



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General**

Office of Inspector General

Office of Inspections

**Inspection of
the U.S. Mission to International
Organizations in Vienna**

Report Number ISP-I-12-17A, March 2012

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



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PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

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Key Judgments

- The Ambassador and deputy chief of mission (DCM) lead a motivated staff that merits commendation for a string of foreign policy successes that have advanced high-priority issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety.
- The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna's (UNVIE) funding for travel and other program activities is insufficient to advance U.S. objectives effectively in the eight international organizations in Vienna at which it represents the United States.
- The Ambassador and DCM have built a cohesive, productive, high-morale team, drawn from many agencies. First- and second-tour officers and specialists are well integrated in this team but would benefit from a more defined career development program.
- In 2012, UNVIE should determine, after the completion of staff realignments, whether it could realize cost savings and gain greater flexibility by reorganizing its UN affairs and arms control sections.
- The public affairs section performs well. Its outreach is global and includes using social media in Farsi and engaging in speaking tours by the Ambassador to Southeast Asia and Latin America.
- Most UNVIE staff members are satisfied with the delivery of services by the tri-mission's joint management office (JMO). Greater use of electronic tracking systems will increase satisfaction.

Management services are evaluated in the OIG report, *Inspection of Tri-Mission Vienna Joint Management Office* (March 2012).

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where OIG did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between September 12 and 29, 2011, and in Vienna, Austria, between October 3 and November 17, 2011. The members of the team were

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Context

UNVIE represents the United States in eight major international organizations that Austria hosts. These include, most notably, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). A fourth major entity is the Wassenaar Arrangement, a nontreaty agreement covering export licensing practices for military and dual use items.

UNVIE is centrally engaged in U.S. efforts worldwide to promote peace and security, develop safe and secure uses of nuclear energy, and bolster the rule of law. UNVIE strives to build global consensus on conventional and nuclear disarmament, counterterrorism, rule of law, anticorruption, counterpiracy, border security, and trafficking in persons. It is the conduit for more than \$250 million in U.S. contributions to Vienna's international organizations.

UNVIE manages high-profile issues that are technical and politically complex. The key issues it focuses on include monitoring and reporting on Iranian and Syrian nuclear capabilities; promoting implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and tracking implementation of nuclear safety measures, such as during and after the nuclear plant accident in Fukushima, Japan. UNVIE also is engaged in the United Nation's recently increased activism to mitigate illicit narcotics trade from Afghanistan and elsewhere. These issues often require coordination with U.S. missions in New York, Geneva, and elsewhere.

UNVIE is a relatively lean operation of 38 Americans and 11 locally employed (LE) staff members, with a \$2.5 million budget, from multiple bureaus and agencies, covering policy and program operations. Management expenses for UNVIE are included in the budget for the tri-mission's JMO. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs; the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism all contribute funding to UNVIE activities. U.S. technical experts working in Washington and on extended visits to Vienna supplement UNVIE's staff. Many of the experts have decades of experience, providing invaluable continuity to the mission.

Executive Direction

The leadership of UNVIE has mastered highly complex subject matter and uses that mastery, along with its strong diplomatic skills, to achieve major successes for the United States. Much of its work—from nuclear nonproliferation to the fight against terrorism and crime—occurs under the microscope of daily attention from the most senior reaches of the U.S. Government and in the spotlight of the global media. Furthermore, the IAEA in Vienna has become Iran’s preferred forum for attempting to attract nonaligned and other countries to its causes. The Ambassador, DCM, and their team have a record of stunning success in this challenging milieu.

