



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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Office of Inspections

May 2013

Compliance Followup Review of Embassy Beirut, Lebanon

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE COMPLIANCE FOLLOWUP REVIEW

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Compliance Followup Reviews (CFR) cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

The Office of Inspections may perform on-site CFRs to verify whether agreed-upon corrective actions for recommendations issued in previous reports were fully and properly implemented and to provide OIG with a quality assurance assessment of its work.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this CFR, the inspectors have: 1) reviewed the previous inspection report and the reported corrective actions; 2) distributed survey instruments to inspected entity(s) and compiled and analyzed the results to measure and report changes in the period between the previous inspection and this CFR; 3) conducted on-site interviews and reviewed and collected documentation to substantiate reported corrective actions; 4) addressed new, significant deficiencies or vulnerabilities identified in the CFR survey results and during the course of the on-site CFR and, where appropriate, issued new recommendations; and, 5) discussed the substance of the draft CFR report substance of the draft CFR report at the final meeting with the head of the inspected bureau/office or post.



United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability, and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H.W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General


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Key Judgments

- The Ambassador and the deputy chief of mission (DCM) have worked together effectively to create greater cohesion and information sharing in the community.
- The embassy effectively represents U.S. strategic and commercial interests and produces a high volume of valuable reporting that meets the needs of Washington policymakers.
- Physical security vulnerabilities at mission facilities, which include office buildings and residences, place employees at risk. Compliance with Overseas Security Policy Board standards is not possible at the current location. Construction of a new embassy compound (NEC) in Beirut, including office and residential facilities, was scheduled by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) as an alternate candidate for 2016. A NEC would address the security shortcomings of the present compound.
- The acting regional security officer (RSO) is proactive and widely respected.

(b) (5)



- Embassy security will improve with the construction of a NEC on recently acquired property, but Beirut is listed only as an alternate mission for 2016 in the Department of State (Department) Capital Security Construction Program.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where the Office of Inspector General (OIG) team did not identify problems that need to be corrected. This report should be read in conjunction with the classified security annex.

The CFR took place in Washington, DC, between January 4 and February 1, 2013, and in Beirut, Lebanon, between February 27 and March 9, 2013. (b) (6)



Background

Embassy Beirut was attacked twice by vehicle bombs in the 1980s, first at the previous chancery site and the second time at the current embassy compound. With the widening Syrian civil war, sectarian tensions and security incidents have increased in Lebanon. All the major Lebanese political parties have ties to one side or the other in the Syrian conflict, and there were recent armed clashes in Tripoli, the country's second-largest city, as well as growing problems in the Bekaa Valley and southern city of Sidon. There are credible reports that Hizballah is supporting the Syrian regime and has shelled Syrian rebel positions from positions inside Lebanon. From 1976 to 2005, Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. Hizballah started a brief but intense war with Israel in 2006.

The Syrian civil conflict has produced 325,000 registered refugees, and perhaps twice that number of Syrians and 32,000 Palestinians have relocated to Lebanon. Lebanon has a population of around 4 million. This influx of refugees has strained relations among Lebanon's sectarian communities (Shia, Sunni, and Christian) and between Lebanese and Syrians. U.S. forces have deployed twice in support of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and national unity: in 1958 and in 1982–83. U.S. assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese Internal Security Forces helps maintain stability in the current environment.

The current embassy is located on an 18-acre, high-security compound in a suburb 20 minutes from downtown Beirut. The embassy includes the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Commerce (local employees only) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Currently, the embassy has 71 U.S. direct-hire positions, 64 of which were filled in March 2013. Twenty to 30 temporary duty personnel routinely supplement the permanent staff. The embassy has 533 locally employed staff members.

The Department's threat rating for Beirut is critical for terrorism and political violence, but the embassy is not included in the Department's recent list of high-threat missions.¹

¹ *Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts of Diplomatic Security*, Department Notice 2012_11_175, dated November 30, 2012.

Evaluation of Compliance

The OIG team found that Embassy Beirut had complied with 32 of 34 formal recommendations and with all informal recommendations contained in the 2012 inspection report. A CFR automatically closes all formal and informal recommendations from the inspection, but these may be reissued by the CFR, as appropriate.


