



**United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General**

**Office of Inspections**

**Inspection of  
The U.S. Mission to the United Nations,  
New York**

**Report Number ISP-I-11-54A, July 2011**

**~~Important Notice~~**

~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

## **PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION**

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2011 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

### **PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### **METHODOLOGY**

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

*Office of Inspector General*

## PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H.W. Geisel". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end.

Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General

## Table of Contents

Key Judgments	1
Context	3
Executive Direction	5
Permanent Representative and National Security Council Member	5
The Mission and the Interagency Process: Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation	8
A Mission with Five Ambassadors	12
Operational Effectiveness	14
Strategic Staffing	14
Managing Performance	16
Maximizing Benefits of Nonpermanent Staff	16
Managing Overtime	17
Records Management	18
Use of Record Emails	19
Destruction or Retirement of Records	20
Policy, Reporting, and Program Implementation	22
Crosscutting Issues	22
Military Staff Committee	26
Economic and Social Affairs	26
Management and Reform	28
Legal Affairs	29
Press and Public Affairs	30
Host Country Relations	34
Resource Management	38
Overall Management	38
Financial Management	40
Human Resources	41
General Services	42
Facilities Management	43
Protocol and Representation	44
Information Resources Management	45
Quality of Life	49
Equal Employment Opportunity	49
Morale	49
Management Controls	51
List of Recommendations	53
Informal Recommendations	57
Principal Officers	61
Abbreviations	62
Appendix: Host Country Files Needing Review	63

## Key Judgments

- The U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York (USUN)<sup>1</sup> has been at the forefront of what President Obama termed America’s “new era of engagement.” It has achieved concrete results that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and Americans’ security.
- The Permanent Representative’s participation in National Security Staff and Principals Committee meetings increases her effectiveness at the United Nations.
- The Permanent Representative set up special policy adviser structures in Washington and New York to support her Cabinet role. The Washington advisers’ roles have some inherent overlap with the mandated responsibilities of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). Despite the bureaucratic tension this arrangement generates, the Washington office gives the Permanent Representative the support, flexibility, and level of engagement that she wants.
- The base budget of USUN has declined in both real and inflationary terms since FY 2001. Little of the base budget is discretionary, and the result is that paltry funds are available for important training, unexpected travel, or routine procurement. Moreover, the budget decline over many years is counterintuitive, considering the level of U.S. interests and engagement in the United Nations.
- USUN has been unable to recruit and retain the Foreign Service officers it needs due to the limited number of positions eligible for the mission’s housing program and the requirement, not imposed on other U.S. Government employees assigned temporarily to New York, to pay Federal taxes on housing allowances.
- Although USUN staff is adept at handling an unending stream of policy and humanitarian crises, over many years, neither the mission’s leadership nor individual section chiefs have given sufficient attention to management of the mission’s people and processes.
  - For many years USUN has focused few resources and little attention on training mission staff, leaving some in jobs for which they lack sufficient skills and others without an opportunity to upgrade or refresh their knowledge.
  - USUN has not had a strategic approach to workforce planning and has refilled vacancies without considering mission priorities and reprogramming options.
  - Historically, USUN has neglected to address its records management shortcomings, and the mission’s work is complicated by insufficient email storage capacity and a lack of standardized paper and electronic filing protocols.


---

<sup>1</sup> There are several U.S. Missions to the United Nations worldwide, but for the purposes of this report, references to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN) are understood to refer to the mission in New York.

- USUN regularly uses task forces to organize responses to crises, such as the Haiti earthquake or the Libyan insurrection. The management and reform section is spearheading a task force on UN management issues that may serve as a model for other intramission focus groups and simultaneously improve stove-piped communications.
- USUN successfully communicates U.S. policy positions to domestic and foreign audiences but needs to take a more strategic approach to public diplomacy and outreach.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where OIG did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between April 5 and May 13, 2011, and in New York, New York, between May 16 and June 10, 2011. (b) (6)



## Context

USUN has been at the forefront of what President Obama termed America's "new era of engagement." It has achieved concrete results that advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and American security. The dividends of current U.S. leadership at the United Nations are tangible, including a no-fly zone and authorization of military force to protect civilians in Libya that prevented potential mass atrocities; the toughest UN sanctions ever against Iran and North Korea; renewed momentum to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials; a coordinated global effort to help Haiti recover and rebuild; UN engagement for the historic and peaceful referendum for independence in Southern Sudan; vital UN assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq; and progress to reform the flawed UN Human Rights Council. Long-time observers of USUN have commented that, in advancing the President's policy, the mission has registered successes that those observers would not have thought possible in the past and might have recommended against even trying.

The mission has improved relations with a broad range of countries, including by increasing contacts with representatives of nearly all of the other 191 delegations and senior UN officials. The mission has conveyed a message that the United States is determined to listen and work in good faith to make the United Nations a more effective and principled forum for addressing pressing global challenges. These changes have been accompanied by a meaningful shift in approach that advances U.S. interests and values and demonstrates a commitment to meeting international obligations. Such changes have made it easier for the mission to secure agreement and burden sharing on matters of strategic importance (b) (5)



Engagement with the UN Secretariat has intensified as the United Nations total annual budget has more than doubled over the past decade, largely due to an increase in the number of peacekeeping operations.<sup>2</sup> There is more on the UN agenda than in the past, and that enhanced agenda has imposed significant additional demands on USUN. The Security Council's workload has expanded considerably, with more than double the number of meetings, resolutions, and Presidential statements of two decades ago. Over the past decade, there has also been a major increase in work related to UN sanctions, with an expansion from one to nine UN sanctions panels of experts to monitor and report on implementation.

Likewise, the General Assembly and its subsidiary committees have increased their programs of work significantly, highlighted by a 20 percent growth in the number of resolutions over the past decade. The operational work of the UN system has also expanded into new areas, including global issues as diverse as HIV/AIDS, climate change, genocide, peacebuilding, and counterterrorism.

An increased level of U.S. engagement in the United Nations has generated the need for higher levels of communication, coordination, and cooperation across U.S. agencies. USUN, IO,

---

<sup>2</sup> The UN program budget for the 2001–2002 budget year was \$2.7 billion; the peacekeeping budget for the same period was \$2.6 billion. The UN program budget for the 2010–2011 budget year was \$5.1 billion; the peacekeeping budget for the same period was \$7.8 billion. The UN fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.

and National Security Council (NSC) staffs maintain almost constant communications every day. The Departments of Defense and Treasury, as well as other government agencies, play greater roles in advancing U.S. objectives at the United Nations. Sustaining the required level of communication and coordination among all these entities adds to the demands and stresses on USUN staff.

Even as the level of UN activity and budgets has grown dramatically, USUN's overall staffing has remained virtually unchanged in the past 10 years. As a result, many mission officers endure 60-hour weeks and longer and more intense periods of crisis management. They face increasing difficulty keeping pace with initiatives emanating from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and other intergovernmental bodies. The mission's budget, even when adjusted for inflation, has declined over the same period.

At about 150 diplomatic, technical, and administrative professionals, mission staffing is lean. In the past two Mission Strategic and Resource Plans, mission leadership sought an increase of five positions distributed among the political, economic and social affairs (ECOSOC),<sup>3</sup> and host country sections, and in the regional security office. Although the mission has made strong cases for these new positions, and the inspection team endorses them, the Department of State (Department) is not likely to satisfy all of USUN's personnel requests. However, the inspection team believes the mission can address some of its expanded staffing needs through reprogramming of existing positions, even as it pursues new positions from Washington.

---

<sup>3</sup> The UN's Economic and Social Council is known as ECOSOC; USUN has also given this abbreviation to the section that covers ECOSOC issues.



format, with section chiefs talking about their sections' activities and achievements. This approach generated a livelier exchange that all welcomed. The Permanent Representative communicates with USUN staff primarily through memoranda or emails. Mission staff appreciates her quick responses to emails on urgent matters. In the past few months, executive office staff devised much-appreciated ways to provide mission employees more direct, written feedback. Many mission staff members indicated that they would like more opportunities for quick, face-to-face discussion with the Permanent Representative but that they understand her schedule is so filled with UN activities in New York that there is limited time for such direct interaction.

The Permanent Representative expressed concern that the new USUN building layout makes intramission communication more difficult. Inspectors discussed with her and her senior staff additional activities that might complement town hall meetings and potentially increase interaction and communication missionwide. However, the physical structure of the new USUN building itself and the restricted movement between floors pose a challenge to communication that requires constant imagination and effort to address.

The Permanent Representative drew on her previous experience at both the Department as Assistant Secretary and the NSC as senior director to develop special staff structures in New York and Washington to support her Cabinet role. The special staff in New York consists of a chief and a deputy chief of staff, three policy advisers, a special assistant, and two schedulers, all but one of whom are political appointees, plus an executive secretary and staff assistant, both career Foreign Service. USUN/W has a senior Foreign Service deputy to the Permanent Representative and seven political appointee staff: a deputy chief of staff/counselor; four policy advisers, one of whom is also the speechwriter; a special assistant; and an office manager. Some of these staff members feel this level of staffing is inadequate to support the Permanent Representative in her NSC role. Although the Permanent Representative's New York and Washington staffs work long and stressful hours, including nights, weekends, and holidays, the level of staffing has provided the Permanent Representative a reasonable level of support for her special responsibilities. Growth in that staff may not be realistic, given overall limits on Department staffing.

The Permanent Representative's New York staff is concentrated on the executive floor of the mission. Many in the mission have difficulty distinguishing between policy advisers and the support staff and do not have a clear sense of their duties. (See the Operational Effectiveness section for an informal recommendation.) There is a perception among some mission staff that the policy advisers and support staff have greater access to the Permanent Representative and more input on a wide range of policy issues than career staff. Because executive office staff members have direct, daily contact with the Permanent Representative that many others do not, such a perception is difficult to overcome. The difficulty is compounded by the building's configuration and the physical isolation of all USUN floors.

USUN shares many characteristics with U.S. embassies overseas, with an ambassador who is the chief of mission, and political, economic, management, and other sections managing distinct issues, and a contract guard force. However, USUN is very much a domestic Department entity. It has a total of five Senate-confirmed ambassadors, including the Permanent

Representative. It is staffed with a mix of Foreign Service, excepted service,<sup>4</sup> political appointee, and contract employees; none has diplomatic privileges and immunities, and all are subject to rules that apply to government employees working in the United States. Mission staff members interact with diplomats of nearly 200 countries, but they are accredited to an international organization. Some Foreign Service staff members receive housing support, but unlike overseas, there are personal tax consequences because this is a domestic assignment for them.

Like the ambassador at an overseas mission, the USUN Permanent Representative received a Presidential letter of instruction. That letter is intended to spell out the responsibilities, authorities, and obligations of a chief of mission. Such Presidential letters have an important function both in instructing a chief of mission and in defining the chief of mission's authorities with respect to representatives of other U.S. agencies. The current Permanent Representative received her Presidential letter of instruction in 2009. It was based on the letter used for overseas chiefs of mission. Some of those instructions, including promoting the export of U.S. goods and services and protecting U.S. citizens in the country of assignment, are not relevant in a domestic U.S. setting. The 2009 letter did not address her responsibilities or authorities with respect to the United Nations or her Cabinet-rank status.

There is no off-the-shelf Presidential letter of instruction that addresses the unique situation of leading a diplomatic mission within the United States. There are, for instance, directives about communication with the United Nations in the *Foreign Affairs Manual* (5 FAM 220) that deserve to be highlighted in the letter of instruction, especially because most U.S. permanent representatives, historically, have not been career diplomats. Similarly, the letter of instruction is important in outlining the relationship between USUN and IO, especially when a permanent representative is a Cabinet-rank official and outranks the IO Assistant Secretary.<sup>5</sup> The absence of a tailored letter of instruction has not affected the ability of the current Permanent Representative or the mission to do their jobs; however, the absence of such a letter has undermined the credibility of that instrument to instruct or inform the incumbent, as well as other agencies of the government that work with her. It also has not defined authoritatively for mission and Department staffs the responsibilities, authorities, and obligations of a permanent representative.

The intranet Web site of the Bureau of Administration indicates that a separate Presidential letter of instruction for USUN permanent representatives is in preparation. All relevant Department elements will review and clear an existing draft letter of instruction once it is revised to take account of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Neither IO nor USUN leaderships have been involved in this process to date. Given the extraordinary nature of the diplomatic work of USUN in New York and the importance of the United Nations to U.S.

---

<sup>4</sup> All but one of USUN's non-Foreign Service staff members fall into the excepted service or General Grade (GG) category. GG is a pay plan used by the Department to denote a pay schedule similar to the General Schedule. Employees under the GG pay schedule are generally not covered by Title 5 laws, rules, and regulations. There is greater flexibility when it comes to hiring a GG, but they are treated like regular Civil Service for pay and performance purposes.

<sup>5</sup> Department standard 1 FAM 331.1(2) states that the IO Assistant Secretary "... leads in the development, coordination, and implementation of U.S. multilateral policy and formulates and implements U.S. policy toward international organizations, with particular emphasis on those organizations which make up the United Nations (UN) system."

interests, a Presidential letter of instruction will guide and strengthen the efforts of future permanent representatives.

**Recommendation 1:** The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should draft and clear a tailored Presidential letter of instruction for the Permanent Representative. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with IO, USUN, and L)

As noted earlier, the Permanent Representative has created special staff structures in both New York and Washington to facilitate her dual roles as a Cabinet-rank officer and as a permanent representative. Over the past several decades, the size and roles of those staffs have fluctuated to reflect the needs of different permanent representatives and, where that person has also held Cabinet rank, to provide additional support. Permanent representatives without Cabinet-rank status have generally had about three support staff members in each of their offices in New York and Washington. Staffing levels for permanent representatives with Cabinet rank have been larger. However, there are no models to guide staffing. Instead, when the President decides that a permanent representative will also be a Cabinet member, the Department responds by providing additional political appointee positions on a temporary basis, if requested. The Department also provides some additional budget support, for example, for representation, but, in general, IO does not receive a larger budget allocation for the additional expenses related to a Cabinet-rank permanent representative. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has additional responsibilities for the personal protection of a Cabinet-rank officer; providing a protective detail has budget implications for that bureau as well.