Examples abound. The UNVIE team, in concert with other delegations, has

- won the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank that enables nonnuclear countries to access nuclear materials for peaceful uses, without having to develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities themselves;
- coordinated with IAEA officials to rally assistance during the accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant, while sharing U.S. expertise on nuclear safety;
- defeated a resolution that would have undermined progress on nonproliferation in the Middle East and managed to keep it off the agenda for the following year;
- succeeded in obtaining passage of resolutions finding Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA obligations, casting doubt on Iran’s assertions that its nuclear program was peaceful, and leading to UN Security Council sanctions against Iran;
- obtained passage of the first-ever resolution exposing Syria’s noncompliance with IAEA nuclear reporting requirements;
- continued to support IAEA efforts to implement verification of Iran’s and Syria’s nuclear programs;
- persuaded key allies among IAEA members to increase the IAEA’s budget;
- strengthened international nuclear nonproliferation norms and increased the security and safety of nuclear energy, while advancing peaceful uses of nuclear technology to address humanitarian needs in health, food production, and water resource management; and
- provided key support to the nuclear test verification effort, including U.S. funding of a hydroacoustic station that will significantly enhance monitoring and verification of nuclear tests worldwide.

As a result of these accomplishments, the United States has improved the safety and security of nuclear materials across the globe, while strengthening deterrence, detection, and verification regimes. These issues are first-tier matters. When UNVIE, in conjunction with other delegations, secured acceptance of the international fuel bank, a top priority on the administration’s agenda, the President sent the Ambassador a warm letter of congratulations for the UNVIE team.

The Ambassador and DCM have earned the respect and trust of counterparts in foreign delegations and the international staff in the eight international organizations in Vienna.

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One observer described the Ambassador as among the best he has seen in 30 years at UNVIE.

Both the Ambassador and DCM possess formidable public affairs experience. Given the worldwide press attention trained on the Vienna International Center, their media work directly increases respect and support for the United States. For example, the DCM and UNVIE's public affairs section conceived an effective way to replicate their messaging to audiences in countries with influence on nuclear and arms control issues. As a result, the Ambassador has conducted well-received speaking tours to Southeast Asia, Latin America, and London, during which he has explained complex multilateral issues and garnered support for U.S. objectives.

UNVIE's leadership is no less effective in managing relations with a diverse set of policymakers in Washington. Officials from the White House, the Department of State (Department), and other agencies commended the Ambassador and DCM for their leadership, management, and substantive skills.

Multiple bureaus of the Department provide funding for UNVIE operations and for staff positions in the mission. In addition, other agencies contribute personnel and certain funding. UNVIE is part of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, but it conducts its intense pace of policy dialogue with the National Security staff more than with any other bureau or agency. Although UNVIE has recorded many policy accomplishments, and partly because of the nature of multisource funding, UNVIE's program budget has been unpredictable and insufficient to advance U.S. objectives at a level that would be commensurate with the importance of the national security issues the mission handles.

For example, overall U.S. funding contributions in 2011 to the IAEA alone—in support of IAEA's work on antiproliferation, nuclear safety and security, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy—was more than \$190 million and came from a variety of U.S. Government agencies, underscoring the vital role the agency plays in these fields. Yet, UNVIE staff lack travel funds to attend relevant IAEA and other meetings related to UNVIE's responsibilities around the world, at which discussions take place on topics in which the United States has important stakes. As effective as they are, UNVIE staff would be even more effective if they had adequate representation funding to support their engagement with foreign missions and international organizations in Vienna and in other capitals, particularly with the large number of delegations skeptical of U.S. objectives in nuclear nonproliferation and other subject areas.

UNVIE has been modest in its formal requests; for example, the current Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP) does not include a request for increased representation and travel funds. UNVIE leadership should revise the MSRP, generate formal cables, and meet with senior Department officials to focus attention on the mission's need for additional resources.

Informal Recommendation 1: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should provide a justification to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and other bureaus for the mission to receive increased budgetary resources annually, including increased representation and travel funds.

Inside the UNVIE offices, the pace is fast, the atmosphere intense, and the workload heavy—especially during meetings of the IAEA and other international organizations and the mission’s frequent, high-level visits. Interagency collaboration and individual and team achievement are both expected and publicly praised. Morale at UNVIE is very high, and the scores on leadership, work environment, and quality-of-life measures were among the highest in the 92 posts that OIG has recently inspected. Positive attitudes derive partly from the compelling nature of UNVIE’s work and partly from the motivating leadership and emphasis placed on morale by the Ambassador and DCM. (b) (5)

The Ambassador and DCM demonstrate full respect for Equal Employment Opportunity principles.

