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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

U.S. Mission to the
African Union,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Report Number ISP-I-10-65, April 2010

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PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This was the first inspection of the U.S. Mission to the African Union, which was established in December 2006. This inspection, done concurrently with the inspection of Embassy Addis Ababa, was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- After a troubled beginning, the U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU) has repaired relations with the bilateral embassy and worked more closely with African Union (AU) leadership. This reflects strong leadership by the Ambassador and effective work by Department and Department of Defense officers.
- Mission strategic goals, however, are not entirely consistent with major U.S. Government objectives, and the Department should initiate a policy review.
- Mission staffing is well outpacing the AU's own efforts to empower and integrate itself as a multilateral institution. The Department and other agencies are not giving adequate scrutiny to staffing. The unrestrained growth is crowding the new embassy compound before it opens; a freeze on staff increases is needed prior to a rightsizing review.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 4 and 20, 2010, and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between February 8 and 26, 2010. (b) (6)

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CONTEXT AND INTRODUCTION

On July 9, 2002, the AU was formed among the 54 African states bent on a revitalized policy of “non-indifference.” (Morocco, however, declined to join because it opposed the membership of Western Sahara; in late 2009, Eritrea dropped out in the wake of AU and U.N. sanctions.) The AU is the successor organization to the Organization of African Unity dating from 1963 and began its existence as a conscious departure from the “old colonial-reactive days” of newly independent Africa. At that time, against a Cold War and Nonaligned Movement backdrop, the Organization of African Unity had favored a nonintervention policy and, to a degree, served as a vehicle for African nations to play off East against West and otherwise obscure the dictatorial and/or venal nature of many African regimes.

The AU’s non-indifference policy, while imperfect in not addressing some major issues such as the situation in Zimbabwe, has presaged a significant change in the activity of Africa’s chief intergovernmental organization. Under AU auspices, Ethiopian, Mozambican, and South African peacekeeping detachments deployed to Burundi in 2003. In 2005, the AU sent troops to Darfur; in 2007-08, after a low-level rebellion, the AU sanctioned the Comoros. Ultimately, it blessed a small military intervention in the Comoros using Tanzanian and other troops. The AU also injected itself with some success into nondemocratic transitions in Togo and Mauritania, suspending the latter in 2005 and 2008 in the wake of coups. The AU has usefully reinforced good behavior by member nations, praising, for example, Nigeria when a change in government was in keeping with constitutional provisions.

In 2009, the AU, for the first time, created a panel of eminent persons to investigate the Darfur issue and make recommendations for a comprehensive solution, including reconciliation, justice, and peace. That panel was chaired by former South African President Mbeki. Most recently, the AU has asked Mbeki to continue leading the implementation phases of his report’s recommendations in hopes of assisting the effort for a comprehensive peace agreement.

At present, besides the crises in Somalia and Sudan, the AU is involved in finding solutions to the unconstitutional changes of power in Guinea and Madagascar, as well as the constitutional manipulation by the ruling party in Niger. The latter situation found the AU somewhat impotent in that it did not have specific provisions to deal with unconstitutional developments. These are now in place. The AU has broadened its traditional disciplinary tools—sanctions and/or suspension of mis-

behaving members—to include asking the United Nations and select other international organizations to act against the offending country. These measures, however, as yet do not include either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, organizations with significant power to effect change.

While still getting its organizational feet on the ground, the AU already is successful in getting the United Nations to pay attention to African political and security issues. It catalyzed African reaction to the general misbehavior of the Eritrean regime and its tacit if not explicit support of Muslim insurgents attempting to topple the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. Building on the AU's decision to sanction Eritrea, the United Nations Security Council imposed broader sanctions including an arms embargo, freezing of assets, and a travel ban on the Eritrean leadership.

In a landmark speech before the Ghanaian parliament last July, President Obama sent a powerful message to the people of Africa: the United States will pledge substantial increases in foreign assistance to Africa, and the United States will partner in building the capacity for sustained development in such areas as democracy, health, the peaceful resolution of conflict, and economic growth.