Although ad hoc arrangements have worked, they do not reflect good business practice or a prudent approach to resource planning. Neither incoming permanent representatives nor IO leadership has a clear sense of what is normal or how to support or budget for the two scenarios. There is now adequate historical information available for the Department to know broadly what levels of staff, office space, budget, and other support are needed for permanent representatives with and without Cabinet status. Having standing guidance available will smooth and speed the transition process for future permanent representatives.

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in coordination with the U. S. Mission to the United Nations, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, should develop standing guidance for support staffing in New York and Washington and budgeting for permanent representatives with and without Cabinet rank. (Action: IO, in coordination with USUN, DS, and M)

### **The Mission and the Interagency Process: Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation**

The United Nations is engaged in a broad array of activities that affect U.S. interests and for which the United States provides the largest individual country share of budget support. This administration also gives high priority to increasing U.S. standing and effectiveness in international organizations. USUN has been particularly successful in accomplishing that goal. One reason for this success is communication, coordination, and cooperation at senior levels of USUN, IO, other Department bureaus, NSC staff, and other agencies. (b) (5)

(b) (5)



Among the Permanent Representative's initiatives is the placement of policy advisers in both the New York and Washington offices. The advisers are not recruited as subject matter experts, but they bring to their jobs experience that the Permanent Representative values. For instance, two of the three current policy advisers in New York came from the United Nations, giving them extraordinary insights as well as a list of quality contacts. In New York, the advisers have focused on longer range issues, with a more strategic approach than is generally possible in USUN's usual crisis mode. In Washington, the advisers focus on support to the Permanent Representative in her role as an NSC member. In addition to her Washington deputy, who regularly attends Deputies Committee and other high-level policy discussions, the policy advisers represent the Permanent Representative in interagency policy committees, small groups, and other interagency meetings that feed information and recommendations into the policy-making processes.

The New York policy advisers generally have been able to work out divisions of labor between themselves and action officers in USUN's other sections that avoid competition or duplication of effort. The policy advisers attend some section meetings or join cross-sectional working groups where issues and responsible action officers are clarified. In Washington, the policy advisers are more directly involved in the interagency policy process and are committed to give the Permanent Representative what she needs to operate at the level she desires in the national policy-making process.

***U.S. Mission to the United Nations/Washington Office***

The size and role of USUN/W has varied over many years. In the previous administration, a small USUN/W office served primarily to support permanent representatives when they visited Washington. In early 2009, the current Permanent Representative developed a plan for the Washington office and had her staff in place more quickly than many other senior staff in the Department. Consequently, USUN/W began to play an active role in the policy process almost immediately. Given the 8-year period where permanent representatives did not have Cabinet rank, USUN/W initially met with confusion and, on occasion, resistance from some Department bureaus. There was no *Foreign Affairs Manual* or other standing instruction for USUN/W. Presidential Policy Directive – 1 of February 13, 2009, codified the Permanent Representative's policy involvement and the USUN/W deputy's place in the Washington policy-

making process.<sup>6</sup> Some parts of the Department adjusted to the Permanent Representative's expanded role, while others, and some agencies, questioned the extent of USUN/W's engagement on her behalf.

Even though USUN/W primarily supports the Permanent Representative in her NSC role, USUN/W staff also engages on UN issues for which IO is responsible to provide guidance and instructions. Coordination among USUN and IO leaders is generally good. The front offices of USUN and IO are in contact daily, and the USUN/W deputy has three weekly meetings scheduled with the IO Assistant Secretary.

The Permanent Representative expects USUN/W first and foremost to support her as a member of the NSC Principals Committee. In that regard, USUN/W's scope encompasses the full range of U.S. foreign policy and national security issues—not just those limited to the United Nations. USUN/W staff members have contacts across the Department and with other agencies that have national security responsibilities. Like the Permanent Representative herself, they are in the Department but also have an independent identity. In carrying out their duties, USUN/W staff members find themselves simultaneously working directly for one Cabinet member while being paid by and physically present in the offices of another. They create conditions for the Permanent Representative's successes at the United Nations while also coordinating and cooperating with the Secretary's most senior officials, including the IO leadership, which has the Department's designated lead in developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. multilateral policy.

USUN/W has worked out its roles in the interagency process and in the Department without the benefit of established guidelines. The resultant lack of clarity about USUN/W's role and responsibilities affects the quality of communications, particularly with IO; some USUN/W staff members work smoothly and inclusively with their IO counterparts and others less effectively.

Some offices and individual employees in IO feel marginalized, even on issues where they have considerable experience and expertise. Because of the unique nature of this institutional arrangement, there have been instances of misunderstanding and miscommunication.

Despite the bureaucratic tension this arrangement generates, the United States is achieving its objectives at the United Nations with better results than many anticipated and the kinds of results the administration wants. USUN/W gives the Permanent Representative the support, flexibility, and level of engagement that she wants. In these circumstances, it is difficult for the inspection team to develop recommendations that might lead to better outcomes.

That said, there are areas where USUN/W's coordination and cooperation with IO could improve. For instance, USUN/W policy advisers attend many interagency meetings that do not

---

<sup>6</sup> Presidential Policy Directive – 1 directs the organization of the National Security Council System, including designating the Permanent Representative as a member of the NSC and the NSC Principals Committee and the deputy to the Permanent Representative as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee.

include representatives from IO. The advisers may learn of outcomes well before Department processes inform IO of taskings from the meetings. USUN/W tries to alert the appropriate offices of impending assignments when turnaround may be urgent. USUN/W policy advisers have also worked directly with regional bureaus on UN-related issues that are time sensitive, either because a Principals Committee meeting is imminent or an issue is on the UN agenda that day or the next. On occasion, some of the policy advisers in Washington bypass traditional IO action offices because they have interagency or Department contacts who they know can provide answers without the intermediation of IO or because they believe time is of the essence and feel they cannot wait for customary Department processes to work. The Permanent Representative is often the designated administration spokesperson on an issue, and normal processes of drafting and clearances are suspended. USUN/W advisers have tasked IO or USUN action officers directly for background or information outside their areas of expertise. On occasion, USUN/W staff members are included as clearers on written products that are also being cleared by USUN in New York. These situations create unnecessary confusion and delay. In recent months, the USUN chief of staff has worked to harmonize relations among USUN, IO, and USUN/W. There is now an understanding, for instance, that USUN/W will channel requests for information through USUN section chiefs and that, if USUN clears an item, a USUN/W clearance is not required.

***Informal Recommendation 1:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should share with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs on a case-by-case basis the results of interagency meetings to which it has special access when that bureau will have to take action and when time is of the essence.

***Informal Recommendation 2:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should provide clear guidance on when its Washington policy advisers need to clear documents that have been prepared by or will be cleared by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

### ***Taking Time to Plan in New York***

Among other duties, policy advisers in New York have responsibility for planning. Working closely with mission sections, they developed a planning document for the 64th UN General Assembly session in 2009 that identified issues and opportunities, including how best to leverage the participation of the President, Secretary of State, and Permanent Representative in their first UN General Assembly session. They developed a similar plan for the 65th session. One policy adviser also worked with the then-recently arrived Ambassador for ECOSOC in the spring of 2010 to develop a strategic plan for that section that identified four key goals, major events and ongoing USUN work related to those goals, and opportunities for the mission to exploit that year. The policy advisers coordinated development of the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan for 2012 and for 2013. The coordination process for the 2013 plan involved sending portions of the 2012 plan to mission sections for updates and revisions, preparing a new draft, including a new chief of mission statement that detailed achievements of the previous year, and clearing the near-final text through the mission. Many overseas missions find ways to discuss an upcoming Mission Strategic and Resource Plan before it is written, thereby building communication across sections and getting buy-in to the document from the outset. USUN itself had a productive off-site in 2009 that fed into preparation of the 64th UN General Assembly strategy document. Mission staff members believe discussion strengthened that document.

Similarly, the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan would be more than the result of a paper process if a more inclusive discussion preceded its preparation.

***Informal Recommendation 3:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should use the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan exercise to improve intramission communication and collaboration by organizing a discussion of goals and accomplishments prior to the start of drafting.

For a mission operating in perpetual crisis mode, a position or positions with responsibility for planning in the executive office represents a significant, but very worthwhile, investment. Such a position did not exist in the recent past, and there may be an understandable preference in such an overstretched mission for action officers over planners in the future. However, the function has been valuable, and elsewhere in this report the inspection team recommends that ECOSOC and other sections develop individual section plans to organize and direct their activities. It is important to institutionalize a planning capability even if future permanent representatives choose not to include a planner position in their executive offices.

***Informal Recommendation 4:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how best to sustain an internal strategic planning capability.

### **A Mission with Five Ambassadors**

In addition to the Permanent Representative, the mission has four other ambassadors who must receive Senate confirmation. The Deputy Permanent Representative shoulders an enormous workload. This is the only one of the five ambassador positions to which Presidents regularly appoint a Foreign Service officer. The current Deputy Permanent Representative, a career officer, represents the mission on a wide range of UN activities. Security Council attention to issues traditionally covered by deputy permanent representatives, such as the Middle East, has increased dramatically and expanded the number of meetings, diplomatic exchanges, and phone calls on her agenda. Although no USUN position bears the title, the Deputy Permanent Representative provides a deputy chief of mission-like or chief operating officer function with respect to the host country, legal, and management sections and the regional security office. Career employees frequently seek her counsel. Despite her already full schedule of official events, she is always accessible, and her openness builds mission morale. In some instances, she has served as a bridge between the worlds of the mission's career and political employees.

The three remaining ambassadors are associated with the political (mainly Security Council issues), ECOSOC, and UN management and reform sections. These ambassadors traditionally have not been career employees. They bring a variety of expertise, experience, and interests to their positions.

The United Nations is a hierarchical organization. Ranks and titles count. Titles can be as compelling as message. In this environment, five Senate-confirmed ambassadors are needed to ensure that the United States is represented at the necessary level in the many UN meetings where U.S. interests are paramount. Ambassadors frequently deliver statements prepared in Washington and on issues where they do not have expertise. They rely on their staffs, who will have engaged with their counterparts in Washington to prepare statements and related

background materials, to give them information they need to represent the United States effectively.

The political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections all have senior Foreign Service or excepted service leadership positions in addition to the respective ambassadors. Those career officers, and in some sections their deputies, are responsible in theory for providing day-to-day leadership and management of the sections. The extent to which the three ambassadors are involved in the policy process that leads to their participation in UN meetings varies. Some become deeply engaged with their section's individual issues officers. They tend, however, not to lead their sections in the way a counselor would lead a section in an overseas mission. Because of the variety of backgrounds, styles, and expectations of the ambassadors and senior section staff members, there is no single model for the working relationships between them. Nor have permanent representatives historically demanded a one-size-fits-all approach as long as the sections accomplish the mission's work.

USUN adapts its finite resources almost day by day to the growing demands of the UN agenda. Its policy successes are impressive. Its staff works incredibly hard. There is a palpable spirit of cooperation between USUN and other diplomatic missions and with the United Nations itself. USUN has been able to win support for U.S. positions on some issues that would not have been possible in the past. With so much attention and manpower devoted to achieving important policy goals, USUN has traditionally paid less attention to its own overall operational effectiveness. There has never been a single model for management of the individual sections or the information they handle. Given their structures, with subunits and deputies, both Foreign Service and excepted service section chiefs have some deputy chief of mission-like responsibilities and obligations in their sections, but accountability has not been incorporated into expectations or performance appraisals. The next section of this report puts forward internal management improvements that are designed to redress long-standing inattention to building an effective operational infrastructure.

## Operational Effectiveness

Historically, most of the mission's section chiefs and deputies, both Foreign Service and excepted service, have been selected based on their subject area expertise. This selection criterion is understandable in light of the policy and negotiating focus of the mission's high-visibility work. The busiest work places, however, require the greatest degree of ongoing management attention in order to adapt resources, both human and financial, to evolving demands and changing needs. Although each USUN section has identified at least one senior staff member to oversee the section's management, in reality those individuals are often the same ones managing the most complex policy issues or leading time-consuming negotiations. Time-sensitive and high-visibility issues will always take priority over long-term planning. Issues like reviews of staffing levels and assignments, the development of training continuums, and the counseling and mentoring of underperforming employees get short shrift.

**Recommendation 3:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should identify the most appropriate officer in each section to oversee the full range of management issues for that section, make management one of the top two items of that officer's work requirements or critical performance elements, specify management performance objectives for the rating period, and survey section staff as part of evaluating the officer's performance. (Action: USUN)

The remainder of this section of the report discusses several areas where sustained management attention could rectify systemic staffing, performance, budget, and records management shortcomings. Although each of the following recommendations is operational, taken together and implemented, they have the potential to address many of USUN's most urgent staffing needs, redirect funding to higher priority activities, and institutionalize the handling of some of the mission's most important records.

### Strategic Staffing

Mission staffing has remained nearly constant for the past 10 years, despite renewed interest in multilateral diplomacy and a more extensive UN calendar. Although some additional positions are requested each year in the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, few have been added because a stagnant USUN budget has allowed for little growth (see the Resource Management section for a more complete discussion of budget planning.) In addition to employee numbers remaining constant, so has the mix of positions within the mission, despite changes in both policy and technology that might drive staffing in a different direction. As a result, some employees are not well used, and others are required to work additional hours to compensate. Over the years, the mission has done little strategic personnel planning and has tended simply to refill vacant positions without considering reprogramming options. As a result, USUN's current leadership has inherited an outdated personnel mix and no process to redress the imbalance or solve some of its own staffing needs. Reprogramming could allow the mission to fill a more urgent need in the same section or an even greater need in another section of the mission.

**Recommendation 4:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should convene an ad hoc working group, chaired by the Deputy Permanent Representative, when vacancies occur to determine whether to refill positions or reprogram them. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 5:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should reprogram positions to support the policy and management needs of the mission. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IO and DGHR)

USUN has many excellent and long-serving employees who provide the mission with valuable institutional knowledge and consistency. In many offices, however, employees' duties have changed or should change in response to new initiatives or technology that add, alter, or reduce employee workloads. Related to the discussion above, few section managers have analyzed whether they continue to have the right mix of positions to maximize productivity and efficiency. Current excepted service position descriptions often reflect neither the reality nor the current requirements for positions.

**Recommendation 6:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish a timeline, perform desk audits, and update all excepted service position descriptions. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IO and DGHR)

Political appointee positions have job descriptions for position classification purposes when established, but they do not require specific job descriptions, leaving roles undefined. This lack of definition provides the executive office much-needed flexibility, but the corresponding lack of transparency creates confusion for some others in the mission who do not always know with whom to coordinate on potentially overlapping issues.

