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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Embassy Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia

Report Number ISP-I-10-51A, April 2010

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PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The inspection was concurrent with the inspection of the U.S. Mission to the African Union. A separate, classified, annex to this inspection report contains a description and evaluation of the embassy's security program.

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

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
KEY JUDGMENTS

- Executive direction at Embassy Addis Ababa is good for a front office in prolonged transition, with seven chiefs or acting chiefs of mission, five deputy chiefs of mission (DCM), and several office management specialists since July 2009. This situation reflects, in part, questionable personnel decisions by the previous leadership in the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) that also have impacted negatively on the political/economic section.
- The impending move to a new embassy and the sharp growth in personnel, both full-time and temporary, forces the management section to operate too often in crisis mode.
- Salaries for locally employed staff are effectively declining because of local currency depreciation and high inflation. As a result, the mission has lost many valuable local employees.
- A stellar project director overseeing the construction of a new embassy building has achieved exemplary coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa elements that will occupy it. This will facilitate the moving-in process scheduled for September 2010.
- The information management program, under excellent leadership, stands out for efficiency, technical skill, and customer service—all achieved despite the primitive, user-unfriendly information and telecommunications systems in Ethiopia.
- As Embassy Addis Ababa has become a busy mission with a heavy workload, evident Washington interest, and a strong sense of task, morale has remained good, surprisingly so, given local conditions. Employees work out of a dilapidated embassy in a construction zone, commute in chaotic traffic, fight a fusty bureaucracy to get cars, household effects, and consumables shipments delivered, and go without reliable Internet service at home.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 4 and 20, 2010, and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between February 8 and 26, 2010. (b) (6)
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CONTEXT

Ethiopia is a country of superlatives, some positive, others not. It is by far the oldest nation in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the oldest in the world, with a recorded history dating back thousands of years. Ethiopia also has one of the world's oldest writing systems and an abiding sense of national identity linked in part to its Semitic/Hamitic background and Coptic Christianity.



The second-most populous country in Africa and three-fourths the size of Alaska, Ethiopia is a poor country with an estimated annual per capita income range from \$350 to \$500. The bulk of the population ekes out a living by subsistence farming. Three wars, including civil strife lasting 17 years, three drought-induced famines, and periodic epidemics have killed millions over the past half century. Reflecting this disease and poverty, Ethiopia has a major U.S. program to combat

HIV/AIDS and is year in, year out the largest recipient of U.S. food assistance, annually receiving approximately 800,000 tons of food. While the total U.S. Governmental assistance budget is considerable, it is only \$11 per capita – among the lowest amounts for any country in Africa.

Ethiopia has not always been blessed with good governance. In 1974, a brutal military grouping known as the Derg ousted the aged, ineffectual Emperor Haile Selassie. Thereafter, Colonel Mengistu transformed the country into a totalitarian, Soviet-style dictatorship before leaving the country in turmoil to seek safe haven in Zimbabwe. Since 1994, the far more moderate Prime Minister Meles has ruled over a “revolutionary democracy.” During the run-up to this year’s national elections, his ruling party sharply constricted the political space for opposition by reducing the freedom of the press, regulating nongovernmental organizations, and other measures. Ethiopia has a veneer of stability, but the potential to boil over – at considerable cost to U.S. interests – is high.

Ethiopia's external difficulties mirror its internal problems. It is embroiled in international disputes with its immediate neighbors, chiefly over borders. The civil war in Sudan has delayed efforts to mark this porous boundary. The turmoil in Somalia has amplified an ongoing territorial dispute over the Ogaden region, and the Somali-Ethiopian border remains largely a provisional administrative line rather than a conventional international boundary. Worst of all are relations with Eritrea, a country that was part of Ethiopia for much of history. After a peaceful separation in 1993, a seemingly minor border dispute led to a savage war in 1998 and bitter relations ever since.

Whatever Ethiopia's problems, it is a valuable partner for the United States in working to achieve regional stability and to combat terrorist elements in the Horn of Africa. Information sharing is robust; U.S.-Ethiopian military cooperation is considerable. Reflecting these realities and the long history of friendly bilateral ties, save for the Mengistu period, the United States has a growing diplomatic presence. A new embassy, incorporating all of the various permanent elements of the U.S. mission, except the Peace Corps, into a single compound, will open in late 2010.

At the time of the inspection, the embassy had 106 U.S. direct-hire personnel and over 1,000 local employees. Its budget in FY 2009 was about \$6.7 million. The resource management section below provides more details on personnel and the budget.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

Embassy Addis Ababa's executive direction is good but in prolonged transition, a circumstance dating from the summer of 2009 when a highly successful Ambassador and most other ranking Department officers departed. Gone in short order were the entire front office, including the DCM and two office management specialists, as well as the officers responsible for political/economic, regional security, management, consular, and public affairs – and in some instances their deputies as well. Several entry-level officers found themselves effectively in charge, as all layers above – the unit and section chiefs as well as the Ambassador and DCM – had left. For one ten-day period, which coincided with a cabinet-level visit, a middle-grade officer served simultaneously as chargé d'affaires/acting DCM, political/economic section chief, and acting public affairs officer, information officer, and cultural officer. By all accounts, he performed well.

Since the Ambassador departed in July of 2009, six chargés d'affaires have served at Embassy Addis Ababa. Among these are two retired former ambassadors. One left upon reaching the mandated annual salary cap; the other was present during the OIG team's inspection but slated to leave in about a month. The DCM, who arrived in September 2009, has also served five times as Embassy Addis Ababa's chargé d'affaires. Also briefly at the helm was the incoming political/economic affairs section chief who, along with the new public affairs officer, has been acting DCM.

Office management specialists have left frequently, too. During the OIG team's inspection, the DCM's office management specialist – after just 5 months in Addis Ababa – left for a non-hardship assignment and was replaced by a temporary-duty office management specialist from another embassy. At present, the Ambassador's office management specialist is on loan from the regional security office. Also rotating through the front office was the political/economic section office management specialist, who was reassigned to the U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU) in January 2010.

While transfers are part and parcel of diplomatic service, the Addis Ababa personnel situation appears to be far from the norm. The OIG team believes that Embassy Addis Ababa, with over 1,100 American and local employees, is too large and too important a mission, with too many moving parts, to have a front office in such flux. The complicated portfolio includes regional responsibilities; numerous

Department of Defense elements as well as very sizeable temporary duty military components; and major programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Peace Corps.

The OIG team's detailed review of the background and rationale for these front office personnel shuffles suggests that the transition might have been better managed. The parade of *chargés d'affaires* and acting DCMs, inherently a "value-subtracted" situation given the learning curve for each incumbent, could have been dispensed with and/or shortened – and some \$100,000 in temporary duty costs saved – had the Department simply extended the previous DCM to serve as *chargé d'affaires ad interim*. For reasons of its own, the previous AF leadership declined to do this, despite the outgoing Ambassador's recommendation. Similarly, AF chose not to extend the political/economic chief, the embassy's best source of programmatic continuity.

Despite all of these complications which inevitably retard paper flow and discourage long-term planning, Embassy Addis Ababa is operating quite well. While the Department routinely notes the embassy's importance and has broadened its regional and security mandate, it has not provided adequate management resources. In fact, the current management platform, given the rapid growth of other agencies and the presence of dozens, if not hundreds of Department of Defense employees, is downright stinting – especially given the inefficient current facility, which is akin to a forward military base, and the impending, complicated move to a new embassy on the existing grounds.

The DCM is highly organized and given to detailed advance preparation. His preparations for the OIG's team's visit and resolution of outstanding issues before the team arrived were models of thoroughness. Within the embassy, the DCM favors straightforward command and control mechanisms, including meetings that are crisp, focused, and encourage a sense of team. A nurturer by nature, he has smoothed over some, but not all, of the friction between the political/economic section chief and several other mission elements. The front office has worked skillfully to lessen tensions between USAID and CDC. Overall, interagency and sectional relations are good.

Outside the embassy, the frequent leadership changes have taken a toll. Ethiopian Government officials understandably would welcome more continuity in high-level embassy contacts before committing undue time to building relationships. Office management specialists, new to the job, find it difficult to finesse the Ethiopian bureaucracy. The DCM, however, has effectively worked with the host government

to facilitate the many in-bound shipments related to the construction of the new embassy compound – a high hurdle in that the Government of Ethiopia is extremely bureaucratic and sensitive to implied infringements of its sovereignty.

MISSION STRATEGIC PLANNING

Embassy Addis Ababa has an unusual operating dilemma in terms of policy guidance and planning. The interim front office lacks chief of mission instructions and full authority. It is somewhat underpowered in terms of dealing with other agencies within the mission, including a dozen or so Department of Defense elements, some not entirely under chief of mission authority and/or prone to resist the chargé's authority almost to the point of insubordination. The OIG team was repeatedly told that the mission, at all levels, receives considerable informal communication from a senior official in AF who was previously ambassador in Addis Ababa. At other times, the mission appears to be fashioning policy guidance from public statements or informal emails from individual Washington agencies. Ironically, Embassy Addis Ababa faces the unusual situation wherein it has a quiver of carrots but no sticks as it seeks to rein in a government whose political direction may be putting U.S. strategic interests at risk.

The OIG team's review suggests that the U.S.-Ethiopian relationship could benefit from firmer, clearer guidance from the Department to include suggested "sticks" that could be judiciously applied in private to the regime. The previous administration did not have National Security Council policy coordination committee meetings related to Ethiopia for several years. The September 2009 National Security Council interagency policy committee usefully reviewed the relationship without producing the sort of specific conclusions that would ideally assist the embassy in implementing programs.

Embassy Addis Ababa's 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, drafted in April 2009, is dated, given the recent flurry of Ethiopian Government legislation designed to constrain political space for the opposition. In Soviet terms, the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front appears bent on "rooting the apparatus," i.e., working on more comprehensive control of the bureaucracy. The Government, for example, has hired, trained, and deployed 30,000 community health workers. Every two weeks, they have to spend an evening with Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front functionaries to get their instructions.

However dated, the 2011 strategic planning document brilliantly anticipates the mission's current uncomfortable equipoise between its top two goals – one of which implies U.S. nurturing of the regime and the other which requires the United States to give it bad news without provoking undue offense.

The top priority is to promote regional stability, a goal that benefits greatly from the revolutionary government's cooperation in shutting down avenues of terrorist funding, thus countering terrorism in and emanating from Somalia. Yet, there is a moral and strategic hazard in pursuing this goal when a minority group representing just six percent of the population dominates the ruling party. Moreover, this "revolutionary" party rallies around personalities rather than ideas, thus complicating any U.S. effort to promote democratic reforms. Vestiges of socialist/communist era economic policies retard economic growth, thus inviting instability. The newspapers hark back to Pravda or Rangoon's daily. The best hotels feature layers of vehicle barriers, guards, x-ray machines, metal detectors, and personal searches.

Against this backdrop, the OIG team believes that the 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, and its 2009 and 2010 predecessors, is overly optimistic in terms of what can be achieved in reforming Ethiopia internally. The document also downplays the likelihood that the increase in government repression will undercut the very stability that makes Ethiopia the favored U.S. ally in the otherwise volatile Horn of Africa.

The OIG team also notes that while the Mission Strategic Plan goals drive all major mission efforts, they do not always track fully with policy priorities, especially related to the promotion of democracy and improvements in agriculture. This reflects the fact that the U.S. Government earmarks or directs virtually all the assistance levels. The OIG team believes that Embassy Addis Ababa lacks the ability to direct foreign assistance resources to optimally advance policy objectives. Among other examples, the OIG team observed a nine-person Department of Defense media information support team whose activities did not appear to synchronize well with the Mission Strategic Plan.

Because of Embassy Addis Ababa's wholesale personnel turnover in the summer of 2009, only one Department officer still at the mission participated significantly in the Mission Strategic Plan drafting process. Accordingly, the document, while still used as the template, lacks a sense of embassy buy-in or immediacy.

The OIG team notes that Mission Strategic Plan performance indicators warrant further refinement to be fully useful as evaluation tools. Current Department guidelines require them to be quantitative and based heavily on external monitoring

agencies. These agencies, however, such as the International Monetary Fund, use longer timelines and typically compile figures a year or more after the events themselves. Ideally, Addis Ababa and other embassies would have considerable flexibility in the use of quantitative indicators.

ENTRY-LEVEL OFFICERS

Because of the unusual turnover within Embassy Addis Ababa's front office, the OIG team leader and deputy met with entry-level officers and staff on multiple occasions, including solo interviews. From these sessions emerged a picture of an overburdened but intensely personable DCM who cares deeply for the newest generation of officers and staff but whose time for informal mentoring is limited. The DCM, however, has hosted the entire 11-person entry-level complement at the empty ambassador's residence and instituted a formal entry-level program. In so doing, the DCM had an activist entry-level officer shape the program in some detail, thus assuring buy-in from the others in the group.

The DCM also asked an entry-level public diplomacy officer, serving a 2-year consular tour, to structure an imaginative representational event that brought together junior members of business and entry-level diplomats from the U.S. Embassy and elsewhere. Participants view the activity itself as a quality event and a good use of U.S. representational funds. However, its preparations showcased the front office's staffing problems wherein it proved time-consuming to move event-related paperwork past two of the seven temporary office management specialists and acting DCMs. Similarly, the absence of continual front office leadership was a contributing factor in allowing the embassy language program to lapse, thus potentially disadvantaging two entry-level officers. One officer, with modest additional training, could have gotten off language probation; the other could have gotten a salary bonus for proficiency in Amharic.

Neither of the two stand-in *chargés d'affaires* called back from retirement has hosted any of the optional-but-traditional events for the entire entry-level staff. Embassy staff noted the contrast with the previous Ambassador who frequently used the conveniently located and spacious residence on the embassy compound to further a sense of team from the bottom up. These stand-in *chargés d'affaires* have not brought entry-level officers on trips up-country or used them as control officers, a practice followed by many long-term chiefs of mission.

MORALE

Despite its problems since the summer of 2009, morale at Embassy Addis Ababa is reasonably good. Largely responsible is the tone set by the DCM who is personally viewed as caring for everyone from the gate guard to agency chiefs and who has engendered a family-friendly atmosphere within the mission. Most section and agency chiefs are effective in keeping up morale.

The prolonged gap between ambassadors, as well as the array of chargés d'affaires and acting DCMs, has left the mission thirsting for continuity in leadership and greater policy and programmatic direction. This has somewhat lowered morale within the work place. Washington-driven staffing decisions have left the mission woefully short of office management specialists. During the OIG team's visit, there was just one fulltime permanent office management specialist for the nearly 40 Department officers at Embassy Addis Ababa. Another Washington staffing decision by the previous AF front office has sidelined an employee widely viewed as the mission's best strategic thinker to out-of-cone employment as information officer within the public affairs section.

