



United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL OFFICE

Department of State Planning for the
Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq

Performance Evaluation

Report Number MERO-I-11-08, May 2011

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PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY FINDINGS	1
INTRODUCTION	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
Results	5
Recommendations.	7
Management Comments and OIG Response.	8
BACKGROUND.	11
MANAGING THE TRANSITION.	13
Management Structure	13
COMPLETION OF RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS	15
KEY TRANSITION ISSUES	17
Police Training	18
Office of Security Cooperation	19
Provincial Posts	20
Consulate Erbil	21
Security.	22
Air Transportation Operations	23
Medical Care.	24
Facility Requirements	25
CONCLUSION	27
ABBREVIATIONS	29
APPENDIX I: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY.	31
APPENDIX II: ONGOING IRAQ STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OFFICE PROJECTS AS OF FEBRUARY 11, 2011	33
APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS.	35

KEY FINDINGS

The Department of State (Department) and Embassy Baghdad have put in place planning and management mechanisms to effectively transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. However, several key decisions have not been made, some plans cannot be finalized, and progress is slipping in a number of areas. The lack of senior level Department participation dedicated to the transition process, which has been a weakness, may be alleviated by the Secretary of State's appointment of an Iraq Transition Coordinator.

Progress is being made on completion of remaining reconstruction projects and transferring responsibility to the Government of Iraq (GOI). Although there have been delays in completing and transferring some projects, and getting local government or the GOI to assume responsibility for some projects can be challenging, according to Embassy Baghdad, remaining projects will be completed by the summer of 2012.

Establishing a viable diplomatic mission in Iraq without Department of Defense (DOD) support and funding will require considerable resources. However, challenges to transition planning make it difficult to develop firm or detailed budget estimates.

The Department faces many challenges in transitioning to a civilian-led effort in Iraq, including:

- Transfer of police training from DOD to the Department is generally on schedule, but plans for the size and scope of the mission have had to be revised and land use agreements have not been confirmed. Protective security for contractor personnel working for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will be provided by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). INL and DS are working on a protective security plan, which they intend to conclude soon.
- Establishment of an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) is behind schedule, and full mission capability is unlikely by October 2011.
- Construction of four planned provincial posts has been delayed by the inability to decide on scope, size, and land use; and uncertain future funding. In addition to cost, security and safety concerns at the current facilities in Erbil make that location particularly problematic.

- To meet air transportation requirements, the Department will need to procure additional aircraft, obtain agreements on flight plans and land use, construct or renovate air facilities, and maintain aircraft.
- Losses in protective security capability for U.S. Government personnel caused by the military's withdrawal will need to be mitigated through closer working relationships with the GOI, as well as access to DOD security-related information and equipment. In addition, there are still weaknesses in Iraqi military specialty units.
- Fully staffed medical facilities may not be in place by the end of the year and will be costly to establish and sustain. (b)(2)(b)(5) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Embassy housing is nearing full capacity, and it may be difficult to absorb the expected influx of personnel. In addition, necessary generator maintenance will decrease available electric power at the same time as demand increases.

INTRODUCTION

By October 1, 2011, the Department will assume full responsibility for the U.S. presence in Iraq, as DOD withdraws its remaining 50,000 troops by December 2011, according to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.¹ This withdrawal will require the Department to provide security, life support, transportation, and other logistical support currently provided by the U.S. military in Baghdad, at consulates in Basra and Erbil, at embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul, and at other sites throughout Iraq.

The transition from a military to a civilian-led mission in Iraq is an unprecedented undertaking, highly complex in nature and scope, with extensive requirements for staff, budgets, and organization—all taking place in an operating environment that is still violent and unpredictable. Mortar and rocket attacks on the embassy compound, roadside bombings, and insurgent attacks against GOI facilities and officials remain common. Under these conditions, planning and coordination are essential to ensure a smooth and successful turnover and assumption of responsibilities by the Department. Since only months remain until the Department takes full responsibility from DOD, there is a need to act efficiently and effectively. For these reasons, OIG has been monitoring the Department and embassy transition efforts. OIG issued a report in August 2009 covering an evaluation undertaken from December 2008 to June 2009.² OIG's evaluation covers the period from August 2010 to February 2011, and the report underscores the consensus of the foreign affairs accountability community, including the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and U.S. Government Accountability Office on the issues facing the Department. Further, the OIG report identifies other key concerns requiring attention.

OIG's Middle East Regional Office (MERO) initiated this work under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, to evaluate Embassy Baghdad and Department plans and activities associated with U.S. military downsizing in Iraq. The objectives of this review were to determine: (1) planning and coordination mechanisms in place at Embassy Baghdad and in Washington, DC; (2) the status of transitioning construction and infrastructure development projects to the Government of Iraq; and (3) key transition issues and operational challenges. OIG

¹ *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, November 17, 2008.

² See *Performance Evaluation of Embassy Baghdad's Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq*, MERO-A-09-10, August 2009. See also *Report of Inspection, Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq*, ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010.

began its work in August 2010 and subsequently met with senior officials involved in transition management in Washington, DC and Iraq. In addition, OIG examined Department program and planning documents and met with operational level officials at the embassy and at provincial posts in Erbil and Kirkuk.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RESULTS

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have mechanisms to effectively plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, but several key decisions remain unresolved, some plans cannot be finalized, and progress in a number of areas is slipping. The current process has improved since OIG's report of August 2009 which identified several planning weaknesses. The Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group, with members from Baghdad and Washington, DC, has been established. In addition, the embassy has established a Transition Cell to manage its transition effort in Iraq. However, the lack of timely decisions on key issues, which stems from a lack of senior level participation in the process, has hampered the effort. OIG notes that the Secretary of State recently appointed an Iraq Transition Coordinator who will be responsible for all Department aspects of the U.S. transition.

The embassy has been moving forward with completion of remaining reconstruction projects and transferring responsibility to local and provincial governments and the GOI. Project completion and transfer will continue beyond the spring of 2011 when the embassy's Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) is set to close. When the office closes, ISPO consultant staff under the embassy's economic section will continue to work on remaining projects, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers managing the technical aspects. Delays in completing and transferring projects have been attributed to the problematic security environment and poor contractor performance. In addition, it has been challenging getting local and provincial governments and the GOI to readily assume responsibility for some reconstruction projects. Despite these challenges, as of March 2011, 83 Department projects are underway, and to date, 5,405 U.S. Government projects, valued at \$15.2 billion, have been transferred to the GOI. Project completion is expected by the summer of 2012.

