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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Embassy Djibouti, Djibouti

Report Number ISP-I-10-50A, April 2010

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PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). A classified annex to this report provides additional findings from the OIG team's security review.

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

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
KEY JUDGMENTS

- A highly effective Ambassador presides over a generally cohesive, productive embassy. Without his strong leadership, the sharply increased workload related to the U.S. military base and security/counterterrorism programs might have overwhelmed this small embassy.
- The management section, including the information technology unit, is less productive, and requires continued high-level attention.
- The Ambassador and deputy chief of mission (DCM) have managed a local staff divided by ethnic differences with exemplary skill and care, including by meeting weekly with a revolving group of senior local employees.
- Three talented entry-level officers head the political/economic/commercial, public diplomacy, and consular sections with evident skill.
- The political/economic/commercial chief handles remarkably well a heavy portfolio as the embassy's main reporting officer, with other operational and assistance responsibilities.
- The public affairs officer manages a busy operation that, while dwarfed by the military base's public diplomacy apparatus, has found a cost-effective niche in presenting the U.S. message.
- Embassy Djibouti's small but complex consular operation is ably handled by an excellent local staff and a talented first-tour officer who is also responsible for refugee and some political reporting.
- A skilled regional security officer, who has served as acting DCM, and staff provide excellent security under challenging conditions.
- The constant influx of temporary duty personnel and ranking visitors, who interface with both embassy officers and the military, as well as construction of a new embassy compound challenge the small management staff. Frictions within the information resource management unit hamper its effectiveness.
- The construction of a new embassy compound in 2011 will consolidate management operations in one location and significantly improve day-to-day oversight of the entire management operation.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between January 4 and January 20, 2010, and in Djibouti, Djibouti, between January 24 and February 4, 2010. (b) (6) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

CONTEXT

Roughly the size (8,500 square miles) and population (650,000) of Vermont, Djibouti is a strategic U.S. partner located in a volatile region—the Horn of Africa. Both literally and figuratively, it has been described as one of the hottest places on the globe. Temperatures range into the 130s. Immediate neighbors include Yemen, just across the Red Sea, Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia, all countries in various states of crisis.



Astride the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea's southern entrance, Djibouti has been inhabited from Biblical times by nomadic tribes who converted to Islam early on because of their proximity to the Arabian Peninsula. The modern country dates from the mid-19th century when the French saw strategic benefit in the port of Djibouti after construction of the Suez Canal began in 1856. Known initially as French Somaliland and later as the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, the Republic of Djibouti gained independence in 1977. French presence remains, however, considerable and includes several thousand troops and a sizeable expatriate community.

A pocket of relative calm in the region with an economy centered on its port, airport, and railroad, Djibouti has been led by two men from the People's Rally for Progress party for 30 years. The first president, Aptidon, ruled until 1999 whereupon his chief of staff and head of security Ismail Omar Guelleh took the helm. Although the country experienced civil war between 1991 and 1994, this abated after a power-sharing arrangement was brokered between the main ethnic groups – the Issa of Somali origin and the Afar of Ethiopian origin.

However small in population and size, and despite limited trade and investment ties, Djibouti is important to U.S. counterterrorism and regional security interests. It is home to the only U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, Camp Lemonnier (a former French Foreign Legion base). Its deep water port is an important refueling

station for U.S. Navy vessels. More broadly, as a moderate pro-American Muslim nation, Djibouti is a calming force in an uncalm region. As such, it plays a positive role in the affairs of the two historic regional powers: Djibouti serves as Ethiopia's access to the sea, and has been instrumental in seeking reconciliation in Somalia.

As the partnership with the government of Djibouti has deepened and regional security concerns have increased, the U.S. embassy has appropriately grown in size to 24 U.S. direct-hire employees and 227 local employees. The mission is seeking 18 additional U.S. direct-hire positions. The embassy's total budget in FY 2009 equaled \$5.1 million. Total U.S. assistance during FY 2010 will be about \$27 million.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

A highly effective career Ambassador presides over a cohesive, well-managed embassy facing a host of unusual challenges. The growing mission in Djibouti has the busy pace and operational activities more typically associated with a sizeable Middle Eastern embassy, but the facilities, local staff, and general Washington visibility of a small sub-Saharan country. There is, in fact, a dated misperception in official Washington of Djibouti as a “sleepy little post.”

A small, distant country in the Horn of Africa with no historical ties, whose gross national product is far surpassed by any U.S. state, would not merit significant interest under normal circumstances. Normal circumstances, however, have not prevailed since September 11, 2001. U.S. interest in Djibouti is above all a function of location—as related to U.S. security and counterterrorism concerns. The country abuts shipping channels through which many of the world’s vessels pass. It is nestled among neighbors such as Yemen, Somalia, and Eritrea where al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements are present. Since 2003, it has been home to Camp Lemonnier, headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the only permanent U.S. base on the African continent. With 3,300 troops and contractors in early 2010, this base has doubled in size since 2008 when the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created. (Previously, Camp Lemonnier fell under the United States Central Command.)

The base, while a boon to embassy security (see below), has amplified the embassy’s workload. Above all, mission leadership necessarily involves itself in how Camp Lemonnier interacts with this tolerant, 99-percent Muslim country whose cooperative posture requires close consultation with Djibouti’s leadership. But for strong ambassadorial leadership, support for scores of ship and flag officer visits, country clearances, and public diplomacy coordination would overwhelm the embassy. During the first week of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspection, the team observed the embassy’s quality management of three major visits including the AFRICOM combatant commander, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

The Ambassador and DCM bring near-perfect skills to the job. The Ambassador, a former deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and director for Africa within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, knows the issues and how to work them within the U.S. Government. His prior service as the Somali watcher

based in Nairobi is germane for Djibouti, itself peopled predominantly by Somalis. The DCM has a background in political-military affairs and Ethiopia and an encyclopedic knowledge of the Horn of Africa. Embassy leadership displays an impressive command of U.S. policy and goals in the entire region and effectively communicates priorities to the entire mission. Both see the big picture, yet both are steeped in details. The Ambassador, while appropriately in charge, has a DCM who can stand in for him easily.

