



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General**

Office of Inspections

**Inspection of the
Office of the United States Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan**

Report Number ISP-I-11-48, June 2011

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PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



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PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

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Key Judgments

- Charged by Secretary Clinton in January 2009 to lead diplomatic and development efforts to create “an integrated strategy that works with both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a whole, as well as engaging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other key friends, allies, and those around the world who are interested in supporting these efforts,” the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) has built an organization that meets the Secretary’s challenge.
- The inclusion of interagency representatives and outside experts is extraordinarily successful. S/SRAP’s absorption of two country desks from the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) and its involvement in direction of the missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan work less well.
- S/SRAP rightly takes pride in being innovative, entrepreneurial, and fast-moving. Its lack of hierarchy, almost unfettered access to the Department’s most senior officials, interagency reach, and breadth of knowledge and experience has permitted S/SRAP to accomplish more in a shorter time than traditional regional bureaus generally can.
- S/SRAP leaders characterize it as being – for all intents and purposes – a bureau. They are right in that, in many respects, it operates like a Department regional bureau. However, S/SRAP leaders have largely jettisoned the management functions of a bureau, which leaves many important operational activities undone. Much needs to be done for S/SRAP to be fully bureau-like.
- Communication and cooperation between S/SRAP and SCA has been adequate, but more needs to be done by both organizations to prepare for eventual restoration of the desks and many S/SRAP responsibilities to SCA.
- The Department is relying on a blended workforce – a mixture of Foreign Service, traditional Civil Service, excepted Civil Service (known as 3161s), contractors, Presidential Management fellows, interns, and retired diplomats – to staff both S/SRAP and the missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Managing this blended workforce presents enormous challenges, which are being met to a large degree.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the on-site review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length on areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need to be corrected.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 10 and March 18, 2011.

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Context

As a candidate, President Obama spoke of the need to get “on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Three days after taking office, he named Richard Holbrooke as his Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to coordinate across the entire government the pursuit of the United States’ strategic goal in that region: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, and prevent it from threatening America and our allies in the future.

To accomplish all this, the Special Representative was empowered to create an innovative, entrepreneurial, and fast-moving operation. His bureaucratic heirs speak proudly of the agility of the S/SRAP and its ability to avoid many of the bureaucratic processes that other elements of the Department must follow. They cite its direct line to the Secretary, and through her to the President, as the basis for its extraordinary structure and approach. Four additional elements are hallmarks of the S/SRAP model:

1. Liaisons from eight other U.S. Government agencies were detailed to the S/SRAP staff, as the core of a “whole of government” approach to policy-making and implementation.
2. World-class experts were brought in to provide first-hand knowledge of the region’s politics, economics, and cultures; analyze events; and shape effective policies.
3. Reflecting the broader regional context and the intersection with U.S. relations with India and Central Asia, the S/SRAP senior deputy was also “dual-hatted” as a deputy assistant secretary in SCA.
4. The country offices for Afghanistan and Pakistan were detached from SCA to create what S/SRAP says is, for all intents and purposes, its own “bureau.”

In December 2009, the President described the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

- a short-term surge in multinational troop levels;
- increased emphasis on training Afghan security forces;
- beginning in July 2011, a transfer of lead security responsibility to Afghans and a start of the transition of U.S. combat forces out of Afghanistan;
- a significant increase in civilian experts to accompany a sizable infusion of additional civilian assistance; and
- a long-term, strategic relationship with Pakistan, including \$1.5 billion annually for the next 5 years, to support Pakistan’s development and democracy.

In its initial months in operation, S/SRAP used its unique structure and style to build the foundation for the latter two objectives.

The December 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review concluded that the United States was on track to achieve its goals, that specific components of the strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan were working well, and that there were notable operational gains. In a speech to the Asia Society on February 18, 2011, Secretary Clinton described a strategy with three mutually

reinforcing tracks, or surges, to further solidify these goals: a military offensive against al-Qaeda terrorists and Taliban insurgents; a civilian campaign to bolster the governments, economies, and civil societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, to undercut the pull of the insurgency; and an intensified diplomatic push to bring the Afghan conflict to an end and chart a new and more secure future for the region. S/SRAP has the lead on the latter two surge efforts.

Taken together with the desks, S/SRAP has 60 direct-hire and 9 contractor employees, plus 16 employees detailed from other agencies and governments. In collaboration with SCA's executive office, it oversees and supports the U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, each of which has thousands of direct-hire and contractor employees and billions of dollars in operating and assistance resources.

As the July 2011 date for initiating the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops approaches, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is transitioning to a civilian-led effort. The death of the Special Representative in December 2010 and the appointment (during the OIG inspection) of his successor also means S/SRAP is in a leadership transition.

The OIG scheduled this inspection before the death of the Special Representative. Subsequently, the acting special representative concurred that the inspection would still be valuable and should proceed. The early phases of this inspection focused on an S/SRAP organization with transitional leadership and uncertainty among staff about the direction and structure of S/SRAP going forward. The Secretary's announcement, and the arrival of the new Special Representative on February 18, 2011, began to clarify those uncertainties.

Executive Direction

S/SRAP resembles earlier special representative or special envoy offices in the Department in some respects, but the interagency and special advisor components are unique. The separation of the two country desks from SCA and their incorporation into S/SRAP, as well as S/SRAP's involvement in direction of the missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, thereby creating a virtual regional bureau, is also atypical.

The S/SRAP that Ambassador Holbrooke created and the special status it enjoyed led to extraordinary accomplishments in a brief period. One senior Department staffer observed that the virtue of S/SRAP was "its ability to do in a day what most bureaus can do only in a week." This virtue was especially important in the organization's early months, when senior leadership in many Washington departments and agencies was in transition, and when the President and the Secretary insisted on a rapid change of focus and intensification of effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan. S/SRAP was, as one senior S/SRAP staff member put it, "a breeding ground of creativity." Another senior S/SRAP staff member told the OIG team that S/SRAP had met the Secretary's stated intent that it should lead diplomatic and development efforts to create "an integrated strategy that works with both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a whole, as well as engaging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other key friends, allies, and those around the world who are interested in supporting these efforts." Based on extensive interviews and observations, the OIG team believes that claim is correct.

Ambassador Holbrooke's S/SRAP consisted of six components:

- first one – and later a total of three – deputies;
- a close personal staff that supported him;
- a group of special advisors with knowledge of the region, its history, politics, and peoples;
- an interagency group whose agencies had programs or interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
- a press and public diplomacy group; and
- the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks.

S/SRAP was augmented further by staff from Department bureaus and offices (such as the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and multiple offices within SCA), who operated out of their home bureaus/offices but worked primarily for S/SRAP. In addition, SCA's executive office provided management support for the two desks; the Executive Secretariat Executive Office provided management support for the personal staff, special advisors, other agency detailees, and media group. This structure, with only slight modifications, remained in place during the OIG inspection.

Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Components

Deputies

The original terms of reference for S/SRAP called for a single deputy, who would concurrently serve as a deputy assistant secretary in SCA. Reflecting understanding of the value of having a deputy familiar with the Department's current working processes, the terms of reference called for the deputy to be a Foreign Service officer. In the summer of 2009, the Special Representative won permission to name a second deputy, who took responsibility for oversight of foreign assistance and related congressional issues, as well as international engagement activities. In 2010, the Special Representative elevated the senior Department of Defense representative to serve as a third deputy overseeing reintegration and strategic communications.

When the Foreign Service deputy position became vacant in mid-2010, the Special Representative selected a seasoned Department Civil Service employee who was returning from an assignment in Afghanistan. Like his predecessor, this deputy had responsibility for oversight of the two desks, as well as several special projects.

Personal Staff

Headed by a chief of staff and including several special assistants, a staff assistant, and an executive assistant (or office management specialist), this group concentrated on providing for the Special Representative's needs. In some respects, the special assistants played the roles of personal assistants. A special assistant for the senior deputy in S/SRAP played a more traditional special assistant role, as he read, edited, and prepared materials for the Deputies and Principals Committee meetings, as well as special correspondence for the Secretary and President, on behalf of the Special Representative. The personal staff met the Special Representative's

information and institutional needs well; nonetheless, many in the organization would have preferred a more transparent and traditional front office special staff operation.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should set up a special assistant and staff aide component to manage the flow and quality of the office's correspondence.