Of the 34 formal recommendations in the 2012 inspection report, 26 were closed before the CFR and 8 were open. Twenty-five of the 26 recommendations closed before the CFR remain closed, but the OIG team reissued Recommendation 24 dealing with an exception for the location of the unclassified server room and telephone private branch exchange server room. The OIG team closed 7 of the 8 previously open recommendations (Recommendations 5, 9, 15, 17, 18, 23, and 26). The OIG team revised and reissued a previously closed recommendation (Recommendation 27) dealing with mail screening.

Of the 13 informal recommendations, the OIG team closed all of them.

Leadership and Advocacy

The embassy effectively represents U.S. strategic and commercial interests and produces a high volume of valuable reporting that meets the needs of Washington policymakers. The Ambassador and DCM work effectively together to overcome the polarization of the community that characterized the environment at the time of the November 2011 inspection. They encourage openness, debate, and two-way information sharing. The front office conducts semimonthly all-hands meetings with American staff members and their dependents. The Ambassador and DCM schedule regular open door sessions for staff to raise questions, and the Ambassador also hosts a semimonthly roundtable with locally employed staff members. A monthly policy review meeting has encouraged information sharing and brainstorming. The DCM has developed and implemented an effective first- and second-tour officer professional development program.

(b) (5)



Security and Risk Mitigation Measures

The acting RSO and his staff have the confidence of the Ambassador and DCM. Travel outside the confines of the compound for both personal and work-related activities requires extensive security support.

In fall 2012, the embassy responded to changing threat levels by restricting employee work-related and personal movements outside the compound. The emergency action committee (EAC) meets often in response to general and specific threats to consider adjustments to security measures. It recently updated the tripwires for authorized and ordered departure. Most EAC members are satisfied with the level of discussion and the openness of the DCM to differing opinions. Recommendations are adopted by consensus and forwarded to the Ambassador for approval. The Ambassador has not overruled an EAC recommendation in the past year.

The EAC was active in the period prior to and during the CFR inspection. The EAC reviews and recommends to the Ambassador key embassy security practices. The EAC could better encourage staff buy-in and debunk perceptions that some decisions affecting the community are made arbitrarily or capriciously by the regional security office or front office. Holding individual EAC members accountable for representing mission security policies and practices to the community would help overcome the perception—erroneous in the opinion of the OIG team—among some employees that EAC recommendations are predetermined by the front office and RSO. For example, the OIG team suggested the EAC convene to review revisions to the embassy radio check policy instituted by the RSO in November 2012, which was the source of some dissatisfaction among employees.

Members of the EAC could brief subordinates more effectively on Ambassador-approved decisions and the rationale for decisions on security. It is important that all members of the EAC convey the same message of explanation for changes to security posture and mitigation measures: “one EAC, one message.” Conveying prompt and consistent messages mitigates against rumors and miscommunications. Although the majority of American staff understands the rationale for more restrictive security measures and abides by them, (b) (5)

Training prior to arrival and at the mission could facilitate better understanding of and adherence to personal security practices among all officers. The embassy is scheduled to conduct a crisis management exercise in April 2013.

The security of the current embassy compound has long been a challenge. The embassy recently completed the purchase of property that can accommodate a NEC and requested that OBO expedite the construction of a NEC. Currently, OBO has scheduled Beirut as an alternate for construction of a NEC in 2016. A developer recently purchased property located between the existing compound and the proposed NEC site. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security and OBO are reviewing how the developer’s plans will affect the NEC. Embassy security will substantially improve by moving to a NEC.

Some embassy employees feel they lack training for responding to an attack or a crisis. Unlike staff at other critical threat posts, Embassy Beirut employees do not take the foreign affairs counterterrorism course, which provides training on emergency medical procedures, chemical biological remediation, and driving in dangerous situations. Such training imparts important skills and awareness among employees at high-threat posts such as Beirut, but the course is expensive. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security also has mobile training teams to provide on-site training for all embassy employees, including local guards and bodyguards. In addition, the Foreign Service Institute's distance learning course, High Threat Security Overseas Seminar, may meet Beirut's needs at a lower cost.