Washington interlocutors have uniformly high praise for embassy managers who enjoy outstanding relations with the Bureau of African Affairs. Subordinates within Embassy Djibouti characterize the Ambassador and DCM as personable, approachable, and inclusive. Neither officer is office-bound; both have visited the warehouse on multiple occasions to enthuse local staff who, uniquely in the OIG team's experience, mission managers know by name.

The Ambassador, while attentive to morale issues, focuses strongly on envisaged goals and how to achieve them. The DCM is more involved in day-to-day aspects of embassy management, at times delving into the details at the expense of time-management, in part because of the inadequacy of the mission's management platform on multiple counts. Both also shoulder much of the workload for the embassy as three key section chiefs, although talented, are entry-level officers and overburdened in any case.

Command and control mechanisms are largely traditional, smooth, and collegial. The Ambassador uses the weekly country team to inform and be informed, and otherwise favors a modest regimen of small meetings in the "billable hours" spirit. These sessions allow for freer flowing, forward-looking policy discussions. The OIG team commends this front office for its skill in substituting email for routine informational meetings to the extent possible.

Agency and section heads describe the Ambassador and DCM as highly personable and approachable, yet sharply focused. Coordination is easy, informal, and two-way in nature. Both the Ambassador and DCM adhere strictly to the dictum: praise in public and rebuke in private. All this furthers the sense of team. It also fosters interagency and intersectional collaboration, which the OIG team found to be very good, with the notable exception of a management section under fire for performance and blamed, implicitly, for Embassy Djibouti's shabby facilities.

MISSION STRATEGIC PLAN

The Mission Strategic Planning process is ill-suited to the special circumstances of Embassy Djibouti, given its proximity to a U.S. military base not under chief of mission authority with 100 times the assets and personnel. The Ambassador and his team have done an admirable job both in managing this relationship and in weaving this reality into the mission planning document. In the end, however, the vast bulk of U.S. official activities, including the bulk of U.S. assistance, does not fall under traditional Mission Strategic Plan metrics.

The Ambassador took an assertive lead in the planning process, a collaborative effort that included the entire Embassy Djibouti country team. The result of this inclusive approach was a first-class blueprint that trimmed strategic goals from six to a more manageable number of three and made a cogent justification for increasing American staff. Drawing on this blueprint, the Ambassador has gotten the ranking flag officers at the U.S. base to coordinate activity in implementing the embassy's key goals.

The OIG team notes that Mission Strategic Plan performance indicators warrant further refinement to be fully useful as evaluation tools. Current Department guidelines require them to be quantitative and based heavily on external monitoring agencies. However, these agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, use longer timelines and typically compile figures a year or more after the events themselves. Ideally, embassies would have great flexibility in the use of quantitative indicators.

MORALE

The OIG team found morale at Embassy Djibouti higher than expected, given that Djibouti is a hot, impoverished country in the Horn of Africa where service is wearing and staff housing less than charming. The monotony is grueling, especially for nonfrancophone family members. Confidential questionnaires prepared by American and national employees laud the Ambassador and DCM for attention to morale. In a praiseworthy practice, the Ambassador meets weekly with a rotating group of senior local employees to exchange views. He and his DCM treat them with evident respect and expect American staff to do likewise. This has narrowed the gap between American and local employees, a contentious issue in the past. Both the Ambassador and DCM also are sensitive to intra-embassy factionalism derived from ethnic rivalry between the Afars and Issas that led to civil war in the 1990s.

Also fostering morale are the front office's efforts to achieve an equitable work-home balance. This is a significant achievement in Djibouti where four different work-day schedules come into play. The embassy is open Sunday through Thursday while the host government works on Saturday and the U.S. military base on Friday and part of Saturday. With the Washington cycle also different, visitors often opt to arrive when the embassy is officially closed.

The Ambassador and DCM scored well above average on OIG's confidential questionnaires submitted by employees. Their collective style puts the accent on calm, friendly, and ethical leadership, which those below appreciate. Both the Ambassador and DCM employ to evident effect "trickle-down" ethics wherein their behavior sets a high standard for subordinates. In instances of disrespect to local staff or unethical behavior, the Ambassador and DCM have directly intervened to correct it. In one instance, they terminated a local employee despite her high-level connections to the host government.

ENTRY-LEVEL OFFICERS

Embassy Djibouti's small entry-level officer complement enjoys an unusual degree of responsibility. Apart from one specialist, the officers serve as section chiefs for consular, public diplomacy, and political/economic/commercial affairs. As such, they have interaction with the front office on a daily, if not, hourly basis. All are managed but not micromanaged. Mentoring takes place more in the context of performing daily duties than in set-piece discussions or off-site activity. The DCM also holds a weekly tradecraft meeting with each of these three section chiefs.

While the embassy lacks a formal entry-level officer program, both the Ambassador and DCM are highly approachable and generous with their time whether in the office or in social settings. The DCM, however, has yet to meet with the officers collectively in an informal setting, and the OIG team recommended informally that this take place.

SECURITY

Embassy Djibouti operates in an unusual security environment, by turns vulnerable and well defended. While the embassy works out of a jumble of converted residences, these make-shift quarters have multiple defenders, including a dedicated police force and the quick reaction force at the nearby U.S. military base at Camp

Lemonnier. Embassy managers also coordinate carefully with the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service and other force protection specialists. The Ambassador has appropriately encouraged the regional security officer to adopt a risk management strategy tailored to these special circumstances. The Ambassador and DCM also give high priority to the relationship with the base, which further enhances security.