UNVIE’s pace of work makes it difficult for its leaders to find time for strategic planning. The MSRP tracks, guides, and clearly explains mission objectives, but a number of realignments would rationalize the workload.

The Ambassador and DCM overlap their roles more than is typical in bilateral missions, often attending the same outside meetings so both can be equally prepared to address complex, technical IAEA issues with senior delegates of other countries and senior IAEA officials. This approach has contributed to many of UNVIE’s successes by giving each of them a command of the details on issues and developments in discussion with their counterpart senior officials.

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The current Ambassador is leaving shortly to take on another senior position. When the current DCM becomes chargé, the chief of the IAEA section will serve as acting DCM. Her expertise with IAEA issues should allow her to cement relations with the chief interlocutors at the IAEA. When a new ambassador arrives, the IAEA section chief should be able to sustain those relationships and take over some of the senior contact work previously performed by the DCM. This shift, in turn, will allow the DCM to focus more on the non-IAEA side of UNVIE’s portfolio, while also focusing more attention on internal supervision. The Ambassador and DCM agreed with the inspectors and are beginning to make the needed adjustments.

Some front office taskings are addressed to a group of officers, making it unclear which unit or person has responsibility for action. Officers work through this group tasking collegially to determine among themselves who will take the lead, but time is wasted in the process. Clearer taskings would speed workflow and reduce confusion. The inspectors discussed this observation with the DCM, who agreed to clarify his taskings in the future.

Career Development Program for First- and Second-Tour Officers

The career development program for first- and second-tour officers and specialists needs attention. It is centered at Embassy Vienna and does not provide the full range of opportunities that would constitute a comprehensive career development matrix. The Ambassador and DCM acknowledge these shortcomings.

First- and second-tour personnel at UNVIE are active in an informal association that includes their counterparts at Embassy Vienna and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (USOSCE). Some employees in this larger group feel confined to the duties of their sections and do not experience the full scope of Foreign Service activities. Only rarely are opportunities available to participate in the wider work of each mission or the other missions in Vienna. Although first- and second-tour officers and specialists from some missions receive mentoring and guidance on a day-to-day basis from their direct supervisors, others do not. All report that their careers would benefit from wider access to senior officers.

The Ambassador and DCM welcomed suggestions for fashioning an entry-level development program that fulfills the Foreign Service Director General's direction, transmitted worldwide on November 22, 2010, as State 120467, to conduct robust mentoring and professional development of entry-level Foreign Service employees. They pledged to collaborate with the other missions to seek short-term opportunities for first- and second-tour personnel to work in UNVIE's sister missions.

Recommendation 1: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should implement a plan to provide first- and second-tour officers and specialists with regular mentoring sessions and well-defined opportunities to gain experience with multilateral relations, support official visits, speak in public fora, produce written reports, and participate in representational events. (Action: UNVIE)

The UNVIE protocol assistant conducts the traditional scope of duties for this position and reports to the Ambassador. Given the demands on the Ambassador's time, it would be more efficient for the Ambassador's office management specialist to supervise the protocol assistant. The Ambassador agreed.

Informal Recommendation 2: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should work with the joint management office at Tri-Mission Vienna to change the supervision of the protocol assistant from the Ambassador to the Ambassador's office management specialist.

The mission maintains multiple databases on contacts. The protocol unit has one, as does each section. These databases overlap, which is an unnecessary duplication of effort. Moreover, not all databases are kept up to date. Most office management specialists in the mission do not have access to the protocol unit's database.

Informal Recommendation 3: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should consolidate and update its mission contacts databases.

Policy and Program Implementation

UNVIE works with a wide variety of UN specialized agencies and the other Vienna-based international organizations, but its primary focus is nuclear nonproliferation and the IAEA. The mission is divided into four substantive sections: IAEA, arms control, UN affairs, and public affairs. This structure provides generally clear lines of responsibility and has allowed the mission to function efficiently and effectively.