Stress from the construction of the new embassy and utter neglect – for cost-conscious reasons – of the dingy, scattered embassy complex is palpable. To weather these shabby facilities, staff resort to humor. Offices are nicknamed for their distinctive problems. Several sections work out of The Swamp where a major flood left a huge area stripped of rugs and, in some instances, even flooring. Others have The Dungeon, a dank airless room. One section chief occupies The Generator, a room adjacent to the embassy's generator where one must wear earplugs whenever city power cuts out. Another officer enjoys The Closet – yes, a converted closet; another has The Bowling Alley, a 30 by 4 foot room with a pipe running its length. The Marine security guard detachment lives in The Stable, once home to horses.

Ethiopian Government-run phone and Internet systems are creaky. Embassy lines to the Department are so few that officers stay well after closing time to transact business with counterparts in Washington. Increasing reliance on U.S.-hosted Web-based tools for consular and other activities adds to the frustration. Bandwidth limitations mean that hours are spent on research tasks that might take minutes or seconds at a European mission. Performing this work after hours at home is not possible; Ethiopia's Internet service is expensive and unreliable.

Outside the office, members of the embassy confront problems common to many African missions. Driving is ultra-dangerous; pollution considerable; and the colorful central market off-limits for security reasons. The embassy language

program was inactive when the inspection started, thereby increasing the sense of isolation between American staff and the country in which they serve. Given that Embassy Addis Ababa has very few staff trained in Amharic, and Amharic's great utility in situations outside the capital and value in relating to Ethiopians in general, the OIG team suggested that mission management work through the Peace Corps to promptly hire a language teacher. A possible hire was in sight before the inspection ended.

The front office also could usefully solicit opinions from staff as to the performance of individual section and unit chiefs, some of whom could benefit from additional managerial counseling.

SECURITY

Embassy Addis Ababa operates in a transitional security situation wherein a new embassy compound is being constructed by 750 workers alongside the existing, seemingly insecure jumble of converted residences and buildings. Embassy management and a talented regional security team maintain multiple layers of defense for the 22.7-acre compound, including a dedicated police force, an embassy guard force, and a six-person Marine security detachment. They also coordinate daily with the construction site security manager to ensure no gaps in physical security. The DCM has appropriately encouraged the regional security officer to tailor his risk management strategy to these special circumstances.

The *chargés d'affaires* and DCM have evident respect for the skilled regional security office staff, and have instilled an admirable culture of security at Embassy Addis Ababa. Country team meetings frequently address security issues. The DCM attends scrupulously to the security of personnel, property, and classified information. When serving as *chargé d'affaires*, he meets weekly with the regional security officer. The regional security officers also have, as necessary, immediate access to the *chargé* of the moment and DCM. Security violations by employees are rare, despite the makeshift, cramped, and cluttered offices.

Embassy leadership also has taken a strategic view on security so that the embassy positions itself for the long term regarding housing and other security-relevant variables. Employees from all sections and agencies laud mission leadership for its evident concern about security as well as its personal involvement in improving the morale among the 491-person guard force deployed at the embassy and residences.

A classified annex to this report provides additional findings from the OIG team's security review.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECTION

Staffing Gaps and Management Challenges

The political/economic section produces a good product despite staffing shortfalls and some managerial shortcomings. The section underwent a wholesale changeover in U.S. officer staffing in 2009 and continues to have staffing gaps. The FS-01 section chief, who soon after arrival in Addis Ababa served as acting DCM for seven weeks, is still settling into the job. The chief could benefit from better time management. The OIG team was repeatedly told that the section's written products, especially cables, were subjected to excessive rewriting and delays in transmission. This detracts from the ability of the officers to write more cables and to travel in the country.

The section chief also could work on improving relations with other embassy elements. Several agency and section chiefs contrasted the current political/economic section chief unfavorably with his predecessor, who was widely viewed as more collegial. Relationships go both ways; there is blame on all sides. The OIG team left an informal recommendation that the DCM work with all parties to clear the air; see a related formal recommendation below.

Following the massive turnover described in the executive direction section, all four full-time officers in the political/economic section arrived in 2009 – three line officers in February, July, and August, and the chief in September 2009. To complicate matters, the section's full-time office management specialist worked in the front office for most of the second half of 2009 and departed for the USAU shortly before the inspection began. An entry-level line officer departed the section in November 2009 for a volunteer position in Kabul, and a section analyst departed in the summer of 2009 and will not be replaced until the summer of 2010. In addition, most of the section's officers were called upon to support the nearby USAU for its summit in February 2010. Staffing gaps in the section, as elsewhere in AF, are endemic. At the time of the inspection, a part-time employee on exchange from an-

other U.S. Government agency had just started in the section, and an eligible family member had recently started as the office management specialist, with the likelihood that she would work part-time for the regional security office as well.

Besides the personnel mentioned above, the section has two local employees in a political unit, two local employees in an economic unit, and two local employees and an eligible family member in the section's self-help grants unit. The OIG team noted some incongruities in the rank of some of the local employees and left an informal recommendation that the section look at the possibility of doing a new computer assisted job evaluation for at least two of the positions. All section personnel except those from the self-help unit attend the section's weekly staff meeting. The OIG team made informal recommendations about the content and attendance at the weekly staff meeting and about scheduling a separate meeting for just the self-help unit employees with the section's chief and deputy every two weeks.

The chief believes that after overcoming the staffing gaps, and as a result of his efforts to improve the written product of his staff, the section will be in a good position in coming months to be more efficient in its work. (b)(2)(b)(6)

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Recommendation 1: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic chief to meet all Department deadlines and to approve routine political/economic section cables within 24 hours and more complex cables within 48 hours. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Political and Economic Issues

The section focuses on developing contacts within the ruling party and the opposition leadership. It also covers human rights, economic reform, regional security, and humanitarian issues. The section works on part or all of the embassy's three primary strategic goals, including building Ethiopia's capacity to promote international peace and security, making progress towards a stable multiparty democracy, and promoting a growing, market-oriented economy. Since the 2005 elections, the Ethiopian

Government has become less democratic. The embassy has accorded democracy and governance greater priority in response to the emphasis of the current U.S. administration and in preparation for elections in Ethiopia in May 2010.

The lack of political freedom in the country makes it difficult for the section to find local partners it can work with on democracy and human rights issues. This is demonstrated most strikingly by the law limiting foreign work with nongovernmental organizations, forcing the embassy to focus more on the programs that it can implement, rather than those that are most important.

Ethiopia's lack of World Trade Organization membership is an anomaly. The organization's rules cover well over 97 percent of all trade in the world, and over 153 countries belong. How hard Ethiopia pushes to accede to the organization will be one of the best indicators of its intent to modernize its economy. Ethiopian reform and political will rather than U.S. and other World Trade Organization members' concessions will ultimately determine the prospects for accession. If the accession negotiations pick up pace, the section could become more active.

The political section also manages some assistance programs separate from USAID. These activities, while relatively small, require considerable management and programmatic time. Among such programs are the Ambassador's special self-help grants (\$90,000 for FY 2009) to community groups, some residual projects under the democracy and human rights fund (with no new money in the last two years), and about \$300,000 a year for HIV/AIDS relief, with no single project over \$30,000. Although the \$300,000 in HIV/AIDS relief is less than 0.1 percent of the total of HIV/AIDS funds spent by U.S. implementing agencies at Embassy Addis Ababa, the OIG team agrees that such small grants can be useful in reaching out to all levels of the society. During the inspection, the self-help unit received greater guidance from the embassy's public affairs officer, who has grant signing authority for the small grants, and Department officials in the proper preparation of such grants.

Reporting and Representation

Some Washington consumers note a decline in reporting about certain key areas, such as Somalia, since the summer of 2009. Washington consumers also thirst for additional reporting on the Ethiopian Government's inner circle, who normally would be contacts of an ambassador or DCM.

Washington readers, especially those in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, commend Embassy Addis Ababa for its systematic, robust, and exceptional human rights reporting. The *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* and the *Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report* were extremely well researched and thorough.

Economic and Commercial Relations

Other than occasional major purchases or renting of Boeing passenger or cargo aircraft by Ethiopian Airlines, the commercial, investment, and other economic opportunities for the United States in Ethiopia are distinctly limited. Economic and commercial relations are rooted in the reality that Ethiopia is an impoverished and distant land. U.S. exports to Ethiopia in 2009 amounted to \$270.4 million. Ethiopian exports to the United States in the same year equaled \$112.9 million. A recent large order by Ethiopian Airlines from Boeing will boost U.S. exports significantly in coming years.

Half of the Ethiopian economy remains dependent on subsistence agriculture, which employs about 80 percent of the workforce. The rest of the economy is a statist, closed, protectionist trading/investment system; hence, Ethiopia's slow progress in accession negotiations for eventual World Trade Organization membership. (Ethiopia is one of the few countries not already a member.) The state controls utilities, including the telecommunications firm, which provides poor service at a high price; prohibits foreign ownership of banks and insurance companies; enforces cargo preference rules for Ethiopian maritime firms; maintains tight foreign exchange restrictions; and raises other impediments to trade and investment. The United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty with Ethiopia.

USAID is providing technical help to Ethiopia for the World Trade Organization accession talks. It also has worked with the political/economic section to create a local American Chamber of Commerce. The political/economic section also updates annually the country commercial guide and the investment climate statement. Embassy Addis Ababa has applied for business facilitation incentive funds from the Department for programming to support increased and effective partnerships between Ethiopian entrepreneurs and U.S. businesses in Ethiopia.

Given the size and nature of the local economy, the OIG team believes that the political/economic section's current allotment of one economic officer, one part-time economic officer, and two local employees for economic/commercial work is appropriate.

The Foreign Commercial Service is not resident in Ethiopia; minimal coverage is provided from Embassy Nairobi. The Foreign Agricultural Service will open an office at Embassy Addis Ababa when the new embassy compound opens later in 2010; the embassy coordinated a conference with Embassy Nairobi's Foreign Agricultural Service in mid-2009.

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

Ethiopia is eligible for duty-free access to the U.S. market under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act. The country has been somewhat successful in increasing its exports to the United States, primarily from the textile sector. The political/economic section conducts an eligibility review each year to include analyses of: the degree of market-based economy; political reform, rule of law, and anticorruption; poverty reduction; workers' rights, child labor, and human rights; and international terrorism and U.S. national security.

Political-Military Affairs

The political/economic section has some quality interaction with the Defense attaché office,

Coordination, communication, and information sharing between the leadership should increase. The two sections need to achieve a better balance and appreciation for the competing U.S. strategic goals of improving democracy and governance while attaining host country cooperation on counterterrorism. Most contact occurs when the political/economic section helps brief Department of Defense visitors and provides note takers for the visits. More substantive contacts between the officers are needed, as is more assertive front office mediation and oversight.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Addis Ababa should establish better cooperation and communication between the political/economic section and the Defense attaché's office, including scheduling weekly meetings between the chiefs. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Defense Attaché's Office and Security Cooperation

The Defense attaché office oversees a wide range of military assistance activities, including Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training (both of the preceding programs funded via the Department), Section 1206¹ assistance programs that have been frozen in recent years, HIV/AIDS prevention, and peacekeeping operations. The security assistance office in the embassy works closely with the Defense attaché to implement assistance and training programs.

The Ethiopian Government complies with most Leahy amendment standards, including those for the Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training assistance programs. The Leahy amendment prohibits assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless certain conditions have been met.

However, the Ethiopian Government has been reluctant to meet Leahy amendment strictures regarding large military-related projects covered under Section 1206. A visit in December 2009 by a senior Department of Defense official increased the likelihood that Ethiopia will regain eligibility for Section 1206 assistance.

As the senior Department of Defense official in Ethiopia, the attaché oversees all permanent and temporary duty Department of Defense personnel at the embassy as well as others not under chief of mission authority for certain special operations. The latter, in Ethiopia, can total in the dozens or hundreds at any given time. There are at least ten different Department of Defense command or other elements in Ethiopia. Among Department of Defense entities operating in the country are civil affairs and military training teams from the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (headquartered in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti), a media information support team partially embedded in the embassy, U.S. African Command units (headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany), and at least four other U.S. command elements. The civil affairs projects build schools, health clinics, bridges, and other infrastructure that is a valuable supplement to traditional aid programming.

The OIG team notes that this array of military elements risks swamping an embassy if not carefully controlled. The OIG team discussed this concern with Embassy Addis Ababa leadership, which intends to work closely with the incoming attaché to review the role of the embassy in approving and clearing visits by all Department of Defense elements.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, based on the campus of the National Defense University at Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington, maintains a five-person regional office with three local support staff at Embassy Addis Ababa. This office's primary purpose is to present seminars and workshops to introduce U.S. military policy throughout the region. Its secondary goal is to maintain contact with program graduates (about 3,500 in the region so far) and support alumni organizations. Most program participants, nominated by U.S. Defense attachés, are foreign affairs or

defense personnel from Africa. The center has parallel programs for defense officers from African embassies in Washington. U.S. Africa Command funds many of these programs, and its members make up most of the expert and speaker pool.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

Overview

U.S. foreign assistance to Ethiopia is large in absolute terms and as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product. However, the amount the U.S. provides Ethiopia, if calculated on a per capita basis, is among the lowest for any country in Africa. U.S. assistance priorities in Ethiopia are to foster regional peace and stability, support democratic reforms, anticipate and respond to food emergencies, increase and broaden economic growth, and expand basic health and education services. The two largest components of U.S. assistance are food aid (under Public Law 480)² and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The two largest implementing agencies at Embassy Addis Ababa are USAID and the CDC. USAID will grow considerably in coming years as the President's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative is implemented in Ethiopia.

Recent Assistance Levels

Estimated amounts of U.S. assistance in FY 2008 and 2009 by major categories, including subitems that exceeded \$10 million in either year, follow:

U.S. Assistance to Ethiopia (Estimated in \$000)		
	FY 2008	FY 2009
Total	\$951,490	\$862,001
Peace and Security	3,629	5,543
Governing Justly and Democratically	2,267	6,000
Investing in People	432,682	435,181
<i>(HIV/AIDS)</i>	354,539	345,981
<i>(Malaria)</i>	19,838	19,700
<i>(Maternal and Child Health)</i>	14,211	18,000
<i>(Family Planning and Reproductive Health)</i>	18,560	20,500
<i>(Education)</i>	15,270	18,000
Economic Growth	15,617	40,500
<i>(Agriculture)</i>	6,767	21,000
<i>(Private sector Competitiveness)</i>	6,345	12,453
Humanitarian Assistance	497,295	374,777
<i>(PL 480)</i>	461,695	312,000
<i>(Disaster Asst.)</i>	35,200	61,277

In July 2009, USAID led an interagency team, with political/economic section support, to prepare the operational plan for FY 2009. The plan is tied to the Mission Strategic Plan. The annual operational plan does not capture all of food and disaster assistance or refugee assistance. In addition, some food aid is difficult to predict and the reporting of such aid flows are delayed. New guidelines for the Mission Strategic Plan and related assistance documents for FY 2010 were under review in Washington at the time of the OIG inspection.