The Ambassador and DCM have empowered Embassy Djibouti's security professionals rather than being intrusive, reflecting their fullest confidence in a highly capable regional security officer. Both maintain an open door for the regional security officer and deputy. Meetings with them are focused, collegial, and frequent. Mutual respect is evident. Employees from all sections and agencies uniformly laud mission leadership for its concern about security and success in fostering a culture of security at Embassy Djibouti.

A classified annex to this report provides additional findings from the OIG team's security review.

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SECTION

The political/economic/commercial section (hereafter referred to for brevity as the political section) is a five-person office led by an able first-tour, entry-level officer. Washington consumers and the OIG team believe that it covers well a wide range of traditional bilateral diplomatic issues, despite staffing constraints. The section chief is supported by an eligible family member employee who helps on the section's assistance programs, reporting, and visitors; a local employee who covers political affairs; a local employee who handles economic and commercial affairs; and a third local employee who also supports the assistance programs. The eligible family member employee position dates from March 2009, but a similar position existed intermittently for family members in previous years. The incumbent, as a U.S. citizen, could take on some of the ample political-military work the DCM is performing. The incumbent, however, lacks a security clearance, which undercuts his utility to the political section. Absent a compelling reason to the contrary, Embassy Djibouti should have him apply for a clearance as soon as possible.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Djibouti should request a security clearance for the eligible family member employee in the political/economic/commercial section. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

The embassy's Mission Strategic Plan captures effectively Embassy Djibouti's broad goals, and the Ambassador has further consolidated these goals to three overarching themes — peace and security, democracy and governance, and economic development — all requiring heavy political section involvement. The embassy has accorded democracy and governance greater priority in response to the emphasis of the current U.S. administration, and in preparation for elections in Djibouti in early 2011. Assistance also remains a key component as Embassy Djibouti presses for greater democracy. It is funneled in part (see below) through the USAID mission, which reopened in 2003, after being closed for a decade because of Djibouti's civil war.

In past years, Embassy Djibouti fell under the now-discontinued special embassy program wherein relatively senior staff served as ambassador and DCM, while other duties, from administration to consular, political, commercial, and public diplomacy, typically were handled by a handful of more junior officers or even just one. At present, Embassy Djibouti retains a special embassy staffing profile while it performs duties commonly found at larger embassies. This situation reflects the increase in U.S. security and counterterrorism activities in Djibouti because of its ideal location and cooperative government. The embassy has expanded so as to have separate section chiefs for political, public diplomacy, and consular affairs. All, however, are entry-level officers. Staffing gaps, as elsewhere in the Bureau of African Affairs, are endemic.

The nearby U.S. military base, which opened in 2003, increases the section's workload far beyond that typical for a small embassy. Although the Ambassador and DCM deal directly and frequently with many political-military issues, the political chief assists in cutting through the thicket of political-military, legal, banking, reciprocity, and administrative issues that arise from the base's presence and involve host government ministries. The political section chief does not do conventional political-military reporting; rather, the DCM and Ambassador cover most of these issues on the policy level for the embassy. A political affairs adviser drawn from the Department works at the nearby CJTF-HOA base and reports directly to the AFRICOM political affairs adviser in Stuttgart. This advisor's political-military reporting is separate from embassy reporting but is adequately coordinated.

The remaining work load for the section chief is ample, and would be so even were the section chief a mid-grade officer. Embassy Djibouti hosts frequent official visitors and an incessant stream of long-term temporary duty employees. The political chief also serves as control officer for congressional delegations and other senior officials who come to Djibouti, chiefly to visit the base. The incumbent also must complete more than a dozen mandated reports (see below) that require as much as one half of her entire work time.

The current consular chief, who arrived in August 2009, also has political reporting responsibilities. Mission management has appropriately sought to broaden this entry-level officer's duties while keeping them somewhat congruent with her primary, consular function. To this end, she has ceded minor political-military functions performed by the previous consul, and assumed instead reporting duties on refugees, and on related Somalia watch issues.

The political section also manages some assistance programs separate from USAID. These activities, while relatively small, require disproportionate management and programmatic time. Among such programs are the Ambassador's special

self-help grants to community groups, and the democracy and human rights fund. USAID Nairobi provides adequate financial oversight of these funds, which amount to only \$70,000. The political section chief monitors trafficking-in-persons issues and is helping to establish the Department of Justice's assistance program to help the Djiboutian government fight such trafficking.

Morale within the section is excellent and furthered by daily sectional meetings. Subordinates laud the section chief for clear direction and a supportive management style. Representational funds are small but adequate. The section has a formal travel schedule and an ambitious reporting plan.

Reporting and Representation

Notwithstanding limited personnel, Embassy Djibouti provides a good volume and quality of reporting. Washington end-users welcome the embassy's efforts to report on regional developments in Somalia and other neighboring countries. They urge the embassy to continue to take a regional focus as much as possible, leveraging Djibouti's location, which serves as a meeting place between the Middle East and Africa. Economic and commercial reporting was also praised, including periodic wrap-up cables, the investment climate statement, and the country commercial guide. Washington readers highlighted the country report human rights report and the advancing democracy and freedom report as extremely well-researched and thorough. The section also does counterterrorism and terrorist financing reporting, including coordinating the embassy's annual country report on counterterrorism and the international narcotics control strategy report Part II (money laundering and financial crimes).

Besides its labors on the self-help and democracy and human rights fund, the political section, in collaboration with the Djiboutian Government facilitates the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Safety Administration's \$6 million to \$10 million megaports initiative designed to enhance nuclear security for cargo containers at Djibouti's new port. It also supports the Federal Aviation Administration's \$900,000 project implemented through the International Civil Aviation Organization to increase air safety in Djibouti. In addition, the section is working with the Office of the Under Secretary for Global Affairs and the Department of Justice to initiate the \$580,000 project using International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds to help Djibouti implement its new antitrafficking-in-persons law.