The mission represents the United States in eight different international organizations and arrangements. These include CTBTO, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), the IAEA, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Board, UNODC, the UN Commission on International Trade Law, the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (OOSA), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In recent years, as nuclear nonproliferation has become a higher U.S. Government priority, UNVIE's staffing levels have grown.

UNVIE staffing is a mix that includes Department generalists and technical specialists from other U.S. agencies. This mix works well, especially in the IAEA section. The mission has recruited well-qualified and hardworking employees, who work as a team on some of the government's highest foreign policy priorities, including nuclear nonproliferation and Iran.

Mission staff effectively support the Ambassador and DCM in their advocacy on areas that are important to U.S. national security. These areas include advancing the concrete actions of international agencies in activities, such as post-earthquake efforts to monitor and redress civil nuclear safety problems following the Fukushima nuclear reactor accident and agreements with IAEA on an initiative for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Staffing

In late 2011, the mission filled a long-term gap in an office management specialist position, allowing officers to spend more time on substantive work. The recent addition of a new position and arrival of another new position in summer 2012, together with adjustments in portfolios and improved administrative support, will help restore balanced workloads.

Informal Recommendation 4: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should assess its workload, once ongoing staffing adjustments have been completed, and incorporate its determination about staffing needs into its next strategic planning request.

In 2012, a Foreign Service position will return to the arms control section after the incumbent, a Foreign Service officer, completes a secondment to the Secretariat of the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement. At the same time, the mission has proposed a realignment of two positions. This realignment would involve downgrading the present arms control section head position in 2013 from an FO-01 to an FO-03 position, while transferring that Bureau of International Organization Affairs-funded position to the IAEA section. An FO-03 position now in the IAEA section that is funded by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance would be transferred to the mission's arms control section and upgraded to an FO-01 position. However, action on this realignment has been pending with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should approve the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna's proposed change in grade and alignment of two positions in the mission's International Atomic Energy Agency and arms control sections. (Action: IO, in coordination with DGHR)

The UN affairs and arms control sections have diverse portfolios and work with multiple international organizations. Both sections are small, especially in comparison to the IAEA section, and the front office does not give them as much attention as it gives the IAEA section. The heads of these two sections are strong leaders and competent managers, but each section has little awareness of the other's activities. This stovepiping has not prevented the mission from drawing upon all staff to meet workload spikes associated with high-level visits and major international meetings. Depending on whether the CTBTO is stood up as an international organization as a result of the treaty entering into force, and after the summer 2012 transfer cycle, the mission will be in a position to evaluate whether the current benefits of having two small, separate UN affairs and arms control sections remain valid.

Informal Recommendation 5: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should assess in late 2012 whether its present organizational structure continues to serve the mission's evolving needs.

Records Management

Most mission employees are not implementing Department procedures for managing and retiring records, as required by 5 FAM 414.5 b.(2), (6) and 5 FAH-4 H-113. Some office management specialists are not familiar with procedures for retiring electronic records. UNVIE employees are not sharing documents in shared electronic folders. In addition, UNVIE sections are not organizing shared folders according to the Department's Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject labeling system. Email messages that meet the definition of records in 5 FAM 443.2 are not archived. Failure to implement such procedures impedes the Department's ability to retrieve official documents of value to the conduct of foreign policy and to historians.

The arms control section does not produce a large volume of front-channel reporting. It does send a large number of emails, including record emails conveying export licensing information from Wassenaar Arrangement member states. The section maintains a large volume of Wassenaar-related paper files that are not necessary because the majority of the material is accessible electronically. The paper files impede efficient use of space.