Recommendation CFR 1: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should require its employees to take appropriate security awareness training. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DS)

Work Environment

(b) (5)

The OIG team observed cramped, aged, and difficult to maintain office and residential facilities on the steep and hilly compound. For example, the health unit is located on a steep hill in a prefabricated modular unit that is accessible only by climbing outside stairs, making the unit inaccessible to disabled personnel or personnel being transported by stretcher or gurney. The runoffs down the steep roads become rivers during a heavy rain. Corrosion, erosion, and natural settling have caused the support structure of some residential units to collapse.

The management section is hard-pressed to repair and maintain the aged facilities, construct new residential units, and provide space for warehouses and more staff. Construction of a NEC would alleviate these long-standing issues and provide greater security, which remains a serious challenge for the embassy.

Motor Vehicle Operations

In anticipation of the CFR, the Ambassador delayed approving a draft revised motor pool policy that addresses the 2012 inspection report recommendation that Embassy Beirut implement a policy detailing the appropriate charges for other authorized use of government-owned vehicles. Specifically, the Ambassador and DCM sought the OIG team's advice about whether to seek a waiver under 14 FAM 433.4 a.(2) from the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration to enable Embassy Beirut to waive charges for the use of the motor pool to provide food delivery services for American employees. The Office of the Legal Adviser had advised that this use of government-owned vehicles in a high-threat environment such as Beirut is permissible without reimbursement under 14 FAM 433.4. The embassy no longer provides motor pool shuttle service for unofficial guests of American employees on the compound.

During the CFR, the OIG team noted that government-owned vehicles equipped with a driver and bodyguard, consistent with current security measures at Embassy Beirut, were occasionally used to transport non-American, unofficial guests of American personnel, accompanied by the American employee, around downtown Beirut. This situation resulted from an attempt by the front office and regional security office to accommodate American officers who were meeting with non-American personnel in downtown Beirut. Transport of non-American and unofficial personnel in government-owned vehicles raises issues of U.S. Government legal liability in case of a traffic accident or other incident. Per 14 FAM 433, there is no provision that addresses the transport of non-American personnel, even if accompanied by an authorized American employee, in government-owned vehicles in a high-threat environment such as Beirut.

Recommendation CFR 2: Embassy Beirut should seek counsel from the Office of the Legal Adviser regarding the use of U.S. Government-owned vehicles to transport non-American, unofficial personnel accompanying authorized American employees in Beirut's high-threat environment and revise its motor vehicle policy as needed. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with L)

Self-Drive Policy

In the past, some embassy employees with self-drive privileges failed to adhere to the embassy's policy requirements that stipulate when it is permissible to self-drive. The employees also failed to adhere to self-drive policy communication requirements. Dialogue between the DCM and respective agency heads has improved mutual understanding and compliance. The heads of those non-Department agencies who are on Annex A and under chief of mission authority with respect to force protection indicated they are committed to adhering to the self-drive policy established by the chief of mission.

Flexible Work Schedule

The general services officer is not exercising effective oversight of work schedules and management of human resources in the unit. This lapse has resulted in several cases of locally employed staff members working more than their scheduled working hours within a particular pay period without receiving overtime pay or comp time as required by local policy. This lack of oversight results in inefficient use of resources (b) (5) Employees are working too little or too many hours per pay period, and the differences are carried over into subsequent pay periods. This carryover process is intended to account for the variations, but is against embassy policy. According to the locally employed staff handbook, employees are expected to work 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week.

Recommendation CFR 3: Embassy Beirut should require supervisors to adhere to the flexible work schedule guidelines contained in the locally employed staff handbook. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Position Descriptions

As part of the annual evaluation of performance, supervisors are required to certify that position descriptions are current and accurate for employees they supervise. Some locally employed staff members indicated that compliance with this requirement is uneven. The OIG team confirmed that some position descriptions are inaccurate and that the embassy does not have a mechanism for holding supervisors accountable. Failure to maintain accurate position descriptions can create confusion about roles and responsibilities, degrade staff effectiveness, and lower morale. Refresher training for supervisors would also help.