Restructured Political Section

Embassy Djibouti recently received authority to create a new entry-level economic/commercial officer position in the combined political section. Depending on the availability of new officers, that individual may arrive within a few months. The OIG team endorsed the creation of this position, but believes the new officer should be designated political/economic/commercial rather than just an economic/commercial officer. The OIG team advised the front office to continue the section as a combined one in an operational sense vice stove-piping so that the two officers can back each other up during absences. In addition, each officer should do a mix of political, economic, and commercial issues to avoid over-specialization. A rotation of the chief's position between the two cones as incumbents depart may be useful. The OIG team also noted that after some period of trial and experience, the embassy may want to request an upgrade for one of the officer positions to a mid-level rank.

In the short term, the front office should consider how to manage the likely gap of many months that will occur once the incumbent chief departs. Thereafter, the Ambassador and DCM will also need to consider how to allocate between the two officers the political-military reporting duties previously handled by the consular officer. The DCM may be able to relinquish some of his political-military duties. The OIG team made an informal recommendation to the embassy's front office on the need to begin planning for the structure and portfolio shifts of the new two-officer political section.

Political-Military Affairs

Djibouti and the United States signed a status of forces agreement in December 2001. In February 2003, the United States and Djibouti signed an access agreement allowing for a U.S. military base at Camp Lemonnier — the site of a French military base as well. A follow-on implementation agreement for the base was reached in May 2006. These two agreements effectively govern the U.S. military presence in the country and substituted for the formal 2001 status of forces agreement. Through an exchange of diplomatic notes in late 2009, the United States and Djibouti extended the Camp Lemonnier base agreement until 2015. Djibouti and the United States have collaborated on the Somalia peace process, including the training of Djiboutian peacekeeping forces for Somalia, and the United States provided support for Djiboutian training of military recruits for Somalia's transitional federal government.

There are more than 20 tenant commands at Camp Lemonnier, with CJTF-HOA perhaps the most prominent one. Many nations use the camp's facilities as part of joint military efforts in the region, including antipiracy. In addition to the tenant

commands at the base, Department of Defense entities operating in the country include, among others: two civil affairs teams from CJTF-HOA; a country coordinating element from CJTF-HOA that works in the embassy but is not under chief of mission authority; an AFRICOM sociocultural research and advisory team; a media information support team partially embedded in the embassy; a U.S. Navy harbor security team to help protect the approximately 100 U.S. Navy ship visits each year; a U.S. navy liaison officer with the Djiboutian Navy; and, a Navy Medical Research unit that works with the Ministry of Health.

This array of Defense Department elements risks swamping a small, thinly staffed embassy. Embassy Djibouti – with the front office establishing a constructive, engaged tone – manages the inherently one-sided relationship with exceptional skill. The embassy leadership meets frequently with senior U.S. military, including at the weekly country team meeting and the weekly reporting officers’ meeting, as well as in numerous other settings. The OIG team witnessed the outstanding cooperation between senior embassy and U.S. military elements.

Defense Attaché’s Office and Security Cooperation

Until the summer of 2009, the Department of Defense’s U.S. liaison office in the embassy handled mainly security cooperation with the Government of Djibouti. The incumbent did not otherwise engage in traditional Defense attaché duties. Upon the arrival of the current attaché, however, the position expanded to become the typical Defense attaché portfolio. (Previously, a Defense attaché based in Addis Ababa covered Djibouti.)

This reconstituted Defense attaché office oversees a wide range of military assistance activities, including foreign military financing, international military education and training, some Section 1206 assistance programs, HIV/AIDS prevention, and peacekeeping operations. In recent years, the office has been particularly effective in bolstering the Djiboutian Navy through provision of brown-water patrol vessels, installation of a regional maritime awareness capability coastal radar system, and construction of the largest-ever foreign military financing project in sub-Saharan Africa, the dual-use naval pier and associated billeting space in Obock in northern Djibouti. As the senior defense official, the Defense attaché also oversees some military special operations personnel at the embassy.

Naval Criminal Investigative Service

With U.S. military ship visits to Djibouti totaling 87 in 2009 and likely to increase in 2010, the naval criminal investigative unit in the embassy plays a major role in ensuring force protection of these vessels and building the U.S. partnership with contacts at Djibouti port, the country's most important economic asset. The officer at the embassy oversees a larger investigative service contingent based at Camp Lemonnier.

Foreign Assistance and Other Economic Benefits of U.S. Presence

Djibouti received only miniscule amounts of U.S. foreign assistance until 2003 when USAID reopened a resident mission and the United States established the military base. The pace of assistance has picked up in recent years.

The President of Djibouti asked for the reopening of USAID during the negotiations to establish the base. An initial economic support fund authorization of \$25 million accompanied USAID's reopening. In recent years, the amount of USAID bilateral and regional funds for Djibouti has tapered off, but the mission remains focused on education and health. The Ambassador and the local USAID director are fully engaged in seeking out new USAID funding.

The establishment of the base also opened Djibouti to considerable other U.S. aid, largely in the security assistance area, including funds provided by agencies other than the Department of Defense, but implemented by the Defense attaché. Djibouti has actively sought U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation funding. If Djibouti qualified for at least "threshold" status, significant monies could be at stake. However, the current Millennium Challenge Corporation country scorecard for Djibouti shows the country missing the mark in 11 out of 17 indicators.