Recommendation 3: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should issue an administrative notice requiring each section to establish, maintain, and annually retire official records, including email messages that qualify as records, and implement a tracking system to verify that employees are managing and retiring electronic records. (Action: UNVIE)

The IAEA section produces a high volume of email messages, especially during the IAEA General Conference and board meetings. Emails are sometimes backed up by front-channel reporting, but much email reporting is not captured as record traffic. UNVIE makes little use of the record email function of the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset software system. Record email is designed to archive emails that should be preserved for the historical

record, such as those relating to schedules for visitors, ongoing steps taken in the implementation of programs, and the exchange of views on policy-related matters.

Recommendation 4: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should implement a system to promote employee compliance with mission guidance on using the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset software system to archive email and other correspondence. (Action: UNVIE)

Reporting, Analysis, and Advocacy

International Atomic Energy Agency Section

The IAEA section has 17 technical, generalist, and support staff members drawn from the Department of State, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Brookhaven National Laboratory. The section's five areas of focus correspond to the organization of the IAEA bureaucracy: safeguards (against nuclear proliferation), safety and security (of nuclear facilities and materials), technical cooperation, peaceful nuclear applications, and budget and management.

Employees from other agencies are fully integrated into the IAEA section, but they also report to their headquarters and provide necessary liaison among those agencies, the Department, and the IAEA Secretariat. The section head helps set work requirements for other agency employees and provides input for their performance evaluations. Interagency cooperation is buttressed by memoranda of understanding between the Department and some of the other agencies represented in the section, including Brookhaven National Laboratory. One section deputy combines valuable experience across several U.S. agencies and has considerable expertise in the area of nuclear safeguards. The overwhelming majority of the section's employees expressed satisfaction with the excellent section management, as did the OIG team.

Section employees handle other specialized, nuclear energy-related entities, and they support U.S. participation in the IAEA's annual Board of Governors and General Conference meetings. The section focuses heavily on nonproliferation in countries of concern, particularly Iran and Syria. The section also works well on recruitment of and advocacy for the employment of qualified Americans as technical staff members at the IAEA Secretariat.

The IAEA section generates a large volume of classified and unclassified communications—more than that of all the other sections combined. Much of the reporting addresses sensitive issues related to Iran's and Syria's nuclear programs and is sent through restricted channels. Washington agencies and offices gave UNVIE high marks across the board for the timeliness and substance of its reporting. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, mission reporting on and support for IAEA activities related to nuclear safety won praise in Washington, an assessment shared by the OIG team.

Reporting on IAEA issues provides valuable analyses and recommendations that shape Washington policymaking. The mission's activist approach facilitates interagency decisionmaking by framing decisions on policy and tactics. This approach is particularly evident in its reports on expanding IAEA activities and budgets—key aspects of U.S. efforts to make the IAEA more robust and effective. Previews and analyses of upcoming IAEA sessions were of

excellent quality and relevance, especially with regard to Iran and the handling of the dynamics within the Non-Aligned Movement. Mission reporting reveals a valuable array of contacts with international organizations and other foreign missions.

The IAEA section's primary focus is the IAEA, but it continues to have unrelated responsibilities for the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a multilateral grouping that monitors and regulates the export of nuclear materials and technology. In 2012, the United States is to assume the chairmanship of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its subordinate, consultative group, which will significantly increase workload. The mission will need to carefully monitor the allocation of increased responsibilities among personnel handling IAEA activities and Nuclear Suppliers Group activities. (b)(5)(b)(6)

[REDACTED] Mission management understands the need to prepare for the eventual transfer of Nuclear Suppliers Group responsibilities to the arms control section.

Informal Recommendation 6: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should phase in, over 3 years, the transfer of the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group responsibilities from the International Atomic Energy Agency section to its arms control section.

In 2010, the United States announced its Peaceful Uses Initiative, pledging to contribute \$50 million over 5 years to help expand the ability of all states to use peaceful nuclear energy and challenging the international community to match that amount by 2015. The initiative has significantly increased the IAEA section's workload. The nuclear security summit to be held in March 2012 in Seoul will add to UNVIE's reporting workload. The mission already is making adjustments that will allow it to increase reporting on nuclear security and will be able to take additional steps to balance the workload when the arms control section is augmented by a new officer position in summer 2012. Enhanced cooperation among mission sections can assist in expanded reporting.