Establishing a viable diplomatic mission in Iraq without the considerable support and resources of DOD will almost certainly require years of effort and the investment of significant resources. However, difficulties in making final decisions and completing plans have hindered the ability to derive firm, detailed budget figures for completing the transition and sustaining operations. The administration requested \$2.7 billion for Iraq in FY 2011 and has requested \$6.3 billion in FY 2012.

The training of police is critical to long-term stability in Iraq. Transfer of police training from DOD to the Department is generally on schedule, with many required actions undertaken or completed. According to INL representatives, a lack of clarity

on funding levels and delays in appropriations have led to review and revision of program scope. INL noted that it is working with the GOI to identify specific training needs for police in various locations. Further, the inability to finalize land use agreements has prevented the start of construction at training sites, and the lack of resolution on land use makes meeting the transition timeline more difficult. DS will be responsible for providing protective security for INL contractor personnel involved in training. INL is working with DS on a protective security plan for these personnel, which it intends to conclude soon.

The OSC is expected to manage the defense relationship between the U.S. Government and the GOI. Establishment of the OSC, however, is behind schedule, and full mission capability is unlikely by October 2011. The schedule has been affected by the inability to decide on the OSC's size or its locations throughout Iraq. Because it is a DOD organization, the OSC will be funded by DOD, but the embassy will be responsible for providing operational support. Officials from the embassy and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) disagree on the level of this support, including provision of office space and logistics.

It is unlikely that four planned provincial posts will be fully established by the end of 2011. Delays in forming a new national government and the inability to obtain land use and lease agreements with the GOI have delayed Department decisions on the size and scope of each post. Uncertain future funding has prevented moving forward with planned construction. The embassy plans to construct temporary facilities by upgrading three provincial reconstruction team (PRT) structures and the regional reconstruction team (RRT) facilities in Erbil. Locating a future consulate in Erbil will be costly, and the security and building safety of the current facilities are problematic. Colocating a temporary consulate at a contingency operations site (COS) near the Erbil airport, which has existing DOD infrastructure, may be a viable alternative.

(b)(2)(b)(5)



The Department faces challenges in expanding and sustaining air operations, including air transportation for chief of mission personnel in and out of Iraq, as well as within the country; quick reaction force movement; search and rescue; and route reconnaissance and convoy escort. To support these air operations, the Department must procure more aircraft, obtain agreements on flight plans with the GOI and other governments and agreements on land use with the GOI, construct or renovate air facilities, and provide aircraft maintenance and refueling.

Embassy Baghdad plans to establish contractor-supported medical facilities to provide comprehensive medical care for U.S. Government personnel. Because of the complexity and considerable cost of construction, staffing, and logistics, there is a risk the embassy will not have a fully operational medical system prior to the military's departure at the end of the year.

Embassy Baghdad is nearing its full housing capacity with nearly 4,000 beds, but will need to accommodate an influx of civilian personnel, which is currently planned to increase to around 8,000 by the end of 2011. The embassy is negotiating with the GOI to obtain more property currently occupied by the U.S. military, but there are no contingency plans if these property leases are delayed or denied. Further, OIG finds NEA's proposed accommodation solutions neither optimal nor sustainable in the long term. In addition, the electric power generation system is already operating at full capacity using all generators full time. These generators will have to undergo maintenance sooner than planned, which will decrease the amount of electricity when demand is increasing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: OIG recommends that Embassy Baghdad, in consultation with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Resource Management, finalize program and operational planning to develop detailed cost estimates for: (1) completing the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq, including construction and procurements; and (2) future funding requirements to sustain programs and operations, including police training, the Office of Security Cooperation, provincial posts, security, air transportation operations, medical care, and facility requirements. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in consultation with NEA and RM)

RECOMMENDATION 2: OIG recommends that Embassy Baghdad evaluate collocating the planned temporary consulate in Erbil at the contingency operations site near the Erbil airport, with Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' police training and air wing operations, until a permanent consulate is constructed. This collocation could result in an estimated \$12.2 million in cost savings for facilities improvements and undetermined savings for duplication and life support. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)

RECOMMENDATION 3: (b)(2)(b)(5)

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE

Embassy Baghdad, DS, the Bureau of Resource Management (RM), and INL provided technical comments on a draft of this report. INL also provided formal written comments, which are included verbatim in Appendix III. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and NEA did not provide comments. Embassy Baghdad noted its appreciation for OIG's report, and further indicated that it constructively highlights important transition-related issues. The embassy, DS, INL, and RM generally concurred with the findings in the report and OIG's recommendations. In response to technical comments from all four entities, OIG has adjusted the text as necessary and appropriate.

In its formal comments, INL stated it made timely decisions on the size and scope of the police training program in Iraq, but planning efforts were hindered and plans had to be revised based on "a lack of clarity on funding levels and delays in congressional appropriations." OIG accepts that uncertain funding levels present challenges to planning. However, since the training program is critical to the U.S. Government strategy for a successful transition, INL should progress with plans based on needs, which would enable the bureau to better advocate for the police training that Iraq requires. In comments on Recommendation 1 in the draft report, INL noted that requirements and cost estimates are continually evolving and are thus difficult to finalize. In response, OIG has adjusted Recommendation 1 by recommending that Embassy Baghdad, in consultation with NEA and RM, finalize program and operational plans so that detailed cost estimates can be developed. In comments on Recommendation 2, INL questioned the utility of moving consulate operations to the COS in Erbil. As a result of its site visit and further examination, the OIG team determined that there are potential cost savings, and therefore, moving temporary consulate operations to the COS should be evaluated by Embassy Baghdad. OIG

maintains the value of examining this option for potential cost savings and efficiencies, and encourages INL to consult with the embassy during its evaluation to ensure its concerns are taken into account.

BACKGROUND

The 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement required the U.S. military to withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and all U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011. The U.S. military successfully withdrew from Iraqi cities in June 2009, transitioning responsibility for security to the GOI. The U.S. military is now transitioning full responsibility for security across Iraq to the GOI and will transfer overall responsibility for the U.S. presence to Embassy Baghdad by October 2011.

This transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq is an enormous undertaking, involving multiple departments and agencies in Washington, DC and Baghdad. The changing U.S. military footprint in Iraq will also have profound impact on Embassy Baghdad activities, operations, and personnel. In its August 2009 report, OIG pointed out that the departure of the U.S. military raised a number of key issues for the Department that needed to be resolved, including protection for the embassy compound and convoy security for goods supplying the embassy; the completion and transfer of reconstruction and infrastructure projects to the GOI; the embassy's reliance on the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) for food service, fuel, vehicle maintenance, transportation, and convoy support; air transport for chief of mission personnel in and out of Iraq; and the continuation of a U.S. civilian presence in the provinces.

The ability of the Department to resolve many transition-related issues is contingent on an active partnership with the GOI. Agreements and plans are already in place to help guide this partnership. The 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement³ provides a blueprint for the U.S. Government's overall efforts in Iraq. The embassy and U.S. Forces-Iraq's 2010 *Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq* guides the Department's strategy, and the embassy's *FY 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan* articulates transition-related goals and targets. However, the inconclusive results of national parliamentary elections in March 2010 hindered the relationship with the GOI. After the elections, it took 9 months to form a new government. According to embassy officials, during this time, decision-making by the GOI slowed or stopped entirely, resulting in a backlog of initial decisions that affected many operational level transition issues.

Embassy Baghdad receives operational support funding from NEA and RM. According to bureau and embassy budget officials, identifying costs associated with the U.S. military drawdown is an ongoing process and costs are identified as requirements arise. Representatives from RM noted that the bureau is continuing

³ *Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq*, November 17, 2008.

to consult with NEA, DS, and OBO to refine projected costs, taking into account evolving requirements, contract awards, and equipment being provided by DOD. In response to a congressional inquiry, the Department stated that the current average monthly obligation rate for the embassy and PRTs is approximately \$120 million. As the transition of DOD-supported activities to the Department accelerates in 2011, average monthly obligations will grow by \$275 million, peaking at approximately \$395 million per month around mid-2011 before dropping to lower obligation rates by the end of the year. Further, in FY 2011, like all Federal agencies, the Department is operating under a continuing budget resolution, and is being funded at the FY 2010 level. Because in FY 2010, the transition was mainly funded through a supplemental appropriation that is not included in the continuing resolution, the amount of funding currently available for the transition is substantially less than the embassy estimated it needed in FY 2011.

MANAGING THE TRANSITION

The Department and Embassy Baghdad have effective planning and coordination mechanisms to manage the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq,⁴ but several key decisions remain unresolved, some plans cannot be finalized, and progress in a number of areas is slipping. For example, during the course of OIG's review the estimated number of personnel to be assigned to INL's planned police training program and DOD's planned OSC presence continually changed. (These two programs and other ongoing transition issues are discussed in greater detail later in this report.) As a result, the embassy cannot finalize plans; and the actions needed to construct facilities and provide for life support, security, and other logistical requirements are stalled. In addition, key high-level decisions in Washington have been delayed, wasting scarce embassy time and effort. According to embassy officials, numerous staff and hundreds of hours were devoted to developing an alternative to the LOGCAP contract for provision of housing, food services, and other life support. After months, it was decided the embassy could continue to use LOGCAP under a shared cost arrangement with DOD.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE


The key mechanism for managing the transition is the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group composed of individuals from offices in Baghdad and Washington, DC. Based upon a review of planning and reporting documents and numerous interviews with sub-working group officials, the OIG team concluded the Working Group is addressing most of the 310 activities the embassy will assume of the more than 1,000 tasks the U.S. military had been performing.⁵ In addition to the Working Group, the embassy's management section maintains a Transition Cell directed by a deputy counselor who is dedicated full-time to managing the embassy's transition efforts. The Transition Cell is composed of 13 sub-working groups and covers all major areas of the transition—provincial affairs, police training, security, and administrative and support initiatives. The Transition Cell is identifying potential problems in the transition work flow process and developing multiple plans based on changing requirements (for example, the recent

⁴ The current transition planning and management process has significantly improved since 2009 when OIG reported the embassy did not have a unified transition plan, but only statements in its Mission Strategic Plan related to reducing reliance on military assets for security augmentation, communications, and logistical support. There was no single entity responsible for overall direction and coordination of embassy transition planning, and planning was being conducted at the operational level without senior level input.

⁵ These tasks are detailed in the 2010 *Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq*, a strategic document composed and approved by top Department and DOD officials in Iraq. The plan includes short-term and longer term objectives in four specific areas—political, security, economic and energy, and rule-of-law—and is updated periodically to reflect changes in the environment in Iraq.

decision to decrease the number of embassy branch offices from three to two). Figure 1 shows the management structure and functional transition areas of responsibility for the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group.

Figure 1: Organization Chart for Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group



Source: OIG analysis of Department and Embassy Baghdad data

According to knowledgeable operational level Department and embassy officials, the inability to obtain timely decisions on key transition issues is undermining the transition effort. These officials report that the problem stems from the lack of senior level Department and DOD officials in Washington dedicated to the Iraq transition process, which hinders quick resolution of outstanding issues. The need for senior level participation in the transition process has also been cited in a recent congressional report⁶ and by an OIG Office of Inspections report.⁷ These reports recommended that a senior level coordinator be appointed to ensure a unified effort. The congressional report noted that the coordinator would serve as the principle interlocutor with DOD on transition issues. The OIG report noted that many in Washington, DC are involved in the transition, but no one appears to have the lead. A high level, full-time coordinator with a dedicated staff would be better placed to push through decisions and oversee the more detailed planning needed for the new mission in Iraq. OIG notes that on February 14, 2011, the Secretary of State announced the appointment of an Ambassador with experience in Iraq to serve as the Iraq Transition Coordinator. The coordinator will be responsible for all Department aspects of the U.S. transition from military to civilian operations in Iraq.

⁶ *Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort, A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, January 31, 2011.*

⁷ *Report of Inspection, Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010.*

COMPLETION OF RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Embassy Baghdad's ISPO is making progress completing the last remaining reconstruction projects, including large infrastructure projects, and transferring responsibility to local and provincial governments and the GOI.⁸ ISPO is scheduled to close in spring of 2011 but, according to officials from the office, all projects will be completed by remaining staff. The office is currently composed of eight U.S. Government direct-hire Department employees, two contractors, and two U.S. military staff members. Plans call for drawing down to five staff members and transferring administrative responsibilities to the embassy's economic section in the summer of 2011, and for final staff members to depart Iraq by the summer of 2012. Consultants from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will continue to provide field oversight and executive supervision for completing the ongoing reconstruction projects.