Millennium Challenge Corporation

Ethiopia has sought U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation funding. If Ethiopia were to qualify for at least threshold status, significant monies could be at stake. However, the current Millennium Challenge Corporation country scorecard for Ethiopia shows the country missing the mark in 11 out of 17 indicators. Thus, there is no immediate likelihood of Millennium Challenge funding in the short term.

Peace Corps

The Peace Corps has a long and storied history in Ethiopia, which once hosted the largest contingent worldwide. After departing during the country's prolonged turbulence and misrule, Peace Corps volunteers returned to Ethiopia about 12 years ago. Currently, there are about 75 volunteers in country but the legacy of good will is such that the Peace Corps could rapidly expand if it so desired. The Peace Corps director meets with the DCM monthly and attends the country team meetings. The DCM briefs incoming volunteers. The OIG team found relations between the Peace Corps and various embassy elements, including the front office and regional security office, ideal.

President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

Other than food aid, the largest U.S. assistance in Ethiopia is the PEPFAR program. In 2004, PEPFAR identified Ethiopia as one of its 15 focus countries under its first five-year authorization. This meant that it received considerable funds on an annual basis. When Congress reauthorized PEPFAR for FY 2009-13, it dropped the concept of focus countries in favor of attempting to achieve a new partnership framework. OIG Report ISP-I-10-01, November 2009, Appendix A-2, contains greater information on the PEPFAR program in Ethiopia and worldwide.

PEPFAR funds for Ethiopia in FY 2009 equaled \$346 million, while the projected funds in FY 2010 are \$328 million, or a 5-percent cut. The cut was a small move to give Ethiopia greater ownership of the projects, to eliminate some redundancies, and to achieve greater efficiencies. PEPFAR funding for Ethiopia through FY 2013 is expected to be close to the \$328 million base line for FY 2010, with some possibility of as-yet unquantifiable non-PEPFAR funds coming from the President's Global Health Initiative.

When created in 2003, PEPFAR deliberately did not set up a new implementing agency. Instead, existing agencies such as the Department, USAID, the National Institutes of Health, the CDC, the Department of Defense, and the Peace Corps became implementers for the program overseas and in Washington. This effort brought together different entities with differing skills and little common experience. In particular, the CDC shifted from a domestically oriented agency to one with far greater overseas responsibilities. Currently CDC is the fastest growing U.S. agency in terms of employees in overseas embassies, primarily because of PEPFAR. The De-

partment's Office of the U.S. Global Aids Coordinator (S/GAC) was given the task of overseeing the varying implementing agencies, to act as a broker, and to ascertain the competitive advantage for each agency. Over time, S/GAC determined that PEPFAR coordinators were needed in many countries, in large measure to smooth out fractious relations among the implementing agencies, and to relieve ambassadors and DCMs of some of the managerial burden. Most coordinators were hired under USAID contracts but as a Department position that reported to the DCM.

There was friction between CDC and USAID in the early years of PEPFAR implementation in Ethiopia, as well as some ineffective PEPFAR coordinators. The physical separation of CDC and USAID in compounds distant from the embassy grounds did not help matters. The Peace Corps, the Department of Defense, and the Department have smaller roles for PEPFAR implementation in Ethiopia.

With the arrival of the new CDC director in January 2009 (who was formerly the deputy in S/GAC), a new PEPFAR coordinator in January 2009, and a new USAID director in January 2009, relations among implementing agencies are markedly better. The DCM chairs a monthly meeting of the PEPFAR executive council, which is supplemented by meetings of collaborative teams or working groups. Some working-level issues still need addressing as the comparative advantages of the various agencies are worked out, and the coordinator remains very busy given the complexities of the PEPFAR program. Nonetheless, the present PEPFAR leadership at Embassy Addis Ababa is to be commended.

The PEPFAR team worked five months to prepare its latest country operating plan, which sets targets for the coming year. Some changeover in the electronic data entry system caused worldwide problems in preparing the plan. Embassy Addis Ababa, however, was able to bypass the problems enough to submit the plan to the Department in late January 2010. The OIG team offers suggestions below on how to lessen the burden of the country operating plan, including making it a biannual rather than an annual exercise.

The embassy's public affairs office publicizes the PEPFAR efforts of the various implementing entities. USAID, by contractual obligation, must put its logo on all of its work, so the U.S. already receives credit for such work locally. CDC, which is less overt in publicizing the source of the PEPFAR funding, awaits a Secretary or Presidential directive that all PEPFAR implementing agencies work under a common logo.

The OIG team found USAID Addis Ababa well integrated in the work of other sections and agencies of the embassy. Conversely, CDC remains relatively unknown to other embassy sections. With the planned consolidation of CDC and USAID on the new embassy compound in September 2010, CDC will have more opportunities to become known and useful to the rest of the embassy community.

Burden of Multiple Assistance Planning Documents

The Department imposes several somewhat repetitive and overlapping assistance report requirements on embassies, largely through the Mission Strategic Plan and the Department's Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. There is, in particular, a heavy overlap between the data and text for the following documents: the Mission Strategic Plan, which looks back one year and ahead three; the performance plan and review required by USAID, which looks back one year and ahead one year, and attempts to incorporate most U.S. Government assistance plans; the operational plan the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance requires, which embassies prepare to capture Department and USAID foreign assistance, minus any of the HIV/AIDS money under PEPFAR; the annual country operational plan, which S/GAC requires of some larger PEPFAR recipients; and the malaria operating plan. In addition, USAID may be required to do a country assistance strategy plan, which is a five-year planning exercise for all U.S. assistance, including assistance agencies other than the Department and USAID provide, after pilot projects in other countries come to an end.

Embassy Addis Ababa, for example, does the Mission Strategic Plan, an operational plan for the embassy prepared by USAID, a country operational plan for PEPFAR, a performance plan and review for USAID, a malaria operational plan for the antimalaria initiative (first funded in late 2006), a plan for the international education initiative, and others.

The OIG team views with misgivings the proliferation of planning documents that consume valuable staff time better spent in the field doing actual assistance work, in many instances. The goal of these reports, after all, is not just to publicize the issues under scrutiny but to provide platforms for action.

A further concern is that form tends to triumph over substance, and coordination with Washington is often limited. The OIG team believes that the Department could discuss how to simplify these complex and overlapping reports. In particular, the onerous country operating plan for PEPFAR could be done every two years rather than every year.

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER

The regional environmental officer handles well boundary and other oceans, science, technology, and health issues across a vast 14-nation area. The officer, who reports locally to the DCM, receives most of her policy guidance from the Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs in the Department. The two other regional environmental officers in Africa are located in Ghana and Botswana. The OIG team believes that the distribution of regional environmental officers is appropriate but a case could be made for covering Eritrea from the regional hub in Jordan rather than from Ethiopia. Although immediate neighbors, Eritrea and Ethiopia have no relations and it is quicker to fly to the Middle East, or for that matter, to the United States, than between these two countries.

The environmental officer, who supervises one local employee and one part-time, locally hired American, is often on the road. In Addis Ababa and elsewhere, the officer advocates for U.S. positions in international negotiations, represents U.S. environmental and science agencies, and implements some projects funded by the Department and other agencies. She spends considerable time advocating broader U.S. participation in the Nile Basin initiative, promotes renewable energy development throughout the region, and explains the U.S. position on climate change. African nations recently asked the Ethiopian prime minister to serve as their primary negotiator at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, and for any follow-up work. The regional officer publishes a detailed and useful monthly environmental newsletter for East Africa. This publication keeps regional embassies and Washington end users informed.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

Embassy Addis Ababa is paying more attention to law enforcement issues. In preparation for the establishment of a permanent legal attaché office with four personnel in the new embassy compound sometime after September 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sent a series of temporary duty personnel, usually one special agent at a time, to work on law enforcement issues, including training. While these temporary but skilled officers work under the overall guidance of the legal attaché in Embassy Sana'a, they keep Embassy Addis Ababa well informed. When the permanent legal attaché office opens in Addis Ababa, it will be fully independent of Embassy Sana'a and will also cover Embassies Djibouti and Asmara. As noted above, until Ethiopian-Eritrean relations improve, coverage of Eritrea likely will be minimal.

There are no Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Homeland Security, or other law enforcement entities represented in the embassy. The embassy might wish to consult early with Embassies Asmara and Djibouti regarding the new permanent legal attaché office's regional mandate.

The embassy's regional security officer manages most of the infrequent law enforcement issues that arise separate from normal embassy functions. The political/economic section cooperated with the temporary legal attaché on a successful implementation of the new Ethiopian money laundering law passed in December 2009. The temporary legal attaché, regional security officer, consular officers, and others meet on the margins of another weekly meeting to coordinate law enforcement issues. Once the legal attaché office is established, the embassy may wish to schedule a separate weekly law enforcement meeting. The regional security officer uses Antiterrorist Assistance program funds and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds to maintain close engagement with relevant Ethiopian officials, including ten antiterrorism training programs scheduled for FY 2010.

Rewards for Justice Program

The regional security officer supervises two investigators dedicated to the Rewards for Justice Program, a strategic program that focuses on areas with terrorist activity, such as the Somalia border. The program develops information through a telephone hotline, advertising, posters, and meetings with regional Ethiopian law enforcement commanders who can provide information about suspected terrorist movements.

REFUGEE AFFAIRS

The regional refugee assistance coordinator, based in Addis Ababa, receives most of her direction from the Bureau of Populations, Refugees and Migration but the DCM is her rating officer. The coordinator attends the weekly front office reporting meeting (along with the political/economic and regional environmental officers), and also meets individually with the DCM. This relationship works: both officers feel they are well informed and supportive of each other's priorities and interests.

The coordinator's primary function is to monitor funds the bureau provides for refugee-related projects, most of which nongovernmental organizations run. Although visiting projects is essential, many refugee camps are so near to volatile border areas that visits often are impossible due to security concerns. Thus, the co-

ordinator is often limited to meeting with the organizations in capitals or other cities near the camps and carefully reviewing the organizations' quarterly written reports. The coordinator also helps applicants for Julia Taft Fund grants.

Ethiopia ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol in 1969, the 28th of 144 signatories. By all reports, Ethiopia treats its refugees well: for example, although they cannot hold salaried jobs, they are free to work at small, one-person enterprises such as shoe repair, hairdressing, and tailoring. In a group interview, urban refugees from Somalia, Sudan, and the Congo told the OIG team that they enjoy considerable freedom of movement in Addis Ababa and are only rarely discriminated against by Ethiopians. Refugee camps, by contrast, often suffer interethnic or intertribal tensions, competition, and even violence. The general poverty of Ethiopia is such that large numbers of its own citizens (as many as 30,000 by some counts) find the steady food supply and medical care in refugee camps so superior to their own tenuous lives that they frequently purchase departing refugees' ration cards or impersonate refugees, despite the legal risks of doing so.

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Embassy Addis Ababa has an excellent consular section which manages a high-fraud, high-pressure workload with evident skill. Far-sighted section management is fine-tuning its processes to increase efficiency and reduce stress on both customers and staff. Despite many challenges, the section runs well, benefitting from the experienced, alert, hands-on chief and deputy, whom all local employees commended to the OIG team.

Consular Management

The consular staff consists of an FS-02 chief, an FS-03 deputy, an assistant regional security officer investigator, four entry-level officers, 26 local employees, and several eligible family members. The staff is sufficient for the work load. Although the workload is not high in simple numbers, the amount of fraud makes the work arduous, complex, and time-consuming. The facility itself is aged, crowded, and poorly laid out, with a small two-storey indoor waiting room and additional waiting areas outside. Consular space in the new embassy compound will be far roomier, with more public windows and a larger waiting room but less secure storage.

Consular Management Controls and Accountability

Consular management controls are in place, and accountability is up to date. Cashiering is handled correctly, with funds deposited with the Class B cashier the same day. Accounting and reconciliation are accurate. Consular information on the embassy's public Web site is current and easy to understand; information on adoptions, an issue of considerable public interest in Ethiopia, is notably thorough and clear. Despite the overburdened and outdated telephone system, a well-designed telephone tree ensures that customers who call can get the information that they need, including reaching an American officer if necessary.

The OIG team found accountable items properly safeguarded and all documents and consular records secured after hours in two storage rooms equipped with cipher locks.

Consular Training

Nearly a third of local staff members have worked in the section for less than one year; only three have more than ten years' experience. Several of the more senior employees have attended training in Washington. Most of the rest have begun online courses and are eager to finish but hesitate to take the time. Orientation to the section is not as methodical as it could be. Local employees are eager for additional orientation and training, as well as for designated training hours so that they do not feel they are stealing time from work for training. The OIG team concurs that staff should have more local, on-the-job training as well as an opportunity to take Foreign Service Institute correspondence courses.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Addis Ababa should create structured plans for consular section employee training, including new employee orientation, and maintain written records of all employees' training progress. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Procedures and Scheduling

Embassy Addis Ababa consular employees are conscientious. There are, however, redundancies in work flow, and employees are not experienced enough to devise more efficient processes. For example, passport applications go back and forth between local employees and officers eight times; whereas, a streamlined process would

involve only three steps. A broader problem is that the section's written standard operating procedures are out of date and not routinely used. Updating and using these procedures will help employees serve consular customers more efficiently and effectively, and with more certainty.

Recommendation 4: Embassy Addis Ababa should update and use written standard operating procedures for all consular operations. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Although consular management regularly adjusts its appointment systems and work assignments, it could do even more to ensure that customers spend as little time as possible in the tiny, stuffy waiting rooms or outdoors. For example, nonimmigrant visa applicants are scheduled to appear in three large groups, one of which coincides with the arrival of embassy employees, who use the same single entrance. All applicants for adoption immigrant visas—up to 20 families per day—arrive at the same time, yet only one or two officers conduct adoption interviews, leaving Americans with fretful babies that they hardly know waiting for hours. The OIG team also found that at times officers leave interview windows to attend to non-time-sensitive duties, leaving applicants waiting longer than necessary. The OIG team informally recommended that consular management stagger scheduling to minimize waiting time for clientele and otherwise ascribe the highest priority to customer service.