***Informal Recommendation 5:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should clarify the roles and responsibilities of each member of the executive office staff and publish that information throughout the mission.

There are 18 mission positions classified as secretarial or office management assistant. Some employees in these positions are not up to date with the latest electronic programs, requiring others in the section to perform duties that a secretary or office management assistant would typically perform. Some position descriptions do not require secretaries and office management specialists to serve as the section's administrator for eCountry Clearance, ePerformance, and e2 Solutions travel programs, although these are standard secretarial or office management assistant responsibilities. Most incumbents have had little recent training and, in some cases, have not attended information technology courses offered within the mission. Additional computer skills training would also create opportunities for secretaries and office management assistants to coordinate a section's electronic records management program.

**Recommendation 7:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should devise standard elements for all secretary and office management specialist position descriptions and critical performance elements, in addition to those specific to individual offices, and revise the position descriptions and job elements accordingly. (Action: USUN)

## Managing Performance

In a mission where 80 percent of the staff are excepted service employees whose careers might span 20 years or more in the same job, supervisors have been inconsistent in dealing with performance issues. Many sections that are composed primarily of excepted service employees are headed by Foreign Service officers who are unfamiliar with the Civil Service appraisal system. Because Foreign Service officers usually serve 3-year tours of duty at USUN, they may also be hesitant to address long-standing performance issues. Managing performance through accurate and timely performance evaluations, an equitable distribution of work, and the use of performance improvement plans is not always the norm. As a result, some employees lose out on the counseling, mentoring, and training that they need to be fully successful in their positions or to adapt to changing priorities and technologies. In some cases, employees have been promoted into positions for which they are ill suited or retained in positions where they are not meeting minimum requirements, but supervisors over the years have adapted performance requirements to skills the employee has rather than skills the section needs. The Foreign Service Institute has two new courses that target managers of Civil Service employees: ePerformance for Civil Service (PA-449) and Civil Service Performance Management and Evaluation Process (PA-495).

**Recommendation 8:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require all Foreign Service officers who are first-time Civil Service supervisors to take the Foreign Service Institute's online training courses PA-449 and PA-495 and monitor for successful completion of the modules. (Action: USUN)

*Informal Recommendation 6:* The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should document delinquent performance evaluations and any failures to conduct required counseling sessions in the performance evaluations of the responsible supervisors.

*Informal Recommendation 7:* The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should train all supervisors in the appropriate use of performance improvement plans.

## Maximizing Benefits of Nonpermanent Staff

USUN makes use of a wide variety of unpaid and paid nonpermanent staff, including summer, autumn, and spring interns; Pickering Fellows; Presidential Management Fellows for a few months at any time of the year; Franklin Fellows for a year or more at any time; temporary duty personnel and retired officers for a few months each year; and longer term exchanges from other agencies. USUN's location in vibrant New York City and the mission's work with the world's leading multilateral body make it attractive to nonpermanent staff who, in turn, help the mission cope with an increased workload and peak-season surges without a corresponding increase in permanent staff.

No one part of the mission coordinates the recruitment of nonpermanent staff. The orientation process is perfunctory (largely a check-in and document-based process) for the newcomers, and there is no formal follow-up for newcomers to share experiences during their stay and compile lessons learned. The human resources unit handles the intern program and provides a 1-day program that is billed as orientation but is really only enhanced check-in. The orientation does not include an introduction to the USUN structure or how USUN relates to what

happens in the United Nations. Recruiting Franklin and Presidential Management Fellows is largely ad hoc, without coordination through either the executive officer or the human resources unit. Thus, some sections attract enough nonpermanent staff, while other sections go lacking; in some cases offices are recruiting the wrong kind of employee for the type of work they need done.

Duties and responsibilities assigned to interns and fellows are a mixed bag. Some interns and fellows are given significant responsibilities, whereas others are used largely on clerical tasks. For the three fellows programs, for example, the mission commits to meeting certain program requirements, but some mission managers are unaware of the distinctions among the types of nonpermanent employees and the kind of work that is appropriate for each.

The lack of a structured orientation program means that some newcomers, particularly interns and fellows, are less likely to understand and benefit from their assignments and thus are less likely to consider future careers in the Department. Once interns and fellows are on board, there are few ongoing activities designed for them, either to facilitate an exchange of ideas or to enhance their USUN experience, such as group discussions or speaker programs. The human resources unit could draw on volunteers from various sections of the mission, including more experienced nonpermanent staff, to assist in this effort. The lack of a coordinated approach to the recruitment and development of nonpermanent staff hinders USUN's ability to get the right type of personnel for the tasks at hand and to set the correct expectations for both the nonpermanent staff and the receiving office.

**Recommendation 9:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop a management policy and procedures for the recruitment, orientation, and development of nonpermanent staff. (Action: USUN)

### **Managing Overtime**

In FY 2010, USUN spent approximately \$300,000 on overtime. To date, FY 2011 overtime expenditures are comparable. Paid overtime represents only a portion of the mission's overtime, however. Employees at higher grade levels cannot be paid for extra hours worked but earn compensatory time off. In either case, overtime involves significant cost to the mission, financially or in lost hours during regular work time. During the UN General Assembly or other major UN events throughout the year, some overtime is essential, with negotiating sessions often lasting late into the night.

USUN's secretarial and information management staffs consume the largest portion of paid overtime, whereas the mission's negotiating officers accumulate the most compensatory time, which they are often unable to use before it expires. Most of the secretarial and information management overtime is in support of the executive office. Much of the secretarial overtime results from the tradition of supporting principals until they are ready to leave the office even if there is only enough work for half of the support staff. A rotating roster of evening staff could cover any eventualities.

The mission does not have a mechanism to plan for or limit unnecessary overtime. As a result, the mission incurs excessive overtime expenditures while failing to fund other important

program-related priorities. In FY 2010, USUN spent only \$9,000 on training, and by June 2011, had spent only \$4,000 on training for the fiscal year—far too little for an organization with more than 150 employees (see the discussion of budget and training in the Resource Management section).

**Recommendation 10:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish an overtime budget baseline and document monthly comparisons of usage against that baseline. (Action: USUN).

Although this report recommends better management of unnecessary overtime, employees in at least two of the mission's sections have not been tracking overtime usage routinely because they believe that they are not entitled to compensation for extraordinary hours of work or that they are unlikely to be granted any compensatory time earned due to the press of work. In the case of ECOSOC, this failure to document overtime affects the mission's ability to apply for the 18 percent premium pay for the section's Foreign Service officers, even though most, if not all, of them work more than the 55 hours per week required to apply for that benefit. Not all of ECOSOC's excepted service staff members maintain records for their extra hours worked even though they may be entitled to compensatory time. These records are also of value in demonstrating a need for additional personnel resources.

Employees in the sanctions unit of the political section also work significant amounts of overtime, but that unit's excepted service personnel do not qualify for the 18 percent differential that Foreign Service officers in the rest of that section receive. Only recently have sanctions unit personnel begun to document overtime hours worked because some of the unit's employees are entitled to some form of overtime compensation.

**Informal Recommendation 8:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a policy that requires all personnel to document their overtime and provide employees with compensation when possible.

The OIG team observed a link between the mission's lack of control of overtime and compensatory time and its lack of attention to time and attendance in general. Managers routinely do not approve overtime in advance as required by *Foreign Affairs Handbook* standards (4 FAH-3 H-523.2). Moreover, the mission has not reviewed its time and attendance practices at an organizational level and does not have a time and attendance policy or uniform timekeeping procedures. More consistent timekeeping would result in more control over the use of overtime and compensatory time.

**Recommendation 11:** The U. S. Mission to the United Nations should standardize timekeeping procedures across sections and require advance approval of overtime and compensatory time to the extent possible. (Action: USUN)

## Records Management

Much of USUN's work is based on precedent: what did the U.S. Government do or say about this subject in preceding years? Many General Assembly resolutions are reintroduced year after year, but subtle changes in drafts may have significant budget implications for the United

States—the United Nations single largest donor—or imply an unintended policy shift. Maintaining an accurate and easily retrievable historical record within the mission as a whole, as well as within individual sections, is essential. Lack of attention over time to the record-keeping function has resulted in the information storage problem, discussed in the next section, and nonstandard record-keeping processes. Each officer at USUN has his or her own records management system. Some officers rely heavily on paper records; others have developed electronic archives that mean something to them but may not be searchable by their successors or colleagues. For others, records management is done through storing vast quantities of emails that exceed the system's storage capacity.

USUN has a research unit (discussed later in this report) dedicated to maintaining the mission's broad historical record. One of the research unit employees is the mission's records manager. That unit, however, has been striving for several years to modernize its record keeping and digitize thousands of documents. There has been no time for the records management coordinator to focus on missionwide records management issues.

Because USUN has not developed a systematic approach to records management over the years, the mission risks losing much of its historical record. There are individual officers with exceptional information technology skills scattered throughout the mission, whose knowledge could be tapped to develop a records management strategy.

***Informal Recommendation 9:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should form a working group, led by the mission's records manager and composed of staff with excellent records management practices and information technology skills. The working group should develop electronic and paper records management protocols in consultation with managers from each section and work with the records manager and the information resources staff to standardize record keeping.

## **Use of Record Emails**

The political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections do a substantial amount of reporting, both ad hoc and formal. Officers send either reporting emails or front channel cables, generally using the cable format to report the formal conclusions of a Security Council session or a major conference, board meeting, or committee event. Most reporting is done through unclassified emails, however, and sent to an extensive list of addressees that varies according to the issue. Throughout the year, officers prepare quick email reports of what transpired at meetings and negotiations and seek guidance for the follow-on sessions. They also use emails to report meeting dynamics, the positions of other delegations, assessments of the negotiation's status, and evolving resolution texts.

Drafters usually send reporting emails with only the immediate supervisor's clearance. The informal nature of emails facilitates timely reporting and mitigates delays caused by formal clearance and approval requirements for telegrams. Over-burdensome clearance requirements on emails would defeat the purpose of using emails for informal reporting.

Currently, the mission sends very few reports by SMART<sup>7</sup> record emails. The rest are sent as normal emails that, if kept at all, are archived only in the sender's or the receiver's personal electronic folders. Consequently, little of the email reporting is available as a historical record or as source material. Record emails are rarely used due to the absence of a mission policy on how and when to use them.

**Recommendation 12:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and disseminate a mission policy on when and how to use SMART emails of record. (Action: USUN)

In OIG questionnaires and interviews, customers expressed frustration with the lack of storage capacity in the email system. Even though the information resource management section installed a new local area network in August 2010 to increase the mission's data storage capacity, the new network did not provide the enhanced capacity that USUN needed. In the lead-up to the inspection, the information management staff members had begun assessing customer needs, increasing email box capacity, and working with customers one on one to inform them about how they can manage their data files more efficiently. They had not yet had time, however, to do a thorough assessment of customer needs. Until they complete such an assessment, it is unclear how much additional storage USUN needs. The new level of individual attention has increased customer satisfaction but is time intensive. USUN has an opportunity to develop a customized network with increased storage capacity that will serve customers better.

**Recommendation 13:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should complete its surveys and one-on-one customer training to determine customer business needs and assess storage requirements. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 14:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resources Management, should plan an on-site visit from the bureau's Global Modernization Program designers to establish a network with greater storage capacity and backup capability. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IRM)

### **Destruction or Retirement of Records**

At the time of the inspection, the research unit was in the process of reviewing masses of paper materials forwarded by individuals or sections that were unsure of the proper disposition or simply did not have the resources to cull those files themselves. At the time of the move from the temporary premises to the new office building, one office destroyed 28 boxes of files that had not been consulted for years. Some offices are still retaining files dating back to the 1950s for reasons that have become unclear even to those who maintain them. According to 5 FAH-4 H-212, offices are to examine their record-keeping procedures continuously to revise, consolidate, or eliminate unnecessary records.

The inspection team reviewed the files being retained by the host country section in particular because paper file holdings were beginning to have space implications for that section. In some cases, file holdings significantly exceeded the domestic records disposition schedule. In other cases, there is no longer any need to retain paper files for records created and maintained

---

<sup>7</sup> State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset.

electronically or for those actions performed and archived by other agencies. Although the recommendation that follows refers to the host country holdings, other mission sections could benefit from a similar review. The Appendix contains a list of host country files requiring review.

**Recommendation 15:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should review the need for paper file retention in the host country relations section, propose updates to the records disposition schedule to the Bureau of Administration for submission to the National Archives and Records Administration, and retire or destroy relevant paper records accordingly. (Action: USUN)

## **Policy, Reporting, and Program Implementation**

### **Crosscutting Issues**

During inspection preparations, the OIG team reviewed questionnaires from the USUN staff in which many respondents described a stove-piped mission. The physical layout of the new office building, with some offices divided between two floors, an inadequate number of elevators, and restricted-access stairwells all complicate communication among sections.

Recently, the mission took an important step toward identifying shared issues, reducing stove piping, and developing a unified strategy on advancing management and reform goals at the United Nations. While the inspectors were at USUN, the first permanent management and reform Ambassador in 3 years initiated a task force drawing representatives from the political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections, as well as the executive office and the Military Staff Committee, to seek areas where all can work together to advance a UN management and reform agenda. In addition to developing a consolidated strategy, this nascent task force has the additional advantage of breaking down any perceived divide between the mission's political appointees and the career staff, which, in turn, will enhance communication on other issues. This effort has already created new enthusiasm among members of staff who now have a better perspective on how their individual roles relate to the mission's broader objectives.

The OIG team counseled mission leadership on the usefulness of other initiatives to reduce stove piping and create a better sense of community in such a busy, goal-oriented mission. These initiatives could include conducting issue-specific town hall meetings, sending officers to other sections' staff meetings with a mandate to report back on priorities, holding periodic deputy section chief meetings, and engaging in a variety of informal and spontaneous team building activities.

### ***Training***

Many of the officers in the political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections took over complex portfolios and began managing issues and negotiating without either multilateral experience, a UN background, or one of the relevant Foreign Service Institute courses. Some employees take Foreign Service Institute training after they have been on the job for a year or more and the course information has already been gleaned through trial and error. USUN does not offer in-house training in these skills except for a 1-day introduction for the nonpermanent staff that supplements USUN during the UN General Assembly. The Foreign Service Institute does not link USUN into its periodic multilateral or negotiating courses via digital video conference. There is no sponsorship program that pairs inexperienced staff with mentors. Several officers are responsible for countries or regions that they have never visited or worked on before, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. These two regions account for the majority of all Security Council work and much of the work in other UN bodies. There are a variety of resources available to prepare officers for their USUN responsibilities, but the staff does not take advantage of them due to the press of business and the paucity of money allotted for training.