Special Advisors

Ambassador Holbrooke recruited a handful of advisors with special knowledge of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as nearby countries and specific issues, and used them as project or team leaders or to serve as his own special links to regional leaders. One early recruit was a distinguished academic expert on Afghanistan, who took the lead on the sensitive issue of promoting reconciliation. One advisor established links with nongovernmental organizations, both international and local, working in the two countries. Another, from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, had extensive knowledge of Pakistan. Some advisors unfamiliar with the government found it difficult to link their specialized knowledge of the countries to Department offices and bureaus that have responsibility for programs. In general, however, the OIG team found that bringing in outside experts helped S/SRAP overcome a major weakness that had stemmed from the fact that many government officials returned from short tours in Afghanistan and Pakistan more conversant with interagency and visitor support issues with than the economic and political cultures of those countries. The special advisors are unquestionably precious human resources, whom the new Special Representative already values, and the OIG team received frequent positive comments about their personal openness.

Communications Team

Although it is focused on the Special Representative, the S/SRAP communications team has taken on some of the characteristics of a traditional bureau press and public diplomacy office. The team played a major role in strategic planning for strategic communication and public diplomacy, including the interagency coordination that is an integral part of that effort. Although the team reached outside of S/SRAP for press officer assistance, including the clearing of press statements, it took the lead role in planning and setting up a heavy schedule of media coverage and availabilities for the Special Representative and other senior U.S. officials.

Interagency Group

The interagency group consists of representatives (primarily other agency detailees to S/SRAP on a nonreimbursable basis) from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The original S/SRAP mandate called for a representative of the National Security Council, as well, but no one ever filled this role. Virtually every one of the representatives arrived at S/SRAP with some degree of expertise in Afghanistan or Pakistan issues, some of them with direct, in-country experience.

These interagency representatives serve as communications links to their home organizations. They are able to gather information from those organizations urgently and convey information from the Special Representative to their home agencies. In the early days of S/SRAP, when time was of the essence and many departments and agencies did not yet have full-time senior staff in place, some agency officials regarded S/SRAP as overly aggressive in trying to direct their programs and activities. However, all senior S/SRAP staff felt that S/SRAP's nontraditional and innovative approach has been instrumental in moving civilian experts and assistance rapidly and in building the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.

Shortly after Ambassador Holbrooke's death, the Secretary reiterated her commitment to the S/SRAP interagency model. According to many in S/SRAP, the interagency component continues to be critical to its work. Some think that a few interagency representatives' day-to-day presence might no longer be essential, but those agencies involved directly in the ongoing civilian and newer push for diplomatic "surges" should continue to be represented. The OIG team discussed its findings on this subject with the new Special Representative shortly before the inspection concluded.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should review its need for the daily presence of interagency representatives who are currently in the office and reaffirm with their respective agencies the need for the representatives' presence going forward.

Afghanistan and Pakistan Desks

From the time of S/SRAP's creation in early 2009 until fall 2010, the desks were not well integrated into S/SRAP. Desk officers felt isolated from both their policy leadership and the broader Department. With the arrival in summer 2010 of the new office directors Ambassador Holbrooke had selected, the Special Representative made a noticeable and appreciated effort to overcome the integration problems. However, by the time of Ambassador's Holbrooke's death, this endeavor remained a work-in-progress. The damage done by the partition model (both internal and vis-à-vis the rest of the Department – see below) has persisted, and attitudes among some S/SRAP personnel have not fully adjusted. The OIG team discussed with the new Special Representative the importance of continuing and enhancing these integrative efforts and some ways he might do so.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should continue efforts to better integrate the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks into the activities of the office.

The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Model

S/SRAP credits much of its success to being a flat, or nonhierarchical, organization. Even though the office began with one deputy and expanded to a total of three during 2010, the focus of information flow was Ambassador Holbrooke. He played the analogous role to a computer's central processing unit where virtually all information flowed to, and all instructions flowed from, the Special Representative. Various elements of S/SRAP – the deputies, special advisors, media group, and occasionally desk officers – served in partitions that worked on tasks assigned

by the Special Representative, often with a changing array of S/SRAP and occasionally other Department elements. These partitioned teams were often very successful. They were responsible for, just to name a few, an extraordinary civilian surge; developing and kicking off projects valued at billions of dollars; building the 40-plus country International Contact Group; helping to win passage, and then begin implementation, of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, providing assistance to Pakistan; successful negotiation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement; and encouragement of and support for multiple Congressional delegation visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Communication and Coordination

Communication across partitions was limited; a daily activity report annotated by the Special Representative became a singular vehicle for S/SRAP staff to learn what others were doing. More commonly, people lined up at the Special Representative's door to receive assignments or report progress. Several S/SRAP staff reported that they made individual information gathering forays to discover what was happening, or elbowed their way into meetings where they thought they might have a role.

There were some large meetings that featured information exchanges, but by staff request four staff meetings per week devolved to two, one primarily for immediate S/SRAP members and a second for S/SRAP and other staff from the Department, including the desks. Weekly meetings (known as "shuras") held at the Department, cochaired by the Special Representative and a senior National Security Council official, and intended to be an opportunity for interagency and intra-Departmental exchanges, became a forum for generalized information sharing. Acknowledging the "shura" was too unwieldy for effective decision-making, several Department and interagency representatives saved significant policy discussions for conversations outside the "shura" venue. In February 2011, recognizing the enormous commitment of senior officials' time to the weekly, 90-minute meetings, the acting S/SRAP announced that the "shura" would shift from a weekly to a monthly format.

Even daily appointment schedules for the Special Representative and the deputies were either unavailable or limited in distribution. Following a leak to a newspaper, the Special Representative's daily schedule became a tightly controlled item. Each deputy's administrative assistant circulated that deputy's schedule separately and to distinct distribution lists. There was no consolidated front office schedule, as is found in all but one of the Department's regional bureaus. The partitioning of schedule information further limited communication within the organization, complicated staff planning, and reinforced a sense of isolation among some staff.

The effect of S/SRAP's partitioning was also evident in information sharing internally and across the Department. S/SRAP did not clear most of its documents prepared for senior Department officials or the National Security Council. By default, special and staff assistants in the Department's senior executive suites served as distributors of some S/SRAP-drafted documents to relevant bureaus and offices, after the fact. Some S/SRAP staff members were notorious for seeking information from others in the Department, or even within S/SRAP, and then not sharing how that information was used – or even checking that the information, as used, was correct. Given the sense of urgency that suffused S/SRAP's early operations, as well as the

sensitivity of some of the issues under its purview, S/SRAP's approach to information sharing was extraordinary – but, to a degree, understandable.

(b) (5)

The newly appointed Special Representative arrived during the inspection, and the OIG team discussed internal communications issues and approaches he might consider in addressing problems the team had identified.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should address internal communications issues by establishing clear guidelines on information sharing, making senior officials' daily calendars more accessible within the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and building a schedule of office-wide and smaller meetings to facilitate information sharing across the organization.

The “Bureau” That is Not a Bureau

S/SRAP's leadership describe the office as being “for all intents and purposes” a bureau. In many respects, S/SRAP does resemble a traditional, regional bureau. Certainly with respect to engagement in the policy process, it might be considered a super-bureau. However, there are a number of important respects in which it does not operate like a typical bureau. Many of these can be explained by the intense involvement of S/SRAP in preparing the Secretary and other senior Department staff for frequent high level meetings in Washington and engagements abroad. Others are explained by thinking of S/SRAP less as a bureau than as an ongoing task force (typically called together on an urgent basis to respond to a crisis, such as the evacuation of Americans in response to political violence or a natural disaster).

All Department bureaus have a principal deputy assistant secretary who serves as the assistant secretary's stand-in when necessary; takes on sensitive assignments for the assistant secretary; and in the regional bureaus is responsible for overall management of the bureau and its relationships with other parts of the Department, as well as overseas missions in its region. The S/SRAP senior deputy has taken on some of these functions, including working with the special Representative to identify and select many senior staff at the missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, as is true in many parts of the Department when a crisis strikes, the principal deputy and other senior staff have largely jettisoned management responsibilities.