NASCENT ORGANIZATION

Whatever its successes in peacekeeping and security, the AU remains a nascent organization in many ways. It has yet to build significantly on the African Economic Community, which was first established by the Organization of African Unity in 1983 but never translated into meaningful trade or economic integration. This remains distinctly a long-term work in progress, in part because the collective gross domestic product for the entire membership is less than that of California.

Comparing the level of economic and political integration achieved by the AU to date with the European Union (EU) and its predecessor organizations, the OIG team finds that AU integration is akin to that of Europe in the 1950s. Like Europe, the AU could achieve far more over the next few decades if member states have the requisite political will. In the interim, USAU and its EU counterpart, as observers rather than members of the AU, have an inherently limited role.

One gauge of appropriate USAU staffing is to compare it with other U.S. multi-lateral missions, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the U.S. Mission to the European Union, the Special Representative to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States. The lat-

ter, in which the United States has full membership and major strategic interests, has 15 full-time employees. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping, an organization to which the United States belongs and whose strategic worth is reflected by presidential participation in annual summits, lacks a resident U.S. Ambassador and operates with a small staff. The Special Representation to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a grouping larger and far more economically important than the AU, is Washington-based and has a tiny staff to draw upon.

The United States first established a mission to the AU with a designated Ambassador in December 2006 – the first and only non-African country to have such an envoy. This was the first Bureau of African Affairs (AF) multilateral mission apart from those based in Nairobi where a variety of specialized units operate. None is headed by a resident Ambassador. (Prior to 2006, the U.S. bilateral ambassador to Ethiopia had responsibility for the African Union; subsequently, the European Union designated an ambassador to the AU.)

The transition to the new USAU headed by an ambassador was problematic on multiple fronts. The first Ambassador arrived in Addis Ababa in December of 2006 only to depart early and under a cloud after multiple complaints by staff, the bilateral embassy, EU embassies, and the Government of Ethiopia. Record-keeping by the Ambassador was minimal, with safes empty upon departure, and internal management contentious. USAU administrative disputes with Embassy Addis Ababa were also sharp and frequent. A second Ambassador had but a brief tour, arriving in September 2008 and leaving on January 20, 2009, with the change in U.S. administrations.

Following the departure of the previous AF Assistant Secretary, the interim leadership of AF argued for a return to the old arrangement wherein the bilateral ambassador to Ethiopia was accredited to the AU. At present, opposition to the separate ambassador concept remains both within AF and at Embassy Addis Ababa, which, in fact, handled the portfolio with a very modest staff in years past. The Bureau of International Organizations appears to have negligible involvement with the AU or USAU. Its identified point of contact had little information for the OIG team other than to say that the Bureau of International Organizations works directly with AF and does not pass any money to the AU. USAU's almost exclusive lifeline to working levels at the Department is through AF's Office of Regional and Security Affairs.

Numerous senior Washington- and Africa-based officials have observed that multilateral groups like the AU, especially in the initial stages, tend to be only as good as the most aggressive member states such as, in this instance, South Africa, Libya, Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, and, historically, Nigeria. Also relevant is the degree to which member states cede sovereignty to the multilateral organization — which

remains highly limited for the AU. In any case, it is often preferable to work on a bilateral basis with member states rather than through the various AU elements headquartered in Addis Ababa, which may not have the political sway of member country leadership. One exception might be Jean Ping, the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU, who, as the former son-in-law of Gabon's longtime ruler, has considerable influence.

A further constraint on the USAU is that the United States, like the EU, has only observer status, and is unlikely to ever be a member of the AU. Moreover, unlike the EU, which has showered its former colonies' organization with money, including about \$420 million over several years (about \$60 million in 2009), the United States has only minimal programmatic activity related directly to the AU. China, which lacks an ambassador dedicated just to the AU, is providing \$150 million for the new AU headquarters building.

