular Facilities and Workload*

There is no office space available for a consular work area and no consular hard line or interview area. Consular space consists of a 9 x 7 foot storage closet that opens directly off the embassy cafeteria. The “consular closet” contains a workstation with consular peripheral equipment, an Automated Cash Register System machine, and a two-drawer safe holding all consular controlled items. The power connections are so limited that the officer cannot have the document printer and passport laminator plugged in at the same time.

The local protocol assistant runs a rudimentary appointment system and assists with intake on the one morning a week the section provides normal consular services. Members of the public seeking consular services enter the compound access control building and sit in the entryway on a wooden bench. The officer stands in the guard’s work area and speaks to the individuals through a window with a deal tray. The absence of a microphone makes it difficult to conduct conversations, especially with the noise from other persons entering the compound access control building and the guards in their working area conducting radio and telephone conversations. There is no privacy, as other visitors are passing immediately by the consular applicants. The embassy has put up a curtain to shield applicants, but this visual barrier does not prevent others from overhearing their conversations. In sensitive cases, guards clear the applicant through security, and the consular officer meets him or her outside for a face-to-face conversation. These conditions will not improve until construction of a new embassy building. The Bureau of Consular Affairs has agreed to fund a microphone system, but the embassy has not procured the equipment.

**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should order and install a microphone system for the consular interview window. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

Standard measurements of consular productivity do not apply in Juba. After the officer has collected documents and any fees from the applicant, he walks across the compound to the consular workspace, deposits the fee in the Automated Cash Register System machine, and processes the case. He then walks back to the compound access control building and delivers the materials to the applicant. This process is awkward and more time consuming than similar services would be in a more traditional section. The consular section has dealt with several complex high-profile cases in recent months, including an arrest case involving an American

citizen with serious medical issues, which generated significant congressional interest; a death case in a remote part of the country; a medical evacuation of a patient on the verge of death; and a number of arrest cases. The lack of basic transportation and communication infrastructure and the limited capacity of the newly installed government make Juba one of the most challenging environments in the world for consular work.

### *Consular Procedures*

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement is the ruling party in South Sudan. Members of the party and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, are subject to possible visa ineligibility under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It does not appear that Embassy Juba, and possibly other posts handling visa applications from members of these organizations, have been processing these applications correctly by finding them ineligible under Section 212(a)(3)(B) and then seeking appropriate waivers. The Bureau of Consular Affairs had not noticed this problem until the OIG team pointed it out.

**Recommendation 25:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide Embassy Juba and other posts in the region with front-channel guidance on processing visa applications from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudan People's Liberation Army and update the South Sudan reciprocity schedule with this guidance. (Action: CA)

In the past, Embassy Juba accepted applications and collected fees for Consular Reports of Birth Abroad and then sent the documents and cash to Embassy Khartoum for processing. In May 2012, the Bureau of Consular Affairs instructed Embassies Juba and Khartoum to cease this practice. Embassy Khartoum returned to Embassy Juba 13 files containing Consular Reports of Birth Abroad applications. Those files are still with Embassy Juba. The applicants had paid fees, but because Embassy Juba does not process applications for Consular Reports of Birth Abroad, it cannot take further action on the cases. Embassy Juba could either forward these cases to another post or return the documents and refund fees to the applicants so that they can apply elsewhere.

**Informal Recommendation 8:** Embassy Juba should seek guidance from the Bureau of Consular Affairs as to how to dispose of the 13 pending Consular Report of Birth Abroad files.

Embassy Juba processes only A and G nonimmigrant visas. Referrals for other visa categories go to Embassy Nairobi under a memorandum of understanding between the two embassies. There is a history of misunderstandings, missed travel, and recriminations between them, however. Embassy Juba has not always understood the requirements of the referral program and visa policy and appears to have attempted to intervene inappropriately in some visa cases. Embassy Nairobi has not always displayed an understanding of conditions in South Sudan. On a related issue, Embassy Juba has not issued an embassy notice explaining the Department's visa referral policy. Better communication and understanding between the two embassies would foster team spirit, clarify points of policy, and improve operational efficiency.

**Recommendation 26:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide funding for an annual trip to Juba by the Nairobi consul general or other consular manager. (Action: CA)

*Informal Recommendation 9:* Embassy Juba should publish an embassy notice containing written guidance about the referral policy.

## Resource Management

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local-Hire Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff	Total Funding FY 2012
<b>Department</b>					
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	10		3	13	\$728,400
<sup>1</sup> ICASS	1		2	3	\$0
Public Diplomacy Representation	1		2	3	\$254,900
				0	\$19,200
<sup>2</sup> Diplomatic Security	2		156	158	\$0
INL	1		1	2	\$491,000
<sup>3</sup> Consular			1	1	\$0
<b>DOD</b>					
Defense Attaché Office	1			1	\$4,700
Office of Defense Cooperation	1			1	\$40,000
<b>Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</b>	1		4	5	\$335,600
<sup>4</sup> USAID	39		105	144	\$370,680,779
<b>Totals</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>274</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>\$372,554,579</b>

<sup>1</sup>Funded under Khartoum ICASS; no separate funding.

<sup>2</sup>Funded under Khartoum diplomatic security; no separate funding.

<sup>3</sup>New position established in FY 2013.

<sup>4</sup>Staff includes 24 U.S. direct hires, 7 U.S. personal services contracts, and 8 third country national personal services contracts.