One mission official, for instance, indicated that the mission has no advocate in the S/SRAP front office to engage on management issues needing high-level attention in the

Department. S/SRAP has no effective orientation program for new staff, including entry-level personnel. Guidelines and support for interagency and other staff who are new to the Department are catch-as-catch-can. S/SRAP does not provide for the supervisory and mentoring needs of special advisors who lack Department (or even U.S. Government) experience. Foreign and Civil Service evaluations are late, and some are seriously overdue. No one is held to account. S/SRAP has not evaluated its system of management controls, nor submitted the required annual management controls statement of assurance. S/SRAP has prepared many planning documents, but is exempted from the Department's usual requirement to prepare a Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan, which is based on Mission Strategic and Resource Plans. Rather, it provides material that is included in the SCA bureau plan. S/SRAP does not evaluate or provide comment on the Mission Strategic and Resource Plans from Kabul or Islamabad.

Recommendation 1: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should designate a staff member to serve as the point of contact for State Department strategic planning exercises, including the Mission and Bureau Strategic and Resource Plans. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 2: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop a formal process whereby each mission receives an appropriately cleared review of its Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, approved by the senior deputy. (Action: S/SRAP)

When Ambassador Holbrooke was away from Washington, there was no formal designation of an acting special representative. Staff merely assumed that the senior deputy had that role, and the deputies themselves indicated there was an informal designation process, but no system for communicating it across the organization. Department bureaus customarily designate a deputy to stand in as acting assistant secretary when the assistant secretary is not personally available.

Lines of authority to the deputies only began to be specified with the creation of an S/SRAP organization chart shortly before the inspection began. Many within S/SRAP told inspectors these lines were largely notional, as deputies acted more as partition (or team) leaders, even as some special advisors played the same roles. The deputies had deputy titles, but the flatness of the organization, centralized role played by the Special Representative, and absence of a chain of command meant that many in S/SRAP had no clear reporting channel or individual to whom they were accountable.

The OIG team discussed with the new Special Representative ways in which the organization could have a clearer chain of command and accountability.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should designate and announce an acting special representative when the Special Representative is away.

Informal Recommendation 6: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should establish an orientation program for new staff.

Informal Recommendation 7: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should establish a mechanism to monitor progress in fulfilling requirements for preparation of Civil Service and Foreign Service evaluations and meeting deadlines set by the Bureau of Human Resources.

Informal Recommendation 8: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should clarify the internal reporting chains and responsibilities of the deputies.

Transition Issues

The Department's history of special representative or special envoy offices is that, in time, they come to an end. The S/SRAP operation at some point in the next several years may fully succeed in its mission or possibly transition to a more traditional special envoy office that does not stand alone from the SCA bureau, or both. At that point, the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks will revert to SCA, as will potentially other S/SRAP elements. The inspection report for the SCA bureau prepared concurrently with the inspection of S/SRAP recommends that SCA begin to plan and prepare for a transition.

Currently, the senior S/SRAP deputy is also an SCA deputy assistant secretary. His coordination and deconfliction function is potentially useful, but after he became the acting special representative in December, senior-level S/SRAP involvement in SCA meetings became more sporadic and less effective. The flow of communication between SCA and S/SRAP is inadequate, as is SCA's awareness of S/SRAP programs and activities in such areas as strategic communications and regional economic issues. [REDACTED]

When the transition takes place, SCA's awareness of S/SRAP programs and activities will be essential for continuity. To meet its responsibilities, SCA – particularly the bureau's deputy assistant secretaries and office directors – will need to be aware of and participate in appropriate S/SRAP meetings and events. Whenever regular bureau and S/SRAP meetings overlap or conflict, the S/SRAP senior deputy/SCA deputy assistant secretary should work with SCA to reschedule them to a mutually convenient time. A successful transition will depend on such coordination. (See related recommendation in the report of the concurrent inspection of SCA.)

Recommendation 3: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should increase sharing of information about and expand invitations to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs so that the bureau participates regularly in programs and activities organized by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA)

Entry-Level Personnel

The general definition of entry-level officers or personnel includes untenured Foreign Service officers and staff. S/SRAP itself does not have any Foreign Service officers who meet this definition, although the desks do. Both S/SRAP and the desks include Foreign Service, Civil Service, and other employees who have been with the Department less than 5 years and can be considered as newcomers.

S/SRAP does not have a separate program for entry-level personnel. However, SCA has invited Afghanistan and Pakistan desk personnel to participate in its activities for entry-level and other Department newcomers. Eventually, as noted above, the desks will revert to SCA. Thus, allowing S/SRAP staff to benefit from SCA's program is sensible. (For further information and a recommendation, see the concurrent OIG inspection report for the SCA bureau.)

Policy and Program Implementation

Country Directorates Reporting to the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

The Afghanistan and Pakistan desks have struggled over the past decade to obtain and retain the staff needed to meet burgeoning policy requirements. They now are staffed by employees from a wide variety of personnel systems: Foreign Service, Civil Service, contractors, interns, 3161 employees,¹ detailees from other agencies, and science or foreign diplomatic fellows. As a result, many have less experience than their counterparts in comparable Department offices. This combination of diverse personnel systems, an experience deficit, and rapid turnover means that office leaders must devote a large percentage of their time to staffing issues and an equally large percentage to mentoring and training new staff, and editing their work. Many officers did not receive Washington Tradecraft training or desk-level orientation, upon arrival.

Informal Recommendation 9: The Offices of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs should provide orientation packages to all new arrivals, keep all orientation materials up-to-date, and coordinate their orientation program with more general orientations offered at the Department or bureau level.

Informal Recommendation 10: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should require all personnel assigned to policy positions to take Washington Tradecraft training at the Foreign Service Institute within 4 months of beginning their assignments.

Due to the blended workforce and an operating style that was often described as “creative chaos,” some individuals in S/SRAP have been able to carve out special roles for themselves outside the ordinary supervisory chains. For instance, some employees whose positions appear on one staffing pattern actually work in another part of S/SRAP, or (in at least two cases) outside

¹ Personnel hired by the head of a temporary organization under 5 U.S.C. 3161 to fill temporary positions, as necessary.

of S/SRAP entirely. The resulting confusion over lines of authority makes it difficult to establish accountability for performance evaluation and set appropriate staffing levels.

Recommendation 4: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should restructure the staffing pattern of the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to reflect actual duties and lines of authority. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and DGHR)

The work of the desks is driven by preparing policy papers to support S/SRAP. The volume and tempo are high, with orders for new papers often coming more quickly than they can be written. Under this pressure, drafting officers assign priority to meeting deadlines, rather than to doing research or obtaining clearances. Some papers do not meet S/SRAP expectations, while others are produced but never used. Both desks' ability to produce papers for top-level meetings is often hindered by the late arrival of agendas from the National Security Council; in some cases, the instructions for preparing documents for a meeting of the Deputies Committee have not reached the office until after the close of business the previous night. In other cases, certain topics are of such great sensitivity that desk officers are not kept abreast of their status, but they are nevertheless tasked with drafting papers, which – because the writers are not fully informed about the issues – cannot be accurate and up-to-date. Effectiveness is also limited by S/SRAP's lack of an adequate system for tasking and coordinating such papers. Failure to give drafting officers sufficient feedback on the changes made to papers by the various levels in S/SRAP also leads to unnecessary work, as drafters have no way of knowing whether what they are producing is needed.

Informal Recommendation 11: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should return a copy of the final version of all papers to the drafting office to help clarify expectations and reduce duplicated efforts.

Informal Recommendation 12: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should assign drafting responsibilities to those responsible for the papers' substance.

Coordination between S/SRAP officials and the desks also is hindered by the use of different communications systems. Officers in S/SRAP use the Principal Officers Executive Management System (POEMS) for email, drafting, and cable retrieval, while officers on the desks use the SCA network. The lack of a common computer platform hinders efficient operations and creates obstacles to effective feedback. An effort to bridge the gap by using SharePoint has not overcome these problems. Some officials in S/SRAP prefer the POEMS system, because it is maintained by the Executive Secretariat, whose support and maintenance services are superior to those provided by the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM). However, no regional bureau uses this bifurcated approach to computer networking. While it would make sense for staff assistants to retain access to the POEMS system, S/SRAP and the desks could better coordinate their work if S/SRAP migrated to the SCA network.

Recommendation 5: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Information Resource Management and the Executive Secretariat, should migrate all its users to a single domain. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA, IRM, and S/ES)

The OIG team identified some areas of duplication or redundancy where savings could be made. For example, SCA and S/SRAP do not need some contract services provided by the Iraq Policy and Operations Group (IPOG). This office, staffed by contract personnel and working from a Department annex, was originally set up to support policy officers working on Iraq. In 2009 its contract was amended to add media alerts and cable summarizing services for officers working on Afghanistan.