**Recommendation 16:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should include multilateral and negotiating skills training and Washington consultations in the transfer orders of relevant Foreign Service officers who have not served in multilateral assignments. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with USUN)

*Informal Recommendation 10:* The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make Washington consultations a part of the training continuum for relevant excepted service personnel during the initial 3 months of their employment.

**Recommendation 17:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute, should develop and implement a plan for training groups of new excepted service and Foreign Service officers in New York. (Action: USUN, in coordination with FSI)

### *United Nations General Assembly*

The annual session of the UN General Assembly is the biggest event on the UN calendar. The UN General Assembly meets in regular session every year from mid-September to early December, with the first week devoted to presentations by heads of state. The six General Assembly committees then meet separately to debate and negotiate numerous resolutions which, when approved, are then discussed in plenary sessions of the General Assembly. Mission staff monitors each committee's negotiations, supplemented by two or three public delegates, area advisers from each regional bureau, temporary duty reporting officers, and Washington-based subject matter experts. Even with additional support, the mission is often hard pressed to cover all of the simultaneously occurring events each fall.

These essential workers require significant administrative support so that they can begin work as soon as they arrive in New York. USUN appoints a member of its permanent staff to coordinate the nonpermanent staff support and activities during the 3 months of the General Assembly, but that coordinator changes every year or two. The reporting officers get a 1-day familiarization course when they arrive in New York but no real guidance based on past experience about what kinds of things warrant their attention in the marathon sessions and what is the most valuable information for an end-of-day report. The lessons learned during the General Assembly are not analyzed and collated into a document that helps the mission, and new coordinators, prepare better for the following year's meeting.

*Informal Recommendation 11:* The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should conduct a lessons learned exercise each December, develop a coordinator and nonpermanent staff handbook, and update that handbook annually.

Regional bureaus designate area advisers, usually former ambassadors, to interact with permanent representatives and other delegates from countries in their region. Area advisers work closely with officers in the political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections to understand U.S. objectives, problems with impending votes, and where they should focus their lobbying efforts, and to develop talking points. Some advisers are more effective than others, and some sections involve them better in strategy sessions. Mission officers cite the ability to understand evolving negotiating positions, personal enthusiasm for the issues, persuasiveness,

and broad recent experience in the region as some of the qualifications of a successful area advisor.

The goal of the area adviser program is to supplement mission efforts to achieve U.S. objectives during the UN General Assembly. Mission staff observes the performance of the various area advisers first hand, but USUN provides no feedback to the regional bureaus on their effectiveness and whether they should continue to serve in that role.

***Informal Recommendation 12:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should prepare a short performance review on each area adviser and submit the review to the bureau's principal deputy assistant secretary.

### ***Uncompensated Extraordinary Hours of Work***

Foreign Service and excepted service personnel in the political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections work long hours on extraordinarily complex, headline issues. Employees in other parts of the mission are equally goal oriented and dedicated, but the burdens fall particularly heavily on staff in those three sections. Employees in those sections are remunerated under several different pay plans: the salaries of some officers are based on a 40-hour work week, whereas others receive premium compensation based on a minimum of 55 hours a week; some officers get paid for overtime; other staff earn compensatory time but can never use it due to the demands of their portfolios; and some employees work with no additional compensation of any type based on their employment category and grade level.

The nature of the work at USUN and its multiple employment categories mean that there will never be parity in pay, work hours, or benefits among all the members of staff in any of these sections. That disparity is a fact of USUN life. The rewards for these staff members come with the work itself and the recognition that they get from the executive office or their supervisors for jobs well done. During the 4-week inspection, the OIG team witnessed several occasions where UN negotiations dragged on until 3:30 or even 5:30 in the morning. USUN staff members were not only involved in discussions until the very end, but they were back at work an hour before the official work day started to report on overnight developments and prepare for the next round. One officer followed this routine 3 days in a row but never flagged. Like professionals on Wall Street, some of the USUN staff members will burn out and move on to jobs with more rational work hours after a few years, but many will stay, testing their stamina year after year. Those whose business it is to monitor the use of U.S. Government resources may not realize the benefits they derive from the unremunerated labor of the USUN policy and negotiating staff. However, the mission would not have registered the recent successes it has achieved in the multilateral arena or advanced American interests so well without it.

### **Political Affairs**

The political affairs section produces high-quality work and maintains generally good morale despite long hours and the constant stress of nearly impossible deadlines. The section's primary focus is the UN Security Council, where decisions are legally binding and have immediate effect on international peace and security. The Security Council meets nearly every workday, and other related preparatory, negotiating, or consultative meetings take place

constantly on the margins of Security Council sessions. The United Nations generally schedules meetings of the Security Council no more than a few weeks in advance, and many meetings occur with only 1 or 2 hours' notice as world events dictate, making much of the section's work reactive and difficult to plan.

The section covers all Security Council decisions concerning world crises or conflicts, the establishment and modification of peacekeeping operations, the imposition of sanctions, and arms control and nonproliferation issues. The staff provides political advice to the executive office, coordinates policy with other UN missions and with Washington agencies, negotiates resolutions, and reports to officials in the mission and Washington on results. The staff's portfolios are divided along both geographic and thematic issues.

At the time of the inspection, a retired ambassador had been serving as the Alternative Representative for several months, pending the arrival of a nominee awaiting Senate confirmation. The Alternative Representative coordinates well with the Foreign Service section chief but did not assert a management role himself. This approach was effective and provided section leadership and management continuity during a period of transition.

The section enjoys generally good relations with Washington officials, including IO and USUN/W. The political section appreciates USUN/W's clout in policy debates with regional bureaus and other agencies. (b) (5)

The section's daily staff meeting is crisp and effective. Several other mission sections attend the political section's staff meeting on a regular basis. The section chief also attends daily meetings with the executive office and passes information quickly and appropriately to his staff.

The political section chief is supported by two deputies and a unit chief for sanctions. All the managers receive high marks from their subordinates for maintaining morale and providing timely and regular information, guidance, and mentoring. Subordinates also credit the managers with trying to achieve some work-life balance despite the long work hours. The section makes good use of exchanges with other agencies; temporary duty staff; Franklin, Pickering, and Presidential Management Fellows; and interns.

The visibility and volume of work in the section's sanctions unit has increased markedly in recent years; sanctions have become a major U.S. and UN policy tool. Tough sanctions taken against North Korea, Iran, and Libya in recent years have set new precedents. The sanctions unit acts as a somewhat autonomous part of the political section, and the unit chief reports directly to the section's minister counselor. The designation of the sanctions unit chief as a third deputy would recognize the importance of sanctions work, clarify the unit's line of authority to the section chief, and build morale in this overworked unit.

***Informal Recommendation 13:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate the political section's sanctions unit chief as the third deputy in the political section.

There has not been an increase in sanctions unit staffing commensurate with the increased workload. As a result, employees accrue considerable unpaid overtime. The sanctions unit has several options for resolving its staffing shortage, including the reprogramming of a

vacant secretarial position in the political section that some argue is no longer needed. (See the Operational Effectiveness section for a discussion of reprogramming missionwide and for a recommendation on documenting overtime.)

As a general practice, following initial email reports sent immediately after Security Council meetings, the political section fleshes out the emails with more thorough telegram reports for the official record. These telegrams are often lengthy summaries of UN meetings that are available elsewhere. The political affairs staff could focus its limited resources on essential reporting and analysis if readers could link into UN transcripts and summaries whenever possible.

***Informal Recommendation 14:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how the political section can reduce the length of reporting telegrams on open Security Council meetings by referring end users to available United Nations-produced materials and supplementing them as needed.

### **Military Staff Committee**

The mission hosts a small office known as the Military Staff Committee. That office represents the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the UN Military Staff Committee and provides military advice to the Permanent Representative and mission staff. A U.S. Army colonel heads the office. He has established a close, collaborative relationship with the Permanent Representative and participates in her morning conference call. Military Staff Committee officers work closely with the political section on peacekeeping issues, and they regularly participate in other sections' meetings, as well as working groups, on subjects with peacekeeping or humanitarian response components.

### **Economic and Social Affairs**

Over the past 24 months the ECOSOC section has been especially successful at promoting U.S. policy interests at the United Nations. Through active lobbying and negotiation in both the General Assembly and relevant committees, the ECOSOC staff has increased vote margins on resolutions substantially beyond what they had been in previous years and has achieved important U.S. political objectives related to Iran and Libya. Despite long work hours and chronic understaffing, the section's effective leadership and the staff's commitment to getting the job done well has paid off with high morale and a real sense of accomplishment.

The ECOSOC section's workload has increased significantly in recent years. UN bodies such as the General Assembly and the ECOSOC Council have sought to enliven their agendas by using new mechanisms such as thematic debates, high-level meetings, summits, and commemorative meetings. The number of such meetings increased from 6 in 2007 to 15 in 2010. Preparations for these events require intensive negotiations on documents and statements and tap already scarce personnel resources. In addition, the United Nations and its members created a number of new institutions, including UN Women and the Peacebuilding Commission, which require monitoring and active participation as they develop their programs. Human rights and some special initiatives related to sexual violence in armed conflict, rights involving sexual orientation and gender identity, and other social issues have taken on new prominence, again

requiring additional strategy sessions and consultations on policy with interested Washington agencies and other delegations and UN staff. Sustainable development and environmental issues resolutions doubled from 12 to 24 in the last General Assembly session.

Keeping up with the normal work required by 14 UN specialized agencies, 10 functional commissions, 5 regional commissions, and 11 UN funds and programs, plus the new initiatives, keeps the section staff extremely busy. Most staff members routinely work more than 55 hours a week. (See the Operational Effectiveness section for a recommendation on documenting overtime.)

Communications within the section are good. The section chief chairs a short staff meeting each morning to pass on information from the executive office morning meetings, to receive updates from section officers, and to coordinate the day's program. Once each week, the Ambassador to ECOSOC chairs the morning meeting. Section planning normally focuses on the immediate except for some strategic planning in advance of the annual General Assembly and ECOSOC Council. Not long after his arrival, the ECOSOC Ambassador and a front office policy adviser developed a 2010 ECOSOC section planning document. Changes in the section's work and focus made that plan less useful than the authors envisioned. The section intends, however, to do more forward planning and review of its longer term objectives.

Most reporting is done by email to a tailored list of addressees. These reports are timely and, according to Washington recipients, provide all necessary information. The section sends formal reporting cables less frequently, usually to report the outcomes of more important meetings. The section does not have a policy on the use of SMART emails of record and only occasionally are they used. (See Recommendation 12 on establishing a mission policy on emails of record.)

The Ambassador to ECOSOC and the section chief have worked out a division of labor where the Ambassador concentrates his efforts on the new Peacebuilding Commission, humanitarian issues, and UN organizations headquartered in New York such as the UN Children's Fund and UN Development Programme. The section chief and his deputy provide frequent briefings, guidance, and counsel to their staff, and the section chief is very effective in policy and strategy development. The deputy takes the lead on editing and clearing documents and in the day-to-day aspects of managing the section. She sometimes assists colleagues in lobbying other delegations during critical votes.

Despite the tremendous increase in the section's workload, staffing has remained stagnant. The mission requested two additional positions for the ECOSOC section in the past two Mission Strategic and Resource Plans: one for health and social issues and the other for sustainable development and environmental issues. With additional personnel, portfolios in the section could be adjusted to reduce every officer's workload. The OIG team supports the mission's request for two additional positions. These new positions would put an additional burden on the deputy, who is already reaching the limit of span of control in supervising more than 10 action officers and support staff, plus a varying number of interns and fellows.


**Informal Recommendation 15:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should consider creating a second deputy position in the economic and social affairs section whenever the section has a new position.

The breadth of issues that ECOSOC officers deal with requires them to interact with Washington representatives from numerous agencies. Their primary interlocutors, however, are in IO. The intricate preparations for the annual UN General Assembly are also mainly with IO. IO prepares position papers and guidance for hundreds of resolutions that will be debated in the various committees. In previous years, some ECOSOC section staff traveled to Washington to consult with IO and help prepare for the General Assembly. Recently, the practice of consultation travel has fallen off. The section's deputy and IO office deputies make weekly telephone calls to establish priorities, exchange information, and resolve communication problems. These calls have strengthened relations between the ECOSOC section and the relevant IO offices. The OIG team encouraged the ECOSOC section to continue this type of consultation in order to maintain strong professional relationships and minimize potential misunderstandings.

### **Management and Reform**

The relatively small management and reform section promotes U.S. objectives of strengthening the UN's management and maintaining discipline over its multibillion dollar budget, of which the United States pays a substantial portion. In pursuing these goals, the management and reform staff represents the United States in various UN oversight and budget-oriented committees. With an unprecedented number of peacekeeping missions, two war crimes tribunals, the UN Capital Master Plan to renovate the UN headquarters complex, and oversight of the regular budget and the budgets of other UN-mandated activities, the management and reform staff is barely able to keep pace. As mentioned earlier, at the time of the inspection the section's new Ambassador initiated a task force to coordinate the mission's approach to the UN management and reform agenda across section lines, which will add significantly to the section's workload. This tightly staffed section is punching way above its weight thanks to a mix of talented employees, each handling a wide range of responsibilities, and it is planning for ways to increase capacity without increasing its permanent staff.

(b) (5)



**Informal Recommendation 16:** (b) (5)

Communication in the management and reform section is good. The section meets weekly, and more often if needed, to coordinate negotiation strategies. The new section chief was hired from the United Nations only a few months before the inspection began, and he was able to adapt quickly to USUN's rhythm. He has formed a close partnership with the newly arrived Ambassador for management and reform, which results in a productive joint management arrangement. The section was preparing to address a staffing crisis as the inspection concluded, with three staff members retiring before the end of 2011, one rotating into the advisory committee position, another taking extended leave, and a Foreign Service officer curtailing. Section management had already considered options for replacing departing staff, including reprogramming a support position and requesting additional nonpermanent staff until they can rebuild the permanent staff. The section's experience with UN management issues seems to have positioned it well to overcome its own management challenges.