Embassy Juba faces serious challenges providing management support for diplomatic and development assistance programs. Inadequate facilities and ineffective International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) are major hindrances.

(b) (5) facilities adversely affects staffing levels, program oversight, normalization of tours of duty, and presence of EFMs. The Department has postponed construction of a new embassy compound (NEC) pending acquisition of a suitable building site. The NEC, originally planned for FY 2013, now is scheduled for FY 2018. Post-Benghazi security concerns have frozen plans for an interim office building that would alleviate space shortages until completion of the NEC. The potential move of the capital from Juba, though deemed by many to be improbable, is also a variable in the NEC equation. In the meantime, office facilities are insufficient to accommodate necessary personnel and their functions, with no relief in sight short of the NEC. Although many employees work in 3.1-square-meter cubicles, the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation’s January 2012 rightsizing review projects the addition of 79 desk positions by 2016.

The Department must consider office facilities in the context of many critical and often competing factors, including managing risk at high-threat posts, implementing and achieving important foreign policy objectives, providing safe and secure facilities in difficult operating environments, and overseeing annual foreign assistance that in FY 2012 totaled \$632 million. A NEC is the long-term solution. In the meantime, the status quo places the embassy in a losing position with regard to the factors listed above. A decision on whether and how to provide

additional office facilities pending completion of a NEC is key. Unless and until Washington makes that decision, the embassy cannot tailor its management platform to match any ensuing change in mission parameters.

**Recommendation 27:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should complete a risk/cost/benefit analysis that yields a decision on the question of constructing an interim office building pending completion of a new embassy compound in Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with DS and OBO)

ICASS services affect embassy operations and morale. USAID provides basic life support ICASS services, which are generally adequate. Embassy Khartoum provides the remaining ICASS services, but that relationship is ill defined and poorly executed, resulting in inadequate services to Juba and dissatisfaction on both sides. An uneasy relationship has worsened over time, particularly as Embassy Khartoum has operated since September 2012 in ordered departure status with minimal management staffing.

There is no matrix or clear definition of services that Khartoum should provide Juba. There are no defined processes for basic tasks, such as filing for medical reimbursements or requesting procurement of goods and services. There is no ownership on the part of Khartoum for its obligations to Juba. Instead, there is miscommunication, mistrust, and blame for breakdowns in support. For its part, Embassy Juba has not had a Department officer who could coordinate with ICASS service providers and focus on management policies and programs.

An officer is scheduled to arrive in March 2013 to fill a newly established management position. Position priorities include repairing basic processes, such as medical reimbursements and simple procurement, and drafting a long-term plan for the provision of ICASS services. Transition of ICASS services from USAID to a Department provider will be particularly difficult to plan, as the timing is unclear. The Bureau of African Affairs intends to establish three ICASS positions in FY 2014. Other indications are that transition is tied to construction of the NEC. For the time being, space constraints and the operating environment argue for continued use of remote support services.

The Bureau of African Affairs has considered various options to shift administrative support from Embassy Khartoum to another post but has deferred action until the new management officer's arrival. Any arrangement will depend on clear and enforced roles, responsibilities, accountability, and processes for services outsourced to another post. Also key will be the servicing post's ability to take ownership of the support platform and be involved in and work collaboratively with Embassy Juba to define systems and processes and ensure they work. A memorandum of understanding is also important to document the relationship and deliverables, including the number and frequency of site visits.

**Recommendation 28:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should implement immediate and transitional plans for provision of International Cooperative and Administrative Support Services to Embassy Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

Another area requiring improvement is communication of management information. The embassy is building a SharePoint site and beginning to use it to disseminate information. SharePoint and other electronic tools allow outreach to American and LE staff. However, SharePoint is not available to all embassy employees. For example, most local guards do not have access to OpenNet Plus and thus cannot access SharePoint. In this and related areas, embassy leadership has not exercised sufficient oversight. The embassy's failure to announce beforehand the visit of the human resources officer so that employees could take advantage of his rare presence at post provides yet another example.

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Juba should implement procedures to disseminate management information to staff in a timely manner. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### **Financial Management**

Embassy Khartoum provides financial management services to Embassy Juba, including processing vouchers and allotment accounting for program, ICASS, representation, and public diplomacy. Financial management services scored a low 2.64 out of 5 on the OIG Workplace and Quality of Life questionnaire. Vouchering payments through Embassy Khartoum takes time and results in occasional delays, especially for LE staff medical and bank fee reimbursements. Some employees also complained of delays in processing travel vouchers.

#### *Cashier Operations*

The only financial management staff member at Embassy Juba is the principal Class B cashier, who took over from the USAID cashier in October 2012. His current accountability is (b) (5), which includes a temporary increase of (b) (5). The cashier is doing a commendable job considering the difficulties in obtaining U.S. dollars and even local currency. An OIG inspector observed a cash verification, which showed the cashier in balance. However, a large number of accommodation exchange receipts, payments, deposits, and vouchers in transit dated as far back as August 2012. The cash verification officer had to go through hundreds of documents to verify the in-transit status of various items. The designated financial management assistant had not cleared these items in the cashier system, and there were errors in accounting data. The embassy has designated a new financial management assistant, the USAID controller, who has begun clearing most of these items. Embassy Khartoum is working on correcting fund cites to allow processing of the vouchers in question. The information management officer is currently the designated cash verification officer. The management officer, who is due to arrive in March 2013, may take over that function.