IPOG alerts desk officers by email when an article on Afghanistan or Pakistan appears in the mainstream U.S. press. Few officers make use of these alerts, however, because they frequently receive the same alerts from IPOG, Embassy Kabul or Islamabad, the Operations Center or the bureau's public affairs office.

Some officers do make use of IPOG's cable summarizing service, but they generally do not read the summaries even though they are well written. Instead, they use it as an alerting service when they cannot locate cables quickly enough in overcrowded in-boxes. Despite the convenience this occasionally represents, the OIG team found that officers could locate needed cables more efficiently by setting filters on the search and retrieval functions of the State Messaging and Retrieval Toolbox (SMART) system to individual user profiles. Doing so would obviate the need for expensive cable alerts from IPOG. At the time the new SMART system was installed in SCA and S/SRAP, few if any users were trained in how to set search functions to include a profile.

Recommendation 6: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs, should discontinue having the Iraq Policy and Operations Group send it media alerts. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and NEA)

Recommendation 7: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs, should discontinue having the Iraq Policy and Operations Group send it cable alerts and summaries and instead request the group to assist it in making cable profiles for its staff more efficient. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and NEA)

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should contact new users approximately 1 month after establishing their State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolbox inbox profiles, to determine whether those profiles are appropriate and useful; make necessary adjustments to the profiles; and provide follow-up user guidance. (Action: IRM, in coordination with S/SRAP)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should assign Iraq Policy and Operations Group analysts to appropriate supervisors in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and/or Pakistan offices. (Action NEA, in coordination with SCA and S/SRAP)

The office management specialists on both desks appear underutilized and have requested additional and more substantive duties. They must routinely perform escort and reception duties, and they have little interaction with their counterparts in the S/SRAP front office and do not back them up. A newly named acting deputy director on the Pakistan desk already has begun to address these concerns. The OIG team encouraged S/SRAP and the desks to work out areas for enhanced office management specialist responsibilities and collaboration.

The policy desks are spending time on issues that should be the responsibility of other offices. For example, both desks spend significant time obtaining visas for personnel being assigned or travelling to Afghanistan and Pakistan (and for Dubai, a customary transit point). Rather than routinely intervening with the Afghan and Pakistani embassies in Washington to urge them to expedite the issuance of individual visas, the desks should reserve this service for senior officials and urgent or sensitive cases, and refer most routine visa cases to the Orientation and In-Processing Center. Monitoring the visa validities of S/SRAP and desk personnel, and being the clearinghouse for visa applications for those travelers, would be an appropriate duty for cross-trained office management specialists on the desks.

Office of Afghanistan Affairs

The Office of Afghanistan Affairs is now a large, one-country office with 25 authorized positions that reports to S/SRAP but continues to receive administrative and other support from SCA. In general, it is a smoothly functioning office. The director provides clear guidance, remaining calm and focused under the pressure of short deadlines. He is supported by two deputies who concentrate on internal management, to whom he delegates clearance authority as necessary, in order to keep paper moving and avoid delays. Despite a sense of disconnection from the previous Special Representative, who rarely visited the desk, morale is high.

Staffing issues take up much of management's time. Virtually everyone is more junior than the staff in comparable Department offices. Because of the need to fill positions by encouraging nonstandard tours of duty, turnover is high. During the inspection, four officers, including one of the deputies, transferred or left the Department. To carry out an S/SRAP goal of building up a cadre of area specialists, the office recruits aggressively for persons with experience in Afghanistan, both in and outside of government.

The office is appropriately organized. Four units focus on political, economic, multifunctional, and political/military issues. Redundancies could be reduced in some areas. The desk does not require a separate, part-time public affairs position, for example, as this support can be more effectively provided by SCA's Office of Press and Public Diplomacy (SCA/PPD).

Informal Recommendation 13: The Office of Afghanistan Affairs should redistribute office workloads to eliminate public affairs responsibilities and request this support from the Office of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy instead.

The office has made significant progress in more systematic record-keeping. Many officers had kept only individual records, which were not passed on to their successors; however, prior to the inspection the office began putting more information on a shared drive, using Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject for faster retrieval, and dividing files by year to make retirement easier. This effort has reduced waste by avoiding duplication and improved the quality of papers by increasing continuity.

The office plays a limited role in overseeing foreign assistance. It is not responsible for managing programs or evaluating their effectiveness. Instead, it works with Embassy Kabul and the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources to improve coordination of assistance programs by all agencies and keep them focused on foreign policy goals. On at least one occasion, officers found a proposed change in a program inconsistent with the justification given to Congress for its funding and urged Embassy Kabul not to approve it. The OIG team encouraged the desk to find a replacement for a contractor with specialized expertise in this area who departed in March for the private sector.

Until recently, the Office of Afghanistan Affairs (unlike most country desks) was not the primary channel of communication with “its” embassy. Relations between S/SRAP and Embassy Kabul have been strained by several issues. In early 2010, the embassy urged Washington to send it fewer uncoordinated, individual requests and to combine instructions from S/SRAP and the desk in a more comprehensive manner. Since S/SRAP did not do so, the embassy began ignoring some messages from S/SRAP entirely. Later that year, the Afghan desk began a daily exchange of official-informal cables to consolidate the flow of information and limit ad hoc or contradictory instructions. These cables have become an important tool for organizing work and have improved coordination between the field and Washington.

More needs to be done. The OIG inspection of Embassy Kabul in 2010 found that S/SRAP’s tight control of information created problems for bureaus that needed to see reporting on their areas of responsibility.² That inspection report contained a recommendation that S/SRAP send the embassy new guidance for reporting that reflected the needs of all Washington consumers, not just its own. S/SRAP was in the process of complying with that recommendation when the Kabul inspection report was closed at the start of the Kabul compliance follow-up review in March 2011.

Recommendation 10: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should prepare, clear, and send new instructions for the formulation and distribution of reporting that includes priorities and the needs of all Washington end users. (Action: S/SRAP)

² ISP-I-10-32, Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2010.

Office of Pakistan Affairs

The Pakistan desk has a young, energetic staff that has performed beyond reasonable expectations. Stretch assignments have placed responsibilities upon inexperienced officers, who nonetheless have responded well.

Despite the hard work, long hours, and a perception of neglect from S/SRAP, the office's morale is high. Interoffice communication is good, and several informal social events have helped build a sense of team cohesion. Several staff commented on the family-friendly atmosphere – making accommodations for childcare needs and encouraging on-time departures whenever possible. As one officer put it, “We've learned to cut through the extraneous stuff, focus on the essential, and get out of here.”

The director has established a productive working relationship with S/SRAP leadership, including spending several weeks as an acting deputy in the S/SRAP front office. While that meant he had to delegate much of the day-to-day operation of the office to his two deputies, he was able to maintain an appropriate balance, and his staff speaks highly of him. The deputies, in turn, have managed the office well, both substantively and administratively.

Although the present team works well together, it faces two challenges in the months ahead. The most experienced officers will depart in routine summer turnover, typically creating gaps of several weeks. The OIG team suggested that desk management enlist the senior S/SRAP deputy to institute the same overlap rule that applies to service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The second challenge lies in the leadership transition in S/SRAP itself: prolonged ambiguity regarding chains of command and needed improvements in operating procedures could inadvertently serve as an impetus for other desk personnel to seek opportunities elsewhere.

Informal Recommendation 14: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should institute the same overlap rule that applies to service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for the Pakistan and Afghanistan desks.

Four subunits, or teams, divide the desk's workload: political, politico-military, economic, and multifunctional. Three work well; the economic team, however, has been undercut by an S/SRAP staff member operating outside a chain of command.

Informal Recommendation 15: The Office of Pakistan Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should review economic staffing, with a view to either clarifying roles and thus strengthening the team or disbanding the subunit.

Although traditional desk structures often do not have a full-time public diplomacy officer, the importance of public diplomacy efforts in the bilateral relationship, liaison with both SCA/PPD and S/SRAP's communications team, and drafting press guidance keeps the desk's public diplomacy officer fully and properly engaged. His management of the office's three interns garnered praise from each of them.

With over \$1 billion in assistance destined for Pakistan each year, an officer overseeing foreign assistance is desirable. Such an officer, with extensive experience in other foreign assistance offices and on appropriations committee staff, recently joined the desk after a 6-month gap. Although not responsible for managing programs or evaluating their effectiveness, she will play an important role in developing their policy justification and serving as a liaison to the foreign assistance implementers.