Informal Recommendation 7: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should expand its reporting on nuclear security issues.

Arms Control Section

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is approaching its entry into force, pending ratification by nine more states—among them, potentially, the United States. The section excels at advocacy of U.S. objectives. Among other accomplishments, it brokered a multilateral deal on funding an integrated field exercise necessary for the development of a treaty on-site inspection regime.

The section represents the United States in the multilateral Wassenaar Arrangement, as well as in the Hague Code of Conduct. A local employee efficiently relays the prelaunch notifications, which are required by the Hague Code of Conduct, by sending front-channel cables to a narrow and specialized audience in Washington.

The section works efficiently, and staff rate the section head as a strong leader who shares information and manages well. The OIG team agrees with this assessment. The section head oversees \$35 million yearly of U.S.-funded contributions to the CTBTO and Wassenaar Arrangement.

United Nations Affairs Section

Following a staffing gap in early 2011, (b)(5)(b)(6) mission reporting on counternarcotics, crime, and corruption has increased in volume and quality. Recent personnel changes (b) (5) created opportunities for U.S. engagement with UNODC, especially with respect to Central Asia and North Africa.

The section chief and his deputy employ an inclusive management style. The deputy merits praise for maintaining the productivity of the unit during a lengthy period in 2011, (b)(5)(b)(6). The section chief serves as the U.S. (b)(6) representative on drug and crime issues and oversees \$30 million per year of U.S.-funded antidrug, anticrime, and counterterrorism projects.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe covers many of the same border security, organized crime, and drug issues as UNODC, but there has been little interaction between UNVIE and USOSCE on these issues in Europe and Eurasia. The UN affairs section would be better able to work with UNODC if it were informed about related Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe activities.

Informal Recommendation 8: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should share information with the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the activities of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the areas of crime, corruption, and drugs.

Foreign Assistance

UNVIE does not control foreign assistance funds. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs is responsible for the payments of U.S. assessments and contributions to international organizations. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism provide project funding to UNODC. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation provides additional “voluntary contributions” funds to the IAEA to promote U.S. priorities and funds for the U.S. assessed contribution to the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance provides funding for the U.S. assessed contribution and additional voluntary contributions to the CTBTO.

Public Affairs

The small public affairs staff, led by a seasoned public affairs officer, sets the tone and substance for UNVIE outreach on mission strategic themes, both in Vienna and to selected influential audiences around the world. The Ambassador and DCM fully support public affairs efforts and frequently give media interviews and backgrounders. The public affairs officer has

developed effective speaking tours for the Ambassador in London, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, where he has discussed contentious IAEA issues in public and with senior government officials who exert influence over decisions made in UN fora. The Ambassador's travel also broadly demonstrates U.S. leadership in international organizations. The section coordinates these trips with appropriate Department bureaus and embassies in Southeast Asia and Latin America.

The section spends the greater part of its time briefing the media and preparing the Ambassador and other senior officers to do the same. It also works closely with the U.S. Missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva on public affairs issues of common interest.

The public affairs officer is UNVIE's interlocutor with the 60-plus-member, international press corps in Vienna. She also works with counterpart public affairs officers of the eight international organizations in Vienna and consults closely with the U.S. Missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva.

In January 2011, a media-savvy officer arrived to fill a new position as assistant public affairs officer. He writes the Ambassador's speeches, organizes briefing books, and serves as control officer for congressional delegations and senior U.S. visitors, among other duties. He has been particularly effective in revitalizing and marketing the mission's social media platforms. His arrival has freed the public affairs officer to develop long-term, strategic planning.

One of the assistant public affairs officer's initiatives was to use the Department's electronic Virtual Student Foreign Service program¹ to explain nonproliferation issues to Farsi-speaking audiences worldwide. He also developed strategic outreach to global, Farsi-speaking social media venues and selected an intern to manage the project at no cost to the mission.