#### *Availability of Hard Currency*

South Sudan's shortage of hard currency has affected the ability of the U.S. disbursing officer bank, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, to provide U.S. dollars to the embassy. Most dollar payments are for accommodation exchange for travel outside South Sudan, LE staff travel advances, travel vouchers, and LE staff bank fees and medical reimbursements. The embassy is seeking a possible solution in coordination with a DOD finance unit based in Uganda and the U.S. disbursing officer at Global Financial Services in Charleston. The OIG team supports this effort.

*Banking Services for Locally Employed Staff Salaries*

The embassy is trying to change the bank into which LE staff pay is deposited. The current bank charges 10 percent for deposits as well as fees for withdrawals. The embassy reimburses individual employees for the deposit fee, which is a time-consuming and labor-intensive activity for the local guard force clerk, the Class B cashier, and Embassy Khartoum. The embassy intends to establish an agreement with a different bank that details specific terms and conditions, including bank charges payable by the embassy rather than by individual employees, and that provides for a teller and an automated teller machine at the embassy. A new agreement was pending at the time of the inspection. The OIG team supports this initiative, which should streamline salary deposits and reduce time spent on fee reimbursements.

*U.S. Agency for International Development Cashier Closeout*

The USAID Class B cashier, who was accountable to the Embassy Khartoum financial management officer, ceased operations on October 1, 2012; however, about (b) (5) remains in accountability that must be settled before it can be closed out. Outstanding interim advances and receipts for approximately (b) (5) also must be settled, along with bank fees charged by the Kenya Commercial Bank. The plan is to turn over the remaining funds, cashier receipts, and charges for bank fees of (b) (5) to the Department cashier, complete with documentation, to settle the account with the U.S. disbursing officer.

Per 4 *Foreign Affairs Handbook* (FAH)-3 H-398.1-2, when there is a permanent change of cashiers, the financial management officer at the servicing post should submit a memorandum for the record, which includes specific information about the outgoing and incoming cashier and any notes on outstanding discrepancies. Once funds and documentation are transferred to the new cashier, the principal officer of the embassy designates in writing two employees, one a U.S. citizen, to verify the cashier's funds. One person must be a U.S. citizen direct-hire officer, preferably trained in cashier operations. All of the verification requirements of 4 FAH-3 H-397.1 must be performed and documented at the time of the transfer.

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services and Embassy Khartoum, should reconcile the U.S. Agency for International Development cashier accountability and close out the account with the U.S. disbursing officer. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CGFS and Embassy Khartoum)

*Alternate Cashier*

There is no designated alternate cashier to the principal Class B cashier as required per 4 FAH-3 H-398.1-1. The alternate must have an advance sufficient to last at least 5 workdays, which is to be safeguarded properly at all times for use during unanticipated brief absences of the Class B cashier. For a planned temporary absence of less than 5 workdays, the Class B cashier issues an additional temporary advance to the alternate in an amount estimated to be sufficient for continuous cashier operations during the Class B cashier's absence.

**Informal Recommendation 10:** Embassy Juba should designate an alternate cashier and issue a cash advance.

The embassy makes payments exceeding \$500 without the necessary approval as an emergency payment. Per 4 FAH-3 H394.1-2 b., a cash payment should not exceed \$500, except in the case of a bona fide emergency. The embassy has requested an extension of the waiver to the \$500 limitation on cash payments because South Sudan is a cash economy and many payments require cash. The DCM is designated to approve emergency cash payments over \$500. However, there is no signature approving such payments on a sampling of vouchers. In addition, the cashier is required to have an emergency payment stamp affixed to the voucher to be signed by the authorized official. By adhering to this procedure, the embassy will limit payments over \$500 only to actual emergencies.

***Informal Recommendation 11:*** Embassy Juba should affix an emergency payment stamp to any payments exceeding \$500 and have the deputy chief of mission sign them before disbursement

### ***Representation Allowance***

Embassy Juba lacks a representation program as required by 3 FAM 3246, which calls for a post-specific policy for the use of representation funds that is consistent with mission goals and objectives. Such a plan would facilitate the allocation of funds to various sections of the mission. The embassy has not established a procedure for reimbursing expenses for various types of entertainment or dollar limits for various types of representation activities. This plan is especially important given limited representation funds.

***Informal Recommendation 12:*** Embassy Juba should implement a representation plan based on promoting mission goals and objectives and prepare an allotment of funds that the chief of mission can allocate to embassy sections.

***Informal Recommendation 13:*** Embassy Juba should issue a management notice describing procedures for submitting representation claims and establishing per capita limits for various types of entertainment.

### ***U.S. Dollar Accommodation Exchange***

An OIG inspector noted numerous accommodation exchange transactions in U.S. dollar Treasury checks that represented proceeds from the Defined Contribution Plan for retirement paid to locally resident retired USAID employees. Per 4 FAH-3 H-391.1, such payments should be made by electronic funds transfer or other noncash mechanism. However, the shortage of hard currency in South Sudan argues for continuation of the payments until the economy and banking system stabilize and hard currency is more consistently available. In the meantime, the payments increase the cashier's workload, cash advance, and associated risk. The team counseled the embassy on the need to monitor and reevaluate the payments and cease them when appropriate.