Three desk staffers have expressed the desire and willingness to study Urdu on their own time, if the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) were to establish an early morning class in the Department, but FSI required a larger number of students. Given the importance of Urdu language skills to U.S. goals in Pakistan and the paucity of such skills in the Department, the OIG team counseled the S/SRAP senior deputy to support this initiative with FSI management.

Foreign Assistance

S/SRAP does not directly manage foreign assistance funds. Some officers are involved in developing broad strategies for the use of money; others are working with bilateral and multilateral donors to raise funds; and still others are involved in the preparation of the Congressional Budget Justification, working with the missions and the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance. The Special Representative and senior staff work closely with the Bureau of Legislative Affairs and USAID to provide information to the Congress on the administration's budget request.

The relationship between S/SRAP and USAID has not always been smooth. There has been a USAID representative within S/SRAP from almost the beginning, but the long lead time in selecting and approving Washington agency leadership resulted in a vacuum, which S/SRAP leadership attempted to fill. Since the summer of 2010, the situation has improved, although concerns remain about the slow expenditure of funds.

In the past 2 years, S/SRAP has directed a significant reorientation of the assistance effort in Pakistan. Its staff has worked with the embassy, the enlarged USAID mission, the Government of Pakistan, and the rest of the donor community. The interagency component of S/SRAP has facilitated expanding the role of some of those agencies within Pakistan. Much of this day-to-day policy effort has been overseen closely by one of the S/SRAP deputies. Now that the new policy direction is in place, the office needs to implement and evaluate it.

The OIG team could not identify anyone within S/SRAP designated to evaluate the impact of the overall assistance effort. The majority of metrics created by program implementers measure program outputs, rather than outcomes. Many of the programs are too new to demonstrate outcomes, but there does not appear to be a concentrated effort to develop processes to measure outcomes over the medium- to long-term. Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have developed systems for monitoring and evaluating projects. S/SRAP already has the advantage of the expertise of the special advisors and the interagency representatives; it is the logical entity, with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to evaluate overall sectoral, national, and regional outcomes. Designating a staff member to handle this responsibility would enable S/SRAP to implement the Under Secretary for Management's October 20, 2010, policy requiring regular evaluations.

Informal Recommendation 16: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should formally designate one of the deputies as being responsible for overall evaluation of the foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Recommendation 11: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop a process to review and consolidate the efforts of the embassies' monitoring and evaluation efforts, in order to assess overall sectoral, national, and regional outcomes of assistance programs. (Action: S/SRAP)

Strategic Communication, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy

A small unit of four people in S/SRAP handles strategic communication, public affairs, and public diplomacy. They report to the deputy for defense, communications, and reconciliation. The unit is led by a director for communications, assisted by a deputy director for public affairs who served in Afghanistan, a deputy director for outreach, and a Presidential Management Fellow.

The unit is cohesive, hardworking, creative, and productive. Its primary role is strategic planning and interagency coordination within its sphere. It has helped draft the Integrated Civilian-Military Afghanistan Communication Plan and the Pakistan Communications Plan and its updates. The unit works closely with its Department of Defense strategic communication counterparts and the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The unit also has a symbiotic relationship with the eight staff members in SCA/PPD, who work primarily in support of S/SRAP and the U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As detailed in the separate and concurrent OIG Inspection Report on the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, five staff members in the SCA/PPD Afghanistan and Pakistan operations support unit manage the public diplomacy and strategic communications grants that implement the S/SRAP strategic communication and public diplomacy strategies. SCA/PPD is also home for the press officer for Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as desk officers for Afghanistan and Pakistan, each of whom provides the routine interaction between the embassy public affairs section and Washington. The desks also have public diplomacy officers of their own.

This unit in S/SRAP and the two public diplomacy officers from the country desks meet jointly with the above-identified SCA/PPD staff for separate weekly calls to the public affairs teams in Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad. Some of these working-level SCA/PPD staff members also attend the weekly S/SRAP "all hands" meeting. Representatives from the related SCA/PPD staff also attend weekly strategic communications meetings led by the S/SRAP communications director, as well as the weekly interagency communications meetings co-chaired by the director of communication and her Department of Defense counterpart, which are hosted on a rotating basis by the Department and the Pentagon.

Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Strategy

The Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy follows four pillars: expand media engagement, counter extremist voices, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people ties.

To implement that strategy, Embassy Islamabad runs the Department's largest bilateral exchange program, and Pakistan has the largest Fulbright program in the world. The public diplomacy budget for Pakistan grew from a base public diplomacy budget of approximately \$1.5 million in FY 2009 to \$58 million in FY 2010 for public diplomacy and strategic communications from Department and USAID funds, not counting strategic communication funds from the Department of Defense. Funds limited to public diplomacy that were spent in Pakistan in FY 2010 totaled \$41.4 million (FY 2010 base of \$1.6 million; FY 2009 supplemental, 2-year funds of \$31.1 million; and FY 2010 supplemental regularization funding of \$8.7 million). The FY 2011 budget request is for up to \$110 million.

The public diplomacy budget in Afghanistan grew from a base public diplomacy budget of \$1.5 million in FY 2009 to over \$87.5 million in FY 2010 for public diplomacy and strategic communications from Department and USAID funds, not counting significant strategic communication funds from the Department of Defense. Funds used only for public diplomacy that were spent in Afghanistan in FY 2010 totaled \$46.7 million (FY 2010 base \$1.3 million; FY 2009 supplemental 2-year money \$22.1 million; and FY 2010 supplemental regularization \$23.3 million).

These budget increases at Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have been accompanied by a doubling of the number of public affairs officers at the two missions and by SCA/PPD staffing up to support grants management. Neither the S/SRAP unit nor SCA/PPD requires further staff augmentation to manage this increased workload.

Shortage of Language Qualified Press Officers

The January 27, 2011, arrest in Lahore, Pakistan, of an American official assigned to Embassy Islamabad drew attention to a public affairs skills gap. Not once during nearly 2 months that coincided with this inspection did a Pakistan-based American public affairs official engage the Urdu-speaking media in that local language about this issue. At the 2011 Global Chiefs of Mission Conference, the final report noted that effective engagement requires talented officers and "officers who can engage contacts in local languages with fluency."³ Likewise, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review stated the intent to, "Make public diplomacy a core diplomatic mission by building regional media hubs staffed by skilled communicators to ensure that we can participate in public debates anywhere and anytime."⁴ This is not the case – or at least not regularly – in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. The result is that other voices, including those of extremists, go unchallenged by U.S. officials speaking local languages. Public opinion in Pakistan of Americans and U.S. policy has consistently been at relatively low levels, but that situation was gradually improving (b) (5) until the disruption of the Lahore incident. The Lahore incident is an aberration, but it illustrates how quickly – after months of implementing a well-designed strategic communication and public diplomacy strategy – an event can halt, and even temporarily reverse, progress.

³ Page 38.

⁴ Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, p. viii.

(b) (5)

[Redacted]

(b) (5)

[Redacted]

In Afghanistan, which has one of the lowest levels of literacy in the world and where people get their information primarily from radio (in rural areas) or television (in urban areas), U.S. officials should be able to engage with the broadcast media in Dari and Pashto. An analogous situation exists in Pakistan. In an effort to help fill the gap, the S/SRAP deputy

director for outreach, a detailee from the Department of Defense who is an Urdu speaker, sometimes calls media contacts in Pakistan, to engage with them in Urdu.

Other direct-hire American staff at the U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan have a degree of competency in the main local languages (Urdu, Pashto, and Dari), but they may not have the high level of language competency needed to speak extemporaneously in a live television interview or as part of a round table. They may not be Department employees or part of the public affairs section or have press attaché skills. According to FSI, fewer than 120 active career and career-conditional employees can read and speak these hard languages at a competency level of 3 or greater. (See table below.) A native-speaker proficiency in a foreign language is measured at or near the 5 competency level. At the time of this inspection, there were 24 Department officers in Afghanistan and Pakistan serving at that highest level of proficiency in any of the three languages. Dari speakers at the 4 level or higher numbered six, two Pashto speakers; and 14 Urdu speakers. Four Dari speakers, one Pashto speaker, and five Urdu speakers spoke those languages at the highest level.