Language

Seventy to 80 percent of visa interviews require interpreters. Most applicants speak Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia, yet only one of the six American consular officers received language training before coming to Ethiopia. The Foreign Service Institute considers 26 weeks sufficient to acquire a 2/0 in Amharic, which is also the level required to satisfy language probation requirements. The officer who received language training, who tested at 3/2 after 26 weeks, conducts Amharic interviews without help; others must rely on local employees to interpret. Facility in Amharic would reduce interview times and allow local employees to tend to other duties. Even if interpretation assistance were needed with some complex questions, some knowledge of Amharic would allow officers to confirm that the interpretation is reasonably correct and accurate.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, the Director General for Human Resources, and the Foreign Service Institute, should request that two or more officers assigned to Embassy Addis Ababa be trained in the Amharic language to the 2/0 level. (Action: CA, in coordination with AF, DGHR, and FSI)

Fraud Prevention

The deputy consular chief manages a fraud unit that consists of an assistant regional security office investigator, two highly experienced local employees with law enforcement backgrounds, and a clerk. The unit has excellent relations with government offices and schools all over Ethiopia, with whom it checks the veracity of documents presented in immigrant and some nonimmigrant visa cases. The unit also performs field investigations for cases that require personal visits or interviews.

Despite the admirable work of these fraud prevention professionals, Addis Ababa's fraud burden increases its workload well beyond what statistics can capture. For example, the consular section's total visa case load in 2009 was about 13,000 immigrant and 17,000 nonimmigrant visa applications, nearly half of which were refused. The fraud unit carried out more than 200 investigations as well as nearly 200 DNA tests to confirm relationships claimed on immigration petitions. Of applicants who actually submitted to DNA testing, about 20 percent failed. Others, knowing that they would fail, abandoned the application process.

The section returned more than 600 immigrant visa and fiancé petitions to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for revocation, the majority involving relationships contracted solely for the purpose of immigration. The section also found disparities in about half of its visas 92/93 (refugee/asylum) cases, either because of suspect family relationships or because the dependents of asylum seekers denied that the petitioner was ever persecuted, tortured, or jailed - claims upon which asylum is granted. The OIG team notes that for cases that must be reviewed, investigated, tested, revoked, and/or reported, far more time is required than for simple issuance. Officers, for example, must perform the initial and follow-up interviews, and thereafter write the investigation requests, refusal letters, reports, and revocation memos.

Two recent validation studies showed that nine percent of referred visa cases – including numerous Embassy Addis Ababa local employees and families – failed to return from the United States. Five percent of those receiving student visas never attended classes. The section is planning a study of B1/B2 (business and tourist) visa issuances, and will report the results when compiled. This report is expected to find

significant asylum claims from members of the Ethiopian middle class who applied for and received nonimmigrant visas. While no apparent fraud was involved, the public affairs section has found that nearly half of its Fulbright scholars and other grantees sent to the United States do not return to Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa is testing a new fraud case management system, a tool it finds helpful in complex cases but burdensome in those that can be resolved through a single call or letter, in that entering such a case into the system takes longer than resolving it. The section would like to see the system linked to the immigrant, nonimmigrant, and American citizen services systems via the consolidated consular database. At present, the National Visa Center enters its fraud prescreening findings as open fraud cases that the fraud prevention manager must close individually, by hand.

A consular officer will attend the upcoming conference on the subject of relationship fraud at the National Visa Center, and Embassy Addis Ababa volunteered to host a regional fraud conference in 2010, yet another indication of the conscientiousness and vision of Addis Ababa's consular management.

Adoptions

Americans adopt more children from Ethiopia than from any other country, except China. In FY 2009, more than 2,000 adopted Ethiopian children emigrated to the United States, a 25 percent increase over the previous year. This large adoption caseload is even more complex than usual in that Ethiopia has not signed The Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (The Hague Adoption Convention), which regulates and safeguards international adoptions. In addition, the Government of Ethiopia does not monitor or regulate adoption agencies. The fees involved in adoption—families spend up to \$40,000, including travel costs—create incentives for malfeasance at every level in a country whose 2009 per capita income is roughly \$400.

Long-standing rumors in U.S. adoption communities as well as media reports in the United States and Australia have portrayed the adoption process in Ethiopia as extremely risky. In so doing, they have accused some adoption agencies of buying children or lying about children's histories. The consular section has not yet confirmed a case of child buying, but has found some malpractice in agencies. Amid growing public concerns and its own uneasiness, the section has instituted a waiting period of up to eight weeks for cases from dubious regions, orphanages, or agencies to allow for field investigations. Investigations, however, can only be performed after the section receives case files, when adoptions are already finalized in Ethiopia.

The Orphan First Pilot Program, instituted in 2003 as a cooperative endeavor between the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security and the Bureau of Consular Affairs and currently in effect in Haiti, Honduras, the Philippines, Poland, and Sierra Leone, allows prospective parents to request review of a child's status before completing an adoption. The program would let the embassy investigate cases before courts approve adoptions, would halt troublesome cases before they are final, and otherwise serve to maintain the integrity of the adoption process in Ethiopia for prospective parents.

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should work with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security to institute an Orphan First program for adoptions in Ethiopia. (Action: CA)

Visas

The worldwide deadline to implement the Web-based nonimmigrant visa application form is April 30, 2010. The consular section, in coordination with the public affairs section, is carefully planning the introduction of this process, a project complicated by Ethiopia's low technological environment. Embassy Addis Ababa's written standard operating procedures, recommended above, should include a process for checking the quality of data fields on this new form.

Both the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa systems contain message windows that inform consular officers whenever individuals of possible interest come to the attention of another U.S. Government agency. These messages should be read and cleared daily, and an informal recommendation was made to this effect.

The consular chief conducts visa referral training for incoming American officers, and the section rigorously adheres to Bureau of Consular Affairs' instructions for handling and processing referred visa cases. The knowledge that many referred visa holders have failed to return from the United States in significant numbers serves to limit the referrals that Embassy Addis Ababa officers are willing to make.

Visas Viper

Embassy Addis Ababa holds Visas Viper meetings as required and has submitted all mandated reports on time. During the past year, one name was submitted by

the USAU, independent of the monthly report, and was also subsequently referenced in the monthly summary report. The consular section duly checked the name in the consolidated consular database to find that the person in question did not hold a U.S. visa.

American Citizen Services

Most services to American citizens involve notarizing documents, although there is also regular need to assist Americans (usually naturalized U.S. citizens of local origin) who are arrested or detained for crossing borders without visas or who overstay their visas and find themselves destitute. Most receive repatriation assistance, either with funds from friends or family members in the United States, or through repatriation loans from the embassy.

While not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Government of Ethiopia has stated that it will follow the Convention's standards on consular notification of arrests and access to prisoners. The embassy, however, was not notified of any of the 18 arrest cases in FY 2009. Instead, the consular section generally learns of arrests from friends or relatives of arrested persons.

Consular management provides notification concerns as talking points to all high-level U.S. Government visitors; the fraud investigators speak with their contacts in customs, immigration, and law enforcement about notification and access; the section performs briefings on notification and access whenever consular, regional security office, or legal attaché personnel travel outside of Addis Ababa. In a July 2009 meeting with the Ambassador, the Ethiopian Prime Minister agreed that notification should be improved. In October 2009, the embassy and the European Union presented a joint demarche on the subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the time of the inspection, there was no apparent progress. In fact, the OIG inspection began just after a U.S. journalist was detained for two days without proper consular notification.

Consular employees do not open cases for American citizens until the individuals have encountered serious problems or until the section has complete information. For example, a record is not created when an arrest is discovered, but only after the individual's identity and the details of the arrest are confirmed. Confirmation, however, can take several days, thus creating a situation in which a relative in the United States will call the Department and the Department cannot find information in the consular system even though the local consular section is aware of the case. Early data entry will help speed the exchange of information and keep the Department correctly informed. An informal recommendation was made to this effect.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION

Context

In Ethiopia, public diplomacy is difficult. With 18 years of uninterrupted control of the country, the Ethiopian Revolutionary People's Democratic Front has steadily narrowed the political space for opposition parties, civil society, and the media. Foreign funding for many nongovernmental organizations has become illegal. Harassment or intimidation of journalists is frequent. On the eve of the OIG inspection, the regime detained an American citizen reporter for two days without charge and without access to U.S. consular authorities or family.

The government has a monopoly on telecommunications and Internet service, thus leaving few media options for those with differing views. Antigovernment and human rights-oriented Web sites are regularly blocked. The Voice of America's Amharic service is frequently jammed.

The sheer size and diversity of Ethiopia, and of U.S. assistance and other activities in the country, complicate public outreach. Tight government regulations demand time-intensive coordination by the three-American officer, 15-local employee public affairs section. Public diplomacy programs must be sensitive not only to government regulations but also to the overly confident presumption of many Ethiopians that government-to-government relations are close and that the United States can temper an authoritarian regime. Tight restrictions on, and self-censorship within, the press limit the scope of traditional audiences used in influencing public opinion. A disenchanted Ethiopian public, the presence of Ethiopian communities within the United States, and limited local economic opportunities have led about half of the public affairs section's grantees to remain in the United States. This further restricts the long-term impact of public diplomacy programming in Ethiopia.

The failure of many Ethiopian exchange grant recipients to return has induced the public affairs section and the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, over time, to significantly reduce exchange programs to the United States. The public affairs section is enlarging in-country programs and wants to increase the number of U.S. scholars in Ethiopia on various Fulbright programs, in part to compensate for the reduction in Ethiopians' studying and/or visiting the United States. The educational infrastructure of Ethiopia can absorb additional American grantees. The public affairs section has asked the bureau for increased funding for American exchange grantees. The OIG team supports this request.

Direction and Management

The public affairs section produces a quality product and the public affairs officer enjoys high regard from mission managers.

The OIG team believes that this problem falls under the rubric that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” and would disappear with more accent on positive reinforcement. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that the DCM and public affairs officer explore ways to enhance team spirit while not undercutting the admirable pressure for more productivity from the section. In so doing, the accent should be put on greater guidance from the front office and more explicit taskings and direction from the public affairs officer.

The public affairs officer has appropriately emphasized the need for better local employee mastery of rules and regulations related to grants, visitor programs, and other public diplomacy activities. Many local staff, despite years of service, lack adequate familiarity with formal regulations and guidelines. For example, in years past, the public affairs section did not have a panel to interview Fulbright scholarship applicants, and local staff members were not aware of this requirement. The public affairs section is now reestablishing Fulbright panels to better assess applicants. Reflecting the public affairs officer’s attention to detail, the section won the AF award during the OIG team’s visit for best reporting and tracking of public diplomacy activities, using the Mission Activity tracker software that measures the effectiveness of public diplomacy outreach to foreign audiences.

Public Affairs and the Mission Strategic Plan

The public affairs section has not succeeded in incorporating public diplomacy activities fully into the Mission Strategic Plan, in large part because other sections produced near final drafts on all goal papers and invited public affairs section participation only when the drafting process was nearly complete. The section has suggested, and the OIG team supports, introduction of a separate stand-alone public diplomacy goal paper in the 2012 Mission Strategic Plan. This will highlight the overall need for greater attention to public diplomacy in the special context of Ethiopia,

a country that receives a billion dollars annually in assistance from the United States but whose leadership viscerally resists some public diplomacy activities pursued by public affairs sections elsewhere.

Programmatic Activities

In the absence of overt U.S. pressure on the democracy and governance reform themes, the public affairs section has historically emphasized programs that promote interfaith tolerance and cooperation, improve media capacity, and support tertiary education. The recent passage of a civil society law that precludes foreign funding to most nongovernmental organizations will further constrain public diplomacy in Ethiopia. The OIG team commends the public affairs officer for accelerating disbursement of a grant to an interfaith peace-building nongovernmental organization before the law took effect.

Despite a cowed media environment, the information unit has succeeded in securing broad and consistent press coverage of U.S. mission assistance activities and of prominent U.S. visitors. Such active media coverage, like the reinvention of the Peace Corps program, once the largest in the world, has improved public understanding of the U.S. contribution to Ethiopia's development. The public affairs section is working collaboratively with USAID, which has its own development outreach coordinator, and CDC to broaden U.S. Government identification with assistance programs while not undercutting the very well-established recognition in Ethiopia of the USAID logo and branding. Embassy Addis Ababa's newly developed coordinating group will also further cooperation among USAID, CDC, PEPFAR, and the public affairs section.

During the OIG team's visit, the public affairs section was shifting programmatic focus towards democracy and transparency themes that will be of greater public interest as the 2010 national elections approach. The section launched a five-part series of highly cost-effective digital videoconferences on election-related themes. Prominent oppositionists dominated the first videoconference, with government officials refusing to attend. The second digital videoconference, however, had significant official participation because of skilled lobbying by the public affairs section. Building on the five videoconferences, the public affairs section will sponsor an intensive U.S. speakers program centered on the need for inclusive elections in countries of diverse populations. This is a core issue in Ethiopia, whose ruling party is dominated by a small minority group while ethnic Oromos and Amharas represent roughly two-thirds of the population.

The public affairs section's recognition of youth as a key audience for public diplomacy outreach is appropriate and timely. The information resource center sponsored an African-American History Month essay contest, which it conducted through the four American Corners for secondary school students. The theme of volunteerism reflects strong targeting and messaging to youth leaders. An upcoming youth conference on the same topic will reinforce the theme.

The Media Information Support Team

Reflecting the increased U.S. military presence in the Horn of Africa, Embassy Addis Ababa currently has a four-person Department of Defense media information support team. Members of the team are not covered under the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 process and are in Addis Ababa under a long-term but purportedly temporary arrangement. They report locally to the Defense attaché and ultimately to their command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Office space for the team has become contentious in that there is no room for them as temporary employees in the already overly subscribed-for new embassy compound, and their current quarters are slated for destruction. The team appears to have limited understanding of chief of mission authorities and would benefit from tighter oversight and integration into the mission. For example, they believe that only the chief of mission can instruct them and thus that there is no need for approval of their projects by the public affairs officer. Without at least informal coordination with the public affairs officer, however, the OIG team believes that the military information support team will continue not to fully factor into their proposals and activities the sociocultural context of Ethiopia. The OIG team left an informal recommendation that the chargé d'affaires meet with the military information support team to discuss better coordination with the public affairs section, as a precondition for continued temporary duty in Ethiopia. Further, the Ambassador could insist that the team take direction from the public affairs officer, who would submit formal input for their annual performance reviews. This practice has worked well at other missions with a military information support team.