### **Human Resources**

Embassy Khartoum provides human resources services in Juba. Most authorized positions (156 of 165 for the Department) are local guards hired under personal services agreements by Embassy Khartoum. Juba employees complain of lack of support and express mistrust of the human resources staff in Khartoum. An experienced human resources officer has

visited Juba only twice during his tenure, the last time in July 2012 in conjunction with a survey conducted by the Office of Overseas Employment. The services that the Embassy Khartoum human resources unit provide receive mixed reviews. On the OIG Workplace and Quality of Life questionnaire, the human resources unit scored a 2.43 out of 5 for both American and LE staff.

### *Locally Employed Staff*

Constrained by a shortage of office space and hindered by a slow hiring process, Embassy Juba has not added enough local employees to meet its needs. Instead, it has created some mixed positions that carry disparate responsibilities. As a result, some LE staff members have assumed duties that are unworkable. One employee, for example, performs a combination of key protocol, consular, and timekeeper duties. Optimum employee performance depends on clearly defined work functions and capabilities and on a rational staffing pattern with the right number of appropriately qualified employees.

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Juba should implement a plan to align locally employed staff positions and functions, update and classify job descriptions as needed, assess workload, and establish a rational staffing pattern that meets mission requirements. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### *Local Compensation Plan*

Embassy Juba employees fall under the Embassy Khartoum local compensation plan and consequently receive the same salaries and benefits as employees in Khartoum. In July 2012 the Bureau of Human Resources, Office of Overseas Employment conducted a salary and benefits survey of local comparators in Juba as part of its development of a separate compensation plan. The comparators represented a small sample of international organizations in South Sudan. Survey results reflected lower salary levels and differences in allowances paid in Juba compared to Khartoum. When this plan is implemented, current employees will be paid according to the new, lower salary schedule but will also receive a Temporary Schedule Revision Allowance to make up the difference. New employees will receive the new base salary rate and benefits. Once the Office of Overseas Employment prepares the local leave plan, the new local compensation plan for Juba will be complete. The differences in payments to existing and new employees will likely present management challenges. The OIG team emphasized to embassy management the need for transparency and communication with LE staff throughout the process.

### *Medical Insurance Plan*

The Office of Overseas Employment has completed the medical plan portion of the local compensation plan for Embassy Juba. The embassy's Foreign Service National committee identified lack of a medical insurance plan as a major concern. LE staff complained about the problems with coverage and the time-consuming process of obtaining reimbursement for medical expenses. The committee emphasized to inspectors the need for a comprehensive insurance program that covers health care provided in Uganda and Kenya, as many of the employees' families live outside South Sudan. At the time of the inspection, Embassy Khartoum's general services office was preparing to issue a solicitation for a medical insurance plan for Embassy Juba.

### *Time and Attendance Reporting*

Time and attendance reporting is inefficient, time consuming, and lacks adequate management controls. The process now goes through Embassy Khartoum. Eliminating Embassy Khartoum from the chain would remove the need to scan and email timesheets to Khartoum and would allow employees to submit timesheets later in the pay period and reduce the number of corrections subsequently necessary to reflect actual hours worked. Creation and review of summary reports of time and attendance would improve internal controls. Finally, access to Windows Time and Attendance would allow direct reporting of time and attendance and automate some steps that the embassy now performs manually. These improvements would bring post more in compliance with 4 FAH-3 H-526, which governs time and attendance and leave reporting procedures and designation of timekeepers. In short, direct reporting from Embassy Juba would be more efficient and timely.

**Recommendation 32:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services and Embassy Khartoum, should implement a plan for training the main timekeeper in Juba and installing the Windows Time and Attendance program to allow Juba to report time and attendance directly to the payroll office, eliminating the need to go through Embassy Khartoum. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CGFS and Embassy Khartoum)

### *Embassy Awards Program*

The presentation of awards provides an opportunity for supervisors to demonstrate their high regard and appreciation for employee contributions. The embassy for its part has issued 10 awards, mostly in the Extra Mile category, during the past year but has not held a formal awards ceremony in more than a year and a half. This approach does little to encourage supervisors to recognize performance through awards and has a negative effect on morale. Department guidance in 3 FAH-1 H-4815 on the presentation of awards specifies that award ceremonies should be held as soon as practicable after the approval of nominees and that a senior embassy official should present the awards.

**Recommendation 33:** Embassy Juba should carry out an awards program that complies with Department of State regulations and hold awards ceremonies twice a year, as prescribed in the locally employed staff handbook. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### *Training Plan*

There is no systematic training program and very few training opportunities for Embassy Juba employees. Department regulation 3 FAH-2 H-312 a. (7) mandates establishing and maintaining training programs to enable employees to meet their work requirements and to develop career potential. The Mission Sudan training policy developed by the human resources office in Khartoum has not been adapted or disseminated to American and LE staff in Juba. A training plan would allow the embassy to plan efficiently for proper employee development. In addition, creating individual development plans for each employee would allow managers and staff to improve employee job skills.

**Recommendation 34:** Embassy Juba should implement a staff training plan. (Action: Embassy Juba)

***Post Orientation Program for American and Locally Employed Staff***

There is no formal orientation program for new American and LE staff. At present, employees receive only forms to complete and a copy of the Locally Employed Staff Handbook. They are not briefed on mission goals and objectives or activities and operations of the embassy.

According to 3 FAM 7244, all new LE staff members should be given assistance in adjusting to their employment and advised fully regarding the conditions of mission employment by means of a planned orientation program. They should receive this orientation as an integral part of the appointment process.