**Legal Affairs**

The legal section provides advice to all five of the USUN ambassadors and the entire USUN staff on a wide range of procedural and substantive issues relating to the United Nations. The section's attorneys also represent the United States on several General Assembly committees, on the Security Council's documentation and procedures working group, on the governing bodies of several criminal tribunals, and on a working group on the International Criminal Court. They assist in drafting and negotiating resolutions for the political, ECOSOC, and management and reform sections and provide ethics advice to all USUN staff.

USUN staff members across the board commented positively on the support and advice that the legal affairs section provided them. In acknowledgement of the vital role that the legal affairs section plays in all mission issues, the head of the section participates in both the Permanent Representative's early morning call with IO and the NSC and the follow-on senior staff meeting, as well as the daily evening wrap-up call.

At the time of the inspection, only one of the three attorney positions was encumbered full time due to a complex hiring chain that involved promoting one before others could be hired to fill the two remaining positions. The office hoped to be back to full strength by the beginning of the 2011 UN General Assembly. During the UN General Assembly, and on other specific issues throughout the year, personnel from the Office of the Legal Adviser provide much-needed assistance from Washington to the small legal affairs staff. The section could make good use of a Franklin or Presidential Management Fellow with a legal background to supplement the attorney staff once there is a full complement of attorneys and someone has the time to mentor a temporary staff member.

The chief of the legal section acknowledged that the attorneys have little time to manage their email boxes and their record keeping in general and that the section's secretary does not have the legal background to organize materials for the attorneys without close oversight. The

OIG team discussed the advisability of seeking a secretary with some legal background whenever there is a vacancy in that position.

### **Press and Public Affairs**

In an administration that has placed renewed emphasis on multilateral diplomacy, the press and public affairs section successfully communicates U.S. policy positions to domestic and foreign audiences to accomplish policy goals. The section has used social media effectively, especially Twitter, to push out messages on the most pressing topics of the day. The Permanent Representative values the work of the section in supporting her as she carries out her duties as an NSC principal and in serving as an effective adjunct to the press operations of the Department and NSC—her highest priorities for the section.

The director of communications has both operational responsibilities as mission spokesman and managerial responsibilities as head of the section. With an energetic Permanent Representative who is a key communicator of policy messages, the director has focused most of his attention on press-related activities, taking an active role in coordinating with Washington, approving all messages, and speaking to journalists. The deputy has primary responsibility for administrative matters and oversight of public diplomacy outreach activities. This division of duties makes sense in principle, but the deputy's work requirements do not enumerate clearly the management responsibilities of the position, such as budget and personnel, or articulate the deputy's decision-making authority on those issues. Delegating more explicitly to the deputy the power to handle matters within the position's scope would lead to both greater efficiency and accountability. The OIG team counseled the director and deputy to hold frequent, even daily, meetings to keep the director apprised of management decisions made by the deputy and preserve the director's ability to exercise ultimate oversight.

**Recommendation 18:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should revise the work requirements of the deputy director of communications to specify the position's management responsibilities and commensurate decision-making authority. (Action: USUN)

Officers assigned to the deputy director position do not routinely receive appropriate training to prepare them to be responsible and accountable for management functions. Portions of the Foreign Service Institute course for public affairs section chiefs address management duties similar to those required at USUN.

**Informal Recommendation 17:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require public affairs section chief training for the deputy director of communications position.

This is a busy office with a wide variety of functions. Staff members perceive an "inner circle" of those working most closely on daily press issues and an "outer circle" of those working on other tasks. The brief daily morning meetings center on immediate press issues, and the wider ranging weekly staff meetings are sometimes cancelled or postponed due to events and schedule conflicts. The OIG team counseled the section managers about building a greater sense of unity through holding meetings more regularly and organizing more informal activities for team building and cross-fertilization of ideas.

## *Press and Social Media*

The Permanent Representative is a key spokesperson for administration policy, and the press and public affairs section works long hours developing, recording, transcribing, and disseminating public statements; answering journalist inquiries; shepherding interviews; clearing press guidance; and monitoring the news. The section closely coordinates messages and strategy with the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs, NSC, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other communicators primarily through a morning conference call. Participation in this call works well in keeping USUN closely aligned on policy messages. However, the IO press office does not participate in the NSC-led call for agency communicators and so is sometimes unaware of upcoming USUN press events and major interviews, although coordination is closer on press inquiries and guidance. Consequently, IO may not have the opportunity to flag issues of concern or offer assistance.

***Informal Recommendation 18:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a channel to inform the Bureau of International Organization Affairs press office leadership of upcoming press activities.

Although the New York mission is the flagship USUN mission, there are six other U.S. missions to UN agencies worldwide. Interaction among the missions is mainly through IO, which has the primary facilitating role. Because the overseas missions also deal with UN issues, often on short deadlines, the public diplomacy officers there would benefit from receiving USUN New York press releases and statements directly upon release, rather than through Washington. These officers used to be on the mailing list, but USUN New York has not updated its list of current public diplomacy officers at overseas USUN missions recently. The OIG team advised them to do so; they agreed.

The press and public affairs section devotes considerable attention and resources to engaging people on social media—especially Twitter. The director set the ambitious target of reaching 50,000 Twitter followers for @AmbassadorRice; thanks to the staff's efforts and rising interest in international issues during the Arab Spring and Sudan election, the number of followers exceeded 50,000 by the end of the inspection, and journalists were quoting from the Permanent Representative's Tweets in news stories. Growth on the Facebook site was slower but still respectable, reaching 4,800 by June 2011. Facebook users may post on the site's wall, and many do, but the section does not normally respond to individual postings.

Both of these sites are keyed to the name of the current Permanent Representative, which raises the question of what will happen to USUN's social media outreach when she leaves this position. The section recognized this problem and began a USUN institutional Twitter feed that had grown to 2,700 followers by June 2011; however, the USUN Web site does not provide a direct link to the USUN Twitter feed, only to the @AmbassadorRice feed. At the time of the inspection, the section was preparing to launch a USUN institutional Facebook page. Building an audience for the institutional social media presence will be crucial for continuity.

***Informal Recommendation 19:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should put links to its institutional social media sites on the mission Web site and continue efforts to develop a strong institutional Facebook site.

USUN designed and inaugurated a new mission Web site in 2009. The site does not follow the standard format the Department established for consistency, but it is an improvement over USUN's previous Web site, and the number of unique visitors has doubled over the past year. The section is good about updating it frequently. As a domestic site, it properly does not link to electronic information developed by the Department specifically for foreign audiences, but it could be taking better advantage of information available on the Department's main www.state.gov Web site. For example, both the USUN and the Department Web sites feature pages on global issues, and the USUN site could benefit by linking to these and other relevant parts of the Department site. In addition, USUN could link to Department-produced translations of key speeches as a service to its growing foreign audience, which reached 42 percent of site visitors in April 2011.

**Informal Recommendation 20:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should include on its Web site relevant links to information on the Department of State's main Web site.

### ***Public Diplomacy and Outreach***

Although the primary focus of the section is press relations and public messaging, the UN location in New York provides the opportunity for public diplomacy outreach to the representatives of 191 UN members. The section conducts panel discussions on policy issues for the UN community, such as panels on disaster relief and urban greening in America. It sponsored a worldwide youth event soliciting young people's advice for the Security Council. It also arranges large numbers of briefings for visiting groups (primarily American) and meetings between USUN officers and nongovernmental organizations, with whom section staff have extensive contacts. However, it could more actively integrate these longer term public diplomacy tools into its overall policy advocacy. Most of the public diplomacy and public affairs activity responds to requests or proposals from outside the section. Planning is sporadic and ad hoc, with no overall strategy. The two-person public diplomacy unit operates largely autonomously and is not integrated fully into the section's work. The USUN mission received approximately \$49,000 in public diplomacy funding in FY 2011 but has no general budget plan to spur initiatives that promote U.S. policy goals.

**Recommendation 19:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop an annual public diplomacy implementation plan that establishes quarterly schedules for panels, briefings, speeches, electronic outreach, and other public diplomacy activities to promote the mission's key priorities. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 20:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a draft budget for public affairs activities at the beginning of each fiscal year. (Action: USUN)

Press and public affairs section staff attend the political and ECOSOC section meetings, and officers from these sections have worked together with the public affairs section on outreach activities. Although the press and public affairs section's advance calendar of activities is not available to other mission sections, public diplomacy events are shared with the entire mission via email notices. Other sections do not always appreciate how the press and public affairs section's activities could support their priorities. Public diplomacy staff could harness missionwide cooperation in a more systematic way by convening issue-oriented brainstorming

sessions to develop input for the public diplomacy plan mentioned earlier, and the OIG team encouraged them to do so.

***Informal Recommendation 21:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should display the press and public affairs section's calendar of activities on SharePoint.

The section does not keep detailed, centralized records of its public diplomacy activities; such record keeping would be helpful to political appointee and Foreign Service staff who rotate regularly. The section had not made any entries in the Mission Activity Tracker since March 2009; Department telegram 07 State 00123741 requires missions to record their public diplomacy activities aimed at foreign audiences in the tracker.

**Recommendation 21:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should enter its most important public diplomacy activities aimed at foreign audiences in the Mission Activity Tracker. (Action: USUN)

### ***Administrative Issues***

The press and public affairs section has taken on new initiatives, such as social media, and enhanced some of its other activities without increasing its permanent staff. Instead, it relies heavily on interns, fellows, and contractors to keep up with the constant stream of basic tasks, such as correspondence, press clips, transcripts, and media monitoring. Section management has not included the two secretaries in many of these activities. Although reliance on nonpermanent staff can work when there is an entire team of extra hands on board, the full-time staff is hard pressed to keep up with required tasks when interns and fellows rotate out and new ones have to be trained or when people are on leave. The section has suffered from staff burnout because of the heavy demands. Dependence on contractors for routine duties also cuts directly into the amount of money available for public diplomacy outreach. The section has inherited tasks and activities over time; these activities may once have been linked to USUN's priorities, but they may be less important now. The OIG team counseled staff members to examine whether they could reduce the time spent on lower priority activities that do not contribute directly to current mission goals. The section's two secretaries could take on additional tasks to even out the burden of routine work.

***Informal Recommendation 22:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make better use of its entire public affairs staff by giving the section's secretaries a greater role in producing transcripts, responding to routine mail, and performing other tasks.

The press and public affairs section produces a daily compilation of press clips that is about 85 to 100 pages long. However, there is a cost to produce the daily press clips in terms of staff time. Production involves a section employee, one or more interns and fellows, and a contractor. Producing it takes approximately 6 hours, including time spent the evening before, in the morning starting at 4:00 a.m., and every weekend. The staff checks a wide variety of news Web sites, columnists, correspondents, blogs, and the State Department News Clips for general domestic and world news and for items that mention the United Nations, USUN priorities, or the Permanent Representative. They put together a news clips email using their own formatting, with abbreviated and full-text sections and external and internal hyperlinks. Although it is an

impressive product, much of this work duplicates the effort that goes into the State Department News Clips, which are available daily at 5:30 a.m. on the Department's internal Web site. The package has grown so large that many USUN officers say they do not have time to look at it all.

**Recommendation 22:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should reduce the amount of staff time spent on press clips. (Action: USUN)

The press and public affairs section is responsible for handling all correspondence from organizations and individuals addressed to the Permanent Representative or the mission in general. The 1998 and 2003 OIG inspection reports noted that the single full-time correspondence position could not adequately handle the load and recommended that the section add more staff for correspondence duties. Because of the reprogramming of positions, the section no longer has even a single staff member devoted full time to correspondence; a staff member and an intern handle it, along with their other duties. The section forwards high-level mail to the executive office and assesses and makes recommendations on invitations, but the section does not respond to or even acknowledge letter mail about issues before the United Nations. Meanwhile, it does log, track, and analyze for trends every piece of incoming mail, including pamphlets, newspapers, and solicitations. The section has not established rules on how to deal with non-issue-oriented mail and has not adopted a set of templates for acknowledging receipt of letter mail.

**Informal Recommendation 23:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a policy on acknowledging and responding to incoming letter mail and look for other ways to streamline the process, such as sending all invitations directly to the executive office for handling.

Although the volume of written mail has significantly decreased in recent years, the volume of email has greatly increased. Staff members categorize emails by subject and tabulate them but do not send personalized responses, although email correspondents do receive an automated response referring them to USUN Internet sites. All of the messages that arrive via the Web site have the same subject line ("Contact us") because the section has not updated this part of the site due to cost constraints. As a result, staff members must open each message and cannot quickly weed out junk email.

**Informal Recommendation 24:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make updating the "Contact us" function on the mission Web site a high priority when the budget allows and should limit the email tabulation process to major categories.

## Host Country Relations

In 1945, when the United States became host to the fledgling United Nations, the U.S. Government signed a number of treaties and multilateral conventions from which flow a series of obligations to the United Nations itself and to the UN diplomatic community in New York. The host country relations section ensures that Federal, State, and local governments, as well as the United Nations and member foreign missions, fulfill all their respective treaty obligations. The section has a problem-solving focus and is on call 24 hours a day. Failure to act promptly in response to diplomatic incidents or on visa and accreditation requests can (b) (5)

(b) (5)

The compact and customer-oriented host country section provides accreditation and visa renewal or change of status services for foreign diplomats, nondiplomatic personnel associated with foreign missions, and UN staff; forwards and tracks applications to the Department of Homeland Security for work authorization; and serves as a liaison between other diplomatic missions and police and civilian entities on a range of issues from parking tickets and leases to arrests and travel arrangements.

The success of a small operation handling a variety of responsibilities depends on cross-training and a seamless backup system so that no one employee's absence causes a breakdown in service. Not all host country staff members are adequately cross-trained. In accreditation, in particular, three staff members perform components of the accreditation function, but their positions span five grade levels, resulting in an inequitable division of labor and a loss of backup potential. The more junior accreditation staff lacks experience in handling high-profile, complicated cases. One accreditation team member is relegated to data entry because that position was not reclassified when it was converted from a clerical position. This situation results in a loss of productivity and flexibility for the accreditation unit as a whole.

**Recommendation 23:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should update and reclassify the three accreditation position descriptions so that the incumbents of all three positions are fully cross-trained and share appropriate portions of the workload. (Action: USUN, in coordination with DGHR)

The senior accreditation staff member coordinates the unit's work but does not have rating responsibility for the two other accreditation staff. She is the person with intimate knowledge of their performance and responsibility for their training. At present, the section's deputy prepares the performance appraisals for all three accreditation staff members after consulting with the senior staff member. This anomaly results in additional work for the section's deputy at appraisal time, but it also limits the senior accreditation staff member's authority.