Language	Foreign Service Generalists	Foreign Service Specialists	Civil Service	Totals
Urdu	35	12	1	48
Pashto	4	2	0	6
Dari	58	5	0	63

Source: Foreign Service Institute

Recommendation 12: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop and implement a plan to recruit detailees or excepted Civil Service employees and place them in Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad press offices to serve as full-time, dedicated public spokespersons; these individuals must be U.S. citizens who are proficient in the local language(s) and have press officer training or experience. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 13: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Foreign Service Institute, should provide career public diplomacy officers with the training they need to communicate proficiently in the designated local languages, so they can engage with the Afghan and Pakistani local language media at any time and in any place. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with DGHR and FSI)

Recommendation 14: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad, should examine the feasibility of developing a speakers bureau of experts who are proficient in Urdu, Pashto, or Dari, who can be detailed from their regular jobs to assist with outreach and engagement strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This speakers bureau should include whole-of-government agencies, as well as American citizens who do not work in government and who are fluent speakers of Urdu, Pashto, or Dari to participate in public outreach and other mission-sponsored public diplomacy activities. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with IIP, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad)

Need for Greater Continuity Among Key Public Diplomacy Officers

The 1-year tour-of-duty policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan has caused a lack of continuity with contacts and impeded efforts to build personal relationships with members of the local media. This discontinuity is a challenge for the embassies' public affairs sections. At times, the S/SRAP director of communications and the staff have reached out directly by telephone to set up media events for high-level visiting U.S. officials. During the inspection, such difficulties occurred when the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went to Pakistan to help resolve the Lahore incident described above. The director of communications' work for Senator Kerry's visit was crucial to orchestrating and designing the media engagement plan in Lahore, which included a pooled television roundtable and a session with top Pakistani editors and columnists. The Urdu-speaking deputy director for outreach also got involved by telephone with the Pakistani media, to ensure successful media opportunities. In a society and in an industry where personal relationships are all-important, tours of duty longer than 12 months for the press attaché and public affairs section chief would be desirable, to give them time to build relationships and foster continuity. Already, Embassies Kabul and Islamabad encourage their chiefs of section and principal officers to commit to 2-year assignments; expanding this approach to apply to senior press officers and local language public spokespersons would be consistent with this already established model. It is worth noting that the officers would be more likely to make such a commitment if some accommodation were made to permit spouses to accompany them, at least on a case-by-case basis.

Informal Recommendation 17: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should encourage candidates for senior press officer and local language public spokesperson positions at Embassies Kabul and Islamabad to commit to 2-year assignments.

Pakistan and Afghanistan Support Office

The Pakistan and Afghanistan Support Office (PASO) coordinates S/SRAP management issues with the Executive Secretariat Executive Office and with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Bureau of South Central Asian Affairs Executive Office (NEA-SCA/EX). The PASO director is also responsible for vetting senior-level staff for positions in Afghanistan and Pakistan and making recommendations to the S/SRAP leadership.

PASO and the Iraq Strategic Partnership Office are temporary offices created by executive order to support the Department's efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. PASO's main purpose is to enhance civilian control and a stable constitutional government in Pakistan; to promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan; and to stimulate the economies of both countries. The executive order allows PASO and Iraq Strategic Partnership Office to hire 3161 employees on 1-year appointments, which can be extended for up to 5 years. The PASO director, who is a 3161 employee, has considerable authority in hiring and deploying PASO 3161 employees in S/SRAP, SCA, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 3161 Personnel Office.

Excepted Civil Service Hiring

The 3161 Personnel Office has three sections: recruiting, employment, and personnel, each led by a senior specialist. All sections do the usual tasks of a traditional, federal personnel office. However, there is no program to record employee performance management. This issue is described in the management controls section of the report.

The 3161 Personnel Office does not have rights and privileges as a fully delegated human resources organization, and thus its actions are approved elsewhere in the Department. Currently, this is done by FSI's human resources office, which also determines salary and authorizes and classifies positions. The 3161 Personnel Office staff feel that FSI's human resources office turnaround time is too long for all its functions, which prevents them from optimizing resources to meet program goals. These delays also mean that offices in Washington and abroad risk losing candidates. The OIG team made a recommendation in a concurrent inspection report on SCA, that SCA, FSI, and HR negotiate a service-level agreement to include customer service standards (vis-a-vis PASO).

Resource Management

S/SRAP -- U.S. Staff ⁵						
Foreign Service	Civil Service	3161 ⁶	Contractor	Detaillee	Fellow/ Intern	Total
24	14	11	9	16	11	85

FY 2010 S/SRAP Resources (in thousands) ⁷	<i>Afghanistan & Pakistan Portion</i>
Traditional Overseas Program Funding (D&CP)	\$54,343
Additional Afghanistan and Pakistan Funding (D&CP)	411,390
Public Diplomacy (D&CP)	3,413
Economic Support Funds	59,746
Other Assistance ⁸	199
International Cooperative Administrative Support Services	100,375
Representation	202
Other Appropriations ⁹	1,760
Total¹⁰	\$631,428

As shown in Appendix 1 at the end of this report, USAID, Department of Defense, and Department-controlled foreign assistance funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan totaled nearly \$18 billion in FY 2010.

Executive Office Overview

S/SRAP receives administrative support from both the Executive Secretariat Executive Office and the NEA-SCA/EX, as follows:

⁵ Staffing numbers provided by EX. Note that S/SRAP does not have overseas staff.

⁶ 3161 staffing numbers provided by PASO.

⁷ Numbers provided by NEA-SCA/EX. S/SRAP provides policy guidance over the Public Diplomacy, Economic Support Funds and Additional Afghanistan and Pakistan Funding while SCA manages the other appropriations. SRAP staff used \$1.8 million of the FY 2010 D&CP funding for travel, \$1.5 million for salaries, and an additional amount (not tracked separately) for 3161s and contract staff.

⁸ Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (Pub. L. 123-123§ 1), Freedom Support Act (Pub. L. 101-138), Development Assistance (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-195, chapters 1 and 10 of Part I).

⁹ Machine Readable Visas Processing Fees, United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, Sec. 810 Fees (22 U.S.C. § 1475e), FSN Separation Liability Trust Fund (Pub. L. 102-138 § 151), Unconditional Gift Funds (22 U.S.C. § 2697).

¹⁰ About 60 percent of this funding was held and managed domestically.

- The Afghanistan and Pakistan desks receive support from NEA-SCA/EX;
- The rest of S/SRAP receives support from the Executive Secretariat Executive Office.
- The S/SRAP senior deputy, who is also a deputy assistant secretary in SCA, receives some administrative support from both executive offices.

Although this division of labor sounds awkward, it works well. The Executive Secretariat Executive Office, which was not part of this inspection, and NEA-SCA/EX have a clear understanding as to responsibilities, as do the staff of the overall S/SRAP organization. The Executive Secretariat Executive Office manages S/SRAP's funding.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Support

The deputy executive director for SCA is responsible for all missions in South and Central Asia, but she spends approximately 80 percent of her time on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Executive Office (EX) staff dedicated solely to Afghanistan and Pakistan has increased from 3 post management positions in June 2009 to 12 at the time of this inspection, including post management, budget, and Foreign Service assignments. They began to focus on the transition from military to civilian staffing in Afghanistan in early 2010, when the staff began meeting regularly with the EX team involved in the Iraq transition. Acting on one of the lessons learned from the Iraq transition, in February 2011, EX hired an Afghanistan management transition coordinator with a background in civilian and military planning. EX plans to augment the coordinator's office with additional staff as the transition deadline of 2014 approaches. The current organizational arrangement works well, due to the efforts of a hard-working and capable deputy executive director and a talented staff.

Staffing Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent Pakistan, is a challenge. The Department began the first of three phases in 2009 in what is termed a "civilian uplift." This uplift was intended to increase the number of U.S. Government civilians from all agencies under Embassy Kabul chief of mission authority from 977 in 2009 to 1,396 in 2011, after which growth was projected to level off. These numbers are augmented by several hundred temporary duty employees. The Afghanistan and Pakistan desks and SCA/PPD aggressively recruit to fill these positions.

The Department is relying on a blended workforce – a mixture of Foreign Service, traditional Civil Service, 3161s, contractors, Presidential Management Fellows, interns, and retired diplomats – to staff both S/SRAP and the missions. Managing this blended workforce is a challenge. Also, as noted elsewhere, S/SRAP has a number of entry-level officers, many of whom have little if any previous experience either overseas or in the Department. Faced with a shortage of mid-level officers and having authority to hire new entry-level officers, the Bureau of Human Resources has been forced to fill mid-level positions in Washington with officers on their first or second tours, who require more training and supervision than experienced veterans. Even this source of stopgap staffing will be lost, if funding cuts force a reduction in the number of new officers hired.