Newly arrived American employees simply receive a check-in sheet and find their way around some, but not all, of the various offices. Ideally, in accordance with 2 FAM 113.7-4, the community liaison office coordinator is responsible for organizing employee orientations. If there is no community liaison office coordinator, as in Juba, the embassy should arrange for another staff member to provide employee orientations.

***Informal Recommendation 14:*** Embassy Juba should implement an orientation program for newly arrived Americans and recently appointed locally employed staff.

**General Services**

***Supply Chain Management***

Embassy Juba's supply chain management system relies largely on Embassy Khartoum, particularly for procurement and financial management. Only four Embassy Juba employees have the Integrated Logistics Management System access necessary to submit purchase requests. Other employees are untrained on the system and/or unaware of it. USAID is also involved in the process, as it receives goods and transfers them to the ordering office, but the USAID clerk does not have access to the Integrated Logistics Management System to view purchases that are destined for Juba. He instead depends on information emailed to him by the Embassy Khartoum procurement unit. Customers complained of the difficulty in ordering simple items, the lack of feedback during the process, and the time the process takes. Frequent turnover of personnel, the limited number of users trained in the Integrated Logistics Management System, and the lack of personnel assigned to track procurements hinder the smooth, timely, and consistent functioning of the supply chain management system. The system is not defined or transparent to those involved and does not function well, making goods vulnerable to loss or theft.

**Recommendation 35:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should define its supply chain management system, including ordering, receiving, shipping, paying, and controlling, and define and enforce responsibilities, accountability, and internal controls. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with AF)

### ***Motor Pool Operations***

USAID provides motor pool support to Embassy Juba, but the Ambassador retains responsibility in accordance with 14 FAM 432.5 for countrywide policies regarding business and other authorized use of vehicles. This service is especially important in Juba, where the motor pool is the sole source of motor transportation, as the embassy does not allow personally owned vehicles or the use of public transportation. The embassy has not documented its motor vehicle policy in a memorandum and provided uniform, fair, and equitable service among personnel. A comprehensive policy and standard operating procedures would specify priorities, standards, and practices, thereby clarifying expectations for customers and motor pool personnel.

**Recommendation 36:** Embassy Juba should implement a motor vehicle policy in accordance with Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Reporting and program staff have been unable to travel efficiently. They have missed important meetings in Juba because a motor pool driver was unavailable. Because of a driver shortage, embassy policy is not to have drivers wait for officers when they are engaged in off-compound meetings. This policy results in a wait of 30 minutes or longer for pickup, reducing productivity. The embassy is hiring additional drivers, which should help resolve this problem.

Motor pool drivers work 8 hours a day, 6 days a week. A review of time and attendance records indicates numerous instances in which driver shifts exceed 10 hours, which violates Department policy and poses a safety risk to drivers and passengers. During one pay period, 7 drivers exceeded 10-hour shifts 21 times. On four occasions, driver shifts exceeded 20 hours. USAID, which provides motor pool services, recently hired three motor pool employees and expressed intent to hire as many as five more. This staffing increase should reduce the motor pool workload and allow scheduling that will reduce, if not eliminate, the number of driver shifts that exceed 10 consecutive hours. Embassy Juba is responsible for complying with the 10-hour rule.

**Recommendation 37:** Embassy Juba should implement a plan that limits drivers to 10-hour shifts, in compliance with Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Juba)

### **Facilities**

USAID provides most facilities management support of nonresidential and residential properties, outsourcing much of it to a contractor, Africa Expeditions. The Department pays for the services it receives via an ICASS invoice. The staff residential units are modular containers and are adequate.

The controlled access area workspace lacks adequate thermostatic controls, resulting in a constant temperature of about 55 degrees Fahrenheit. Employees are unable to work effectively under those conditions for any length of time, even when wearing heavy clothing.

**Recommendation 38:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should repair the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system in the Embassy Juba controlled access area. (Action: OBO)

## **Fire Protection, Safety, Health, and Environmental Management**

Aspects of Embassy Juba's fire protection and safety, health, and environmental management programs are in place and working. Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations specialists paid assessment and assistance visits to Juba in December 2008 and February 2012. A recently arrived USAID officer has assumed responsibilities as the post occupational safety and health officer. An LE maintenance supervisor assists him and has the requisite training. Survey information from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations indicated progress in mitigating deficiencies noted in its assessment reports.

The OIG team noted insufficient front office involvement in the overall safety program. In accordance with 15 FAM 933, the embassy established a safety, health, and environmental management committee, but it has yet to meet despite the 15 FAM 933.2 a. requirement to do so at least semiannually. The embassy also does not comply with the 15 FAM 957.3 requirement to implement a motor vehicle safety management program. For example, it does not have a driver safety training program, such as the Department-standard Smith System or other approved method. The operating environment in Juba, shortage of adequate medical facilities, and limited medical evacuation capabilities increase the importance of safety and health programs.

**Recommendation 39:** Embassy Juba should implement a safety, health, and environmental management program in accordance with Department of State regulations. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Some employees questioned the safety of a specific airline that the embassy uses for official travel. The OIG team could not substantiate the basis for the concerns, but an inspector advised the USAID executive officer and the embassy's acting management officer of the correct process, should the embassy seek to prohibit flying on a specific airline.