**Informal Recommendation 25:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make the senior accreditation staff member the supervisor and rating officer for the rest of the accreditation staff.


(b) (5)

**Recommendation 24:** (b) (5)

On occasion, employees detect fraud and misrepresentation in the visa renewal, accreditation, and work authorization processes. They were unaware, however, of the value of reporting the fraud that they detect and prevent to the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs. Overseas fraud prevention managers are required to report on fraud trends semiannually. Although the incidence of fraud is far lower at USUN than at overseas missions, USUN's reports would provide useful input to fraud prevention officers in embassies in the diplomats' countries of origin.

***Informal Recommendation 26:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should consolidate all the host country cases involving potential or confirmed fraud into an annual report to the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

(b) (5)



**Recommendation 25:** (b) (5)



One full-time host country relations employee coordinates the airport courtesies, aircraft overflight clearance, and travel restriction programs and serves as a liaison between diplomatic missions and law enforcement whenever diplomats or their families are detained by U.S. law enforcement. Especially during major UN events like the General Assembly, these responsibilities involve a substantial amount of after-hours engagement with foreign missions and law enforcement entities.

When the host country section receives an inquiry or a complaint via diplomatic note, the staff passes any law enforcement questions to the appropriate action office outside the mission. Occasionally, however, the investigating entity does not inform host country relations of the outcome, and the mission is unable to respond to the inquiring foreign mission by return diplomatic note. To complicate matters, several Department entities and various New York metropolitan area law enforcement agencies have overlapping responsibilities with regard to foreign missions, their staffs, and facilities. There is no memorandum of agreement to provide guidance on the division of responsibility or a regular meeting schedule to discuss impending events or critique completed events.

***Informal Recommendation 27:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop a memorandum of agreement between host country relations and the New York diplomatic security field office that clearly outlines the responsibilities of each for

support to foreign diplomats and facilities assigned to the United Nations and that establishes regular multiagency information-sharing sessions.

## Resource Management

Agency	Total Funding FY 2010
State – Diplomatic and Consular Programs	\$4,588,761 <sup>8</sup>
State – Public Diplomacy	\$122,500
State – Diplomatic Security	0
Military Staff Committee	NA
U.S. Agency for International Development Representation	NA
<b>Totals</b>	\$4,912,110

### Overall Management

USUN’s management operation is akin to that in an overseas mission, providing the full range of management support, backed by the IO executive directorate in Washington. The section runs well, with an experienced and skilled management counselor and strong leaders in each functional unit, although some of the larger operational effectiveness issues noted earlier also affect this section. The major management challenge of the past year was the move from interim space into the new office building, a process that, in many ways, is ongoing. The move occurred before the building was fully ready for occupancy, a decision made to avoid both the high cost of extending the interim contract and the start of the UN General Assembly, the largest “all-hands-on-deck” event on the UN calendar. The early move provided many challenges for the general services and information technology staff, in particular; some of those continue as a few final construction items remain unfinished, including some computer cabling.

With so many of the management resources devoted to the move, other management issues slid lower on the priority list. It is time for the mission to turn its attention to the most pressing of these. The OIG team identified training needs in almost all sections of USUN, and there are several specific training recommendations throughout this report. Historical budget information suggests that training has been a low priority for many years. The lack of training to update skills is particularly important in areas of rapid change, such as information technology, yet few resources have been identified for that effort, and productivity suffers as a result. Current managers in the information resource management and the human resources units have made training a priority for their newest staff members and found ways to make it happen at a low cost to the mission. Despite this commendable start, USUN managers have not made the preparation of short- and long-term training plans a part of their management strategy. USUN can enlist the help of the Foreign Service Institute and the Regional Support Center in Frankfurt to find the most cost-effective ways of achieving training goals.

---

<sup>8</sup> The base budget for FY 2010 was \$3,621,700. The final budget number includes supplemental funding for travel, contract cost for a temporary employee, expenses in connection with the move to the new office building, and other unfinanced requirements.

**Recommendation 26:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require mission managers to work with the human resources unit to prepare a specific and prioritized training plan for employees in their section. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 27:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, should identify resources available to provide priority training in the most cost-effective manner. (Action: USUN, in coordination with FSI and IO)

There are several employees at USUN who are eligible for, and considering, retirement. The Office of Personnel Management holds a 1-day retirement course for Civil Service personnel in New York. The mission's current practice is to fund this course for USUN's excepted service personnel at a much lower cost than funding per diem and travel to the Department's 4-day retirement course. These employees do not, however, receive the benefit of all the information contained in the longer course.

**Recommendation 28:** The Foreign Service Institute, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should offer all or part of the retirement seminar course via digital video conference to U.S. Mission to the United Nations staff. (Action: FSI, in coordination with USUN)

The OIG team reviewed budget data confirming that USUN's base budget has declined in both real and inflationary terms since FY 2001. The numbers reflect a 2001 base of \$4.1 million and a base budget in 2011 of \$3.9 million. Adjusted for inflation, the decline is even steeper. Each year the mission is only able to sustain this low level of funding with an infusion of supplemental funds specified for one-time expenses such as the 2010 and 2011 move-related expenses, and supplemental funding each year for items such as information technology upgrades, special conferences, and travel. Each year the final budget, after the supplemental funds are added, is generally from \$400,000 to more than \$1 million higher than the base. Very little of USUN's base funding is discretionary; most is obligated as soon as it arrives, leaving the mission little left over for important training, unexpected travel of personnel apart from the executive office, or even routine procurement. Over many years, the mission has done little advance planning. As noted above, USUN lacks short- and long-term training plans. The mission also has no travel plan. Although unanticipated travel requirements are the norm, the mission has travel history that it could use to budget annual travel. The procurement plan maintained in the general services office is not prioritized. Even in these times of declining budgets, better planning could help justify a needed increase in USUN's base budget or at least prevent further slippage.

**Recommendation 29:** The U. S. Mission to the United Nations should justify an increase in the base budget after undertaking a financial planning exercise that includes a training plan with courses and costs identified, an estimated travel budget based on the previous year's travel and any known travel requirements, and a prioritized procurement plan. (Action: USUN)

Despite tight budgets, USUN has a small awards program. Some members have been on the awards committee for many years and, at the time of inspection, two members were from the same mission section. The mission would benefit from more rotation of awards committee

members, including the chairman. The OIG team's review of recent award recipients showed that a number of senior officers had received awards, rather than writing them for their subordinates. The OIG team suggested that the mission strive for a better balance between awards for junior and senior members of the USUN team.

***Informal Recommendation 28:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should revise the mission awards program, rotating awards committee chairmanship and membership among employees and sections, and balancing awards between junior and senior staff.

## **Financial Management**

The financial management team is strong, as is its working relationship with the IO executive director's office. A Civil Service financial management officer leads the small team that includes a budget analyst and a voucher examiner. The mission's regard for the financial management unit is reflected in high scores in the OIG's workplace and quality-of-life questionnaires. The unit closely monitors accounts and is effective in tracking allocations and managing obligations for the mission's program and representation allotments, totaling approximately \$4.6 million.

The financial management office has taken the lead in exploring ways to fund new office building operating expenses outside the program budget. It has engaged with the regional bureau executive director's office to evaluate a shared-services-type plan to allocate and share rent and certain utility costs of approximately \$12.7 million per year with three non-USUN Department tenants. The plan is evolving and follows the Department's model for allocating costs to overseas posts. At the time of the inspection, the mission had determined the square feet occupied by various tenant agencies and generated sample invoices.

Despite its success, the section could operate more effectively by expanding the duties and developing the knowledge base for both the budget analyst and the voucher examiner. At present, staff functions are limited to achieve desirable separation of duties. For example, subordinate staff is prohibited from certifying vouchers. When the financial management officer (certifying officer) is on leave, payments become backlogged. Finding a solution to expand the duties of the budget analyst will reduce the risk of unpaid bills.

***Informal Recommendation 29:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should implement a cross-training plan that provides each financial management office employee with additional skills and backup responsibilities.

In addition, the financial management unit lacks written standard operating procedures for regular office functions. Preparation of standard operating procedures will assist the cross-training effort and capture the knowledge of those working in the unit.

***Informal Recommendation 30:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should document standard operating procedures for the financial management section.

## Human Resources

USUN made a wise decision in 2009 to create and fill a new human resources officer position. In a short time the incumbent has made changes that are felt and praised throughout the mission. Other new hires in the human resources unit have also made a positive difference in service delivery. The section has focused on training new personnel and realigning tasks to better suit employee skill sets. The unit continues, however, to struggle with customer complaints, some of which have merit.

The perception of poor customer service is, in part, due to the lack of cross-training and information sharing within the human resources office. Each employee in the office has a specific set of duties and responsibilities; in most cases only one employee is trained to handle a particular task or program. None has a designated backup. As a result, employees are often unable to answer customer service inquiries if they do not fall in their direct area of responsibility. In addition, some personnel are not fully up to date on issues for which they have responsibility. Not all human resources employees have received basic training on key programs that require significant customer assistance such as ePerformance. The section has a shared computer drive, but because it is not well organized, few use it to store work documents, preferring instead to keep them in private folders. This method allows other employees in the office no immediate access to documents created by an absent team member. Customers express frustration at receiving incorrect information from unit employees; in some cases they reach out to Department human resources contacts to answer their questions.

**Recommendation 30:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should identify and schedule formal and informal training for each human resources unit employee to provide each with expertise in her own area of responsibility and basic knowledge of other human resources policies and programs. (Action: USUN)

**Informal Recommendation 31:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate backups for each human resources position, providing on-the-job training to the backup personnel on each new duty.

**Informal Recommendation 32:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should reorganize the human resources shared electronic filing system, prohibiting the use of private folders for completed business documents, deleting or archiving old documents, and establishing clear subject folders to store current documents.

The human resources unit lacks written standard operating procedures for common human resources functions. An online folder containing procedures for common tasks would provide a ready reference for all in the section, allowing any member of the unit to research answers to typical customer inquiries and assisting backups to perform the duties of an absent employee.

**Informal Recommendation 33:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop written standard operating procedures for common human resources tasks.

## General Services

The general services unit is an effective operation, having made great strides since the last inspection, when it was reported to be inefficient and unresponsive. Good leadership and the staff's response to it appear to account for this change. The unit's responsibilities include the housing program, property management, procurement, and motor pool. The unit received the management section's highest ratings in the OIG's workplace and quality-of-life questionnaires. The section is well managed, and collaboration with the regional bureau executive director's office is good, but personal property internal controls need strengthening. The nimble unit serves over 150 mission personnel. Each employee has multiple, often unrelated responsibilities. The unit shouldered much of the responsibility in planning and executing the mission's 2010 move to the new office building.

Housing has been a long-standing topic of interest in the mission. Approximately half of the diplomatic and consular program budget is spent on housing costs. Most, but not all, personnel transferred to New York from Washington or overseas participate in a housing program that permits them to rent accommodations within a half hour of the office building. The mission pays the rent for these employees, but the subsidy is added to the employee's earnings for tax purposes. The ensuing tax liability (Federal, State, and city) diminishes this housing benefit, making it less attractive for some to serve at USUN. However, despite being taxed on the benefit, most participants expressed satisfaction with the mission's housing program.

The housing program is being administered fairly and is considered to be a positive aspect of this tour of duty. The mission is authorized subsidized housing for 30 Foreign Service positions, 5 U.S. representatives to the United Nations, and 2 others to help offset the high costs of housing in New York City. Participation has remained constant since the last inspection report. The housing benefit is congressionally authorized and designed to enable USUN to attract highly qualified officers despite the high cost of living in New York City. Currently, all of the mission's Foreign Service officers who choose to take advantage of the housing program can do so; however, the mission has been unable to fill one vacant Foreign Service position because there are no more housing slots. Three other positions, previously Foreign Service, are temporarily filled with excepted service personnel until the number of housing slots can be increased. USUN has worked extensively with the Department and with the Office of Management and Budget to provide information and justification for increasing the number of Foreign Service positions eligible for the housing program from 30 to 35; the request is pending congressional approval. The OIG team agrees that increasing the number of positions with a housing benefit will aid recruitment and retention of Foreign Service officers and supports USUN's efforts in this regard.

Two general services employees manage expendable and nonexpendable property. The management office and small property staff found it difficult to track \$3 million worth of property during the move to the new office building. The mission generated a 2010 nonexpendable property certification with exceptions within the tolerable limits, but the certification was not a meaningful control device. The Management Controls section of the report discusses inadequate procedures for transferring out and receiving substantial amounts of property.

A competent contract specialist, with a \$100,000 warrant, leads the mission's procurement efforts. The mission has strengthened the procurement operation by training other general services employees to make minor purchases using the government purchase card. The mission makes extensive use of the purchase card program and monitors it closely.


The motor pool has three full-time drivers and a fleet of five vehicles. Motor pool supports the five ambassadors to the USUN. The unit maintains the vehicles well and documents vehicle use daily.

## **Facilities Management**

The new USUN building was built through a General Services Administration (GSA) contract, and GSA is responsible for maintenance and safety. The Department pays an annual lease amount to GSA that includes most services and utilities. The building process was not without challenges and construction delays. The move-in date slipped, and finally USUN moved from interim swing space into the building in August 2010, before the building was fully ready for occupancy. For several weeks after the move, residents worked in what was still a construction zone. Elevators were not working well, and for several months, employees would get stuck regularly. Delivery delays created situations where equipment and furniture were installed in the wrong order, requiring time-consuming adjustments. The event that prompted completion of the most pressing items was President Obama's visit to officially inaugurate the new building on March 29, 2011.

Even with that effort to complete outstanding items before March 29, some construction items remain incomplete. During the OIG team's visit, Department and USUN security personnel met with GSA and the city of New York to develop final plans on several security equipment problems, including the bollards that surround the building. Some exterior finishing is missing. Many safety problems have been corrected, but a few remain outstanding. In addition to GSA items, the Department has not completed computer cabling, and some furniture still has not arrived.

(b) (5)



Despite all of these difficulties, occupants are settled into the building and making it work. Most are now happy with their space and learning how to work around inconveniences.