Recommendation CFR 4: Embassy Beirut should require supervisors to verify the accuracy of position descriptions before certifying them and should conduct training on supervisor responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Information Management and Information Security

Unclassified Server and Telephone Room

The embassy has not adequately addressed the physical, environmental, and procedural security issues with the telephone switch and unclassified server room that OIG identified in its 2012 inspection report. In an oversight, the embassy has not obtained an exception from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to operate the unclassified server room and telephone switch in prefabricated buildings. As a result, the embassy is not in compliance with 12 FAM 624. The embassy is upgrading the telephone system, but the project completion date is undetermined and an exception is still needed. The 2012 report recommendation is reissued.

Recommendation CFR 5: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should request an exception for the unclassified server room and telephone private branch exchange server room to operate in a prefabricated building. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DS)

Mail Screening Facility

As noted in the 2012 inspection report, Embassy Beirut's mail screening facility does not comply with Department regulations. (b) (5)

The embassy has not developed written procedures for equipment use in screening mail as required by 14 FAH-4 H-121. The 2012 report recommendation is revised and reissued.

Recommendation CFR 6: (b) (5)

List of CFR Recommendations

Recommendation CFR 1: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should require its employees to take appropriate security awareness training. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DS)

Recommendation CFR 2: Embassy Beirut should seek counsel from the Office of the Legal Adviser regarding the use of U.S. Government-owned vehicles to transport non-American, unofficial personnel accompanying authorized American employees in Beirut's high-threat environment and revise its motor vehicle policy as needed. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with L)

Recommendation CFR 3: Embassy Beirut should require supervisors to adhere to the flexible work schedule guidelines contained in the locally employed staff handbook. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Recommendation CFR 4: Embassy Beirut should require supervisors to verify the accuracy of position descriptions before certifying them and should conduct training on supervisor responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Recommendation CFR 5: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should request an exception for the unclassified server room and telephone private branch exchange server room to operate in a prefabricated building. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DS)

Recommendation CFR 6: (b) (5)

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Principal Officials


	Name	Arrival Date
Ambassador	Maura Connelly	Sept 2010
Deputy Chief of Mission	Richard Mills	March 2012
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Robert Pitre	May 2012
Consular	Sarah Bellman	Aug 2012
Political/Economic	Danielle Garbe	July 2011
Public Affairs	Amanda Johnson	Aug 2011
Regional Affairs Office	Stephen Bracken	June 2012
Regional Security	David Brown	Sept 2011
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	Paul Malik	Nov 2012
Other Agencies:		
Department of Defense	Col. David Brenner	Aug 2012
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Scott Smith	Sept 2012
U.S. Agency for International Development	Azza el Abed	Aug 2012

Abbreviations

CFR	Compliance followup review
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	Department of State
EAC	Emergency action committee
NEC	New embassy compound
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
RSO	Regional security officer
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

APPENDIX I: Status of 2012 Inspection Recommendations

(b) (5)



Recommendation 2: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Office of Medical Services, should request that the regional psychiatrist visit post at least twice a year to monitor workplace stress and overall morale. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with MED)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Beirut should establish a formal mentoring and professional development program for entry-level officers and specialists that emphasizes personal mentoring by mission leaders. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Beirut should implement standard procedures to document the progress of grantees in meeting their stated objectives. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Beirut, should terminate the Internal Security Forces secure radio program and reprogram funds for other use, if appropriate. (Action: INL, in coordination with Embassy Beirut).