SHARPEN THE FOCUS

Washington officials and the OIG team believe that the first U.S. order of business is to impose a sharp focus on what the United States cares most about in terms of AU activity – peacekeeping and security, and democracy and governance – rather than be diverted into a multiplicity of assistance issues amply covered by large organizations on a bilateral, regional, or global basis. Many of these issues appear extraneous in that there is little or no mandate by the member states, no unique in-house expertise, and a likelihood of duplicating work already being done by others. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, can handle most African health issues on a bilateral or regional basis. Bilateral embassies can nudge individual countries towards economic integration — a distant dream where the United States gains little by involving itself prematurely.

More broadly, the OIG team believes that the USAU is out in front of the realities of AU integration. As an observer, it may be beyond the United States' ability to shape the AU or galvanize it into sustained action. Once, however, the AU-U.S. relationship develops a track record and a sense of mutual confidence, it would be appropriate to expand to environment, economic, counternarcotics, and other fronts. The OIG team commends the USAU for its activism but believes for now that it should hone in on the most immediate possibilities for successful AU-U.S. cooperation – i.e., those related to security, peacekeeping, and effective governance.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the African Union, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Under Secretary for Management, should request a National Security Council interagency policy committee review to determine the U.S. Mission to the African Union's medium- and long-term objectives. (Action: AF, in coordination with USAU, P, and M)

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The USAU Ambassador, a political appointee like his two predecessors, has done an admirable job of improving executive direction at the USAU since arriving in September of 2009. Under his watch, the USAU has resolved some of the traditional difficulties in getting a new organization up and running, and done so with limited funding and human resources and an unclear mandate. The Ambassador has forged a strong sense of team within the mission: the four Department and Department of Defense officers are highly integrated and handle all substantive matters. Embassy Addis Ababa is responsible for management, security, and information technology support, freeing USAU from these responsibilities, which traditionally command considerable front office time.

Within the mission, the Ambassador has a limited regime of meetings, appropriate within the context of a small operation, and a true open-door policy. Participants describe these sessions as crisp, well-focused, and collegial. The Ambassador's supportive style keeps staff morale high and ensures smooth relations with the bilateral embassy, without undercutting his status as an independent chief of mission. Both the USAU Ambassador and acting deputy chief of mission (DCM) regularly attend the weekly bilateral embassy's country team. In addition, the two front offices try to meet alone every week. With the two-way flow of information now adequate, the OIG team counseled that just one USAU officer attend the bilateral country team meeting — given USAU's view that staffing is inadequate (see below).

The Ambassador has rebuilt contacts with the diplomatic community and key AU interlocutors, above all with Chairperson Ping, Deputy Chairperson Erastus Mwencha, and Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra. The Ambassador volunteered to be the co-chair with the Danish Ambassador for the AU Partners Group, which coordinates between the AU and observer states. All AU officials are ready to engage the United States and do so at whatever level that is necessary to share information, but appreciate having an interlocutor with the rank of Ambassador. Apart from the other seven commissioners, there are few natural Ambassadorial-level contacts within the AU, which is largely composed of civil servants and politicians from across Africa.

USAU STAFFING

USAU staffing under the Ambassador includes an acting DCM (a political officer to be replaced by a permanent DCM in summer of 2010), a political-public diplomacy officer, military officers seconded from the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) and the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), an American office management specialist, two contract employees based at AU headquarters, a vacant USAID liaison officer position, and four local employees. The resource management section below describes current and project staffing at the mission.

BACK TO THE FUTURE?

The OIG team's interviews with senior and mid-ranking officials in Washington and Addis Ababa revealed sharp disagreement over the wisdom of stationing a U.S. Ambassador to the AU and/or of basing this envoy in Addis Ababa as opposed to Washington. Many view it as premature — and a decision made by the previous administration for internal personnel reasons and without any real commitment otherwise. In questioning the decision, they observe that the United States is already adequately and increasingly engaged in Africa. The U.S. bilateral embassies are generally the largest missions in most countries. U.S. assistance programs, amplified by large amounts of HIV/AIDS money, are robust. AFRICOM is active in many countries.