Embassy officials cited the difficult security environment and poor contractor performance as the major hindrances to project completion. In addition, embassy officials noted the challenge of getting local and provincial governments and GOI ministries to readily assume responsibility for some transferred projects. Despite these challenges, embassy officials noted that, to date, they have been able to transfer 5,405 projects valued at \$15.2 billion to local and provincial governments or GOI ministries. Current projections call for completing and transferring the final, remaining 83 projects between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. See Appendix II for information on IPSO reconstruction projects and funding.

⁸ Reconstruction projects are supported by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (\$21 billion) and Economic Support Funds (\$1 billion).

KEY TRANSITION ISSUES

The Department's current plan for Iraq calls for approximately 17,000 personnel under chief of mission authority at 15 sites throughout the country. The goal is to have political, economic, and security personnel throughout the country, especially in key areas, such as Mosul and Kirkuk, to engage daily with their Iraqi counterparts, help defuse crises, and develop long-term solutions to problems. This ambitious diplomatic plan is constrained by competing budget priorities and pressures to restrict overall federal spending. Congressional leaders are questioning the size, scope, structure, and cost of the U.S. Government's diplomatic presence, as well as whether this level of effort is required.⁹ Further, because plans have not been finalized, it has been difficult to develop firm, detailed budget figures including figures for construction, security, and life support. In congressional testimony, the Ambassador estimated construction costs in the order of \$1 billion dollars over several fiscal years and operating costs up to many hundreds of millions of dollars, largely for security and life support. According to some estimates obtained by OIG, it may cost \$350 million to establish each consulate and embassy branch office and \$150-\$200 million in annual operating costs.¹⁰ Figure 2 shows the location of future consulates, proposed OSC sites, future embassy branch offices, police development sites, and air hubs.

Figure 2: Location of Future Consulates, Proposed Office of Security Cooperation Sites, Future Embassy Branch Offices, Police Development Sites, and Air Hubs



Source: OIG analysis of Department data

⁹ Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the transition to a civilian mission in Iraq, February 1, 2011.

¹⁰ As a point of reference, in August 2009, OIG reported that the Department spent more than \$75 million annually and employed as many as 700 people to secure, operate, and maintain a regional embassy office in Hillah (Babil Province) with a ratio of nearly four life support and personal security contractors to each U.S. Government staff member.

Each multi-faceted aspect of the transition from a military mission to a civilian-led effort faces many different challenges. The Department will need to continue managing the U.S. Government's security relationship with the GOI by training and building the capacity of Iraqi police and the military. In addition, to support expansion of a U.S. diplomatic presence, the Department has identified a need to construct, staff, and support operation of provincial posts. An increasing number of personnel under chief of mission authority, as well as contractors, at both the embassy and provincial posts will require life support services, personal security, reliable air transportation, and adequate medical care. For provision of these services, contracts will need to be solicited and contractors selected. Further, the Department must rely on other partners, such as the GOI, to finalize land use agreements for police training facilities, provincial posts, and aircraft operations. The Department is also dependent on DOD to provide security-related information, equipment, and systems, as well as excess medical equipment. Finally, increases in personnel will strain the embassy's ability to provide adequate housing and electric power.

POLICE TRAINING

The Department is generally on pace to assume control of Iraqi police training from the U.S. military by October 1, 2011; however, INL has continued to revise the size and scope of its program.¹¹ According to INL officials, these revisions are the result of funding uncertainties. Since 2003, the U.S. Government has spent approximately \$7.3 billion to train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces. In testimony before Congress, the Ambassador stated that helping the Iraqis professionalize their police is absolutely critical to the country's long-term stability. U.S. military-provided police training has focused on basic policing skills. Currently, the U.S. military manages more than 370 civilian police and customs and border police advisors at more than 130 sites in 18 provinces. The INL-led police development program will focus on higher level mentoring, advising, and training at the ministerial and provincial level, and on specialized training. Recent plans call for approximately 190 subject matter experts based out of three hubs—Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil.¹² These training experts will travel to 28 Iraqi advisory sites focusing on population centers in 10 of 18 provinces.

According to embassy officials, the transfer of U.S. military responsibilities for police training to the Department is generally on schedule. OIG's analysis of key milestones shows the Department, the U.S. military, and the GOI have undertaken or

¹¹ National Security Presidential Directive 36 assigned the mission of organizing, equipping, and training Iraq's security forces, including the police, to the U.S. Central Command until the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed the Department of State should take on that responsibility. *United States Government Operations in Iraq*, May 11, 2004.

¹² An additional 45 Department of Justice personnel funded out of INL's Police Development Program will work on complementary rule-of-law and justice programs.

completed many required actions, such as signing a Department-GOI memorandum of agreement establishing the INL-led program and identifying hub training sites. However, the Department has been unable to confirm final staffing numbers for U.S. Government direct-hire personnel, contractors, or trainers needed for training. In addition, although INL has developed an initial compendium of training materials, the bureau continues to work with the GOI to identify specific training elements for facilities and departments. The GOI's failure to finalize land use agreements with the embassy has prevented INL from starting required construction at the training sites. According to embassy officials, the longer land use remains an unresolved issue with the GOI, the more difficult it will be to meet the transition timeline. According to INL, protective security for its contractor personnel involved in training will be provided by DS. INL and DS are coordinating, but have not concluded, a protective security plan for the police training program.

OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION

The steps needed to establish the OSC to manage the U.S. Government's bilateral defense relationship with the GOI are significantly behind schedule, and the office is unlikely to reach full mission capability by October 2011.¹³ The OSC mission will include advising, training, and equipping Iraqi forces; supporting professional military education; planning joint military exercises; and managing more than \$13 billion worth of foreign military sales programs with the GOI.¹⁴ As of February 2011, decisions had not yet been made on the size of the OSC mission and site locations throughout Iraq. The OIG team reviewed reports that showed planned full-time military and civilian U.S. Government direct-hire staffing levels fluctuating from the low 100s to nearly 1,000. Permanent staff will be augmented by an as yet undetermined number of contractors. Initial planning called for OSC sites in multiple locations across Iraq—in Baghdad, Besmaya, Taji, Tikrit, and Umm Qasr. More recent plans, which take into account expected budget decreases, call for colocating some OSC operations at embassy provincial sites, but no final site decisions have been made.