A further OIG team concern is that the military information support team spends significant time and resources in identifying and developing projects – and leading local contacts to assume they will be awarded a contract – before vetting proposals with relevant mission elements. With such sunk costs, other embassy offices generally pass these projects on with only minor edits rather than a serious review. A better practice would be to coordinate the projects with the public affairs and political/economic sections earlier on. The OIG team left an informal recommendation to this effect.

Housekeeping

The OIG team commends the public affairs section for its exemplary preparation for the inspection. All grants files are in order and the grants data base up-to-date. The strategic plan for the section has been completed and the Web site upgraded. Further, with a view towards greater section unity, the public affairs officer has initiated more frequent meetings among American staff. The public affairs office has also usefully developed message points on mission objectives that all embassy employees can use.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

RESOURCES

Staffing

Agency	U.S. Direct Hires	Eligible family members	Local Staff	Contract Staff	Long-Term Temporary Staff	Total Staff
Department of State	69	13	850	-	1	933
USAID	19	-	170	30	-	219
Department of Defense	9	-	6	-	-	15
Centers for Disease Control	9	-	100	-	-	109
Peace Corps	4	-	-	-	-	4
Other Agencies	-	-	-	-	172	172
Totals	110	13	1,126	30	173	1,452

Budget (FY 2009 Actual)

State Program	\$2,583,100
ICASS	3,564,700
Public Diplomacy	529,100
Representation - State	45,700
Representation - Public Diplomacy	6,800
Total	\$6,729,400

Personnel Increase Requests

Embassy Addis Ababa's 2011 Mission Strategic Plan requests only one additional U.S. direct-hire position, an information systems officer. In addition, although not reflected in the strategic plan, USAID expects to request NSDD-38 approval for 15-30 U.S. employees and 30-50 locally employed staff to manage and support the President's Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative. USAID Washington hopes to assign at least ten development leadership initiative positions (akin to the Depart-

ment's entry-level officer positions) to the USAID mission in Addis Ababa, including positions in contracting and finance. None of these positions has been approved via the required NSDD-38 process, nor is there space in the new embassy building for this level of growth.

MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

From early spring until August 2009, Embassy Addis Ababa's management operation suffered from multiple, lengthy staffing gaps in key positions. These personnel shortfalls, infrequently filled for brief periods by temporary duty personnel, coincided with significant growth in the embassy's non-management staffing as well as with the construction of a new embassy next to the old facilities. Frequent personnel shuffles within the front office distracted embassy leadership, including acting DCMs, from management issues.

Staffing gaps in the front office and within the management section have created a difficult environment in which to accomplish more than the immediate. During the heavy make-ready season last spring, with 53 new families arriving, the embassy had only one general services officer and no management officer or facilities manager. Long term planning has suffered and management section employees are only now beginning to work on process improvement.

Despite such multiple challenges, the new team in place, with a full complement of officers, is well-positioned to make major, lasting changes to management operations. Customer complaints still exist, but progress is evident. The management officer, an FS-01 on his first such assignment, articulates his priorities with precision and understands the need to improve communication with the mission. A professional relationship with the DCM, who has a management background, should improve management section communication with embassy leadership and also give section employees a better sense of overall mission priorities. These improvements notwithstanding, the management officer could retain greater control and oversight over select issues, rather than pursuing a policy of delegating almost all tasks to unit chiefs under his supervision.

Embassy Addis Ababa has grown rapidly from 87 full-time American officers in 2005 to 163 Americans today. Concurrently, the management work load has more than doubled. The USAU, established in 2006 with its own Ambassador, requires support. Similarly, much increased USAID and CDC components generate additional work. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has a large, long-term, temporary duty presence in Addis Ababa, as does the Department of Defense whose

dozen or so elements within Ethiopia are not fully captured in embassy statistics. Typically, there are roughly 140 long-term temporary duty personnel in Addis Ababa working for Department of Defense elements and for the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. The visitor workload has risen from modest to that more typical of a large, busy embassy with considerable Washington interest. The OIG team's second week at Embassy Addis Ababa coincided with the arrival of six separate congressional delegations.

Construction of the new embassy compound, on the site of the present compound, began in February 2009 with completion scheduled for September 2010. The complications of working in an ultra-active construction zone include noise and infrequent, but disruptive, utility outages when the contractor inadvertently cuts unmarked power or water lines. In anticipation of the move to the new chancery, repairs and improvements to current embassy buildings are kept to a bare minimum.

The American management staff includes three general services officers (the third position was created and filled in August), a facilities manager, a financial management officer, a Foreign Service nurse practitioner, an information management officer, an information programs officer, two information management specialists, and a human resources officer. A second human resources officer position is pending NSDD-38 approval.

The management section's organizational structure and job descriptions have not yet been adapted to reflect the rapid growth in embassy personnel and the changes consolidation with CDS and USAID will bring. Without updated structures and position descriptions, the management section could experience confusion, interpersonal tension, and inefficiencies. Identifying areas where the most change is occurring, where position descriptions need to be updated, and where reorganization is needed is important to achieving long-term effectiveness and a cohesive management team.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Addis Ababa should identify management units that will experience significant change after partial consolidation with the management sections of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Centers for Disease Control and prepare organization charts and updated position descriptions for employees in those units before the move to the new embassy. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Management Consolidation

The primary focus of Embassy Addis Ababa's management section until September 2010 is the move to the new chancery and the accompanying consolidation of management services. Tenants in the new chancery will include major USAID and CDC offices as well as a joint management operation supporting all agencies. The embassy's goal is to smooth the transition to the extent possible. The OIG team was impressed with some of the thinking and early planning that is shaping consolidation. The implementation phase of the process, however, started late and is just beginning to take shape.

The embassy has been working with the Joint Management Council in the Department to identify consolidation areas to which USAID and CDC have agreed. The embassy anticipates no reduction in force for local employees. The growth in ICASS positions has not kept pace with the growth in program functions, and local employees from USAID and CDC will augment the State ICASS staff in key consolidation units, thus reducing the need for even larger staffing increases. The ICASS council has approved 17 new positions for the consolidated section.

The management officer has assigned responsibility for consolidation planning to the supervisory general services officer who had previously done a management consolidation with USAID and has developed an outline for making consolidation work. The process to date, however, has involved little coordination or consultation with others in the management section. The supervisory general services officer has not communicated detailed timelines and outcomes to those who need to know, while the management officer has remained outside of the process. The OIG team found that when the supervisory general services officer was out of the office for a few days, no one else knew enough about the entire process to assume his portfolio or to report on progress.

With so little time remaining and so much critical planning yet to be done or even started, more knowledge transfer within the management section is critical. The consolidation timeline lacks measurable, identifiable outcomes, such as completion of process maps, written policies and procedures, and updated position descriptions.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop a specific and measurable timeline that identifies all of the steps necessary to create an effective joint management operation. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The management officer has a gift for delegating. However, the consolidation of three management sections into one is a complex organizational task, with major ramifications not only for employees in the section but also on the efficiency, morale, and effectiveness of the entire embassy. Success requires the expert guidance and assistance of the management officer.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the management officer to be a knowledgeable and active participant in consolidation planning and implementation. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The supervisory general services officer and the USAID executive officer drafted a Department/ICASS, USAID, and CDC administrative services consolidation plan memorandum of understanding in October 2009 and circulated it to USAID and CDC. The document sets out the USAID, CDC, and Department agreement as to guiding principles, services for consolidation, and processes to be followed. It reflects buy-in from all three agencies and sets the expectations for interagency participation in the consolidation process. At the end of February 2010, the embassy had yet to issue the memorandum.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Addis Ababa should complete and sign the joint administrative services consolidation plan memorandum of understanding. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The New Embassy Compound Construction Project

The new embassy in Addis Ababa, with space for 568 employees, will be sub-Saharan Africa's largest. Although the facility was originally designed for 472 employees, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations enlarged it to accommodate 96 additional employees after the project was awarded. The mission had not anticipated the exceptionally rapid growth in USAID, CDC, and military and law enforcement operations when the original planning numbers were created. The new embassy project director has coordinated with each agency that will occupy the building to assign spaces and to accommodate new requirements. Space remains tight, particularly in the controlled access area, with pressure to fit in additional USAU and military positions.

Embassy Addis Ababa has embraced the complex new embassy project, despite the challenges of working in a construction zone. This reflects the skill of the project director and team in keeping the embassy informed at every stage of the project, which is well on schedule.

More broadly, the OIG team commends the exceptional coordination between the project director and the embassy elements that will occupy and maintain the new space. Turnover discussions and training are already underway. The project director has reached out to the regional security and information management officers as well as the facilities manager to establish detailed training schedules. The director has worked with each embassy interlocutor to allow American and local staff responsible for maintaining the buildings systems to shadow and work with Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations staff and learn about the each new system from installation through operational testing. This coordination element is critical to the ultimate success of the turnover process and the transition from construction site to working building.

At the OIG team's request, the project director provided a copy of the procedures that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations prescribes for the turnover of a new embassy compound. The project director in Addis Ababa has been even more forward leaning in working with Embassy Addis Ababa, providing a schedule for maintenance employees to work with his staff on a regular basis. The OIG team would like to see these procedures followed in every new embassy project.

The local staff in the facilities maintenance unit expressed concern about receiving enough training to handle the state-of-the-art utility systems. Although the contractor has already begun training, which local employees have attended, they stated this was basic and insufficient. Locally employed staff in Ethiopia have been working with the most low-tech systems and will now be expected to run the most high-tech systems with minimal training. They are nervous about this and it is to their credit that they are asking for more training. There are few courses available at the Foreign Service Institute or the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations that can give these employees the training that they need.

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and Embassy Addis Ababa, should locate or design a training program for the facilities management staff who will work in the new embassy compound. (Action: OBO, in coordination with FSI and Embassy Addis Ababa)

The embassy has a move coordinator, an eligible family member who traveled to Ouagadougou to observe the move to a newly constructed embassy there and came back with excellent ideas. The coordinator has created nine move working groups with coordinators for each. One, the so-called “cafeteria working group”, will focus on creative problem solving. The new embassy’s cafeteria has seating room for only 80 people, a serious issue in an embassy with 568 employees and no restaurants nearby. The cafeteria was sized far too small for the original 427 occupants of the building, even before an additional 96 positions were added to the building plan. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has offered no solutions to this problem, leaving it to the embassy to cope.

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should use Embassy Addis Ababa as a case study to review the standards for cafeteria spaces in embassy construction projects and to ensure that the cafeteria size in future projects is adequate to support the building occupants. (Action: OBO)

The embassy also has established a working group to review parking options, both during the next phase of construction and after the new parking lot construction is finished. With the addition of USAID and CDC to the new embassy, on-site parking will be even tighter. There are no on-street options in the area, nor does safe public transportation exist. The OIG team left an informal recommendation for Embassy Addis Ababa to create as many spaces as possible.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

A generalist financial management officer and a highly professional staff of 11 local employees operate the financial management unit. The unit supports 32 Department and other agency components, and a steady stream of temporary duty and high-level visitors, including congressional delegations. The embassy’s serviced accounts increased from \$15 million in FY 2005 to \$46 million in FY 2009. The unit handles this workload well. Financial management services received high scores on the ICASS customer satisfaction survey and on OIG workplace and quality of life questionnaires. The staff is responsive to customers, knowledgeable about the regulations, and conscientious about observing required management controls. Funds management has improved since the last OIG inspection and has become the unit’s strong suit. The unit is effective in establishing, liquidating, and monitoring obligations.

The financial management unit supports two ambassadors – one at the bilateral mission and one at USAU. USAU itself has no independent budget authority, and its funds are “fenced” amounts from the bilateral mission’s diplomatic and consular program allotment. The unit maintains an impressive cuff record system that allows it to provide competent, real-time budget information to this key customer. The system works well for the bilateral mission, the USAU, and AF. The mission also has a growing PEPFAR program, and the financial management unit manages continually increasing health-related and HIV/AIDS funding. The OIG team observed effective coordination among the financial management unit, USAID, and CDC in budget formulation and execution for PEPFAR projects.

Financial management unit internal controls recommendations are presented in the management controls section of the report.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

The creation of a joint management platform for the new embassy will transition some employees into ICASS for whom other agencies were previous paying. The consolidation of services will reduce somewhat the parallel management structures that previously existed, particularly with USAID. In 2007, USAID became a subscriber to ICASS for residential housing and maintenance. The mission does not have a combined furniture pool, but the ICASS council will consider this once the joint management operation is functional and the move to the new embassy is completed.

The embassy management section has been working closely with the Joint Management Council. The section is on track for consolidating many general services functions—and to a lesser extent financial management and human resources offices functions—with USAID and CDC in time for the impending move. Interagency working groups have planned for consolidation in four key areas: customs and shipping; warehousing; procurement; and motor pool. These working groups have identified 30 local employee positions at other agencies that will be transitioned to ICASS. The management section has secured ICASS approval and funding for 17 additional local positions to round out the platform. These positions will be filled during the transition.

Consolidation and transition ICASS budget planning has been impressive. Despite some initial objections from ICASS council members, \$800,000 for new embassy-related expenses was included in the FY 2010 ICASS target and allocated to agencies according to the space they will occupy in the new building. The finan-

cial management unit has informed all agencies that costs will rise as a result of the move. ICASS costs will increase sharply as a result of the new embassy compound's higher electricity consumption. The current annual ICASS electricity expense is roughly \$90,000 per year. The amount is expected to jump to as much as \$1.5 million per year, a notional figure based on increases in Nairobi upon that embassy's move to a new building.

Human Resources

The American human resources officer, plus a staff of eight local employees, supports more than 1,100 local employees, 140 long-term temporary duty U.S. personnel, and 163 Americans working full-time in Addis Ababa. The unit also provides human resources support to Embassy Djibouti.

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Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Human Resources should provide an assistance visit to Embassy Addis Ababa and work with the embassy to increase employee retention. (Action: HR)

The current human resources officer supports training and is focused on staff development. Although the embassy has sent sizeable numbers of employees to outside training, two key training needs remain. The mission has not had on-site training for local employee supervisory skills and customer service. After management consolidation, many local employee supervisors will be managing expanded sections that include former USAID and CDC personnel. The units will need leadership from section supervisors to forge effective teams. Twenty-five of the first-line locally employed staff supervisors have not had supervisory skills training.

Procurement and customs and shipping units could do better in terms of customer service. In the new environment, when USAID, CDC, and other agency support staff are melded into one entity, each unit will need customer service training as a group, with all unit staff hearing and understanding the same customer service message. Both types of training are necessary before the move to the new building to serve as a part of the team building that will be essential for consolidation. To be successful, the on-site training would include all USAID and CDC employees who will be cross-walked to the ICASS joint management offices as part of the consolidation. The embassy has requested this training from the Foreign Service Institute and the Regional Services Center in Frankfurt, but the requests were denied.