Unlike the EU, which has given the AU ample resources in the belief that it can replicate its own EU success story, the United States has not given its mission much to work with in terms of programmatic contributions to the AU or staff. Washington could do a better job defining the mission and stating more explicitly that the USAU is important.

While many small bilateral missions in Addis Ababa focus heavily on AU doings, in many cases attending more to this than to bilateral issues, the United States, despite the USAU Ambassador, is very much the reverse — with almost all resources and time going to the bilateral relationship. The OIG team's inspection coincided with visits by six congressional delegations, almost all exclusively focused on the bilateral relationship. It also overlapped with a brief visit by a deputy assistant

secretary for African Affairs and a one-day visit by the U.S. Ambassador to Madagascar, the latter coming specifically to work with the AU and USAU on Madagascar political problems. The main representational event, however, was hosted by the bilateral chargé d'affaires and linked to a military delegation passing through Addis Ababa rather than tied in to the AU or USAU. In the OIG team's view, the USAU Ambassador could be more assertive in pushing for representations like this to be his event, and otherwise make greater use of the official residence. Only two representational functions have taken place there in five months. Hosting more events would strengthen the case for having a resident Ambassador to the AU, with attendant support costs for the residence and staff. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this subject.

Other Washington observers believe that sober second thoughts would have the USAU Ambassador based in the United States, allowing the envoy to work with Congress and liaise with African missions based in Washington and New York, with their rich lode of influential diplomats with strong ties to leaders at home. Media coverage would probably not suffer in that Addis Ababa has restrictive media policies, poor telecommunications, and a highly limited audience for USAU public diplomacy (about 500 persons). An Ambassador or Special Representative/Ambassador coming out periodically to the AU, which has two annual summits — one in Addis Ababa and one at a rotating location — would occasion a burst of publicity.

Whatever these considerations, the OIG team does not believe that the United States is in a position to act precipitously regarding the structure of the USAU. To move the Ambassador elsewhere and explain the rationale would require skillful preparation work — and might in the end simply not be possible, given the implied headline that the United States is pulling back from the AU. Much of diplomacy, in any case, is presence. Moreover, the Ambassador has established relationships with AU leaders that would presumably weaken were the envoy Washington-based.

MISSION STRATEGIC PLAN AND BUREAU STRATEGIC PLAN

The USAU's latest mission strategic plan, completed in April 2009, cites governing justly and democratically as the primary goal of the mission, with building the AU's capacity to promote peace and security as the second goal. At present, however, the USAU devotes about two-thirds of its time to peace and security issues, which the OIG team views as the primary USAU goal. The mission's strategic plan states that informing the AU about U.S. foreign policy is the third goal. As discussed elsewhere, the OIG team believes there is an insufficient natural audience at the AU

to justify such a high priority for the mission. The OIG team was also struck by the limited reference to the USAU in AF's strategic plan. If AF intends to increase the importance of the USAU, then the AF strategic plan should focus more on the future role of the AU.

TELEGRAM SIGNING AUTHORITY

USAU shares a communications facility with Embassy Addis Ababa, and all cables must have the bilateral chief of mission as approving rather than the USAU ambassador. When USAU was created late 2006, the mission was too small to have separate communications facility. Under the current telegram system, a manual override would have to be performed to show USAU as signing off on cables, and mistakes could be made. When the new embassy compound is ready in September 2010, the switch to the SMART cable system will give USAU the technical capability to have a separate signing authority at little or no extra cost.

Recommendation 2: The U.S. Mission to the African Union, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa, should receive telegram signing authority as soon as technically feasible. (Action: USAU, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa)

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

REPORTING AND REPRESENTATION

Despite limited personnel and financial resources and an unclear mandate, the mission's four line officers perform admirably under difficult circumstances. These officers can only cover a small fraction of AU meetings, leaving them to attend only those of greatest U.S. interest. The officers also handle a substantial visitor workload, including attendees to the semiannual summits. The OIG team commends the Department of Defense for providing several temporary personnel in the early years of the mission when the management style of the initial Ambassador led to unplanned turnover and vacancies. The two current Department of Defense officers continue to range well beyond their liaison mandate in handling representation and reporting responsibilities.