Conference rooms throughout the USUN building are often used for small meetings but are impractical for events that host large numbers of outside participants. Most conference rooms are small, and all are in classified areas of the building that require escorts and complicated logistics, particularly if refreshments are involved. In the political section, for example, the

conference room does not provide adequate seating to host all Security Council counterparts at one time. The USUN building has a large, multipurpose and press event space on the second floor that some USUN sections have used successfully for larger events with outside participants. This space is accessible from the unclassified side of the building and works well for many types of events.

***Informal Recommendation 34:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should maximize use of the second-floor multipurpose room for hosting negotiating sessions with Security Council counterparts and other events that involve large groups and outside participants.

### ***The Waldorf Astoria Residence***

An apartment on the top floor of the Waldorf Astoria Towers has served as the official residence for the USUN Permanent Representative for the past 64 years. The Department has made several attempts to locate less costly alternatives but has concluded each time that the Waldorf is the least expensive option. There are several reasons why the current residence works. The Permanent Representative and USUN pay for a dedicated official residence staff of two and one-half employees. In addition, the Waldorf provides supplementary cleaning staff as part of the lease cost. USUN holds many of its representation events at the residence, and Waldorf employees assist the general services staff in moving furniture and setting up the space for these events, another significant cost savings. The proximity of the residence to USUN is an added advantage of the property, making it a desirable location for representation purposes. The current lease expires in 2011, and the mission is reviewing all options.

### **Protocol and Representation**

Representational events are an essential multilateral diplomacy tool. Many missions organize business dinners or receptions at the same time as important UN meetings for this reason. The Permanent Representative makes effective use of the mission's representation budget.

USUN could not hold successful representation events without a skilled protocol office, and fortunately it has one. Most events are held either on the 22nd floor of the USUN building or in the residence of the Permanent Representative at the Waldorf. The office organizes events throughout the year, but its staff is stretched very thin during the General Assembly when there may be events nearly every night of the week, occasionally two at the same time. The head of the protocol office has many years of experience and is training the two newer staff members. All three are expected to know details of each event so that they can step in at a moment's notice to resolve problems seamlessly. The section is known within the mission for its ability to handle complicated logistics.

Most of the mission's FY 2010 \$200,000 in representation funds—some from the regular budget and some from supplemental allocations—supported the Permanent Representative, events related to the General Assembly and the six committees, and other ambassadorial-level representation. For unanticipated events or extraordinary lobbying efforts, the Department occasionally makes additional representational funding available to the mission. The seven

operational mission sections, however, are not as well funded and find it difficult to mount working-level representational programs or to reciprocate invitations from their diplomatic colleagues. In FY 2010, the ECOSOC section, for example, received \$1,500 in FY 2010 to apportion among its 15 officers. The political, press, and management sections used all of their FY 2010 allocations, but other sections, including ECOSOC, did not use all the funds earmarked for them.

***Informal Recommendation 35:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require each operational section to solicit input from all employees about their representational priorities, request funds based on concrete proposals, and identify excess funds early enough to permit their reapportionment.

## **Information Resources Management**

The move to the new office building left the information management team struggling to manage new systems, resolve technical issues, and meet customers' expectations. The information resources management unit operates in an environment similar to that of an overseas mission, handling unclassified, classified, SMART, telephones, and radios. Many of the unit's 14 employees have not attended Washington information management tradecraft courses, leaving them without updated technical skills. In addition, the staff interacts daily with customers who have little time for end-user training. This training vacuum creates a challenging environment for both customers and the service provider and is discussed in more detail in the next section. Other areas requiring attention in the information management unit include developing a help desk operation, creating individual development plans for the unit's employees, and resolving outstanding technical issues. Additional recommendations are listed in the classified annex to this report.

### ***Leveraging Technology***

USUN's information resource management unit is staffed to support 120 users. The unit's actual customer base is 190, however, which includes 3 non-USUN Department offices that were colocated in the new building following the recent move. In the 3 months before and during the General Assembly, the unit adds another 40 customers to the mix. In this underresourced environment, customer requests are handled via telephone, email, and office visits, and the unit tracks each request on a spreadsheet. During the migration of information to the computer systems in the new office building, the help desk lost its electronic standard operating procedures, and the section has had difficulty resolving customer requests in a timely manner.

**Recommendation 31:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a formal information resource management help desk operation that is staffed with customer liaisons. (Action: USUN)

USUN customers at times face difficulties working with electronic media and using the Department's new programs. They work in crisis mode and struggle to find time to manage the flood of emails, understand how to use SMART, and learn how to operate in a SharePoint environment. The information resource management unit has an applications instructor to

provide on-site user training for USUN staff, and the Department maintains an online SMART training course, but many customers do not take advantage of these resources. (See Recommendation 12 for related SMART issues.)

***Informal Recommendation 36:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a training regime that requires users to complete online SMART training and attend on-site Microsoft Outlook email and SharePoint courses.

The move to the new USUN building included the installation of new systems and equipment. Unit staff has not, however, had all the necessary training to keep up with the changes nor to optimize use of the new systems. Some individual development plans and position descriptions are outdated and contain no short- or long-term training requirements. During the inspection the information management officer was in the process of updating some of the development plans and position descriptions.

***Informal Recommendation 37:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should update individual development plans and position descriptions for each information resource management section employee.

The second-floor multipurpose room contains audiovisual equipment to support press events arranged by the USUN press office as well as by the Department's Foreign Press Center, located in the same building. However, USUN has no dedicated audiovisual technician to meet the demand for use of this increasingly sophisticated equipment. The mission also frequently conducts digital video conferences but could do more. At present, information unit staff members cover video conferencing requests on an ad hoc basis but have neither the time nor the skills to handle this task on a regular basis. The information management officer has prepared a request for an additional full-time audiovisual technician position, but the mission has no vacant position to use for this purpose and has not included a position request in the recent Mission Strategic and Resource Plan.

***Informal Recommendation 38:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how best to provide audiovisual technician services to the mission, either through training existing personnel, reprogramming a position, or requesting additional resources.

A USUN designers group, drawing on representatives from each section, is working with the information management trainer to develop a USUN SharePoint Web site. The Web site is a great grass roots effort, but the mission has no project plan that identifies the implementation steps, timeline, or opportunity for peer review.

***Informal Recommendation 39:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate a project manager to oversee design, content, and maintenance of the mission's SharePoint Web site.

### ***Resolving Move-Related Issues***

The move to the new office building occurred 5 months before the inspection began, but a long technical “punch list” of incomplete items remains. Most of these items require additional cable installation and the assistance of Department technical staff. The OIG team found cases of missing network connections and printers that were not networked due to insufficient cabling. These outstanding issues have a negative impact on productivity, morale, and efficiency.

**Recommendation 32:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management should send a team to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to complete the cable installation project. (Action: IRM)

USUN transferred several desktop printers from the interim location and installed them in the new building. Some offices do not make full use of their networked printers but prefer desktop printers, which are more expensive to maintain and operate. The mission can save money by eliminating most desktop printers and requiring the use of networked printers.

***Informal Recommendation 40:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a policy that governs the use of networked printers and defines the parameters for the limited use of desktop printers.

In the past, the USUN information management team sent a representative to Washington to meet with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and IO counterparts at least twice a year. This practice no longer occurs due to time and budget constraints, but communication and follow-up on technical and training issues with Washington counterparts remains important so that USUN can stay current with Department policy and operational changes.

***Informal Recommendation 41:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should hold digital video or telephone conferences twice a month with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs information management staff.

### ***The Research Unit***

The research unit is well regarded by those who regularly use its research capability, but it is relatively unknown to others within the mission and the Department. The research unit collection is unique and includes major UN documents dating back to 1945. USUN staff forward historical and procedural records to the research unit for inclusion in central files and forwarding to the National Archives and Records Administration. Many of the documents the research unit collects are held nowhere else; the unit is the sole manager of this segment of the U.S. Government’s archivable data. In addition to archiving information sent to them or gleaned from UN publications, the unit’s five technical information specialists and two assistants provide research services to customers, including USUN staff, who request interpretive and analytical information on a broad range of political, economic, legal, financial, social, and parliamentary questions regarding the United Nations. The analysts track General Assembly and Security Council voting practices to help the Department prepare congressionally mandated reports, circulate periodical articles to profiled individuals, track UN reform initiatives and UN budget data since 1946, and archive UN press releases. One member of the research unit is USUN’s

only certified records manager but has had little involvement with records management missionwide (see the Operational Effectiveness section).

The research unit's goal is to digitize all archival documents, but the staff has made little progress since the 2003 OIG inspection. Changes in technology and a major systems failure delayed the project until just a few months before the move to the new building. The move, and the attendant technological problems, stopped progress, and the project has remained stalled through the date of this inspection. Records managers in the Department may have information that would assist the research unit in locating supplemental equipment to complete the digitization project.

**Recommendation 33:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should identify and procure software and scanners needed to digitize archival records. (Action: USUN, in coordination with A)

The research unit maintains a file of 537,600 index cards containing information on significant UN precedents and events, including important cross-references. The cards are a relic of an earlier time, and although the analysts continue to use them, the ink is degrading and becoming harder to read. Digitizing the cards makes searches easier and provides open access to USUN employees and potentially to the Department. The National Archives and Records Administration requires the cards in digitized form. In 2007, the unit began to enter data from the cards into a library software program to produce an electronic indexing system. At the time of the inspection, employees had entered only 18,228 cards. Until all cards are digitized, the unit runs the risk of losing important historical information.

**Informal Recommendation 42:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should solicit an estimate for digitizing the research unit's index cards and determine whether it is cost effective to do so.

## Quality of Life

### Equal Employment Opportunity

USUN's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor has served for more than 20 years in the position and has met all ongoing training requirements. USUN has identified a second employee to serve as a counselor once she has received the necessary training; she replaces a second counselor who recently left the mission. Although the mission had posted the EEO counselor's name and contact information in a small break room and in the human resources office, the posting contained little information about the program or USUN's commitment to equal opportunity and was not displayed near the much-used elevators. The mission has held no formal EEO training for the past few years, nor has USUN discussed the EEO program at town hall meetings. Increased visibility of the program would promote EEO sensitivity in the workplace.

*Informal Recommendation 43:* The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should invigorate and publicize its Equal Employment Opportunity program.

### Morale

Morale at USUN is mixed. Some staff members relish the work, the pace, and the inherent stress of negotiations, must-win votes, and constant crises. Others struggle to find a work-life balance or perceive unfairness in disparate remuneration systems. Even some Foreign Service officers who receive housing allowances and 18 percent premium compensation for extraordinary hours of work occasionally seek curtailments because of the hefty tax liability by Federal, State, and city authorities on benefits that were intended to be incentives to recruitment and retention. Foreign Service officers master negotiation skills that will serve them throughout their careers, but many excepted service staff will remain at USUN for many years, with limited options to transfer to other government agencies.

Those mission staff members not on the firing lines of multilateral diplomacy sometimes find it difficult to see how their jobs support U.S. goals and objectives. Consequently, morale among employees in support positions varies according to the quality of their supervisors and the collegiality of the workplace rather than stemming from the intrinsic rewards of a well-fought UN negotiating session or a stirring General Assembly session.

Mission leadership has taken steps to address some of these challenges and is committed to doing more. The mission has worked with the Department to seek, but has not won, legislative authority to increase the number of positions in the housing allowance program and to receive parity with temporarily assigned employees from other U.S. Government agencies who do not pay taxes on their housing allowances. These benefits would facilitate growth in the number of Foreign Service officers and ensure a balance between officers with policy and overseas expertise and those with sustained subject matter experience in the UN context.

USUN managers and leaders face a unique challenge. As one mission employee put it, the mission is like a mini-Department. It is unlike an overseas mission that has an innate sense of

community. Nevertheless, mission leaders have made efforts to communicate and build teams across all 21 floors of the USUN building in spite of, or because of, the unrelenting press of business. Management notices improve transparency. Senior staff participation in section meetings and events increases familiarity and a sense that section and individual efforts are recognized. More can be done, such as taking steps to be as transparent as possible when hiring excepted service staff: explaining the level of commitment needed, the unavoidable disparities with Foreign Service benefits, and the limitations on advancement. Also, greater attention to professional development of mission staff, as outlined in earlier sections of this report, can raise the overall sense of professionalism and feeling that there is, indeed, a USUN community.

## Management Controls

The Permanent Representative's memorandum regarding assurance on management controls, dated August 23, 2010, states that USUN's systems of management controls, taken as a whole, comply with the Comptroller General's standards and the Department's objectives. It also states that mission assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation.

USUN's management controls program is satisfactory overall. Despite management's best efforts, however, the OIG team found that property management controls need strengthening.

### *Property Management*

In 2010, the mission transferred out property with an approximate original cost of \$2.2 million from the old office building with the understanding that the Department would purchase replacement furniture and equipment for the new office building. With the assistance of the Bureau of Administration, the mission transferred this property both within the Department and through donations to schools, prisons, and other organizations. A Bureau of Administration contractor undertook this large project and updated the appropriate database to reflect the property transfers outside the mission.

Although the contractor prepared spreadsheets listing and identifying property as transferred and updated in the property records, the mission did not prepare form DS-584, Nonexpendable Property Transaction, for the vast majority of the transfers and failed to document contemporaneous authorizing and approving acknowledgements from the accountable property and principal custodial officers, as required by 14 FAH-1 H-434. Also, the mission did not reflect location changes for retained property in the property application database. As a result, a large number of manual adjustments to the inventory application were required at year end, which negated the internal control feature of scanning at the time of transfer.

The mission received approximately \$800,000 of equipment, purchased by the Bureau of Administration, for the new office building. The mission did not receive packing lists, receiving reports, or other delivery documentation for this property and thus could not verify whether shipments were complete. Further, the mission did not complete form DS-1955, Receiving Worksheet for Nonexpendable Property, required by 14 FAH-1 H-321.5, to update the property application database. USUN requested the documentation from the Bureau of Administration but has not received it. Lacking documentation, the mission updated the database by using information on the property itself, such as serial numbers, and estimating purchase price. As a result, the mission is not assured that database information is accurate and all property deliveries are complete and recorded. The mission has requested a property assistance visit from the Bureau of Administration to review property management procedures.

**Recommendation 34:** The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should conduct a property assistance visit to the mission and issue a trip report, including findings and recommendations. (Action: A, in coordination with USUN)

**Recommendation 35:** The Bureau of Administration should provide the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with all receiving documentation for furniture and equipment delivered to the new office building in 2010 and 2011. (Action: A)

**Recommendation 36:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should match furniture and equipment property delivery records from the Bureau of Administration to entries in its property application database and update data items, as appropriate. (Action: USUN)

The OIG team observed other property-related management control deficiencies. For example, the same employee is charged with taking the annual inventory and maintaining inventory records. Failing to separate the inventory and record-keeping duties is a management control vulnerability.