## **Information Management**

The information management section works under difficult conditions to meet the embassy's computer needs. For the most part, the section is successful. A small staff, severe space limitations, poor local communications infrastructure, and regular power fluctuations that cause equipment damage hinder staff's ability to provide quality service. In this environment, the section provides adequate computer support to a continuous flow of short-term visitors and a permanent staff with significant reporting requirements. The two-person information management section coordinates well with other offices, and the embassy benefits from their advanced technical skills.

Information management staff is responsible for two computer networks, user support, account management for approximately 105 users, and the radio and Department cell phone programs. One experienced officer, who shares tasks with one LE staff computer operator, manages the information management section. The two-person section is professional and competent. However, because the workload is ample for two people, the embassy often requests temporary assistance from the regional bureau when one of the employees takes leave or attends training.

USAID operates a separate network that is not attached to Department networks. The information management office has no oversight of the USAID network or its computer technicians. The embassy's emergency communications systems are in good working order and tested in accordance with Department standards. Spares inventories are minimal, due to space limitations and a local policy to minimize emergency destruction times. USAID manages telephone and pouch mail programs, which are normally under information management's purview. Juba's first Global Information Technology Modernization installation, scheduled for March 2013, will replace the current expeditionary pack of servers and provide the unclassified network with new servers, switches, and cabling.

### *Network Performance*

Embassy Juba has a small controlled access area with three workstations. The room serves approximately 26 network users plus a handful of visitors at any given time. A sluggish network with long download times is sometimes impracticable, particularly for visitors who attempt to access their home accounts. Timeouts occur regularly, and data exchange is sometimes difficult. Members of the OIG team observed first hand the slow network, waiting 3 minutes for a page download in one instance. The Ambassador and others have commented on the lack of quick, secure, and reliable communications.

According to 1 FAM 275.1-2, the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) is responsible for ensuring the reliable operations and performance of classified and unclassified Internet-working systems and network services. The OIG team observed that Embassy Juba's network performance is still not adequate, despite emails and telephone correspondence among the embassy, the Bureau of African Affairs, and IRM that have contributed to only slight improvements over time. The OIG team confirmed with IRM that, although there is no established measurement to articulate and test the actual user experience in Juba, IRM has conducted testing/analysis of the embassy's network performance and has taken steps to improve it. IRM's remediation efforts have been limited due to the lack of reliable communications services available in Juba and the embassy's sole reliance on its VSAT Systems satellite system. Unreliable network services interrupt operations and can result in loss of data.

**Recommendation 40:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with Bureau of Information Resource Management, should document specific network inadequacies and work with systems specialists to improve the embassy's capacity for quick, secure, and reliable communications on both the unclassified and classified systems. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with IRM)

### *Information Technology Licenses*

Embassy Juba is not in compliance with Department and Federal regulations designed to safeguard against licensing violations and copyright infringements. According to 5 FAM 915.11, "all software running on Department systems must have a valid license." The hurry to establish the embassy in 2011 had the Bureau of African Affairs improvising to acquire the embassy's computer workstation from multiple sources. Though all of the software came from Department sources, the embassy has no record and cannot prove the equipment is licensed. The equipment associated with the upcoming Global Information Technology Modernization installation is on site and came with licenses, but the embassy cannot produce licenses for approximately 55 workstations. It is important that the embassy work with the Bureau of African Affairs to identify

enterprise licenses, unused licenses, or new licenses for these workstations to address this deficiency.

**Recommendation 41:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should obtain valid licenses for all embassy computer software. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with AF)

### *Consular Systems*

The OIG team found evidence of at least five outages of computer equipment and programs that disrupted visa processing or American citizens services since the installation of consular systems in summer 2012. Three incidents resulted in delays of more than 10 days between reporting the problem to the Office of Consular Systems and Technology and a resolution. It further appears that passport applications the section has been submitting electronically to Washington have not been received in the U.S., and applicants had still not received passports many months after they applied in Juba. The embassy accepts some responsibility for the delays, because the entry-level officer handling consular duties also has significant political responsibilities and is sometimes unavailable during the times needed for testing a resolution. The continuing outages make the consular officer and the information management section concerned about possible systemic problems with the equipment or the installation process and warrant the immediate assistance of the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

**Recommendation 42:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should arrange the visit of a technician to Juba to resolve outstanding consular system problems. (Action: CA, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

## **Quality of Life**

### **Health Unit**

#### ***Regional Medical Officer Visits***

A Foreign Service health practitioner is based at Embassy Juba. A regional medical officer and a regional psychiatrist at Embassy Nairobi also serve the embassy. Medical evacuations are possible only during daylight hours; there have been three since August 2012. Given the stressful nature of assignment to Embassy Juba and the limited medical infrastructure in South Sudan, it is important that the regional psychiatrist and the regional medical officer visit the embassy as often as practicable to assess the health services and consult with the health practitioner.

***Informal Recommendation 15:*** Embassy Juba should schedule visits from the regional medical officer and regional psychiatrist.

#### ***Local Nursing Coverage***

The Foreign Service health practitioner provides clinical services and supervises the operation of the health unit in accordance with 16 FAM 113.5. There is no local medical advisor providing support on a continuous basis. In addition, the practitioner participates in annual nurses training and conferences. Arranging coverage during her absence is sometimes difficult.

***Informal Recommendation 16:*** Embassy Juba should implement a plan to provide temporary coverage during the absence of the Foreign Service health practitioner.