While the number of positions continues to increase, the pool of potential Foreign Service volunteers who have not yet served in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq continues to shrink.

Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have requested that the Department consider increasing the length of tours from 1 year to 18 months or 2 years. While this would improve continuity, many working with Foreign Service assignments say it would decrease the number of people willing to volunteer to work in these extremely challenging missions.

A number of Civil Service employees have expressed interest in serving in Afghanistan or Pakistan. However, assignment rules allow Civil Service staff to be assigned to Foreign Service positions only if no Foreign Service officer has bid on the position. This can sometimes mean that no one fills the job at all, if the Foreign Service bidder subsequently goes elsewhere after logging the bid. The assignments offices within the bureau and in the Bureau of Human Resources have worked to mitigate this problem. As the pool of Foreign Service personnel who have not served in these missions shrinks, it may be necessary to increase the opportunities for Civil Service employees to fill positions there.

EX holds weekly teleconferences with Embassies Kabul and Islamabad, as well as regular and frequent meetings with other Department offices involved in the expansion at these two missions. The EX staff members work well together. EX also works closely with the S/SRAP office on staffing and other management issues. In general, this relationship functions well, with the exception of domestic Civil Service hiring. The Afghanistan desk, for example, spent months attempting to hire office management assistants and waiting to have other positions reclassified and advertised. The process has been time consuming and, so far, unsuccessful, which has weakened the desk's ability to support S/SRAP. The transition coordinator and the EX staff involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to meet regularly with the Iraq EX team as issues or questions arise. They also plan to adapt a specialized software program, used by the Iraq team to manage staffing and planning, for the Afghanistan transition.

Human Resources Division

Domestic Services

S/SRAP receives domestic human resources support from the Executive Secretariat Executive Office and the NEA-SCA/EX. The human resources office in the Executive Secretariat Executive Office supports most direct-hire positions, and at times, activity is intense. EX provides support for the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks. As noted above, PASO and the 3161 Personnel Office support temporary employees hired under a program to strengthen governments in Pakistan and Afghanistan; this office is discussed in an earlier section of this report.

The EX human resources provider's services are problematic. Often the service provider is unresponsive, and S/SRAP sometimes faces a lengthy hiring process in order to staff the desks. This topic and a recommendation to restructure domestic human resources services in EX are found in the concurrent SCA inspection report.

Foreign Service Assignments

The Foreign Service assignments process in EX generally works well. Two assignments officers handle staffing for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other members of the EX assignments office also assist as needed.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan are the Department's number one staffing priority. To further this goal, the Department now has two assignment seasons: June of each year for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, and early fall for all other positions. This procedure, which allows the three priority missions to choose their candidates before the regular bidding season begins, has meant that a large percentage of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan positions are filled within a few months. By mid-March 2011, the bureau had filled 92 percent of the summer 2011 Afghanistan positions, 91 percent of the Iraq positions, and 95 percent of the Pakistan positions.

In an attempt to improve continuity, Embassies Kabul and Islamabad have proposed that the tours of duty for those countries be increased from 1 year to 18 months or 2 years. Opinions regarding longer tours were mixed. While this change would provide better continuity than the 1-year tours, many human resources staff were concerned that this change might reduce the number of volunteers. Some suggested that front office, section chief, principal officer, and certain other key positions be changed to 2-year tours, while all other tours remain at 1 year. Embassies Kabul and Islamabad already encourage section chiefs and principal officers to serve 2 years, and they have enjoyed some success. All three posts (including Iraq) have substantial service recognition packages, a 15 percent incentive pay bonus for extending for a second year, and a policy of no-fault curtailment. The Department also recently implemented continuity tours, in which employees spend 1 year in a mission in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan and 1 year in a related position outside of those three countries. (See Strategic Communication, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy section, above, for related discussion and an informal recommendation.)

Post Management Officers

The post management officers provide management liaison between overseas missions and Department bureaus and offices. Six post management officers and two assistants provide support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition to the usual responsibilities, the Pakistan and Afghanistan post management officers interact with other U.S. Government agencies on management related matters. Overseas staff generally expressed satisfaction with the service they provide.

General Services

General services are provided well overall. S/SRAP receives general services support from the Executive Secretariat Executive Office and the bureaus' EX. At times, demands for travel support from the Executive Secretariat Executive Office are intense and include coordinating travel using a variety of means, including military aircraft. S/SRAP uses the two executive offices effectively. There is no need for coordination between them, and no overlap in services provided.

Orientation and In-Processing Center

S/SRAP has a stake in the Orientation and In-Processing Center, which assists all U.S. Government employees and contractors under chief of mission authority who are deploying to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. The director, deputy director, and program assistant are direct-hires under 3161 authority. The remaining 11 are contract employees. In addition to handling in-processing, the center provides off-shore support to reduce the administrative footprint at these high-threat posts. It performs its mission well.

Information Services Division

The NEA-SCA/EX technology team provides support only to the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks. Customers experience frequent system outages and are reluctant to let go of EX's dynamic support team, since they are dissatisfied with the IRM Information Technology Service Center's slow response. Previous OIG inspection reports have raised issues with regard to IRM's service, communication, and technicians' skills.¹¹ However, these problems cannot be attributed solely to the IRM information technology consolidation program; typically, they also involve the Department's antiquated infrastructure, which may take years to resolve.

Customer Service and Support

Employees in S/SRAP frequently stay late at work, only to lose their work to SBU computer system crashes. The classified network is no different and, in some offices, even worse. (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

At first glance, it may seem easy to blame the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, IRM, the Office of Facilities Management Services, or EX for system and service deficiencies – but the true culprit is the Department infrastructure itself. (b) (5)

[REDACTED]

To compound the problem, office moves, which often occur with little notification to IRM or EX's information technology section, affect the equipment, network, and ultimately, the customers. In some cases, an office renovation can affect employees in nearby offices.

¹¹ Evaluation of the Information Technology Consolidation Project at the Department of State, Report Number AUD/IT-10-11, January 2010.

Renovation and technical projects are abundant throughout the building, and will take years to sort out and fix. In order to manage the multitude of issues affecting customers, different sections of IRM and the Office of Facilities Management Services should meet weekly to sort through the problems, determine responsibility, and resolve them. Relations are good between the teams, and with the help of the IRM Liaison Division, they are trying to resolve the many problems.

Recommendation 15: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should direct the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Bureau of South Central Asian Affairs Executive Office to meet weekly with its Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Office of Facilities Management Services counterparts to address customers' issues. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with NEA-SCA/EX, IRM, and A/OPR)

Management Controls

S/SRAP has not reviewed its system of management controls, as required by 2 FAM 022.7(2), nor has it submitted an annual management controls statement of assurance as required by 2 FAM 024 d. As a result, the organization does not have added assurance that its operations are in compliance with Department regulations and free from waste, fraud, and abuse.

Recommendation 16: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should evaluate its system of management controls, and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should submit an annual management controls statement of assurance for the year ended July 31, 2010. (Action: S/SRAP)

Performance Management

Timeliness and completion of Civil Service performance evaluations and work commitments has been a problem for S/SRAP. Some Civil Service employees complained, and the human resources service provider confirmed, that S/SRAP and desk leaders did not show enough concern about fulfilling this important function and did not meet reporting requirements for unreported and late Civil Service performance evaluations (3 FAH-1 H-2825.4).

Although SCA is responsible for ensuring that the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks complete required performance evaluations, that bureau is not currently in the Afghanistan and Pakistan office directors' chain of command. However, this is an issue throughout S/SRAP. The performance evaluation function is important for employee morale and for administering an effective personnel system. The OIG counseled managers regarding this issue.

Recommendation 17: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should submit a delinquent raters list, identifying both delinquent raters and Civil Service employees whose performance evaluation reports are late or were not prepared. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA)

Recommendation 18: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should institute and enforce a

policy, with sanctions, that supervisors complete overdue employee evaluations according to the timetable set by the Bureau of Human Resources. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA)

Extensions and Performance Management for Temporary Employees


S/SRAP uses a number of 3161 employees. The 3161 Personnel Office does not have a uniform policy for managing requests for extensions of 3161 employees. Not having such a policy leaves employees uncertain about their eligibility to extend and confuses supervisors who need to decide whether to support a request for extension. In a concurrent report on the OIG inspection of SCA, inspectors made a recommendation that SCA publish a policy on extension requests, which will address this problem.