**Recommendation 37:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should separate the record-keeping and inventory functions and document the responsibilities of each function in the relevant employees' work commitments. (Action: USUN)

Currently, the general services officer is the accountable property officer, and another employee is the principal custodial officer. Although the Department does not provide guidance for assigning property management responsibility at domestic organizations, 14 FAH-1 H-112.1 provides guidance for overseas missions, which is useful in the domestic context as well. The 14 FAH cite states that functional responsibility for property management is inherent in the position of the post management officer, suggesting that the management counselor is the best person to be the accountable property officer. Such an adjustment at USUN would permit the general services officer to be the principal custodial officer, thereby strengthening managerial oversight and improving the control environment.

***Informal Recommendation 44:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate the management counselor as the accountable property officer and the general services officer as the principal custodial officer.

## List of Recommendations

**Recommendation 1:** The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and the Office of the Legal Adviser, should draft and clear a tailored Presidential letter of instruction for the Permanent Representative. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with IO, USUN, and L)

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in coordination with the U. S. Mission to the United Nations, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, should develop standing guidance for support staffing in New York and Washington and budgeting for permanent representatives with and without Cabinet rank. (Action: IO, in coordination with USUN, DS, and M)

**Recommendation 3:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should identify the most appropriate officer in each section to oversee the full range of management issues for that section, make management one of the top two items of that officer's work requirements or critical performance elements, specify management performance objectives for the rating period, and survey section staff as part of evaluating the officer's performance. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 4:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should convene an ad hoc working group, chaired by the Deputy Permanent Representative, when vacancies occur to determine whether to refill positions or reprogram them. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 5:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should reprogram positions to support the policy and management needs of the mission. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IO and DGHR)

**Recommendation 6:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish a timeline, perform desk audits, and update all excepted service position descriptions. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IO and DGHR)

**Recommendation 7:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should devise standard elements for all secretary and office management specialist position descriptions and critical performance elements, in addition to those specific to individual offices, and revise the position descriptions and job elements accordingly. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 8:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require all Foreign Service officers who are first-time Civil Service supervisors to take the Foreign Service Institute's online training courses PA-449 and PA-495 and monitor for successful completion of the modules. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 9:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop a management policy and procedures for the recruitment, orientation, and development of nonpermanent staff. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 10:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish an overtime budget baseline and document monthly comparisons of usage against that baseline. (Action: USUN).

**Recommendation 11:** The U. S. Mission to the United Nations should standardize timekeeping procedures across sections and require advance approval of overtime and compensatory time to the extent possible. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 12:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and disseminate a mission policy on when and how to use SMART emails of record. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 13:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should complete its surveys and one-on-one customer training to determine customer business needs and assess storage requirements. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 14:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Information Resources Management, should plan an on-site visit from the bureau's Global Modernization Program designers to establish a network with greater storage capacity and backup capability. (Action: USUN, in coordination with IRM)

**Recommendation 15:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should review the need for paper file retention in the host country relations section, propose updates to the records disposition schedule to the Bureau of Administration for submission to the National Archives and Records Administration, and retire or destroy relevant paper records accordingly. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 16:** The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should include multilateral and negotiating skills training and Washington consultations in the transfer orders of relevant Foreign Service officers who have not served in multilateral assignments. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with USUN)

**Recommendation 17:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute, should develop and implement a plan for training groups of new excepted service and Foreign Service officers in New York. (Action: USUN, in coordination with FSI)

**Recommendation 18:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should revise the work requirements of the deputy director of communications to specify the position's management responsibilities and commensurate decision-making authority. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 19:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop an annual public diplomacy implementation plan that establishes quarterly schedules for panels, briefings, speeches, electronic outreach, and other public diplomacy activities to promote the mission's key priorities. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 20:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a draft budget for public affairs activities at the beginning of each fiscal year. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 21:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should enter its most important public diplomacy activities aimed at foreign audiences in the Mission Activity Tracker. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 22:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should reduce the amount of staff time spent on press clips. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 23:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should update and reclassify the three accreditation position descriptions so that the incumbents of all three positions are fully cross-trained and share appropriate portions of the workload. (Action: USUN, in coordination with DGHR)

**Recommendation 24:** (b) (5) [Redacted]

**Recommendation 25:** (b) (5) [Redacted]

**Recommendation 26:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require mission managers to work with the human resources unit to prepare a specific and prioritized training plan for employees in their section. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 27:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, should identify resources available to provide priority training in the most cost-effective manner. (Action: USUN, in coordination with FSI and IO)

**Recommendation 28:** The Foreign Service Institute, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should offer all or part of the retirement seminar course via digital video conference to U.S. Mission to the United Nations staff. (Action: FSI, in coordination with USUN)

**Recommendation 29:** The U. S. Mission to the United Nations should justify an increase in the base budget after undertaking a financial planning exercise that includes a training plan with courses and costs identified, an estimated travel budget based on the previous year's travel and any known travel requirements, and a prioritized procurement plan. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 30:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should identify and schedule formal and informal training for each human resources unit employee to provide each with expertise in her own area of responsibility and basic knowledge of other human resources policies and programs. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 31:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a formal information resource management help desk operation that is staffed with customer liaisons. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 32:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management should send a team to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to complete the cable installation project. (Action: IRM)

**Recommendation 33:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should identify and procure software and scanners needed to digitize archival records. (Action: USUN, in coordination with A)

**Recommendation 34:** The Bureau of Administration, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, should conduct a property assistance visit to the mission and issue a trip report, including findings and recommendations. (Action: A, in coordination with USUN)

**Recommendation 35:** The Bureau of Administration should provide the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with all receiving documentation for furniture and equipment delivered to the new office building in 2010 and 2011. (Action: A)

**Recommendation 36:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should match furniture and equipment property delivery records from the Bureau of Administration to entries in its property application database and update data items, as appropriate. (Action: USUN)

**Recommendation 37:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should separate the record-keeping and inventory functions and document the responsibilities of each function in the relevant employees' work commitments. (Action: USUN)

## Informal Recommendations

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

***Informal Recommendation 1:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should share with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs on a case-by-case basis the results of interagency meetings to which it has special access when that bureau will have to take action and when time is of the essence.

***Informal Recommendation 2:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should provide clear guidance on when its Washington policy advisers need to clear documents that have been prepared by or will be cleared by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

***Informal Recommendation 3:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should use the Mission Strategic and Resource Plan exercise to improve intramission communication and collaboration by organizing a discussion of goals and accomplishments prior to the start of drafting.

***Informal Recommendation 4:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how best to sustain an internal strategic planning capability.

***Informal Recommendation 5:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should clarify the roles and responsibilities of each member of the executive office staff and publish that information throughout the mission.

***Informal Recommendation 6:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should document delinquent performance evaluations and any failures to conduct required counseling sessions in the performance evaluations of the responsible supervisors.

***Informal Recommendation 7:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should train all supervisors in the appropriate use of performance improvement plans.

***Informal Recommendation 8:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a policy that requires all personnel to document their overtime and provide employees with compensation when possible.

***Informal Recommendation 9:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should form a working group, led by the mission's records manager and composed of staff with excellent records management practices and information technology skills. The working group should develop electronic and paper records management protocols in consultation with managers from each section and work with the records manager and the information resources staff to standardize record keeping.

**Informal Recommendation 10:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make Washington consultations a part of the training continuum for relevant excepted service personnel during the initial 3 months of their employment.

**Informal Recommendation 11:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should conduct a lessons learned exercise each December, develop a coordinator and nonpermanent staff handbook, and update that handbook annually.

**Informal Recommendation 12:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should prepare a short performance review on each area adviser and submit the review to the bureau's principal deputy assistant secretary.

**Informal Recommendation 13:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate the political section's sanctions unit chief as the third deputy in the political section.

**Informal Recommendation 14:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how the political section can reduce the length of reporting telegrams on open Security Council meetings by referring end users to available United Nations-produced materials and supplementing them as needed.

**Informal Recommendation 15:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should consider creating a second deputy position in the economic and social affairs section whenever the section has a new position.

**Informal Recommendation 16:** (b) (5)

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the text of Informal Recommendation 16. The text "(b) (5)" is visible in red at the top left of the redaction.

**Informal Recommendation 17:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require public affairs section chief training for the deputy director of communications position.

**Informal Recommendation 18:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a channel to inform the Bureau of International Organization Affairs press office leadership of upcoming press activities.

**Informal Recommendation 19:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should put links to its institutional social media sites on the mission Web site and continue efforts to develop a strong institutional Facebook site.

**Informal Recommendation 20:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should include on its Web site relevant links to information on the Department of State's main Web site.

**Informal Recommendation 21:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should display the press and public affairs section's calendar of activities on SharePoint.

**Informal Recommendation 22:** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make better use of its entire public affairs staff by giving the section's secretaries a greater role in producing transcripts, responding to routine mail, and performing other tasks.

***Informal Recommendation 23:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a policy on acknowledging and responding to incoming letter mail and look for other ways to streamline the process, such as sending all invitations directly to the executive office for handling.

***Informal Recommendation 24:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make updating the “Contact us” function on the mission Web site a high priority when the budget allows and should limit the email tabulation process to major categories.

***Informal Recommendation 25:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should make the senior accreditation staff member the supervisor and rating officer for the rest of the accreditation staff.

***Informal Recommendation 26:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should consolidate all the host country cases involving potential or confirmed fraud into an annual report to the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

***Informal Recommendation 27:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop a memorandum of agreement between host country relations and the New York diplomatic security field office that clearly outlines the responsibilities of each for support to foreign diplomats and facilities assigned to the United Nations and that establishes regular multiagency information-sharing sessions.

***Informal Recommendation 28:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should revise the mission awards program, rotating awards committee chairmanship and membership among employees and sections, and balancing awards between junior and senior staff.

***Informal Recommendation 29:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should implement a cross-training plan that provides each financial management office employee with additional skills and backup responsibilities.

***Informal Recommendation 30:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should document standard operating procedures for the financial management section.

***Informal Recommendation 31:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate backups for each human resources position, providing on-the-job training to the backup personnel on each new duty.

***Informal Recommendation 32:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should reorganize the human resources shared electronic filing system, prohibiting the use of private folders for completed business documents, deleting or archiving old documents, and establishing clear subject folders to store current documents.

***Informal Recommendation 33:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should develop written standard operating procedures for common human resources tasks.

***Informal Recommendation 34:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should maximize use of the second-floor multipurpose room for hosting negotiating sessions with Security Council counterparts and other events that involve large groups and outside participants.

***Informal Recommendation 35:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should require each operational section to solicit input from all employees about their representational priorities, request funds based on concrete proposals, and identify excess funds early enough to permit their reapportionment.

***Informal Recommendation 36:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish and implement a training regime that requires users to complete online SMART training and attend on-site Microsoft Outlook email and SharePoint courses.

***Informal Recommendation 37:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should update individual development plans and position descriptions for each information resource management section employee.

***Informal Recommendation 38:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should determine how best to provide audiovisual technician services to the mission, either through training existing personnel, reprogramming a position, or requesting additional resources.

***Informal Recommendation 39:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate a project manager to oversee design, content, and maintenance of the mission's SharePoint Web site.

***Informal Recommendation 40:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should establish a policy that governs the use of networked printers and defines the parameters for the limited use of desktop printers.

***Informal Recommendation 41:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should hold digital video or telephone conferences twice a month with the Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs information management staff.

***Informal Recommendation 42:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should solicit an estimate for digitizing the research unit's index cards and determine whether it is cost effective to do so.

***Informal Recommendation 43:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should invigorate and publicize its Equal Employment Opportunity program.

***Informal Recommendation 44:*** The U.S. Mission to the United Nations should designate the management counselor as the accountable property officer and the general services officer as the principal custodial officer.

## Principal Officers

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Arrival Date</b>
Permanent Representative	Ambassador Susan E. Rice	01/2009
Deputy Permanent Representative	Ambassador Rosemary A. DiCarlo	07/2010 <sup>9</sup>
Acting Alternate Permanent Representative for Special Political Affairs	Ambassador (ret) David B. Dunn	01/2011
Representative to the Economic and Social Council	Ambassador Frederick D. Barton	12/2009
Ambassador for UN Management and Reform	Ambassador Joseph M. Torsella	04/2011
Section Chiefs:		
Management	Carol Urban	08/2010
Host Country	Russell Graham	07/1990
Political	William Grant	06/2010
ECOSOC	John F. Sammis	05/2009
Management and Reform	Stephen Lieberman	10/2010
Press and Public Affairs	Mark Kornblau	02/2009
Regional Security	Timothy Riley	07/2010
Other Agencies:		
Military Staff Committee	Col. Robert Whalen	06/2011

---

<sup>9</sup> Ambassador DiCarlo was Alternate Permanent Representative for Special Political Affairs from 08/2008 until she assumed the Deputy Permanent Representative position.

## Abbreviations

ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	<i>Foreign Affairs Handbook</i>
FAM	<i>Foreign Affairs Manual</i>
GG	General Grade
GSA	General Services Administration
IO	Bureau of International Organization Affairs
NSC	National Security Council
SMART	State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset
USUN	U.S. Mission to the United Nations
USUN/W	U.S. Mission to the United Nations Washington office

## **Appendix: Host Country Files Needing Review**

B1 extension of stay requests  
Change of status applications  
Chronological files  
Country files  
Diplomatic notes  
Identification card photo files for both diplomatic and nondiplomatic personnel (hard copies)  
Receipts for collected passports, identification cards, and work authorizations  
Records of diplomatic incidents  
UN letters identifying accredited journalists  
Visa confirmation letters  
Work authorization applications and supporting document (already approved)

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

**FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE,  
OR MISMANAGEMENT**  
of Federal programs hurts everyone.

Contact the  
Office of Inspector General  
**HOTLINE**  
to report illegal or wasteful activities:

202-647-3320  
800-409-9926

[oighotline@state.gov](mailto:oighotline@state.gov)

[oig.state.gov](http://oig.state.gov)

Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State  
P.O. Box 9778  
Arlington, VA 22219

Cables to the Inspector General  
should be slugged "OIG Channel"  
to ensure confidentiality.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~