## Management Controls

The chief of mission's annual statement of assurance underscored the distribution of management control responsibilities for the mission among Embassy Juba, USAID, and Embassy Khartoum. The statement did not mention any specific weakness. The OIG team recognized the challenges to maintaining adequate controls and mandatory programs in Juba's difficult operating environment and with a small staff that already shoulders considerable workload. Nonetheless, the OIG team identified some deficiencies.

### Financial Management

#### *Consular Receipts*

There are problems with cash accountability in the consular section. The consular officer arrived with little cashier training and made some systems errors in his first months in operating the Automated Cash Register System. Following a December visit of the regional consular officer, the officer corrected some procedures, and he recently completed online cashier training.

#### *Cashier Operations*

The embassy does not have a procedure to verify subcashier advances on a scheduled basis. In accordance with 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3, unannounced cash verifications are required for subcashiers with advances over \$1,000 and quarterly verifications for advances of less than \$1,000. Without periodic cash counts, there is no safeguard against possible fraud or embezzlement of funds.

***Informal Recommendation 17:*** Embassy Juba should distribute a memo, complete with the appropriate forms, to all American supervisors of subcashiers, requiring them to perform unannounced cash reconciliations on a monthly or quarterly basis.

#### *Medical Reimbursements*

In accordance with the local compensation plan, the embassy reimburses LE staff for medical expenses. Embassy Khartoum prescribes this process, as Embassy Juba shares the same local compensation plan. An OIG inspector found the process as exercised by Embassy Juba to be unduly cumbersome, misunderstood by customers and service providers alike, and inconsiderate of Juba-specific factors. Some employees cited instances of reimbursement taking months. Some questioned the arbitrary requirement for employees to submit claims within 30 days of treatment, as many Juba employee family members reside in Uganda or Kenya. Medical benefits are one of the most complex, expensive, and sensitive components of the compensation plan. The challenge is to implement a process that is simple, fair, transparent, and timely, but with adequate controls to prevent fraud.

**Recommendation 43:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should implement a medical claims reimbursement process for local staff. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with AF)

**Visa Adjudication Review**

The DCM has not been carrying out required adjudication reviews for nonimmigrant visa cases. This failure weakens oversight of the consular function. Such oversight is critically important at Embassy Juba, where a first-tour officer handles consular operations.

**Recommendation 44:** Embassy Juba should require the deputy chief of mission to carry out required adjudication reviews for nonimmigrant visa cases. (Action: Embassy Juba)

## List of Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and the Bureau of African Affairs, should develop clear policy goals and objectives to guide policy engagement. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with S/USSESSS and AF)

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of African Affairs should fold the Sudan and South Sudan desks back into the bureau, once the conditions in the March 15, 2012, memo are met. (Action: AF)

**Recommendation 3:** The Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should implement procedures for obtaining embassy concurrence on planned foreign assistance projects. (Action: S/USSESSS, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should assign at least some incoming political/economic and public diplomacy officers to Embassy Juba to 2-year assignments, with the first year in either the Bureau of African Affairs or the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF)

**Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should approve Embassy Juba's FY 2014 Mission Resource Request for three eligible family member positions. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF)

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Juba should contact the Office of Civil Rights to gain official appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should install and provide training on information-sharing systems, including SharePoint, contact management, and records management systems, at Embassy Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, should develop a missionwide reporting plan. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with S/USSESSS)

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Juba should create a central biographic file that is accessible to Department of State personnel. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Juba should review the amount of in-country travel embassy staff has performed since the embassy changed its practice on chartering planes, identify reasons for the decrease, and adjust procedures as necessary. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Bureau of African Affairs, should add one mid-level political/economic officer position to increase reporting on refugee and other humanitarian issues by either creating a new position

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or transferring a position from Embassy Khartoum. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with DGHR and AF)

**Recommendation 12:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should upgrade position 10-004075 to FS-01, make FS-04 position number 10-004077 economic/consular, make FS-02 position number 14-121002 economic, and remove FS-02 position 10-125006 from the staffing pattern. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba and CA)

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Juba should draft a public affairs plan to address mission priorities. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Juba should draft a mission media plan for informing the South Sudanese public of the extent of U.S. Government assistance and of the efforts of the embassy. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Juba should update the registration of its grants to comply with Federal law. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Juba should close all grants files with accurate and complete documentation. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 17:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should assess whether to establish a Fulbright program in South Sudan and, if feasible, take such action. (Action: ECA, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 18:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should fund a visit to Juba by the regional English language officer for South Sudan to do a needs analysis of English language programs. (Action: ECA)

**Recommendation 19:** The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs should fund an initial regional educational advising coordinator visit to South Sudan to conduct a needs analysis for establishing an educational adviser position. (Action: ECA)

**Recommendation 20:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should send a temporary duty consular officer to Embassy Juba to set up internal control systems and help prepare the consular package. (Action: CA)

**Recommendation 21:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should implement a policy requiring that any sole consular officer assigned to Embassy Juba complete the Consular Section Chief Basics Course (PC 550) prior to beginning the assignment. (Action: CA, in coordination with DGHR)

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Juba should fill the consular locally employed staff position without delay. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide funding for any new consular local employee to travel to a post neighboring Juba for training. (Action: CA)

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**Recommendation 24:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should order and install a microphone system for the consular interview window. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

**Recommendation 25:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide Embassy Juba and other posts in the region with front-channel guidance on processing visa applications from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudan People's Liberation Army and update the South Sudan reciprocity schedule with this guidance. (Action: CA)