The 3161 Personnel Office also does not have an adequate system of performance management or reference for future employment of these employees. Given that the Department may need such employees in the future, the 3161 Personnel Office should maintain files on past 3161 hires, to develop a rapid reaction cadre of staff with a proven record of good performance. Currently, the vetting system is informal, and recommendations for 3161 employees take place by word of mouth, rather than through a more formal system with adequate documentation. In a concurrent report on the OIG inspection of SCA, inspectors made a recommendation that SCA develop a rating system for 3161 employees, which will address this problem.

Security Program

The security program within S/SRAP was at the cusp of change during this OIG inspection. The first Special Representative did not emphasize security, but the program is being revamped. The new leadership emphasizes the importance of good security practice, and working-level officers are changing their attitudes in personal security duties and responsibilities. To assist in the transformation, the NEA-SCA security officer, a Bureau of Diplomatic Security special agent, is being augmented by one individual from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Programs Applications Division.

(b) (5)



List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should designate a staff member to serve as the point of contact for State Department strategic planning exercises, including the Mission and Bureau Strategic and Resource Plans. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 2: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop a formal process whereby each mission receives an appropriately cleared review of its Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, approved by the senior deputy. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 3: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should increase sharing of information about and expand invitations to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs so that the bureau participates regularly in programs and activities organized by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA)

Recommendation 4: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and the Bureau of Human Resources, should restructure the staffing pattern of the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to reflect actual duties and lines of authority. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and DGHR)

Recommendation 5: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Information Resource Management and the Executive Secretariat, should migrate all its users to a single domain. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA, IRM, and S/ES)

Recommendation 6: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs, should discontinue having the Iraq Policy and Operations Group send it media alerts. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and NEA)

Recommendation 7: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs, should discontinue having the Iraq Policy and Operations Group send it cable alerts and summaries and instead request the group to assist it in making cable profiles for its staff more efficient. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA and NEA)

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should contact new users approximately 1 month after establishing their State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolbox inbox profiles, to determine whether those profiles are appropriate and useful; make necessary adjustments to the profiles; and provide follow-up user guidance. (Action: IRM, in coordination with S/SRAP)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should assign Iraq Policy and Operations Group analysts to appropriate supervisors in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and/or Pakistan offices. (Action: NEA, in coordination with SCA and S/SRAP)

Recommendation 10: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should prepare, clear, and send new instructions for the formulation and distribution of reporting that includes priorities and the needs of all Washington end users. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 11: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop a process to review and consolidate the efforts of the embassies' monitoring and evaluation efforts, in order to assess overall sectoral, national, and regional outcomes of assistance programs. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 12: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should develop and implement a plan to recruit detailees or excepted Civil Service employees and place them in Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad press offices to serve as full-time, dedicated public spokespersons; these individuals must be U.S. citizens who are proficient in the local language(s) and have press officer training or experience. (Action: S/SRAP)

Recommendation 13: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Foreign Service Institute, should provide career public diplomacy officers with the training they need to communicate proficiently in the designated local languages, so they can engage with the Afghan and Pakistani local language media at any time and in any place. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with DGHR and FSI)

Recommendation 14: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of International Information Programs, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad, should examine the feasibility of developing a speakers bureau of experts who are proficient in Urdu, Pashto, or Dari, who can be detailed from their regular jobs to assist with outreach and engagement strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This speakers bureau should include whole-of-government agencies, as well as American citizens who do not work in government and who are fluent speakers of Urdu, Pashto, or Dari to participate in public outreach and other mission-sponsored public diplomacy activities. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with IIP, and Embassies Kabul and Islamabad)

Recommendation 15: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should direct the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Bureau of South Central Asian Affairs Executive Office to meet weekly with its Bureau of Information Resource Management and the Office of Facilities Management Services counterparts to address customers' issues. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with NEA-SCA/EX, IRM, and A/OPR)

Recommendation 16: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should evaluate its system of management controls, and the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should submit an annual management controls statement of assurance for the year ended July 31, 2010. (Action: S/SRAP)

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Recommendation 18: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should institute and enforce a policy, with sanctions, that supervisors complete overdue employee evaluations according to the timetable set by the Bureau of Human Resources. (Action: S/SRAP, in coordination with SCA)

Informal Recommendations

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should set up a special assistant and staff aide component to manage the flow and quality of the office's correspondence.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should review its need for the daily presence of interagency representatives who are currently in the office and reaffirm with their respective agencies the need for the representatives' presence going forward.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should continue efforts to better integrate the Afghanistan and Pakistan desks into the activities of the office.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should address internal communications issues by establishing clear guidelines on information sharing, making senior officials' daily calendars more accessible within the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and building a schedule of office-wide and smaller meetings to facilitate information sharing across the organization.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should designate and announce an acting special representative when the Special Representative is away.

Informal Recommendation 6: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should establish an orientation program for new staff.

Informal Recommendation 7: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should establish a mechanism to monitor progress in fulfilling requirements for preparation of Civil Service and Foreign Service evaluations and meeting deadlines set by the Bureau of Human Resources.

Informal Recommendation 8: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should clarify the internal reporting chains and responsibilities of the deputies.

Informal Recommendation 9: The Offices of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs should provide orientation packages to all new arrivals, keep all orientation materials up-to-date, and coordinate their orientation program with more general orientations offered at the Department or bureau level.

Informal Recommendation 10: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should require all personnel assigned to policy positions to take Washington Tradecraft training at the Foreign Service Institute within 4 months of beginning their assignments.

Informal Recommendation 11: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should return a copy of the final version of all papers to the drafting office to help clarify expectations and reduce duplicated efforts.

Informal Recommendation 12: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should assign drafting responsibilities to those responsible for the papers' substance.

Informal Recommendation 13: The Office of Afghanistan Affairs should redistribute office workloads to eliminate public affairs responsibilities and request this support from the Office of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy instead.

Informal Recommendation 14: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should institute the same overlap rule that applies to service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan for the Pakistan and Afghanistan desks.

Informal Recommendation 15: The Office of Pakistan Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, should review economic staffing, with a view to either clarifying roles and thus strengthening the team or disbanding the subunit.

Informal Recommendation 16: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should formally designate one of the deputies as being responsible for overall evaluation of the foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Informal Recommendation 17: The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan should encourage candidates for senior press officer and local language public spokesperson positions at Embassies Kabul and Islamabad to commit to 2-year assignments.

Principal Officials

	<i>Name</i>	<i>Arrival Date</i>
<i>Executive Office</i>		
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan	Marc Grossman	2/2011
Senior Deputy and Deputy Assistant Secretary	Frank Ruggiero	7/2010
Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan	Dan Feldman	8/2009
Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan	Vikram Singh	5/2009
<i>Office Directors</i>		
NEA-SCA/EX	Jay Anania	8/2009
SCA/A	Jim De Hart	6/2010
SCA/P	Tim Lenderking	6/2010

Acronyms

D&CP	Diplomatic and Consular Programs
EX	Executive Office
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
IRM	Bureau of Information Resource Management
NEA-SCA/EX	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Bureau of South Central Asian Affairs Executive Office
PASO	Pakistan and Afghanistan Support Office
POEMS	Principal Officers Executive Management System
S/SRAP	Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
SCA	Bureau for South and Central Asian Affairs
SCA/PPD	Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
SCI	Sensitive compartmented information
TSWA	Temporary secure working area
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

Appendix I: Summary of Foreign Assistance Funding Allocation

FY 2010 Department, USAID, and Department of Defense Controlled Foreign Assistance Resources for Afghanistan and Pakistan (in thousands)¹²	<i>Afghanistan & Pakistan</i>
Economic Support Funds	<i>\$4,890,000</i>
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement	<i>790,000</i>
Foreign Military Financing	<i>298,000</i>
Global Health and Child Survival	<i>122,049</i>
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs	<i>79,905</i>
Food For Peace Title II	<i>15,500</i>
International Military Education and Training	<i>6,500</i>
State and USAID Total	<i>6,201,954</i>
Department of Defense	<i>11,672,800</i>
State, USAID, and Department of Defense Total	<i>\$17,874,754</i>

¹²State and USAID numbers were taken from SCA's FY 2012 Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan. Department of Defense numbers were provided by the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance.

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