Besides direct foreign assistance, Djibouti also receives considerable indirect economic benefits from the presence of the base, including jobs, the opportunity for Djiboutian firms to provide services and goods, and other benefits. For FY 2010, and based on money flow projections from FY 2009 budgets, the embassy projects that about \$27 million in direct U.S. foreign assistance will be disbursed in Djibouti. This figure, although small in absolute terms by U.S. standards, is significant relative to the Djiboutian economy (see below).

In April 2009, USAID prepared FY 2009 annual operational plan that covers most of the foreign assistance resources for U.S. strategic goals in Djibouti and relates to the Mission Strategic Plan. Nonetheless, the mission strategic planning tables include only USAID bilateral program funding, foreign military financing, and international military and training funds. Other embassy elements contributed to USAID's operational plan. New guidelines for the Mission Strategic Plan and related assistance documents for 2010 were under review in Washington at the time of the OIG inspection. Thus, the latest assistance figure tabulation was on hold.

In any case, country-wide consolidated assistance numbers for FY 2010 are not readily available. Some new U.S. assistance projects, such as the Department of Energy megaports project described above, were not captured in the FY 2009 operational plan. In addition, the country assistance figures are necessarily incomplete in that major Department of Defense elements in Djibouti conduct assistance operations that do not fall under chief of mission authority. To complicate matters, significant Section 1206 assistance money is managed by both the Defense attaché, who is under chief of mission authority, and by command elements at the base.

Given the realities of the complex U.S. military operations in Djibouti, the embassy cannot be expected to oversee all assistance expenditures in the country, but it does a good job of coordinating with senior Department of Defense officials in Djibouti. Senior leaders at the base and in the embassy consult frequently about assistance. A country coordinating element under CJTF-HOA works out of the embassy, but is not under chief of mission authority. Although some implementation hiccups occasionally occur at the working level, the senior leadership on both sides consistently reaffirms the need for joint coordination.

The USAID director spends considerable time ensuring that civil-affairs programming under CJTF-HOA adheres to Mission Strategic Plan priorities. These civil affairs projects build schools, health clinics, and other social infrastructure that are valuable supplements to traditional aid programming. The annual civil affairs budget of \$10 million goes to the 13 countries within the area of responsibility, with Djibouti's share about \$2 million. In addition, the base's combatant commander's initiative fund provided nearly \$2 million in November 2009 to assist the Djiboutian military in hosting the African Union East Africa Standby Force Field Training Exercise. This exercise involved about 1,000 troops from 12 neighboring countries.

The embassy projects the following U.S. assistance disbursements in Djibouti in FY 2010:

USAID:

- \$3.8 million - USAID bilateral (Health and Education)
- \$2.3 million – USAID central/regional funding (Education)
- \$1 million – USAID Food for Peace aid

Embassy-managed security cooperation:

- \$3 million – \$ 2.7 million under International Military Education and Training and \$300,000 under the Foreign Military Financing program
- \$3.5 million – Section 1206 Department of Defense funds for regional maritime awareness (disbursed by both Defense Attaché and base elements)
- \$2 million – East Africa Regional Security Initiative money for an anti-terrorism unit
- \$500,000 – Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism funds for border post rehabilitation
- \$1 million – Somalia Peacekeeping Operations funds for training
- \$150,000 – Department of Defense funds to combat HIV/AIDS

Department of Energy:

- \$5 million – megaports \$ 6-10 million total, with \$ 5 million in 2010. The megaports initiative will systematically enhance detection of radioactive materials in containerized cargo.

Department of Defense not under chief of mission authority but coordinated appropriately:

- \$2 million – CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs projects
- \$2 million – AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA support to the East Africa Regional Security Brigade
(see above re Section 1206 assistance)

Other funding not all under chief of mission authority but coordinated appropriately:

- \$1 million – Various small funds related to trafficking in persons and other initiatives.

TOTAL:

\$26.25 million

Economic and Commercial Relations

Economic and commercial relations are at most modest and rooted in the reality that Djibouti is an impoverished, distant land. Its gross domestic product is less than \$1 billion dollars. U.S. exports to Djibouti in 2008 amounted to \$141 million, and Djiboutian exports to the United States, not counting transshipped goods, barely moved the scale at \$7 million in 2008. Djibouti belongs to the World Trade Organization, and Dubai is by far the largest foreign investor in Djibouti. While direct U.S. foreign investment amounts in Djibouti have been trivial, a sizeable salt extraction project under construction draws upon U.S. investment capital and has an investment guarantee from the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Although there is no bilateral investment treaty with the United States, Djibouti provides a generally welcoming investment climate, a strategic location, and a quality deep water port. Djibouti serves as the major seaport for Ethiopia, Africa's second-most populous country. The large investment by Dubai World Ports in Djibouti's harbor, including an industrial and commercial free zone, which could boost transshipment possibilities, may act as the catalyst for other large foreign investments. Djibouti is also seeking financial services investments. A state-owned telecommunications firm provides reliable but expensive service.

In the absence of any Foreign Commercial Service presence at the embassy, the political section annually updates the country commercial guide and the investment climate statement. The Foreign Commercial Service in Embassy Nairobi provides minimal support. Embassy Djibouti has applied for business facilitation incentive funds from the Department for programming to support increased and effective partnerships between Djiboutian entrepreneurs and a growing U.S. business presence in Djibouti, including for the military base. The section recently organized an open house meeting for U.S. businesses in Djibouti, hosted by the Ambassador. The OIG team believes that the political section has an appropriately modest commercial program, given the size of the local market. The economic/commercial local employee might, however, benefit from more specialized training from the Foreign Commercial Service in Nairobi or elsewhere.

Law Enforcement Issues

There is no resident legal attaché, Drug Enforcement Administration official, or other U.S. Department of Justice or Department of Homeland Security representative in the embassy. A legal attaché in Sana'a, Yemen, covers Djibouti on an intermittent basis. The embassy might wish to consider future law enforcement coverage in Djibouti as a new legal attaché office is established in Ethiopia. The embassy's

regional security officer handles well most of the infrequent law enforcement issues that arise separate from normal embassy functions. The regional security officer will use antiterrorist assistance program funds and possible international narcotics and law enforcement funds to renew close engagement with the national police and gendarmes.