**Recommendation 26:** The Bureau of Consular Affairs should provide funding for an annual trip to Juba by the Nairobi consul general or other consular manager. (Action: CA)

**Recommendation 27:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should complete a risk/cost/benefit analysis that yields a decision on the question of constructing an interim office building pending completion of a new embassy compound in Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with DS and OBO)

**Recommendation 28:** The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba, should implement immediate and transitional plans for provision of International Cooperative and Administrative Support Services to Embassy Juba. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 29:** Embassy Juba should implement procedures to disseminate management information to staff in a timely manner. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 30:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services and Embassy Khartoum, should reconcile the U.S. Agency for International Development cashier accountability and close out the account with the U.S. disbursing officer. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CGFS and Embassy Khartoum)

**Recommendation 31:** Embassy Juba should implement a plan to align locally employed staff positions and functions, update and classify job descriptions as needed, assess workload, and establish a rational staffing pattern that meets mission requirements. (Action: Embassy Juba)

**Recommendation 32:** Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services and Embassy Khartoum, should implement a plan for training the main timekeeper in Juba and installing the Windows Time and Attendance program to allow Juba to report time and attendance directly to the payroll office, eliminating the need to go through Embassy Khartoum. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CGFS and Embassy Khartoum)

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**Recommendation 44:** Embassy Juba should require the deputy chief of mission to carry out required adjudication reviews for nonimmigrant visa cases. (Action: Embassy Juba)

## List of Informal Recommendations

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

***Informal Recommendation 1:*** Embassy Juba should implement a plan for entry-level officer development.

***Informal Recommendation 2:*** Embassy Juba should, after the official appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor, post information concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity program on its SharePoint Web site.

***Informal Recommendation 3:*** Embassy Juba should establish working groups for each Mission Resource Request objective.

***Informal Recommendation 4:*** Embassy Juba should start uploading informal reports on humanitarian developments to a content management system.

***Informal Recommendation 5:*** Embassy Juba should recreate a dedicated FSN-09 protocol position and hire an experienced specialist with strong local contacts and English language skills.

***Informal Recommendation 6:*** Embassy Juba should revise position descriptions for local employees in the public affairs section to define more accurately their cultural and information duties.

***Informal Recommendation 7:*** Embassy Juba should work with the Bureau of Consular Affairs to determine what additional job-related training the current consular officer should receive in the months remaining in his tour and to provide this training.

***Informal Recommendation 8:*** Embassy Juba should seek guidance from the Bureau of Consular Affairs as to how to dispose of the 13 pending Consular Report of Birth Abroad files.

***Informal Recommendation 9:*** Embassy Juba should publish an embassy notice containing written guidance about the referral policy.

***Informal Recommendation 10:*** Embassy Juba should designate an alternate cashier and issue a cash advance.

***Informal Recommendation 11:*** Embassy Juba should affix an emergency payment stamp to any payments exceeding \$500 and have the deputy chief of mission sign them before disbursement

***Informal Recommendation 12:*** Embassy Juba should implement a representation plan based on promoting mission goals and objectives and prepare an allotment of funds that the chief of mission can allocate to embassy sections.

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***Informal Recommendation 13:*** Embassy Juba should issue a management notice describing procedures for submitting representation claims and establishing per capita limits for various types of entertainment.

***Informal Recommendation 14:*** Embassy Juba should implement an orientation program for newly arrived Americans and recently appointed locally employed staff.

***Informal Recommendation 15:*** Embassy Juba should schedule visits from the regional medical officer and regional psychiatrist.

***Informal Recommendation 16:*** Embassy Juba should implement a plan to provide temporary coverage during the absence of the Foreign Service health practitioner.

***Informal Recommendation 17:*** Embassy Juba should distribute a memo, complete with the appropriate forms, to all American supervisors of subcashiers, requiring them to perform unannounced cash reconciliations on a monthly or quarterly basis.

## Principal Officials

	Name	Arrival Date
Ambassador	Susan D. Page	12/2011
Deputy Chief of Mission	Michael McClellan	9/2012
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Consular/Political	Oliver Mains	7/2012
Economic	Walter Miller	8/2012
Health Unit	Vickie Burnham	8/2012
Information Resources Management	Michael Dugan	7/2012
Management	Nancy B. Brannaman	3/2013
Political	James Liddle	8/2012
Public Affairs	Tiffany McGriff	8/2012
Regional Security	Robert Karpowski	6/2012
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	Mary Walz	9/2011
<b>Other Agencies:</b>		
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	Christi Murray (temporary duty)	Intermittently since 2010
Defense Attaché Office	USA Lt.Col. Clement Ketchum	May 2012
Joint Logistic Element	USN Lt. Tyler Marshburn	Oct 2012
Office of Security Cooperation	Filled by temporary duty personnel to May 2013	
Office of Transnational Issues	Patrick Haley	Sep 2012
U.S. Agency for International Development	William Brands	Aug 2012

## Abbreviations

AFRICOM	Combatant Command for Africa
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	U.S. Department of State
DOD	Department of Defense
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	<i>Foreign Affairs Handbook</i>
FAM	<i>Foreign Affairs Manual</i>
IAA	Interagency agreement
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
INL	International Law Enforcement
IRM	Bureau of Information Resource Management
LE	Locally employed (staff)
NEC	New embassy compound
PAO	Public affairs officer
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
RELO	Regional English language officer
S/USSESS	Office of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development



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