Recommendation 14: The Foreign Service Institute should work with Embassy Addis Ababa to set up on-site supervisory and customer service training for local employees, as part of an optimal transition to the joint management platform. (Action: FSI, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa)

The human resources unit runs an excellent performance evaluation program for local employees, with support from the management officer and DCM. Most evaluation reports are completed on time, but reviews for a number of management section local employees were late during the past year. A few employees did not receive within-grade increases on time. The OIG team left an informal recommendation for the embassy to counsel individual officers on the importance of this process and, as necessary, discipline repeat offenders.

The locally employed staff handbook is outdated; it was last revised in 2007. A new handbook is nearly complete, lacking only the final edits. The OIG team made an informal recommendation to update the local employee handbook.

The Office of Overseas Employment has approved the mission's inclusion in the defined contribution plan for retirement planning. The embassy is working with the locally employed staff forum to address employee concerns about the change in retirement savings programs. The embassy is giving priority to sorting out the remaining details as to start date and the transfer of funds from the local provident fund to the defined contribution plan. However, further work is needed in the Department to determine the optimal way to transfer funds from the local provident fund to the defined contribution plan.

Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and Embassy Addis Ababa, should complete the transfer of the Addis Ababa provident fund account to the defined contribution plan. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF and Embassy Addis Ababa)

Workforce Planning

Mission Addis Ababa has had a difficult environment in which to achieve realistic workforce planning. With dynamic growth and front office leadership in prolonged transition, the mission has scrambled to stay ahead of the planning curve and to determine its own future. The absence of an accurate workforce plan led to a near disaster during the first phases of new embassy construction. An embassy planned to house 427 desk positions will now hold 568 – and the current staff will just fit. The embassy has seen growth in military operations, USAID, CDC, and management support positions. When the new embassy opens it will also include a new four-person legal attaché section and a three-person Foreign Agricultural Service office – neither of which was part of embassy Addis Ababa five years ago.

The embassy does not currently require all agencies to use the NSDD-38 process to request permission to add U.S. personal service contract employees to their staff. These personnel, however, consume the same embassy resources as a U.S. direct-hire employee, including office space, housing, and other ICASS services. They also fall under chief of mission authority for security and other purposes. If the mission does not request NSDD-38 approval for U.S. personal services contractors, agencies can add positions without regard to the effect that they will have on overall mission resources.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Addis Ababa should require all agencies to use the National Security Decision Directive-38 process before adding U.S. personal services contractor positions. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The growth in program positions has required increased ICASS staff to support the new personnel and operations. The ICASS council has approved new local employee positions. Within the last month, the embassy received an NSDD-38 request for a second human resources officer.

A rightsizing review with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation is planned for November 2010. The timing is ideal, occurring just a few months after the move to the new embassy. The embassy should begin identifying staffing priorities and discussing with other agencies the program changes, proposed staffing increases, and space and resource constraints that will drive the process. The OIG team left an informal recommendation for the management office to begin now to engage the DCM and other agencies in workforce planning discussions.

General Services

Procurement

The somewhat inexperienced procurement unit manages a heavy workload reasonably well. The unit could, however, benefit from more direct American supervision and a stronger accent on customer communication. Customer complaints generally highlight a lack of communication on procurement orders. Customers were particularly vocal about a lack of transparency regarding year-end procurement requests. The OIG team counseled the supervisory general services officer and recommended informally that the procurement unit provide periodic status reports to its customers. (See the human resources section of the report for a formal recommendation to obtain customer service training for the procurement unit's employees.)

All employees in the unit are aware of mission operating requirements and procurement rules. The OIG team commends the unit for its assistance to the financial management unit, which has achieved superb results in clearing unliquidated obligations.

Property Management

The assistant general services officer in charge of the property management unit has shaped up the embassy's property management program. Nonexpendable and expendable inventory overages and shortages were less than one percent in the last reporting cycle. With evident energy and direction, the assistant general services officer transformed a warehouse "disaster" into the management office's success story of the year. What was once a chaotic collection of furniture, appliances, supplies, and equipment is now a clean, well-organized warehouse where property is neatly arranged and readily accessible.

The unit conducted a very productive property sale at the end of 2009, both monetarily and operationally. Its work preparing for the next sale is equally impres-

sive. In addition to work done for the Department, the unit performs ICASS property management and warehousing services for CDC and two Department of Defense elements. USAID will consolidate its property management function with the embassy after it moves into the new embassy compound.

The warehouse compound is leased property, about 30 minutes from the embassy. The various buildings and structures were constructed on a sloped lot and space is tight. There is little room for trucks to turn around and unloading is difficult. When shipments arrive, containers are unloaded immediately because there is no room to hold them. The limitations of the warehouse compound limit the ability of the property management unit to provide efficient service during peak periods.

The new embassy compound does not include a warehouse, but it does contain a general services office/facilities maintenance annex that will house the motor pool, motor vehicle repair shop, and expendable supplies storage. The new annex vehicle maintenance area is too small to service all embassy vehicles and there is insufficient space to park all embassy vehicles.

A new proposed consolidated warehouse compound, with space for shops and official vehicle parking, is located 20 minutes from the embassy. This facility, which has loading docks and container holding space, would be ideal for the consolidated property management operation. Much planning and execution remains before this new warehouse option can become a reality.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should consolidate the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services property management operation and obtain a lease for a warehouse facility that will support all mission property management requirements. (Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with AF and OBO)

Customs and Shipping

The customs and shipping unit is a steady performer but is overly dependent on its locally employed supervisor and gets low marks for customer communication. There is a long and slow pipeline for getting ground shipments to the embassy. Delays are associated with the extensive and languid host country bureaucracy, and the need to transship surface shipments through the port in Djibouti. The unit's American supervisor and local staff are not fully knowledgeable as to what causes delays at

Ethiopian customs. They could also acquire a better understanding of the difficulties faced by freight forwarders moving shipments through Djibouti. The American management section has not been together long enough to understand all the unit's challenges. All in all, the unit has little leverage to hasten the arrival of incoming shipments or provide customers credible explanations for shipment delays.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the supervisory and assistant general services officers to make fact finding trips to Ethiopian customs clearance warehouses and Djibouti freight forwarders to evaluate and better understand customs and transportation activities essential to the embassy's logistics. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The customs and shipping unit has been dependent on its local staff for most customer feedback, which in many cases has been too little, late, and ineffective. The unit does not provide customer feedback on a systematic and recurring basis.

Recommendation 19: Embassy Addis Ababa should implement a process to provide weekly status updates to customers with pending shipments. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Motor Pool

The embassy has an ambitious motor pool program that supports diverse requirements, many resulting from a chief of mission finding that public transportation in Addis Ababa is unsafe. Mission employees praise the motor pool for its support of official visitors and temporary duty personnel. The mission has ample vehicles to support other travel requirements, but recent mission growth has outpaced the increase in available drivers and sometimes results in customer complaints. The embassy has completed the hiring process for six additional drivers. The OIG team recommended informally that the unit coordinate with the motor pool consolidation working group to determine whether additional drivers are needed to support the consolidated motor pool workload.

DriveCam and eServices programs were both installed in June 2009. DriveCam is a program that video records driving behavior and accidents and provides feedback to the Department and embassy on driving situations and driver and passenger

behavior in embassy vehicles. It was imposed by the Office of Safety, Health and Environmental Management as a result of the motor pool's high accident rate. The DriveCam program is helpful, especially in calling attention to driver safety.

The DriveCam program is a source of frustration for managers and also a morale issue for drivers because its contractor administrator, based in California, does not distinguish between driving conditions in the United States and the developing world. Addis Ababa ranks among the most difficult places anywhere to avoid accidents. Managers and drivers are frustrated by criticism they perceive as unfair. American officers have asked the Department and the contractor to adjust the program, but to no avail. The OIG team recommended informally that since the DriveCam program was implemented to improve the safe driving skills of drivers in the developing world, the general services office continue its dialogue with the Department and the DriveCam contractor to adjust events they take exception to and help continue the positive change in driver behavior.

Migration to eServices has especially burdened the motor pool unit. The eServices motor pool component works well for routine trips but does not offer an easy way to arrange more complex movements or to alter a previous order. In the end, the system creates more confusion for the motor pool unit than it solves. Consolidation will bring USAID and CDC motor pool vehicles and services under the ICASS platform. The OIG team believes the success or failure of the ICASS consolidation will depend on the results of the motor pool transition—the consolidation's most visible activity.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, should create a motor pool service ordering system that works in the Embassy Addis Ababa consolidated motor pool environment. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with M/PRI)

Housing

The doubling of the housing pool since 2007 has created a strain on the housing unit, though it is managing well. The unit manages 122 residential short-term leases and two government-owned residences. The residential inventory has kept pace with embassy growth and the recent addition of USAID as an ICASS housing customer.

Housing is expensive and difficult to find in Addis Ababa. The growth in international organization presence in Addis Ababa is driving up prices and the housing staff has increasing difficulty locating properties within a reasonable distance of the embassy. The housing quality itself is good but the chaotic traffic is not. Staff complaints about the dodge-'em-car 30-minute commutes are frequent. The management section has worked with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to implement rental benchmarking and eliminate the need for rental ceiling waiver requests.

The housing unit includes two eligible family member make-ready coordinators. The make-ready workload, during peak transfer seasons, is a challenge for both the housing and the facilities maintenance units. The make-ready coordinators are the interface between the two sections, setting up schedules and keeping all parties in the loop on changes to arrival dates and priorities.

The housing unit has some upcoming challenges. The locally employed housing supervisor, a 12-year veteran, received a special immigrant visa and is leaving in June. The management office is preparing for his departure, but nonetheless his contributions will be deeply missed and hard to replace. Others in the unit are competent, but lack the supervisor's knowledge. The housing unit staff does a good job of reporting and managing the housing database, but the general services office should begin now to hire and groom a replacement for the housing supervisor so that the unit is ready to manage the heavy summer workload.

Facilities Management

Embassy Addis Ababa's experienced facilities manager arrived in November 2009 to find a workforce hungry for leadership. The unit's new maintenance supervisor began work on the same day in November 2009, after a 10-month gap in the position. (b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6) (b)(2)(b)(6) The facilities manager implemented critical changes and improvements to the facilities management program, beginning with a regular weekly meeting to foster teamwork within the unit.

Soon after his arrival, the facilities manager established a safety, health, and environmental management committee to focus on safety upgrades. As a result, first aid kits and fire extinguishers are on order for vehicles. The facilities manager writes a safety column for the embassy newsletter and has hired a local occupational safety and health assistant. The facilities manager is preparing a purchase request for safety shoes, goggles, and clothing for the maintenance staff. The unit needs more safety training, especially for new personnel. The OIG team left an informal recommendation to establish a safety training program for the facilities management unit.

The embassy's facilities manager is working with the new embassy project director to identify maintenance requirements that will drive a reorganization of the facilities management section. The ICASS council approved eight new positions to support building maintenance. The manager will likely fill some of the new positions with qualified employees working for the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations who know the building and the systems in it. Once the reorganization is complete, the facilities manager will hold an offsite with his staff, including those cross-walked from USAID, to foster teamwork before the move to the new building.

When the embassy moves into the new chancery and the facilities management unit takes over maintenance of the new utility systems, comprehensive preventive maintenance records will be the key to success. The system used in many posts, Work Orders for Windows, is less effective in providing the kind of maintenance history this embassy will need than other available software products.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Addis Ababa should request, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should approve, the use of off-the-shelf software for preventive maintenance scheduling and record keeping for new embassy systems. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with OBO)

In addition to the new embassy construction, the mission has two other priorities for the facilities management unit and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations. Both the chief of mission's residence and the DCM's residence need major renovation. The chief of mission's residence is a beautiful old structure, known as the Roosevelt House, but furnishings and floor coverings are tired and ready for refurbishment. The embassy is exploring whether this residence meets the criteria for inclusion in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations historically significant buildings program.

USAU occupies the former DCM's residence. USAU will move into the new embassy, once construction is complete, and their current offices will revert to the DCM's residence. The embassy has requested funding for the renovation work for both projects but the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has declined this request.

The facilities management unit lacks a basic stock of high quality repair parts and supplies to keep up with requests for maintenance at employee residences—in a mission that has doubled its residential maintenance workload in the past three years. Local employees in the facilities section must often try to locate an inferior lo-

cal product to fix an appliance because there is no stock of repair parts and supplies purchased from U.S. vendors. The OIG team informally recommended that the facilities manager work with the facilities staff, the budget office, and the procurement staff to identify items that the embassy should order on a regular basis and keep in stock as well as to identify vendors who can quickly supply needed parts and equipment and with whom the embassy should maintain a blanket purchase agreement.

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' policy is to assign a second facilities manager, on a temporary assignment, six to nine months before completion of a new embassy project to assist with the move and new building shake-out issues and to remain until the decommissioning process is completed. Although the embassy has made repeated requests for this resource, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has not assigned a second facility management officer to Addis Ababa to assist with the move to the new embassy.

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should assign a transition facilities manager to Embassy Addis Ababa to assist with the move to the new embassy and the decommissioning process. (Action: OBO)

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SECURITY

The information management program, under the leadership of the information management officer, stands out for efficiency, technical skill, and customer service—all achieved despite Ethiopia's relatively primitive, user-unfriendly information and telecommunications systems.

Embassy Addis Ababa's information management program is comprehensive to say the least. In fact, the OIG team found them similar to those of much larger embassies, which feature rapidly growing customer bases and revolving doors of ranking delegations and temporary duty visitors.

As is endemic with African missions, the operating environment and local infrastructure have presented constant problems, aggravated by an atypically high turnover rate in local staff. Other problems, unresolved by the less skillful previous management team, linger. In general, however, information managers have gained

the upper ground. Staff morale is high, and teamwork is evident. Management quickly addressed several areas of concern identified during the inspection. High ICASS survey results and solid scoring on OIG questionnaires also confirm that the program is successful.

The information management program covers an array of information technology operations, including the OpenNet network, the ClassNet network, and a dedicated Internet network. The program also comprises pouch management, mailroom operations, and radio, telephone, and Internet services, among others. The program is one of the largest operations in AF: there are over 500 users; 350 workstations; and, 13 servers in the OpenNet network. The classified network includes approximately 40 workstations and five servers.

New Embassy Compound Construction

Embassy Addis Ababa is in a unique situation in that the new embassy is being constructed on a site immediately adjacent to the current embassy. Collaboration between the new embassy project director and the information management officer is highly effective and involves all facets of information management. Typically, coordination between information management and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations is minimal during the preliminary stages of construction. The bureau's project director, however, has provided the information management staff the opportunity to become familiar with the new embassy's cabling and infrastructure through a scheduled work rotation. The OIG team was told that this collaboration is at the initiative of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in order to better merge existing embassy information management procedures into those being established for new embassies. The OIG team commends this approach.