Burden of Reporting Requirements on Small Embassies

Some years ago, the Department eliminated with no concurrent uptick in embassy resources the useful special embassy reporting program designed to lessen the burden of mandated reporting requirements to which small missions, as opposed to large embassies, devote disproportionate time. At present, small embassies stagger under the load of annual reports on subjects ranging from human rights to religious freedom, trafficking in persons, and investment disputes, among others. Each is based on a separately defined statute with unique reporting schedules and standards, some in conflict. Many of the mandated reports carry the possibility of sanctions. Thus, dialogue with host governments can be prickly and beyond the skill or experience of officers in small embassies who typically craft these reports.

Above all, the OIG team favors a simplification of the different deadlines, guidelines, and timelines for these many reports, especially for those not mandated by Congress. Ideally, small missions like Djibouti would prepare an omnibus report covering these required topics all at one time, once a year. The embassy could then draw upon individual sections needed for reports due later in the year, as none of these reports relies heavily on timely information, given the lengthy processing procedures in Washington.

At a minimum, the OIG team believes that the Department might seek to amalgamate mandated reports into logical subgroups. For example, an omnibus economic report could address the investment disputes, intellectual property, and national trade estimate reports. A homeland security report could cluster the counterterrorism, money-laundering, and narcotics reports. A human rights and democracy report could embrace the human rights, religious freedom, trafficking in persons, advancing freedom and democracy, and labor reports.

Further, the OIG team believes that the Department could discuss how to simplify certain more complex and overlapping reports such as the lengthy Mission Strategic Plan, operating plan, performance plan and review, and other reports required by USAID and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. In so doing, small embassies and missions with little likelihood of receiving major assistance would prepare an Internal Revenue Service 1040-A-style “short form.”

Overall, the OIG team finds that the current mandated annual reporting system invites duplication of effort and undercuts the effectiveness of individual reports. For one thing, the time officers spend researching and writing these reports is time not spent addressing the serious, global, underlying issues they reflect. The goal of these reports, after all, is not just to publicize the issues under scrutiny but to provide platforms for action.

Refugee Affairs

The consular officer handles refugee affairs and reporting as an adjunct to her main portfolio. The OIG team found this arrangement adequate. It notes, however, that the embassy missed a chance to report on a significant event picked up by international media in which the Djibouti Government forcibly repatriated Somalis. While a cable on this development appears to have reached the draft stage, it was not transmitted to the Department.

Djibouti has a refugee presence estimated variously between 11,000 and 30,000, a significant number for a country whose permanent population is roughly 650,000. The government ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1977 but has not yet applied it effectively. One complication is the difficulty in differentiating between genuine refugees and others transiting Djibouti en route to temporary work in the Middle East. International organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration perform specific projects. None, however, has offered broader assistance to Djibouti to manage its resident refugee population.

The consular officer also manages the Bureau of Populations, Refugees and Migration's Julia Taft Fund grants for refugees. During the OIG team's visit, she also served as control officer for a Department of Homeland Security refugee resettlement processing team. With a previous resettlement team so miffed by inadequate U.N. arrangements for their visit that they refused to come back for several years, the officer appropriately focused on making this visit successful.

CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Djibouti's knowledgeable, confident entry-level consular officer, ably assisted by three skilled local employees, handles a full range of consular work that is low on volume but high in complexity.

Consular Facility

Located in a dedicated building adjacent to the main chancery, the Djibouti consular section is one of the Department's smallest worldwide. Its clean, well-decorated public waiting room is little larger than a walk-in closet, with only two public windows and a work area smaller than a typical home dining room. Space use is elegant — the consular section chief has a separate office with line of sight over the cashier function while each local employee has personal work space. Equipment, supplies, and files are neatly stowed. Appointments are scheduled so as to minimize the waiting room population, given that there is no way for customers to avoid overhearing others' interviews in so small an area. If an interview ranges into sensitive personal information, the consular staff asks others to step outside. The staff is sufficient for the current workload.

Consular Management

The chief of the consular section is an entry-level public diplomacy officer occupying an FS-03 position. In addition to consular duties, the officer also is responsible for refugee issues, and for some political reporting. The Ambassador and DCM appropriately waited until the vice consul was comfortable with consular and refugee work before they assigned this officer political duties. That portfolio was originally designated political-military, but was sensibly modified to Somalia-watching, a subject important to overall mission activities and one that meshes with many consular and refugee issues.

The officer has established productive relations with American and local staff throughout the mission. She meets frequently with the DCM and consults him informally as needed. She and the DCM brief embassy duty officers together — the DCM on upcoming or ongoing visits, the consular officer on American citizen services cases. The consular officer is also in close contact with the regional consular officer in Frankfurt, whose most recent visit found only a few small issues that quickly were improved, but no significant deficiencies.

Internal controls are current and correct. The consular cashier turns in funds to the class B cashier almost every day, and receipts are provided per 7 FAH-1 H-700.

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The consular pages on the embassy's Web site are solely in English, although Djibouti is a francophone country and some customers, chiefly immigrant visa applicants, know only Somali. No regulation requires that consular information be available in local languages, but making it so would save time for staff in that clients would be less likely to misunderstand instructions. The OIG team informally recommended that the consular section provide complete consular information in French on its Web site. Although translating into written Somali is difficult (all education in Djibouti is in French and even well-educated Somali speakers do not often write in that language) the OIG team informally recommended that the embassy also provide brief, Somali-language consular Web pages.