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Beirut should acquire contact management software and train personnel on its use. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Beirut should designate a consular representative to serve on the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services budget committee. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should request language designation for the American citizens services unit chief, position number 30358001, during the next language designation review. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DGHR and CA)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Beirut should prepare disaster assistance kits to facilitate consular section emergency preparedness. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Beirut should standardize its cashier hours so that they are the same every day. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Beirut should implement a policy to increase its use of the post support unit to process vouchers whenever possible. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 12: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, should schedule quarterly human resources officer visits to Beirut until the arrival of the permanently assigned human resources officer. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with NEA)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, should transfer local employee position classification responsibilities to the Frankfurt Regional Support Center. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with EUR)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Beirut should abolish locally employed human resources assistant position number C54225. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Beirut should terminate the use of purchase orders to employ foreign nationals. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Beirut should construct a designated area that secures property from theft and deterioration pending proper receipt and further disposition. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Beirut should store nonexpendable property on shelving that meets Department of State safety requirements. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Beirut should implement a policy that details the appropriate charges for other authorized use of government-owned vehicles. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Beirut should implement a policy to use the required functions of the Department of State-standard Work Orders for Windows facilities maintenance management application. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Beirut should establish a schedule for conducting safety, health, and environmental management committee meetings at least semiannually. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Beirut should relocate the information systems officer to the information systems center to facilitate closer oversight of the local employee systems administration staff. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Beirut should implement standard operating procedures for performing information systems security officer duties. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and the Bureau of Information Resource Management, should develop a project plan for the cable infrastructure upgrade that incorporates data and telephone lines. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with OBO and IRM)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should request a waiver for the sensitive but unclassified and telephone private branch exchange server rooms to operate in a prefabricated building. (Action: Embassy Beirut, in coordination with DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Open.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

CFR Findings: The OIG team reissued the recommendation.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Beirut should update information systems standard operating procedures to include systems administration duties, backup and recovery procedures, and processes to maintain a systems operations log for unclassified and classified computer networks. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Beirut should implement a plan to test the information technology contingency plans for the classified and unclassified computer networks and to update them as systems environments and resources change. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

(b) (5)



Recommendation 28: Embassy Beirut should implement a standardized procedure to manage information technology service requests. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 29: Embassy Beirut should implement an interagency policy for reserving and occupying the temporary duty quarters at the Tango Inn. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 30: Embassy Beirut should invest in the Ambassador's representative the responsibility for coordinating and interfacing with the Beirut Recreation Association and its board on day-to-day operations. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 31: Embassy Beirut should establish a second reserve fund to use for any future equipment or furniture purchases for or renovations to the Tango Inn. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 32: Embassy Beirut should implement a plan to staff the medical unit until the arrival of the Foreign Service health practitioner. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 33: Embassy Beirut should procure a lockbox with a combination lock for storage of the consular sub cashier's advance and store all backup sub cashier advances in the sub cashier's safe. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Recommendation 34: Embassy Beirut should implement procedures that restrict fuel pump access only to authorized personnel. (Action: Embassy Beirut)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed.

Pre-CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

APPENDIX II: Status of 2012 Inspection Informal Recommendations

Informal Recommendation 1: Embassy Beirut should discontinue translation of open-source press and media that are available to Washington consumers from other sources.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed alternative implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 2: Embassy Beirut should include consular representation on the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan working group.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 3: Embassy Beirut should prepare an agenda for annual warden meetings and use them as opportunities to solicit feedback and evaluate the program on an ongoing basis.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 4: Embassy Beirut should provide training to all consular officers in the start-to-finish process of producing an emergency passport.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 5: Embassy Beirut should develop a written standard operating procedure for closing the visa section in the event of a crisis.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 6: Embassy Beirut should establish an International Cooperative Administrative Support Services budget committee.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 7: Embassy Beirut should implement procedures to close out purchase orders following final payments to vendors.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 8: Embassy Beirut should store inflammable materials properly and minimize their stock levels based on market availability and usage.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 9: Embassy Beirut should align the information technology contingency plans with the emergency action plan and update the information technology section of the emergency action plan as needed.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 10: Embassy Beirut should review the community liaison office workload with its Interagency Cooperative Administrative Support Services budget committee and establish an additional position in the office.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 11: Embassy Beirut should establish a small commissary on the embassy grounds.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.

Informal Recommendation 12: Embassy Beirut should eliminate use of the honor system to pay for bar drinks and implement a cash-only sale mechanism, similar to that established for meal purchases, to collect the funds for drinks sales.

CFR Findings: The OIG team confirmed implementation: recommendation closed.



**FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE,
OR MISMANAGEMENT
OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
HURTS EVERYONE.**

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