The AU has eight commissions devoted to political affairs; social affairs; trade and industry; economic affairs; peace and security; infrastructure and energy; human resources, science and technology; and rural economy and agriculture. The key commissions for the USAU are peace and security, and political affairs. The AU also convenes international contact group meetings to broker common positions on African countries in crisis. At present, there are contact groups on Guinea, Madagascar, and Somalia. The United States is invited into these groups as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. The USAU Ambassador and staff represent the U.S. Government in many instances, but the Department may send an envoy or ask the U.S. Ambassador to the country in question to attend. These contact groups produce communiqués that include recommendations to the AU Peace and Security Council and the United Nations. One such example from 2009 was the international contact group recommendation that targeted economic sanctions be imposed on Mauritania's coup leaders. In a new area of cooperation, the AU selected the Prime Minister of Ethiopia to be the primary negotiator for African countries at the United Nations climate change talks in Copenhagen and at the United Nations.

Deputy Chief of Mission and Political Reporting and Representation

In the summer of 2009, the Department agreed to convert the FS-02 political officer's position to be an FS-02 DCM, to take effect in summer 2010. The current acting DCM shoulders a heavy reporting burden while also orienting and advising the new Ambassador. The FS-03 political officer is a mainstay of the mission, with a substantial reporting burden, as well as some public diplomacy activities.

While the incoming DCM will have minimal managerial duties, the permanent DCM position is justified in that it elevates U.S. representation at the status-conscious AU, especially when a DCM is serving as chargé d'affaires. This would be essential if the USAU Ambassador were to reside in the United States, or if the bilateral Ambassador were to be accredited to the AU. The DCM, given the lack of managerial duties, must continue to do reporting and representation duties, thus obviating the need for an additional political or economic officer position pending a more thorough review of the mission's future needs.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The current political/public diplomacy officer spends the bulk of her time on political affairs, and much less on public diplomacy. Given the open-ended nature of trying to cover lesser events at the AU, the officer could in theory spend all of her time on political affairs. However, the OIG team cautions against creating an additional public diplomacy position pending a review of mission staffing and priorities. The OIG team believes that public diplomacy should not be the third objective of the USAU Mission Strategic Plan. The natural audience for the USAU's work is miniscule – about 500 diplomats at the AU and member nation embassies, some journalists, and Web site visitors. The mission's public diplomacy efforts have tended to spill over to activities that belong in the realm of the bilateral embassy.

About two-thirds of the officer's work on public diplomacy concerns the Ambassador's public appearances, speeches, remarks, and interviews. The officer receives part-time support from one USAU local employee. The limited contact with AF's Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs could be increased. The OIG team left an informal recommendation to this effect.

ASSISTANCE TO THE AFRICAN UNION

The U.S. Government gives little money directly to the AU for operations. For FY 2011, the mission requested that \$1.5 million in economic support funds go to the AU, including \$1 million for peace and security and \$500,000 for governing justly and democratically. While the United States supplies roughly \$150 million a year related to peacekeeping operations in which the AU is involved, these monies are funneled directly and bilaterally to participating countries rather than through the USAU or AU. The two Department of Defense officers at USAU help coordinate these contributions to bilateral nations. A U.S. Presidential finding to allow the negotiation of end-use agreements with the AU is pending. This would allow the Department to fund some long-promised communication capabilities for the AU.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

Embassy Addis Ababa's management section supports two Ambassadors and two separate and distinct missions — the bilateral mission and the small USAU. Until recently, Embassy Addis Ababa treated USAU as any other management customer, with no separate management interface. In November 2009, however, the embassy's financial management officer was identified as the USAU management liaison, a logical choice in that most interaction between USAU and management relates to budget issues. The new arrangement has worked well, satisfying both USAU and the embassy's management section.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

USAU Staffing

Prior to the creation of the USAU, the bilateral Ambassador covered the AU with the part-time help of one political section officer at the bilateral embassy. In 2005, the Department of Defense received a U.S. Presidential determination allowing it to work directly with the AU. During USAU's initial three years, it had varying numbers of temporary and permanent employees, with temporary Department of Defense employees filling in after the early departure of several Department staff. At the time of the inspection, the mission had ten U.S. and local employees, plus two contractors at the AU. The total staffing for USAU is obscured by the inclusion of some USAU local employees in the bilateral embassy's staffing pattern.