The consular officer conducts most interviews herself, but sometimes calls on local employees for help with more technical French as well as with Somali, which she does not speak. At the request of these employees, who at times find themselves pressured by applicants to intervene with the officer during interviews, the consular inspector conducted a training session on interpreting, emphasizing the need for the interpreter to interpret precisely, adding nothing extraneous to the translation process.

American Citizen Services

The self-declared "Republic of Somaliland," which the U.S. Government does not recognize as independent of the country of Somalia, is part of the embassy's consular district. Embassy officers, however, are not allowed to travel there, and the Department also warns Americans against traveling to Somalia. While very few Americans require emergency services in the Republic of Somaliland, the handful of cases that do occur command an inordinate amount of time. In August 2009, two Americans who had been repeatedly warned against traveling to Somalia to interview pirates fell into what eventually turned out to be a debt-related dispute. Sorting out this complex misadventure required intensive effort by Embassy Djibouti as well as the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Three Somali-American consular wardens in Somaliland keep in close touch with the consular section and are prepared to assist Americans as much as possible, but the help they can provide is limited to passing messages and assisting with contacting and dealing with local authorities. They have no formal authority.

The nearby U.S. base, Camp Lemonnier, provides a steady supply of U.S. passport applications via a military courier. The consular officer has not found serious errors in these applications, but does not know whether the courier's work is in ac-

cord with 7 FAM 1300 Appendix X. Some consular sections that work with military couriers find patterns of carelessness and even fraud in U.S. passport applications from military members, so compliance with the FAM requirements is essential.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti should apply 7 FAM 1300 Appendix X to ensure that the military courier service at Camp Lemonnier works within all specified regulations and procedures. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Visa Services

Bureau of Consular Affairs' workload statistics indicate that six percent of Djibouti's visa applicants require clearances before a visa can be issued. The OIG team notes, however, that the number of applicants requiring clearances is actually almost 20 percent, with security advisory opinions, simple advisory opinions, and other name-check results increasing the number.

The consular officer instructs new embassy officers in proper nonimmigrant visa referral procedures according to 9 FAM Appendix K before accepting referrals from them. The DCM reviews nonimmigrant visa issuances and refusals regularly, per 9 FAM 41.113 and 41.121.

The DCM chairs the Visas Viper committee meetings, which are held and reported monthly per 9 FAM 40.37 and 09 State 132497. Resultant names are submitted promptly and correctly.

Fraud Prevention

The consular section periodically performs nonimmigrant visa validation studies, but has as yet not fully analyzed the data collected during these studies. The Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Fraud Prevention Programs, provides detailed information and advice on its Web pages and also welcomes direct contact. The OIG team informally recommended that the consular section draw on these resources to identify patterns useful in better adjudicating visa applications.

The consular section has formal and informal contacts in the Djibouti Government and business community, which allows it to quickly verify Djiboutian documents that are needed for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas. (b) (2)(b) (2)
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

An able second-tour, entry-level officer with no prior public diplomacy experience directs a public affairs operation that is unusually demanding for such a small embassy and driven in large part by the activities related to the nearby U.S. base with over 4,000 military and civilian staff. While this complicates coordination of the U.S. message, Embassy Djibouti and the base report harmonious relations. Like the rest of the embassy, the public affairs section bustles with energy and focus. Local staff is small: an overtaxed cultural assistant; a novice press assistant; and a French translator who supports the entire embassy (as will the Somali translator, once that position is filled).

Although there is no Fulbright program and the information resource center consists of just a few shelves of books, the public affairs officer still manages a wide range of traditional public diplomacy activities. The entire mission participates in the selection of five International Visitor grantees; the section sends out highly qualified mid-career professional Humphrey grantees; six English-language discussion groups (making use of military volunteers) are running six nights a week; and the section manages the public appearances of the Ambassador and the DCM. USAID programs also get timely and effective support, with the public affairs officer clearing all press releases and ensuring the U.S. Government gets proper credit for the assistance it provides. A newly instituted contact database has entries that seem both broad and deep, and a recent democracy-focused speaker program brought together political opponents who had not met in public in seven years. In addition, the section is creating an exchange program alumni network and producing a country-specific educational advising video. Also underway is the arduous process of negotiating public placement of American Shelf reference books.

Literally hour by hour, the public affairs section engages with the nearby American military contingent, clearing its press releases, liaising with its public affairs officers, publicizing its numerous charitable ventures, briefing newly arrived military on the local culture, and supervising its embassy-based media information support team. The military team is preparing to launch a country-wide media survey. It also has partnered with the Djibouti Government to produce and distribute school kits for all rural elementary students.

All this activity comes at a price, leaving the public affairs officer strapped for time. Mandatory program reporting via the mission activity tracker could be more punctual, a fact the public affairs officer recognizes and is trying to remedy via greater involvement of his staff in the process. Similarly, the staff had not been making entries into the grants database management system (although the grant files them-

selves were properly maintained). Once the OIG team alerted them, though, they promptly created an account and entered the necessary information. The embassy's public Web site, which the section runs, has a few broken links and some inaccurate content, all of which can be corrected easily.

Greater attention to detail will not solve the core problem: there are too few local employees in the public affairs section for the workload of the embassy. The cultural assistant is diverted by Web site responsibilities and administrative chores. The new press assistant, still mastering her portfolio, frequently gets called back to her former job as Somali translator because a suitable replacement has yet to be found. The French translator, who in effect services the entire embassy in francophone Djibouti, has virtually no time to support basic programming.