Traditionally, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs allots most International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) grants to geographic bureaus, which in turn allot the grants to enable embassies to bring individuals to the United States. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs generally allots only four grants annually to the Bureau of International Organizations, which then assigns them to individual, multilateral missions abroad, based on the quality of nominations it receives. The Bureau of International Organizations has done an excellent job in using the winter incentive programs to increase the number of grants from four to six or eight grants annually.

UNVIE staff have contacts with many strong candidates for IVLP grants. Based on the limited grants available to the Bureau of International Organizations and the competition for grants from other multilateral missions, it is unlikely that UNVIE could secure the number of grants it could usefully program. The Bureau of International Organizations assigned one IVLP grant to UNVIE, which will use it in FY 2012. There is room for UNVIE to increase its use of this program to expose influential contacts to a spectrum of U.S. experts, both private and public, who shape U.S. policies.

¹ The Virtual Student Foreign Service is an "eInternship" program that uses the Web to connect U.S. college students to overseas U.S. embassies in order to engage in digital public diplomacy.

The Department's multilateral missions deal with some of the most important national security issues facing the United States. They each work with potential grantees representing countries whose officials need this exposure to the United States and its foreign and security policy experts. The IVLP grants can provide these opportunities.

Informal Recommendation 9: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should make a case to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to double the allotment of International Visitor Leadership Program grants available to multilateral missions.

The IVLP is expensive for the Department. U.S. embassies and multilateral missions abroad often use the alternative, no-cost Voluntary Visitor program to supplement IVLP grants. Under the Voluntary Visitor program, U.S. agencies organize a program for the visitor, but the visitor pays his or her travel and per diem costs. UNVIE has not used the Voluntary Visitor program.

Informal Recommendation 10: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should use the Voluntary Visitor program to supplement its International Visitor Leadership Program.

The UNVIE public affairs section has had minimal contact with the other two U.S. diplomatic missions in Vienna: Embassy Vienna and USOSCE. Communication among the three missions is mainly an exchange of information about programming that addresses similar audiences. Developing better cooperation among the three staffs may offer cost savings and create synergies that would enhance each mission's public diplomacy efforts. Expanded use of social media in particular areas would benefit from tri-mission collaboration.

Informal Recommendation 11: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should consult at least quarterly with Embassy Vienna and the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to identify areas where collaboration, including the use and marketing of social media, could expand the reach of U.S. public diplomacy.

Resource Management

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local-Hire Staff	Locally Employed Staff	Total Staff	Total Funding FY 2011
Department of State	32	1	6	39	
Diplomatic and Consular Programs	30	1	5	36	\$2,152,200
UNVIE Representation	0	0	0	0	\$41,600
Public Affairs	2	0	1	3	\$173,700
Public Affairs Representation	0	0	0	0	\$3,900
Arms Control	0	0	0	0	\$146,565
Department of Energy	4	0	4	8	N/A
Nuclear Regulatory Commission	2	0	0	2	N/A
Totals	38	1	10	49	\$2,517,965

The tri-mission's JMO provides management support services for Embassy Vienna. Management issues are discussed in the OIG report, *Inspection of the Tri-Mission Vienna Joint Management Office* (March 2012).

Budget and accounting issues are perplexing to UNVIE officers because they did not consult fully with the JMO financial management center. Nevertheless, UNVIE employees praise the financial management center for support and timely responses. The Consolidated Overseas Accountability Support Toolbox is not installed on certain officers' desktop computers to help track budgets. Additionally, it appears that UNVIE employees are not familiar with the LE staff who provide the bulk of on-site support.

Informal Recommendation 12: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should have the Consolidated Overseas Accountability Support Toolbox installed on the computers of those officers with budget and accounting responsibilities.

Informal Recommendation 13: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should work with Embassy Vienna to introduce the embassy's locally employed staff with responsibility for management support to the officers of the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna.

Management Controls

UNVIE believes that its management controls program is limited to those controls the JMO assures. However, the JMO is the administrative and management service provider, and it has no relationship to UNVIE's political, economic, and public affairs functions. Without a controls program for these areas, UNVIE does not have assurance that all its operations are free from waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. The Department's management controls program applies to all program, operational, and financial areas, according to 2 FAM 021.1 d. Further, 2 FAM 021.1 c. (1) requires Department managers to evaluate systems on an ongoing basis.