In discussing USAU's footprint within the new embassy compound under construction, the USAU indicated a desire to increase its full-time complement to at least 16 U.S. and local positions, plus two contractors who will work at the AU. This greatly exceeds the space set aside for the USAU in the new compound. Spillover would cramp other embassy components. Conversely, the carefully planned front office space for the USAU (which was to mirror the bilateral Ambassador's office) will be overcrowded from the start and less attractive for visitors from the AU and others.

There are no signs that the USAU appetite for growth is abating. During the OIG team's review, for example, the USAU sought and gained Embassy Addis Ababa's NSDD-38 approval for an economic officer position. This happened despite the OIG team's specific recommendation that this not take place until a Washington staffing review was done.

The OIG team notes, and also disagrees with, a pending request for an eligible family member office management specialist to work for USAU personnel below the level of Ambassador. This specialist would be in addition to the local administrative assistant and an incoming Department of Defense administrative assistant. The USAU wants two officers to replace the political/public diplomacy officer; it is arguing for two USAID liaison officers in place of the (vacant) single USAID position, the newly approved economic officer and an officer from another agency to be determined. The office will also supervise two contractors at the AU and four local employees. Were these staff increases not headed off by the Department's review, the USAU would have permanent American staff about equal to that of the U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States, a much more established organization to which the United States belongs and whose membership is of far greater strategic and commercial interest to the United States.

Current USAU Staffing

- Ambassador
- Acting DCM
- Political/public diplomacy officer
- Ambassador's office management specialist
- AFRICOM liaison officer
- CJTF-HOA liaison officer
- CJTF-HOA temporary noncommissioned officer (since January 2010)
- USAID liaison officer (vacant since summer 2009; temporary officer expected in winter/spring 2010; discussion of eventually having two USAID liaison officers)
- Local employee protocol assistant (vacant since January 2009; new hire in clearance process)
- Local employee administrative assistant
- Local employee Ambassador's chauffeur
- Local employee Ambassador's chauffeur
- Security adviser (contract) embedded in AU strategic planning and management unit
- Democracy adviser (contract) in AU democracy and electoral assistance unit (possibility of contract not being extended beyond 03/2010)

Projected USAU Staffing

- Ambassador
- DCM (new officer estimated time of arrival 09/ 2010; acting DCM's estimated time of departure is 06/2010)
- Political/public diplomacy officer (there has been discussion about making this two distinct positions)
- Economic officer (from Diplomacy 3.0)
- Ambassador's office management specialist
- Second office management specialist (eligible family member to be hired ahead of move to new embassy compound)
- AFRICOM liaison officer
- CJTF-HOA liaison officer
- AFRICOM administrative assistant (to replace temporary noncommissioned officer; estimated time of arrival Fall 2010)
- USAID liaison officer (programs)
- USAID liaison officer (representation)
- Possible other officer from another U.S. agency to be determined
- Local employee protocol assistant (estimated time of arrival 03/2010)
- Local employee administrative assistant
- Local employee Ambassador's chauffeur
- Local employee Ambassador's chauffeur
- Security adviser (contract) embedded in AU strategic planning and management unit
- Democracy adviser (contract) in AU democracy and electoral assistance unit (if contract extended beyond 03/2010)

The last rightsizing exercise for the bilateral embassy dates from September 2005, as revised in July 2006, i.e., before the USAU was established. As a result, USAU growth has been haphazard, with minimal justification for each new addition and with no long-term plan. The projected and desired growth in USAU would strain the new embassy compound. The Department must decide whether its global priorities allow for such growth.