Staffing

The information management operation has experienced considerable turnover in every section, with errors by the previous management team leading to the loss of several key personnel. The effects still linger, in part because the learning period for a newly hired systems administrator is typically eight months. Surprisingly, retention is even difficult in higher graded positions. Although there is no fix-all solution to this problem, the OIG team consulted with management regarding possible approaches. The issue is further addressed in the human resources section of this report.

Information Management Specialist Position

The 2004 OIG inspection report recommended the creation of an additional information management specialist position. The position, intended to provide needed support, was also created to address the mission's information system security officer duties. In 2008, the position was created in coordination with AF but with the stipulation that Embassy Addis Ababa would provide regional support when requested. Due to inattention to detail, however, the position's NSDD-38 description did not note these regional duties. Previous information managers then erred by fending off various opportunities for the incumbent specialist to provide regional support. An added problem was that the regional aspect of the position was the sole reason the incumbent specialist had requested that assignment. Without a formal agreement in place, this will remain an issue of contention between the embassy and AF.

Recommendation 23: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should establish a memorandum of agreement addressing the information management specialist's regional responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with AF)

Fiber Optic Network

Embassy Addis Ababa is currently waiting for the completion of an underwater fiber optic cable extended along the coast of East Africa. The connection, provided via African-owned SEACOM, provides enhanced Internet access. SEACOM officials have been in negotiations with the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation for the past two years with no result. Some neighboring African countries have negotiated agreements with SEACOM in a few weeks. The Ethiopian connection is contingent on Djibouti's connection due to profitability issues. SEACOM representatives have stated that there is little time left and action is required at the highest levels of the Ethiopian government. The OIG team believes that this issue is critical to the overall effectiveness of Embassy Addis Ababa operations and warrants elevation to the Ambassador.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Addis Ababa should meet with Ethiopian authorities and request approval for the SEACOM connection. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Information Systems Center

The information systems center runs effectively. The staff of four systems administrators, headed by a senior administrator who is widely respected throughout the mission, operates as a cohesive unit. The information systems center currently uses the Department's eServices applications for all the offices it supports, except for that of the regional security office. Management has stated its intent to fold the regional security office into the eServices platform after the move to the new embassy.

Management continues to stress the need for an information systems officer position in the center. The mission referred to a recommendation in the 2004 OIG inspection report as justification for the need for the additional informational systems officer position in the FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan. The mission was under the assumption that the 2004 OIG recommendation was still pending, but the recommendation was resolved in 2008 via the creation of a fourth information management specialist position.

A new information systems center position would be ideal, but AF is not inclined to permit this until other bureau staffing shortfalls are addressed. The OIG team suggested that management consider restructuring the staff after the move to the new embassy. A specialist position from the information program center can then be relocated to the information systems center, a move that has proven successful at other embassies moving into new facilities. The recently vacated information management associate position is currently being advertised with the possibility that additional support could be located in the information programs center if needed. The OIG team made an informal recommendation regarding this issue.

Diplomatic Pouch and Mailroom Operation

Embassy Addis Ababa manages an active mail and diplomatic pouch operation. The group supports an array of functions that consist of publication, local mail, pouch, and homeward bound services, in addition to providing backup support to other operations. Consistent with all sections in the information management program, the mailroom staff has experienced significant turnover. The level of service has remained high, despite a demanding, ever-increasing workload. The month of December alone experienced daily pouch deliveries of a ton or more.

The mailroom's homeward-bound program continues to serve as the mission's personal outgoing mail process. The program, ultra-expensive at six dollars per pound, is also complicated. The process invites confusion as users must interface with the employees' association and mailroom staff in addition to filling out an

optional United States Postal Service application. The OIG team discussed with information managers the need to streamline the process. Prior to the OIG team's departure, information managers began to address the issue and intend to issue a management notice explaining the program. The OIG team left an informal recommendation regarding this issue.

The ability to send outgoing mail is important to mission morale. With the increased size of the American staff complement at Embassy Addis Ababa, information managers might consider establishing a diplomatic post office. Regulations require the embassy to start this process by doing a cost analysis and determining if there is support and adequate ICASS resources. Information managers have already begun this process. The OIG team supports this initiative and issued an informal recommendation to that effect.

Work Equipment

During the inspection, information management looked again at providing necessary uniforms and protective equipment to the local staff. The issue, previously stalled by various sections of management, is still pending. Local staff outlined in detail their standing request for equipment that includes shirts, pants, gloves, boots, lifting support, and rain gear. The American supervisor approved the request but the management section never processed it. The items requested would improve the physical safety of the work force and enhance the group's professional identity.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Addis Ababa should provide the mailroom staff and telephone/radio technicians with the equipment necessary to conduct their work, including shirts, pants, gloves, boots, lifting support, and rain gear. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

QUALITY OF LIFE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

The embassy has a well functioning Equal Employment Opportunity program that benefits from coordination between the human resources office and the Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. The counselor has assisted employees on a variety of matters and is available to employees of other missions in the region. The embassy's caseload is small, in large part because the counselor guides complainants to alternative and equally effective remedies. The human resources office promotes the program, working closely with the counselor on the Equal Employment Opportunity portion of the quarterly locally employed staff orientation exercise. Equal Employment Opportunity information is prominently displayed outside the cashier office in the administrative annex.

COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICE

Embassy Addis Ababa's two community liaison office coordinators are a dynamic team. Both are experienced, energetic, enthusiastic, and community-oriented. The community liaison office is a focal point for the mission and heavily focused on promoting morale. The office runs the orientation program for new employees, including a forum in which members of the local staff provide an Ethiopian cultural context. The office also organizes the embassy's orientation programs in October and March.

The community liaison office coordinators are often the first contact that a new arrival will have with the mission and the first port of call when frustrations arise. They send welcome emails when an employee is assigned to the mission. They meet with new staff and family members within a few days of their arrival.

New arrivals to Embassy Addis Ababa express frustration with the lack of information on how to accomplish simple tasks, such as setting up Internet at home or obtaining a local driver's license. Information they receive is often incomplete, requiring several visits to an office to accomplish what could have been done in one trip

with better information. Shipment information for vehicles, household effects, and consumables is sometimes unavailable. Time is wasted, damaging morale and taking employees away from their work unnecessarily.

Recommendation 26: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop information sheets for new arrivals that help them to get settled into their new environment. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

HEALTH UNIT

Employees hold the busy health unit in high regard. The unit maintains excellent relationships with its customers and with local care providers. The management office supports the unit, ensuring that patient care is never compromised due to resource limitations.

A Foreign Service health practitioner is the embassy medical officer. A regional medical officer, two registered nurses, and a laboratory technician support the embassy medical officer. A new regional medical technologist position, approved but not yet filled, will serve the mission well. The new embassy building's health unit will feature a much larger laboratory than the medical unit has in its current location. This new laboratory, coupled with the addition of the regional medical technologist, will create an opportunity for the health unit to improve the skills of the locally employed lab technician.

The embassy is fortunate to have good regional air connections to handle its frequent medical evacuations, many associated with the high altitude of Addis Ababa. Transportation is readily available for visits from other regional medical officers and to the medical evacuation point in London.

The health unit is concerned with the quality of local care. Ethiopia's medical facilities would rarely meet U.S. standards, and many lack the latest diagnostic equipment. The best doctors tend to leave the country. When the regional medical officer is out of country, it is at times necessary to seek physician services outside the unit. While an American pediatrician and a U.S.-trained behavioral counselor are available, there are few good physicians in other specialties.

The unit would like to hire a part-time consultant because volume is high and the staff cannot always meet the requirements. The OIG team recommended informally that the health unit coordinate with the management and human resources offices to determine the best means to procure medical consultant services.

RECREATION ASSOCIATION

The American Embassy Employees' Association board energetically directs association activities. Association services include a commissary, library/video library, cafeteria, tennis courts, and an offsite recreational facility at Lake Langanu two hours south of Addis Ababa. Currently, the commissary is a profitable enterprise. The cafeteria breaks even at best but provides quality food service and is important for community morale. The Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs thoroughly inspected the association's operation in March 2009 and provided a comprehensive report with 25 action items. The association has taken action on many of them.

The association has not completed important actions related to administrative management and internal controls. The board's recent attempt to sign a license agreement with the embassy for logistical support was not approved by the Office of Commissary and Recreation affairs. The board is working to modify the agreement language, as required. The OIG team recommended informally that the board make effecting its licensing agreement a priority. In addition, the association has not followed the recommendation to implement an automated accounting system. This and a related matter are discussed in the management controls section of the report. The association has a strong balance sheet with significant cash reserves.

OVERSEAS SCHOOLS

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(b)(2)(b)(6) The school receives an annual grant from the Office of Overseas Schools and grants from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for security upgrades. The school has begun the contracting work to construct a perimeter wall and install cameras. The embassy will use a Bureau of Diplomatic Security grant to reimburse the school upon completion of the security upgrade project.

The Defense attaché chairs the school board and the financial management officer sits on the board as the ambassador's representative. The board recently declined to renew the school director's contract, which expires in 2011. That decision created some controversy, which seems to have quieted. Families are generally satisfied with the school. Many, in fact, chose an assignment to Addis Ababa because of the school's reputation.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The chief of mission memorandum regarding assurance on management controls, dated August 7, 2009, states that Embassy Addis Ababa's systems of management controls, taken as a whole, comply with the Comptroller General of the United States' standards and the Department's objectives. Also, it states that assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation and does not identify any deficiencies in inventory controls. The OIG team found little evidence in the form of an operative management controls program to support the assertions.

Much to their credit, the current DCM and management officer, both arriving after the 2009 assertion, observed the lack of a viable management controls program and cited this to the OIG team as a recurring problem at Addis Ababa. The management officer used the Department's management controls assessment materials to conduct a rigorous management controls exercise in which all embassy sections participated. The DCM and management officer analyzed the results and assigned corrective actions to section heads. The embassy shared the results with the OIG team in an effort to improve management controls and set up a sustainable program. The embassy has addressed vulnerabilities and remedied them. Despite management's best efforts, however, the OIG team found a few issues that need attention.

E-SERVICES

A key challenge for the embassy's management controls program is integrating the recent addition of eServices into its management operation. The embassy had not prepared for the eServices installation before the arrival of a Collaborative Management Initiative team in June 2009. The team, in fact, arrived just prior to a wholesale turnover in the management section and at the same time the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' Office of Safety, Health and Environment team was in Addis Ababa to install the DriveCam program.

Although the embassy was clearly unprepared for such a shift in operations, the team installed the entire eServices suite of programs and disabled other service request systems. The team had scheduled only a week at the embassy to install the new system and train service providers and users. The team provided no systems integration support to help the embassy adapt their processes to the new tool. The

team provided generic e-Services training materials, some of which were inaccurate or incomplete, and did not address how the tool is used in Embassy Addis Ababa. Only 200 of the potential 1,200 users were trained. Summer turnover for the mission exceeded 50 percent and new arrivals did not know how to use e-Services. In an embassy already beset with management challenges, this one caused a near collapse. Both the eService and DriveCam programs needed significant bandwidth to run—something in short supply in Ethiopia where the government-controlled information systems are creaky at best.

The OIG team found that most e-Services components are not working well. It will be months before they are useful to customers, service providers, and managers. Customers have access to the program and its instructions, which on the surface appear to be intuitive and user friendly, but in reality often leave users unclear on how to navigate the user interface to request a particular service. In many cases, eServices does not effectively convert customer requests to meaningful orders that can be filled by service providers. Service providers noted that e-Services often complicated their jobs and required them to create work-arounds. The e-Services' objective to match the embassy's operating results with ICASS service standards is far from reality. All of this has far reaching implications in a management control context—the management office finds it difficult to deliver timely and quality services and customers are often left frustrated and unhappy.

Recommendation 27: The Under Secretary for Management's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa and the Foreign Service Institute, should create an effective system of customer service and support within the eServices framework. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa and FSI)

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Cashier Controls

The embassy makes extensive use of petty cash purchases to operate in the Ethiopian cash economy. The OIG team considered the anomaly of this practice and agreed it is reasonable. The management office uses subcashiers in the general services unit for local cash procurements. In addition, funds are advanced to subcashiers in CDC and the Department of Defense.

The supervisors of these sub-cashiers have not verified the advances on a monthly basis as required by 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3 a. Supervisors of other subcashiers with smaller advances, subject to quarterly verifications, have not performed all necessary verifications. As a result, the embassy has been at risk that errors, defalcations, and misuse involving cash may go undetected. The subcashier's U.S. citizen supervisor is responsible for ensuring that verifications are done in a timely manner (4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3 f.).

Recommendation 28: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop and implement a system to ensure that subcashier supervisors conduct monthly, unannounced cash verifications and quarterly verifications of lesser amounts. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Ababa should update work requirement statements for all Department of State subcashier supervisors to assign responsibility for cash verifications required by 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3 f. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Verification of Shipping Charges

The financial management unit did not compare employees' assignment travel expenses to GSO shipment files in order to determine the veracity of charges. An informal recommendation was offered to ensure this comparison is made before approving payments to local shippers.

HUMAN RESOURCES

The human resources office performs the embassy's timekeeping function and understands post differential termination rules. The unit failed to recognize the need to terminate post differential twice during the past year, but corrected itself and made adjustments and obtained reimbursement accordingly. The human resources office relies on an informal notification system to ensure it complies with allowance terminations. There are no mission-specific written policies and procedures for pro-

cessing changes in post differential and some American travelers may be unaware of their obligation under 4 FAH-3 H-533.10-3 c. to inform the embassy of travel to the United States, requiring termination of post differential.

Recommendation 30: Embassy Addis Ababa should prepare written policies and procedures to administer its allowance program. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 31: Embassy Addis Ababa should issue a management instruction reminding employees of the requirements and circumstances to terminate post differential when traveling to the United States. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

AMERICAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION

The American Embassy Employees' Association has an inadequate accounting system and poor internal controls. In the past three years, outside auditors either disclaimed or issued qualified opinions on the association's financial statements. In so doing, they cited improper inventory procedures and failure to reconcile cash. The association does not have an accounting system capable of generating financial statements and, therefore, has no reasonable assurance that its financial reporting is accurate.