Recommendation 5: The U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna should designate a management controls coordinator to undertake a risk assessment of all its assessable units, to formulate the basis for an assertion on management controls, and to implement a management controls program. (Action: UNVIE)

The Chief of Mission disclaimed responsibility for UNVIE's assertion on the annual management control statement of assurance, dated July 14, 2011. His statement asserted that the Chief of Mission for Embassy Vienna has final authority and responsibility for assuring that UNVIE's management control objectives are achieved. However, under 2 FAM 024 d., chiefs of mission are required to provide an assurance statement concerning the effectiveness of internal controls in their respective operations such as the use of travel funds or overtime.

Recommendation 6: The U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna should reissue its 2011 annual management control statement of assurance and include the Chief of Mission's statement, based on risk assessments covering the entire mission. (Action: UNVIE)

List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should implement a plan to provide first- and second-tour officers and specialists with regular mentoring sessions and well-defined opportunities to gain experience with multilateral relations, support official visits, speak in public fora, produce written reports, and participate in representational events. (Action: UNVIE)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should approve the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna's proposed change in grade and alignment of two positions in the mission's International Atomic Energy Agency and arms control sections. (Action: IO, in coordination with DGHR)

Recommendation 3: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should issue an administrative notice requiring each section to establish, maintain, and annually retire official records, including email messages that qualify as records, and implement a tracking system to verify that employees are managing and retiring electronic records. (Action: UNVIE)

Recommendation 4: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should implement a system to promote employee compliance with mission guidance on using the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset software system to archive email and other correspondence. (Action: UNVIE)

Recommendation 5: The U.S. Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna should designate a management controls coordinator to undertake a risk assessment of all its assessable units, to formulate the basis for an assertion on management controls, and to implement a management controls program. (Action: UNVIE)

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List of Informal Recommendations

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Informal Recommendation 1: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should provide a justification to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and other bureaus for the mission to receive increased budgetary resources annually, including increased representation and travel funds.

Informal Recommendation 2: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should work with the joint management office at Tri-Mission Vienna to change the supervision of the protocol assistant from the Ambassador to the Ambassador's office management specialist.

Informal Recommendation 3: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should consolidate and update its mission contacts databases.

Informal Recommendation 4: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should assess its workload, once ongoing staffing adjustments have been completed, and incorporate its determination about staffing needs into its next strategic planning request.

Informal Recommendation 5: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should assess in late 2012 whether its present organizational structure continues to serve the mission's evolving needs.

Informal Recommendation 6: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should phase in, over 3 years, the transfer of the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group responsibilities from the International Atomic Energy Agency section to its arms control section.

Informal Recommendation 7: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should expand its reporting on nuclear security issues.

Informal Recommendation 8: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should share information with the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the activities of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the areas of crime, corruption, and drugs.

Informal Recommendation 9: The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna should make a case to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs to double the allotment of International Visitor Leadership Program grants available to multilateral missions.

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Principal Officials

	Name	Arrival Date
Ambassador	Glyn Davies	08/09
Deputy Chief of Mission	Robert Wood	04/10
Chiefs of Sections:		
International Atomic Energy Agency Section	Sharon White	08/11
Arms Control Section	John Godfrey	08/10
UN Affairs Section	David Bame	09/11
Public Affairs	Jennifer Hall-Godfrey	05/10
Joint Management Officer	Margaret Uyehara	08/10
Regional Security Officer	Mary-Jo Swinimer	03/11

Abbreviations

CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Department	U.S. Department of State
HCOG	Hague Code of Conduct
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IVLP	International Visitor Leadership Program
JMO	Joint management office
LE	Locally employed
MSRP	Mission Strategic and Resource Plan
OOSA	Office of Outer Space Affairs
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNVIE	U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna
USOSCE	U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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