Although the OSC is a DOD organization, it falls under chief of mission authority, and the embassy is generally responsible for providing operational support. During the course of this evaluation, the OIG team observed a lack of agreement between the embassy and NEA on the level of support for the OSC. Embassy officials told the OIG team they had not been involved in planning discussions

¹³ In OIG's August 2009 report, the embassy noted that OSC would greatly impact the embassy platform in 2011 and beyond. However, the program has not been defined in scope, number of personnel and their deployment to different Iraq sites, the duration of their mission, or their support needs. Therefore, the embassy cannot begin the necessary planning.

¹⁴ According to the Ambassador's February 2011 congressional testimony, there are 336 cases of foreign military sales (valued at \$8 billion) currently planned, and the GOI has requested an additional 61 cases (valued at \$5 billion).

with DOD and were expecting only to assist DOD in acquiring property for future OSC offices. These embassy officials were expecting DOD to plan, fund, build up, and support the OSC sites. NEA officials told the OIG team that, although they expect DOD to provide the necessary funding, the embassy would be responsible for providing office space and logistical support. Office space is of particular importance because the embassy has expressed serious concerns about increasingly cramped office and housing space at Embassy Baghdad.

Finally, according to a congressional report, the Department and DOD have not decided on security standards for OSC sites or provision of funding. Department security standards are more restrictive than DOD requirements and could result in an estimated additional \$750 million in costs. According to this report, the Department may not be able to afford the associated security costs at the OSC sites.¹⁵

PROVINCIAL POSTS

The Department will face significant challenges in seeking to establish four provincial posts—two permanent consulates in Basra and Erbil and two temporary embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul—and it is unlikely that many aspects of the Department's plans for a provincial presence will be completed before the U.S. military's departure at the end of 2011.¹⁶ The GOI's delays in forming a new national government and the inability of the embassy to obtain formal land use and lease agreements for building sites have been primary obstacles. In part, these obstacles have delayed the Department's final decisions on the size and scope of each provincial post. Department and embassy officials told the OIG team that fundamental decisions need to be made on staffing levels, site construction, and logistical and life support operations. These decisions affect many other required actions including: recruitment and training of staff; drawing up of architectural plans and letting of construction contracts; and arranging security for personnel, facilities, and staff movements.

Further, the uncertain funding situation caused by FY 2011 continuing resolutions and the ongoing FY 2012 budgeting process have hindered the embassy in moving forward with planned construction. OBO originally planned to construct permanent consular facilities in Basra and Erbil, but without supplemental appropriations

¹⁵ *Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort, A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, January 31, 2011.*

¹⁶ According to embassy officials, the embassy's FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, and its FY 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan, the mission of the U.S. provincial presence is to mitigate and mediate Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shia, and Baghdad-provincial tensions; strengthen the rule-of-law and the capacity of provincial institutions in key flashpoint locations; balance foreign interference; promote the safe return and resettlement of displaced persons; encourage foreign investment, economic growth, and development; report on strategic trends, events, and causes of Iraqi instability; present American policy and promote mutual understanding and respect for American values; and provide limited services to American citizens.

funding, OBO has changed those plans.¹⁷ The Basra and Erbil permanent consulate construction will now be managed and prioritized under OBO's normal construction planning process. According to embassy officials, completion of the permanent consulates is not expected for up to 5 years. In the interim, embassy plans call for upgrading and retrofitting the PRT structures currently located on U.S. military forward operating bases in Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk and using these bases as provincial posts. Similarly, OBO plans to renovate and use existing structures to house consulate operations in Erbil, where a RRT¹⁸ is located on a makeshift compound of leased houses and buildings.

Consulate Erbil

The situation in Erbil presents unique problems. As OIG reported in August 2009, the Erbil facilities are less than adequate.¹⁹ Offices and living quarters for the RRT are located among local residences and businesses in an enclosed neighborhood. In addition, a May 2009 OBO fire inspector's report on the condition of the main office building concluded it is unsafe due to problems with office layout that would make exit in case of fire problematic, and the electrical wiring is a fire hazard. The location of the RRT Erbil compound in the city is also a serious security concern.

(b)(2)(b)(5)

A possible alternative to the RRT location is the COS, near the Erbil airport, which is currently occupied by the U.S. military. The site is scheduled for use as office space, housing, and life support for INL's police training and all air wing operations. The OIG team visited the COS and concluded there is sufficient space to accommodate consulate operations. Temporarily locating the consulate at the COS until a permanent consulate is constructed would save the Department the cost of providing two perimeter static guard forces and two separate life support systems. In addition, the costs of relocating the consulate to the COS would be offset by an estimated \$10 million OBO would plan to spend renovating RRT Erbil, and \$2.2 million DS estimates it would cost to install security upgrades. Colocating the consulate with INL would also facilitate coordination and information sharing between staffs in this critical region.


¹⁷ The Department originally requested \$527 million in its FY 2010 supplemental budget request to establish permanent consular posts. However, Department officials told OIG that permanent construction funding was not included in FY 2010 supplemental appropriations. The Department now plans to spend \$481 million in Diplomatic and Consular Program funds to retrofit and improve existing structures for interim posts, designed to last 3-5 years, rather than on new construction for permanent posts.

¹⁸ RRT Erbil was established in 2007. The team functions like a PRT, but is called an RRT because it covers the entire Kurdistan Region, comprising the provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah.

¹⁹ *Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009.

SECURITY

A key focus of the Department's transition planning has been preparing for a reduction in U.S. military protective security for U.S. Government personnel in Baghdad and other major cities. Department plans call for deploying more than 7,000 U.S. Government direct-hire regional security office agents, protective services contractors, and third-country perimeter guard force personnel to protect U.S. Government personnel and property throughout Iraq. Although the level of civilian security force protection will increase, Department and U.S. military personnel acknowledge that the overall U.S. security capability will be reduced. For example, according to these officials, conducting frequent secure ground movements in locations outside of Baghdad will be a significant challenge. (b)(2)(b)(5)



The embassy will attempt to mitigate the loss of tactical intelligence by establishing closer working relationships with the GOI. In September 2010, the embassy deployed DS agents to Mosul, Basra, and Kirkuk to liaise with outgoing U.S. military personnel and Iraqi officials. In addition, the Department has formally requested continued access to DOD systems and applications that provide intelligence and operations data. (b)(2)(b)(5)



(b)(2)(b)(5)



²⁰ DOD's biometric database is the comprehensive repository for biometric information collected from detainees, enemy combatants, and other non-U.S. persons of interest in Iraq. This database stores and matches fingerprints, facial images, palm prints, and iris patterns, and prevents unauthorized access at U.S. installations.