Recommendation 32: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the American Embassy Employees' Association to work with its independent public accountant, to hire an outside consultant to obtain and install an automated accounting system. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

The association's clerical office has a few permanent employees, one of whom is the accountant. The small size of the staff limits the association's ability to achieve proper segregation of duties. The accountant records cash transactions, is in many cases a custodian of cash, and reconciles cash and thus is in a position to conceal

errors and omissions. Someone other than the record keeper should prepare bank reconciliations. Because the Addis Ababa association maintains over half of its net assets in cash accounts, better controls are needed. The OIG team believes it is essential to have the embassy's financial management officer perform the association's bank reconciliations under the provisions of 6 FAM 531.1.

Recommendation 33: Embassy Addis Ababa should task its financial management officer to prepare monthly bank reconciliations for all American Embassy Employees' Association bank accounts. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic chief to meet all Department deadlines and to approve routine political/economic section cables within 24 hours and more complex cables within 48 hours. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 2: Embassy Addis Ababa should establish better cooperation and communication between the political/economic section and the Defense attaché's office, including scheduling weekly meetings between the chiefs. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Addis Ababa should create structured plans for consular section employee training, including new employee orientation, and maintain written records of all employees' training progress. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Addis Ababa should update and use written standard operating procedures for all consular operations. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, the Director General for Human Resources, and the Foreign Service Institute, should request that two or more officers assigned to Embassy Addis Ababa be trained in the Amharic language to the 2/0 level. (Action: CA, in coordination with AF, DGHR, and FSI)

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Consular Affairs should work with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services of the Department of Homeland Security to institute an Orphan First program for adoptions in Ethiopia. (Action: CA)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Addis Ababa should identify management units that will experience significant change after partial consolidation with the management sections of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Centers for Disease Control and prepare organization charts and updated position descriptions for employees in those units before the move to the new embassy. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop a specific and measurable timeline that identifies all of the steps necessary to create an effective joint management operation. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the management officer to be a knowledgeable and active participant in consolidation planning and implementation. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Addis Ababa should complete and sign the joint administrative services consolidation plan memorandum of understanding. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute and Embassy Addis Ababa, should locate or design a training program for the facilities management staff who will work in the new embassy compound. (Action: OBO, in coordination with FSI and Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should use Embassy Addis Ababa as a case study to review the standards for cafeteria spaces in embassy construction projects and to ensure that the cafeteria size in future projects is adequate to support the building occupants. (Action: OBO)

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Human Resources should provide an assistance visit to Embassy Addis Ababa and work with the embassy to increase employee retention. (Action: HR)

Recommendation 14: The Foreign Service Institute should work with Embassy Addis Ababa to set up on-site supervisory and customer service training for local employees, as part of an optimal transition to the joint management platform. (Action: FSI, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and Embassy Addis Ababa, should complete the transfer of the Addis Ababa provident fund account to the defined contribution plan. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with AF and Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Addis Ababa should require all agencies to use the National Security Decision Directive-38 process before adding U.S. personal services contractor positions. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 17: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should consolidate the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services property management operation and obtain a lease for a warehouse facility that will support all mission property management requirements. (Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with AF and OBO)

Recommendation 18: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the supervisory and assistant general services officers to make fact finding trips to Ethiopian customs clearance warehouses and Djibouti freight forwarders to evaluate and better understand customs and transportation activities essential to the embassy's logistics. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Addis Ababa should implement a process to provide weekly status updates to customers with pending shipments. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, should create a motor pool service ordering system that works in the Embassy Addis Ababa consolidated motor pool environment. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with M/PRI)

Recommendation 21: Embassy Addis Ababa should request, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should approve, the use of off-the-shelf software for preventive maintenance scheduling and record keeping for new embassy systems. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should assign a transition facilities manager to Embassy Addis Ababa to assist with the move to the new embassy and the decommissioning process. (Action: OBO)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should establish a memorandum of agreement addressing the information management specialist's regional responsibilities. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 24: Embassy Addis Ababa should meet with Ethiopian authorities and request approval for the SEACOM connection. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Addis Ababa should provide the mailroom staff and telephone/radio technicians with the equipment necessary to conduct their work, including shirts, pants, gloves, boots, lifting support, and rain gear. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 26: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop information sheets for new arrivals that help them to get settled into their new environment. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 27: The Under Secretary for Management's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa and the Foreign Service Institute, should create an effective system of customer service and support within the e-Services framework. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa and FSI)

Recommendation 28: Embassy Addis Ababa should develop and implement a system to ensure that subcashier supervisors conduct monthly, unannounced cash verifications and quarterly verifications of lesser amounts. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 29: Embassy Ababa should update work requirement statements for all Department of State subcashier supervisors to assign responsibility for cash verifications required by 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3 f. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 30: Embassy Addis Ababa should prepare written policies and procedures to administer its allowance program. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 31: Embassy Addis Ababa should issue a management instruction reminding employees of the requirements and circumstances to terminate post differential when traveling to the United States. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 32: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the American Embassy Employees' Association to work with its independent public accountant, to hire an outside consultant to obtain and install an automated accounting system. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 33: Embassy Addis Ababa should task its financial management officer to prepare monthly bank reconciliations for all American Embassy Employees' Association bank accounts. (Action: Embassy Addis Ababa)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SECTION

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At least two of the section's local employee position rankings are not consistent with other rankings in the section.

Informal Recommendation 2: Embassy Addis Ababa should do new position descriptions and computer assisted job evaluations for at least the lower-ranking political subunit employee and the lower-ranking economic/commercial subunit employee.

The section's weekly staff meetings tend to focus too much on notes from the weekly country team and can go on at length.

Informal Recommendation 3: Embassy Addis Ababa should counsel the political/economic chief about how to run more efficient meetings, including how to encourage substantive discussion among employees and decide which information from the country team and other meetings should be disseminated at the staff meeting and which might more usefully be distributed via email.

No employees from the section's self-help subunit attend the weekly section meeting.

Informal Recommendation 4: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic chief to include the head of the self-help subunit in the weekly staff meetings.

The section's three self-unit employees have little contact with the section chief.

Informal Recommendation 5: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic section chief and deputy to meet every two weeks with the self-help subunit's employees.

The political/economic chief loses track of due dates, action officers, and cables given to him for clearance. Consequently, work flow is inefficient. The section does not have a system for tracking progress on action requests from the Department.

Informal Recommendation 6: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic chief to develop and use a log, accessible to all cleared members of the section, of action requests cabled from the Department, their due dates, progress made, and date of completion.

The section also does not track other action items.

Informal Recommendation 7: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic section to develop and use a log of action requests from non-cable sources, their due dates, progress made, and date of completion. The system should have the capacity to send reminders to the political/economic chief and action officer.

The section's officers need more time with the section chief to discuss the substance and direction of their action items.

Informal Recommendation 8: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic section chief to meet frequently on a one-to-one basis with his officers to discuss policy issues, and to reach decisions easily and quickly.

The section chief does not let individual officers know how they are performing.

Informal Recommendation 9: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic chief to counsel employees on their performance, according to the schedule the Department mandates.

The section only recently decided to do formal representation, travel, and reporting schedules.

Informal Recommendation 10: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the political/economic section to implement formal representation, travel, and reporting schedules, keyed to mission strategic goals and available resources.

CONSULAR SECTION

Consular section customers are scheduled to arrive in large groups. This sometimes conflicts with employees' entry to the embassy or requires customers to wait hours for service.

Informal Recommendation 11: Embassy Addis Ababa should adjust consular scheduling so that customers can be admitted without delay.

At times consular officers leave interview windows to attend to non-time-sensitive duties, leaving applicants waiting longer than necessary.

Informal Recommendation 12: Embassy Addis Ababa should require consular officers to make customer service their primary duty as long as there are customers waiting.

Both the immigrant visa and nonimmigrant visa systems contain messages that inform consular officers whenever individuals of possible interest come to the attention of another U.S. Government agency. Consular regulations require that these messages be read and cleared promptly.

Informal Recommendation 13: Embassy Addis Ababa should establish and implement a system for reading and clearing immigrant visa and nonimmigrant visa systems messages daily.

The consular section does not open cases for American citizens unless the individuals have encountered serious problems or until the section has complete information. As a result, the Department is sometimes in the awkward position of having no information when a relative telephones.

Informal Recommendation 14: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the consular section to open cases in the American citizen services computer system as soon as an American citizen in trouble comes to its attention.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION

The section needs to enhance team spirit while not undercutting the admirable pressure for more productivity. In so doing, the accent should be put on greater guidance from the front office and more explicit taskings and direction from the public affairs officer.

Informal Recommendation 15: Embassy Addis Ababa should work to enhance team spirit in the public affairs section.

The four-person Department of Defense media information support team at Embassy Addis Ababa is not covered under the NSDD 38 process but is in Addis Ababa under a long-term but purportedly temporary arrangement. The team appears to have limited understanding of chief of mission authorities and would benefit from tighter oversight and integration into the mission. For example, team members currently believe that only the chief of mission can instruct them and thus that there is no need for approval of their projects by the public affairs officer.

Informal Recommendation 16: Embassy Addis Ababa should condition the military information support team's continued temporary duty in Ethiopia on the team taking direction from the public affairs officer, who would submit formal input for their annual performance reviews. The embassy should so inform the team, while also counseling them on coordinating better with mission elements.

The military information support team spends significant time and resources in identifying and developing projects—and leading local contacts to assume they will be awarded a contract—before vetting proposals with relevant mission elements.

Informal Recommendation 17: Embassy Addis Ababa should require the military information support team to coordinate projects with the public affairs, political/economic, and other relevant sections early on, as a precondition for continued temporary duty at Addis Ababa.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The New Embassy Compound Construction Project

Once construction of the new embassy is complete, the mission will have insufficient parking to support the occupants of the new chancery.

Informal Recommendation 18: Embassy Addis Ababa should create as many parking spaces as possible.

Human Resources

Some locally employed staff performance evaluations in the general services unit were completed late, delaying the employees' within-grade increases.

Informal Recommendation 19: Embassy Addis Ababa should include timely completion of employee evaluation reports in the work requirements of all supervisors and counsel those who fail to meet the deadlines.

The locally employed staff handbook was last updated in 2007 and several policies have changed since that time. New employees should receive a handbook that contains the correct policies. The human resources unit has started, but not completed, an update to the handbook to reflect current policies.

Informal Recommendation 20: Embassy Addis Ababa should update and distribute its handbook for local employees.

Workforce Planning

Embassy Addis Ababa will participate in a rightsizing exercise in spring 2010 with the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation.

Informal Recommendation 21: Embassy Addis Ababa should hold discussions with other agencies to determine future staffing plans and priorities, and to discuss space and other resource constraints, in advance of the rightsizing exercise.

Procurement

The procurement unit receives many complaints from customers regarding poor communication on procurement requests.

Informal Recommendation 22: Embassy Addis Ababa should implement standard operating procedures for the procurement unit to provide periodic status reports to its customers.

Property Management

Embassy Addis Ababa plans to consolidate warehouse services with USAID sometime after the move to the new embassy. The embassy's current warehouse is full and not well-designed for the volume that the consolidation will bring. The embassy has located a warehouse property, available for lease, with all of the features needed to support a consolidated property management operation, and to handle motor pool requirements for official vehicle parking and vehicle maintenance shops. The embassy has yet to complete lease negotiations.

Informal Recommendation 23: Embassy Addis Ababa should discuss the warehouse lease possibilities with the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services council and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations and keep the property management consolidation process on track.

Motor Pool

Motor pool does not have enough drivers to support mission requirements.

Informal Recommendation 24: Embassy Addis Ababa should determine how many additional drivers are needed to support mission consolidation and coordinate hiring additional drivers with the motor pool consolidation working group.

The DriveCam program does not distinguish driving conditions between parts of the developing world and the United States. American officers have asked the Department and the contractor to adjust the program, but to no avail.

Informal Recommendation 25: Embassy Addis Ababa should continue its dialogue with the Department and the DriveCam contractor to adjust adjudication of driving incidences they take exception to and help continue the positive change in driver behavior.

Facilities Management

Embassy Addis Ababa does not have a regular safety training program for facilities management employees.

Informal Recommendation 26: Embassy Addis Ababa should establish a safety training program for facilities management employees.

The facilities management unit does not have a ready stock of spare parts and supplies for residential generators and appliances that are procured from the United States.

Informal Recommendation 27: Embassy Addis Ababa identify spare part and supplies that the embassy should stock on a regular basis and identify vendors with whom the embassy should maintain a blanket purchase agreement for emergency repair supplies.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY

The information management staff may not be restructured after the move to the new embassy.

Informal Recommendation 28: Embassy Addis Ababa should restructure the information management staff, relocating one American specialist from the information programs center to serve as the information systems officer.

The homeward bound program is a complicated process that invites confusion as users must interface with the employees' association and mailroom staff in addition to filling out an optional United States Postal Service application.

Informal Recommendation 29: Embassy Addis Ababa should restructure the homeward bound program to eliminate process confusion.

The ability to send outgoing mail is important to mission morale.

Informal Recommendation 30: Embassy Addis Ababa should conduct a cost analysis and determine if there is support and adequate resources to open a diplomatic post office.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Health Unit

The health unit's biggest concern is the quality of local medical care. Ethiopia does not have a good medical system. The unit would like to hire a part-time local physi-

cian as a medical consultant to handle the high volume of work in the medical unit and liaise with the Ethiopian medical providers.

Informal Recommendation 31: Embassy Addis Ababa should procure additional physician services.

American Embassy Employees' Association

The Department's Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs did not approve the association board's draft licensing agreement for logistical support.

Informal Recommendation 32: Embassy Addis Ababa should assist the American Embassy Employees' Association board to complete its licensing agreement.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

Financial Management

The financial management unit does not compare employees' assignment travel expenses to GSO shipment files in order to determine the veracity of charges.

Informal Recommendation 33: Embassy Addis Ababa should implement procedures to compare employees' assignment travel expenses to general services office shipment files before making payments to local shippers.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
Chargé	John Yates	01/10
Deputy Chief of Mission	Tuli Mushingi	09/09

Chiefs of Sections:

Consular	Abigail Rupp	07/09
Management	Alan Roecks	08/09
Political/Economic	Kirk McBride	09/09
President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief	Carmela Green-Abate	01/09
Public Affairs	Alyson Grunder	08/09
Refugees	Inga Heemink	10/08
Regional Affairs	Andrew Martin	07/08
Regional Environmental	Kirsten Bauman	08/08
Regional Security	Keith LaRochelle	11/09

Other Agencies:

CDC	Thomas Kenyon	01/09
Department of Defense	Col. Bradley Anderson	07/07
Peace Corps	Nwando Diallo	12/08
U.S. Agency for International Development	Thomas Staal	03/09

ABBREVIATIONS

AF	Bureau of African Affairs
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
S/GAC	Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
USAU	U.S. Mission to the African Union
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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