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Director General for Human Resources and the U.S. Mission to the African Union, should freeze indefinitely all additional and vacant mission positions for the Department and other agencies pending at the time of the inspection until a policy review and a rightsizing review of the mission take place. (Action: AF, in coordination with DGHR and USAU)

Recommendation 4: The Under Secretary for Management's Office of Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the African Union, Embassy Addis Ababa, and the Bureau of African Affairs, should prepare a rightsizing plan for the U.S. Mission to the African Union. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with USAU, Embassy Addis Ababa, and AF)

Budget

The USAU budget is part of the Embassy Addis Ababa program budget. The financial management officer fences off a separate amount for USAU, a figure which also reflects annual increases in the overall program budget. The financial management office keeps separate cuff records for USAU funds. The financial management officer meets regularly with the acting USAU DCM to discuss budget issues. This arrangement works because USAU is cooperative and manages money well.

At the end of the year, budgets are adjusted to use leftover program funds where they are needed. Using this method, the program funds themselves remain fungible, and the embassy can transfer unused funds from one entity to the other, depending upon overall mission priorities. Funds have been transferred from the USAU to the bilateral embassy and vice versa. Maintaining this flexibility allows far greater opportunity to support mission priorities as long as the two ambassadors are working well together.

The representation and public diplomacy budgets count as one combined allotment to Embassy Addis Ababa and USAU, but the Department designates the amount of representation and public diplomacy funds assigned to USAU in the funding cable it sends to the embassy.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

The USAU is not treated as a separate International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) entity. The embassy charges ICASS costs for employees of other agencies who work for USAU to parent agency's ICASS invoices instead of preparing a separate set of invoices for each agency represented at USAU.

GSO Operations

The USAU has a seat on the housing board that is not agency specific. The USAU representative is currently the housing board chair. The embassy's general services office provides the same level of service to USAU as to the bilateral embassy.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The USAU ambassador does not sign a separate statement of assurance on management controls. Embassy Addis Ababa maintains the USAU's management platform.

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the African Union, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Under Secretary for Management, should request a National Security Council interagency policy committee review to determine the U.S. Mission to the African Union's medium- and long-term objectives. (Action: AF, in coordination with USAU, P, and M)

Recommendation 2: The U.S. Mission to the African Union, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa, should receive telegram signing authority as soon as technically feasible. (Action: USAU, in coordination with Embassy Addis Ababa)

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Director General for Human Resources and the U.S. Mission to the African Union, should freeze indefinitely all additional and vacant mission positions for the Department and other agencies pending at the time of the inspection until a policy review and a rightsizing review of the mission take place. (Action: AF, in coordination with DGHR and USAU)

Recommendation 4: The Under Secretary for Management's Office of Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, in coordination with the U.S. Mission to the African Union, Embassy Addis Ababa, and the Bureau of African Affairs, should prepare a rightsizing plan for the U.S. Mission to the African Union. (Action: M/PRI, in coordination with USAU, Embassy Addis Ababa, and AF)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The USAU Ambassador, who hosted only two official events in five months, could be more assertive in pushing for representational events for visitors to Addis Ababa, and otherwise make greater use of the official residence.

Informal Recommendation 1: The U.S. Mission to the African Union should make greater use of the Ambassador's residence for official events.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The USAU has limited contact with AF's Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

Informal recommendation 2: The U.S. Mission to the African Union and the Bureau of African Affairs Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should increase communication with each other.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
Ambassador	Michael Battle	09/09
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission	Joel Maybury	07/08
Political and Public Diplomacy Officer	Lauren Ladenson	08/09
U.S. AFRICOM Military Liaison Officer	Col. Mark Ellington	07/08
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa Liaison Officer	Capt. (U.S. Navy) Jeff Landsman	01/10

ABBREVIATIONS

AF	Bureau of African Affairs
AFRICOM	U.S. African Command
AU	African Union
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
EU	European Union
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
OIG	Office of Inspector General
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAU	U.S. Mission to the African Union

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