In January 2009, the GOI assumed nominal control of the heavily guarded International Zone. Iraqi soldiers are responsible for perimeter security, vehicle and personal searches, and badge clearance at the International Zone's external checkpoints. In OIG's August 2009 report, it was noted that the performance and reliability of these Iraqi forces to protect the embassy and personnel, especially from the real threat of kidnapping, were paramount. According to embassy security officials, the Iraqi military has performed adequately in manning checkpoints for access to the International Zone; however, weaknesses still exist in Iraqi military specialty units. For example, a recent mortar attack resulted in an unexploded mortar shell outside the embassy gate. The Iraqi Army failed to respond, and the U.S. military was called in to locate, disarm, and dispose of the mortar shell. Additionally, embassy security officials stated they cannot rely on intelligence support from the Iraqi Army to monitor security threats to the embassy. Since the U.S. military withdrew from Iraqi cities in June 2009, the embassy has continued to experience indirect fire incidents, which indicates the difficulty Iraqi forces have had monitoring and disrupting security threats to the embassy and its personnel.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS

Currently, the U.S. military provides air transportation for chief of mission personnel into and out of Iraq from Amman, Jordan and Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait, as well as internally throughout Iraq. As the military departs Iraq, it is taking its aircraft which will require the Department to expand its air operations, known as Embassy Air Iraq.²¹ Initially the Department explored chartering aircraft and using commercially available flights as alternatives to military aircraft transportation. However, due to security, logistical, and operational control concerns, the Department decided to expand its own air operations to include all air transportation for chief of mission personnel (both internal and external), quick reaction force movement, search and rescue, medical and casualty evacuation, and route reconnaissance and convoy escort.

As of January 2011, Embassy Air Iraq consisted of 19 aircraft based in Baghdad. The plan is to expand up to as many as 46 aircraft by December 2011, to include:

- 18-20 medium lift S-61 helicopters
- 14-18 light lift UH-1N helicopters
- Three light observation MD-530 helicopters
- Five Dash 8 fixed wing aircraft (50-passenger capacity)

The future quantity and mix of aircraft are under review, in conjunction with pending decisions on the future of the U.S. mission in Iraq and the size and scope of the Department's police training program. The fleet will be based and maintained in

²¹ In September 2009, INL's Office of Aviation put in place a task order to support Iraq aviation requirements. As of January 2011, \$183.3 million had been allocated for general operations and \$10.3 million for construction.

Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil and will service ring routes transporting personnel into and out of Iraq, internally from Baghdad to Basra and Erbil, and to and from helicopter hubs in support of embassy branch offices, police training centers, and OSC sites.

In addition to putting in place an air operation with more than 20 aircraft²² supporting a 7-day-a-week mission load, the embassy is facing a number of other challenges in the months ahead. First, the Department must finalize agreements with the Governments of Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait authorizing Embassy Air Iraq flight plans. Second, the Department needs to finalize land use agreements with the GOI to base aircraft in Basra and Erbil and use landing zones at the hub sites. Third, flight and landing zones, maintenance hangars, operation buildings, and air traffic control towers need to be renovated or constructed. Construction is in the initial stage in Baghdad and is only in the planning stage in Erbil and Basra. According to INL officials, completing these construction tasks by December 2011 will be difficult. Finally, the embassy must develop an independent aviation logistics operation for maintenance and refueling. Maintenance hangars with cranes are not available and Iraqi commercial aviation fuel delivery capability and dependability is poor.

MEDICAL CARE

Embassy Baghdad plans to establish a network of contractor-supported medical facilities to provide comprehensive medical care after the U.S. military's withdrawal. A concept of operations has been developed and excess military medical equipment has been requested from DOD, but the Department is still in the contract solicitation phase. Senior embassy officials told the OIG team there is a risk the embassy will not have a fully mission capable medical operation prior to the military's departure. For example, a contractor needs to be selected; doctors, nurses, and medical technicians identified and deployed; facilities constructed; and a host of logistical operations settled.

The embassy plans to develop its own medical care operations because all but two hospitals (in Erbil) cannot be used due to security concerns or inadequate medical care. Plans call for establishing an undetermined number of medical units to provide on-site primary and initial emergency care for general medical, surgical, orthopedic, gynecologic, and mental health conditions to personnel at embassy sites. There are also plans to set up an undetermined number of diplomatic support hospitals to provide medical/trauma care and overnight bed capabilities. The largest of the diplomatic support hospitals will be located within the U.S.-controlled area at the Baghdad International Airport. This hospital will have the staff and equipment to manage two surgical patients, as well as post-operative/intensive care to stabilize up to six patients until they can be medically evacuated.

²² The Department requested that DOD provide Black Hawk helicopters, but the military declined citing the pressing need for those air assets in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The cost to develop and sustain medical care operations is currently unknown, but according to embassy officials, it will be considerable. Further, based on interviews with embassy management, security, and medical personnel, and review of available planning documents, the (b)(2)(b)(5)

Although embassy medical plans do not currently include the capability for handling a mass casualty event, embassy officials stated that even the U.S. military's current combat support hospital can be overwhelmed by a large number of casualties. The embassy won't have the resources that are currently available at the military's hospital; however, embassy officials stated that they are developing scenarios and will continue to explore possibilities for mitigating the impact of a mass casualty event, such as moving surgeons, employing fixed wing embassy planes, utilizing a civilian air ambulance service, or calling upon possible military resources to transport casualties to advanced trauma care facilities in Amman, Europe, or the Gulf.


FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

Embassy Baghdad's existing stock of housing and beds (3,959) is nearing full capacity.²⁴ With the influx of civilian staff, and the relocation of personnel from U.S. Government locations that are being returned to the GOI on the east end of the International Zone,²⁵ personnel under chief of mission authority is expected to reach approximately 8,000 by the end of 2011. To meet life support requirements for these personnel increases, Embassy Baghdad is negotiating with the GOI to secure new leases on properties across from the embassy compound currently occupied by the U.S. military—forward operating bases Prosperity and Union. According to embassy officials, there are no contingency plans for accommodating the increased staffing levels if leases to the Prosperity and Union properties are delayed or denied. Figure 3 shows U.S. Government facilities in the International Zone.

(b)(2)(b)(5)

²⁵ The GOI has mandated that all properties east of the July 14th bridge corridor occupied by the U.S. Government be vacated by Spring 2011. The relocation will affect the large U.S. Agency for International Development compound and several private protective services contractor compounds.

Figure 3: U.S. Government Facilities in the International Zone in Baghdad, Iraq



- 1) Camp Olympia
- 2) Landing Zone Fernandez
- 3) Forward Operating Base Prosperity
- 4) Forward Operating Base Union
- 5) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- 6) Worldwide Personal Protective Services Camp
- 7) North Wedge housing

Source: OIG analysis of U.S. Government data

NEA officials told the OIG team that creative ways would be found to accommodate and provide life support for more civilian personnel, including “hot bunking” (creating shifts for use of sleeping rooms), adding more containerized housing units, or requiring private contractors to find accommodations off of the embassy compound in nearby neighborhoods. OIG agrees with the embassy that none of these options is optimal or sustainable in the long run.

Further compounding Embassy Baghdad’s space problem is an electric power generation system already operating at full capacity. Existing and planned increases in infrastructure and personnel at the embassy have expanded its power needs to exceed what the power plant was designed to provide. According to embassy facility managers, because the generators are exceeding their intended use, they will have to undergo maintenance sooner than planned, which will decrease the amount of electricity available to support current embassy operations at a time when operations and demand for electricity will be increasing.²⁶

²⁶ According to embassy officials, a power plant serving a U.S. military base in Taji, north of Baghdad, has been identified as a possible additional power source for the embassy. If the plant is successfully purchased, it will need to be dismantled and reassembled, and space will need to be found to set up operations.

CONCLUSION

Events in Iraq are at a critical stage, with less than 7 months remaining until the Department assumes control of a civilian-led mission on October 1, 2011. The U.S. military is on pace to depart Iraq by the end of the year. The U.S. Government is committed to fostering a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq by building capacity and providing training to Iraq's police and military. Plans are proceeding to build a robust diplomatic and assistance platform at 15 sites throughout Iraq, including opening two new consulates and two embassy branch offices. However, although effective planning mechanisms are in place to manage the transition process, some key milestones are not being met, and there is a risk that some programs and operations will not be ready. Some slippage is due to unanticipated events beyond the Department's control, such as securing land use and lease agreements from the GOI and delays in funding decisions and appropriations. Other problems are the result of decision-making delays or the lack of final decisions, such as on the scope of INL's police training mission and the OSC mission. The uncertain budgetary situation is also hampering the transition process. Establishing a viable diplomatic mission to maintain Iraq as a strategic partner will almost certainly require years of effort and the investment of considerable resources. The Department has requested \$6.3 billion in FY 2012 for its programs and activities in Iraq, but recent congressional debate foretells a tightening fiscal situation that may require hard choices in the years ahead. Managing the transition in Iraq is an unprecedented effort as is the Department's transformation into an expeditionary organization working in an overseas contingency operational environment.

ABBREVIATIONS

COS	contingency operations site
Department	Department of State
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
GOI	Government of Iraq
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ISPO	Iraq Strategic Partnership Office
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MERO	Middle East Regional Office
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
RM	Bureau of Resource Management
RRT	regional reconstruction team

APPENDIX I: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

MERO initiated this evaluation in August 2010 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, to evaluate Embassy Baghdad and Department plans and activities associated with U.S. military downsizing in Iraq. The objectives of this review were to determine: (1) planning and coordination mechanisms in place at Embassy Baghdad and in Washington, DC; (2) the status of transitioning construction and infrastructure development projects to the Government of Iraq; and (3) key transition issues and operational challenges.

OIG reviewed embassy program and management planning, implementation, staffing, and budget documents; and the embassy's Mission Strategic Plans and Mission Strategic Resource Plan for FY 2010-2012. OIG examined the Strategic Framework Agreement and the Security Agreement between the U.S. military and the GOI, and held extensive discussions with senior and operational level officials at Embassy Baghdad, including the Ambassador for Management, the Ambassador for Transition, and officials from the management Transition Cell, general services office, regional security office, ISPO, INL, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the embassy medical unit, the Office of Provincial Affairs, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The team also met with the director of the Iraq Support Unit at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan. OIG held extensive discussions with senior and operational level officials in Washington, DC, including the co-chairs of the Iraq Enduring Presence Working Group and officials from the Bureaus of Management, NEA, Political-Military Affairs, DS, INL, and RM. OIG attended Congressional hearings or reviewed testimony, including testimony from the former and current Ambassadors to Iraq, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Under Secretary for Management at the Department, and DOD officials. OIG also reviewed relevant MERO reports, as well as the following: *Report of Inspection, Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq* (ISP-C-11-08A, OIG, Office of Inspections, October 2010); *Special Report on Iraq Transition Planning, Better planning for Defense-to-State transition in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and waste* (Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, July 12, 2010); *Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress* (three reports issued by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 2010, October 2010, and January 2011); *Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight* (GAO-09-294SP, U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 24, 2009); *Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq* (GAO-10-376, U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 19, 2010); *Securing and Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the U.S. Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq* (GAO-10-584R, U.S. Government

Accountability Office, April 22, 2010); and *Iraq: The Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-led Effort, A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, January 31, 2011*.

The OIG team conducted work at Embassy Baghdad and at PRT locations in Erbil and Kirkuk, which are two of the four planned locations for consulates and embassy branch offices. At these sites, the OIG team interviewed directors, management officers, regional security office agents, and PRT leaders and their deputies and staff. The OIG team also obtained and reviewed planning and reporting documents from officials in the field.

OIG conducted this evaluation from August 2010 until February 2011. OIG conducted this evaluation in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* issued in January 2011 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

The report was prepared under the direction of Richard “Nick” Arntson, Assistant Inspector General for MERO. The following staff members conducted the evaluation and/or contributed to this report: Patrick Dickriede, Kelly Herberger, Jennifer L. Manzullo, David R. Miller, Gerald P. Montoya, and J. Addison Ricks.

APPENDIX II: ONGOING IRAQ STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP OFFICE PROJECTS AS OF FEBRUARY 11, 2011

Sector or Other Expenses	Ongoing Projects	Funds Obligated (dollars in millions)
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds		
Building/Education/Health	0	\$0
Electricity	2	77.4
Water	1	3.3
Security and Justice	1	17.9
Transportation/Communication	3	66.3
Grants (non-construction)*	2	8.1
Contracts (non-construction)*	0	0
Subtotal	10	\$173
Economic Support Funds		
Building/Education/Health	32	45
Electricity	12	31.1
Oil	0	0
CD/Operations, Maintenance, Sustainment	6	6.8
Water	16	38.3
Security and Justice	2	0.2
Transportation/Communications	0	0
Grants (non-construction)*	2	0.4
Contracts (non-construction)*	1	2
Infrastructure Security Program Water	0	0
Infrastructure Security Program Oil	0	0
Infrastructure Security Program Electricity	2	8.3
Targeted Development Program	0	0
Subtotal	73	\$132.1
Total	83	\$305.1

*These contracts and grants are for other than “brick and mortar” projects, and include funding for a wide variety of activities such as consultant fees, legal services, public awareness campaigns, and salaries.

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 28, 2011

UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM

TO: OIG – Harold W. Geisel

FROM: INL – William R. Brownfield

SUBJECT: Comments on the Draft Report on Department of State Planning for
the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq

INL appreciates the opportunity to review and provide comments on the draft report on Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq and generally agrees with the draft report. Below, we offer general comments on INL-related issues in the report and, although INL is not the action office, we comment on the potential impact of two recommendations on INL programs if implemented. In addition, the Bureau offers technical corrections to the draft report that are provided as an attachment.

General Comments:

Size and Scope of INL's Police Program. On pages 3, 6, 10, 14 and 22, the report states that the size and scope of INL's police development mission have not been finalized and as a result the embassy cannot finalize its plans (pg. 10). On page 22, the report specifically states:

“Other problems are a result of failure to make timely decisions, such as determining the scope and number of police trainers and the scope of the OSC mission.”

This statement and all other references to this issue throughout the report pertaining to a lack of timely decisions regarding INL's Police Development Program (PDP) are not correct. In fact, the size and scope of the PDP has been determined since August 2009. However, planning efforts have been hindered by a lack of clarity on funding levels and delays in congressional appropriations. As a result, the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, in response to decisions made by the Administration's Deputies Committee in summer 2010 and again in winter 2011, requested that INL refine the overall size and scope of the PDP. This action was done concomitantly with similar policy reviews that revised the overall size and scope of the Embassy's diplomatic presence in Iraq. These actions should not be construed as a "...failure to make timely decisions," as the report suggests. Indeed, as further support requirements, overall costs and anticipated funding levels for the PDP became known, the policy decisions to revise the size and scope of the PDP were made in a timely manner. Once these decisions were implemented, INL closely coordinated any changing ramifications in support requirements – e.g. staffing numbers – with Post and the relevant bureau(s) through the Iraq Transition Working Group and sub-working groups. Moreover, the goals and objectives of the PDP have remained constant and are based on ongoing coordination with our Government of Iraq interlocutors. The PDP will focus on mentoring, advising and training for senior officials who are responsible for leadership and management of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Services.

Training. On pages 6 and 14, the report indicates that the Department has been unable to decide on who will need training or what training is needed. On page 14, the report states:

"However, the Department has been unable to decide on the staffing numbers for U.S. Government direct-hire personnel, contractors, or trainers; who will need training; or what training is needed."

The PDP does have detailed information on the type of training that will be provided, staffing and who will need what training. We continue to work closely with our Iraqi counterparts to identify what specific training elements they seek in each respective facility or department, and we have prepared an initial compendium of training materials covering more than 100 courses.

Protective Security Plan. On pages 3, 6 and 14, the report indicates that the Department has not concluded a protective security plan for personnel involved in the police program. On page 14, it specifically states:

"Protective security for contractor personnel is expected to be provided either under the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) Worldwide Protective Security contracts or a standalone INL-financed security services contract."

However, as of February 2011, DS and INL had not reached a decision and no agreements had been finalized.”

Under Secretary Kennedy determined over a year ago that INL’s PDP will fall under the security responsibility of the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). INL and DS will shortly finalize a Memorandum of Agreement to codify the roles and responsibilities of each bureau in terms of security for the INL programs. However, the exact requirements and security posture continue to evolve in accordance with decisions impacting both the program and security requirements and the changing political and security environment in Iraq. INL and DS work closely together and will continue to do so throughout the life of the program to ensure INL advisors/trainers are provided appropriate security.

Recommendations:

While none of the report’s recommendations are specifically slated for INL action, Recommendations 1 and 2 do have collateral impact on INL’s responsibilities. Our specific comments in this regard are as follows:

Recommendation 1: *OIG recommends that Embassy Baghdad, in consultation with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of Resource Management, develop detailed cost estimates for: (1) completing the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq, including construction and procurements; and (2) future funding requirements to sustain programs and operations, including police training, the Office of Security Cooperation, provincial posts, security, air transportation operations, medical care, and facility requirements. (Action: Embassy Baghdad, in consultation with NEA and RM)*

INL concurs that detailed cost estimates must be established but offers that further definition of requirements, revisions on support costs and the changing environment in Iraq lead to continually evolving estimates. NEA, RM and INL are constantly reviewing and revising cost estimates to ensure the assumptions and estimates are as accurate and up to date as possible.

Recommendation 2: *OIG recommends that Embassy Baghdad evaluate collocating the planned temporary consulate in Erbil at the contingency operations site near the Erbil airport, with Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs’ police training and air wing operations, until a permanent consulate is constructed. This collocation could result in an estimated \$12.2 million in cost savings for facilities improvements and undetermined savings for duplication and life support. (Action: Embassy Baghdad)*

INL understands the recommendation to collocate the consulate at Erbil with INL programs and the air wing at COS Erbil, but does not believe it is a feasible

option at this time. We understand that the decision was made to keep the temporary consulate facilities at Ankawa compound in order to reduce the costs needed to build at COS Erbil. Furthermore, since COS Erbil is not expected to be the final location of the future consulate, there was limited utility in moving the consulate operations now, just to move them again when the consulate was built. Finally, it is possible that the future permanent consulate will not be built and operational before INL's police program departs Erbil. If the temporary consulate operations moved to COS Erbil, the costs to maintain and operate a facility without INL sharing the burden would be far too costly.

If you have any additional questions or concerns, please contact Patricia Yorkman of my staff at (202) 453-8036.

Attachment: As noted.

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