The U.S. military presence has shot up in recent years, thereby driving up the embassy's work load and revealing inadequacies in its overall staffing as well as its management platform. Given the increased demand on the public diplomacy section's resources and the sheer difficulty of getting business done both within and without the embassy, there is a clear need for another local employee. The most cost-effective addition would be a program assistant who could liaise with embassy service providers, manage the Web site, make program arrangements, and assume dozens of other tasks that now burden everyone. Such a staffing increase, which is in accordance with both the most recent Mission Strategic Plan and the most recent rightsizing review, would improve day-to-day operations and provide a surge capacity that is now non-existent in this busy section.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should create a program assistant position for a local employee in the public affairs section. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF)

A final OIG team concern is with public diplomacy representation funds. In FY 2008, much of this funding was made available to officers of other sections. Because the other officers did not spend the money, it eventually reverted to the public affairs officer, who used it appropriately. Such a disbursement has not been repeated in FYs 2009 and 2010. The embassy agreed with the OIG team that public diplomacy representation funds are to be used exclusively in support of programs and activities that have a public diplomacy focus.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

STAFFING, BUDGET AND PERSONNEL INCREASE REQUESTS

Current Embassy Djibouti Staffing

| | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| Direct-Hire U.S. Staffing | |
| -State | 20 |
| -USAID | 2 |
| -DOD | 2 |
| U.S. Total | 24 |
| Local employees | |
| | 227 |

Embassy Djibouti Budget (actual FY 2009, dollars)

| | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| State Program | \$1,496,900 |
| ICASS | 3,455,800 |
| Public Diplomacy | 126,600 |
| Representation – | |
| State | 16,500 |
| Public Diplomacy | 1,500 |
| Total | \$5,097,300 |

Personnel Increase Requests

The FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan requests 18 new U.S. direct-hire positions: eight for the Department, five for USAID, and five for the future Marine security guard detachment at the new embassy compound.

MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

Embassy Djibouti's management challenges have overwhelmed the section. Customer complaints are legion; (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) The management officer, an FS-02 with previous general services officer experience,

Financial Management

The financial management unit does a good job with minimal oversight, receiving acceptable scores on a recent International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) customer satisfaction survey. A locally employed budget analyst and a staff of four operate the unit, which provides support for all Department accounts and for one small Department of Defense component. The embassy's serviced accounts increased from nearly \$4 million in FY 2004, to \$9.5 million in 2009. The success of the unit has resulted, in part, from the support of the regional financial management officer in Nairobi. With this assistance, the unit is effective in establishing, liquidating, and monitoring obligations, but increases in funding and projected additional growth have justified the need for greater management oversight. The regional financial management officer's advocacy contributed to the recent approval of a new direct-hire American financial management officer position.

Financial management unit internal controls recommendations are noted in the management controls section of the report.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

The ICASS process in Djibouti operates satisfactorily. The chairman of the ICASS council is new to the role but understands the requirements of that position. The ICASS council has approved new local employee positions for facilities maintenance and other ICASS positions that management has requested. The embassy's most recent budget submission was not as informative as ICASS personnel in Washington would have preferred, but was acceptable. USAID and Department of Defense elements at the embassy maintain separate furniture pools and motor pools. The addition of the recently approved financial management officer position should improve communication with the Department and provide better ICASS program management.

Human Resources

Three local employees staff the human resources unit. A U.S. direct-hire human resources officer in Addis Ababa visits quarterly. The management officer provides oversight in Djibouti but spends little time monitoring or understanding the details of day-to-day human resources issues. Customer service is a challenge for the unit. The three human resources local employees sometimes have unrealistic expectations regarding advancement and are also at times impatient with local employees whom they perceive as difficult or rude.

Workforce Planning

Embassy Djibouti participated in a rightsizing exercise in 2005 with the Under Secretary of Management's Office of Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, identifying 13 new positions. The embassy successfully projected staffing needs in support of the increased military presence in Djibouti, and many of the positions identified in 2005 have been created and filled. The Bureau of Human Resources recently created economics officer and financial management officer positions. The embassy agreed to add additional public diplomacy and management local employees to manage the increased workload generated by the large U.S. military presence in Djibouti. The embassy is scheduled to update the rightsizing study in spring 2010.

GENERAL SERVICES

Procurement

The procurement unit has generally good instincts but could improve customer service and expand its use of procurement methods. The unit's two locally employed procurement assistants have recent training and are aware of mission operating requirements. The unit, however, would benefit from more direct American supervision. Procurement assistants were not aware that ICASS standards existed for their unit's services. The OIG team recommended informally that the temporary duty general services officer post ICASS procurement standards in a prominent location in the procurement office.

The embassy does not use the WebPASS procurement application and thus does not have the benefit of electronic integration between the financial management office and the procurement unit. As a result, all coordination between these physically separated units is done manually. This prevents the embassy from achieving optimal funds management and providing good customer service.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti should install and use the WebPASS procurement application. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

The OIG team identified cases in which requested purchases were not made. In one instance, funds were not available; in another, the procurement clerk was uncertain what to order. No information was conveyed back to the requestors. Clearly

lessly on warehouse grounds, and many improvements are needed in the unit's management controls. The warehouse is located about two and a half miles from the chancery compound in a desert-like environment, adjacent to dumping grounds for debris. In contrast to the environment, the warehouse itself is neat, organized, and clean, although it stores unneeded scrap metal and 18 barrels of waste oil. The warehouse operation includes many containers and stationary buildings with only three or four climate-controlled spaces. Workshops are under cover but still hot and inhospitable. Warehousing and property operations will move to the new embassy compound in 2011.

The warehouse supervisor brings energy and direction to the unit. He and the nonexpendable property clerk have command of the nonexpendable property application. In its last reporting cycle, the unit used scanners for the first time to record inventory. Although this inventory was documented in accordance with Department standards, documentation for the previous two cycles was not available for review as required by 14 FAM 416.2 e. (see management controls section). The expendable supply clerk has mastered the basic features of the WebPASS expendable supply application but does not use the application's replenishment-level function. This control deficiency and others are discussed in the management controls section of the report.

The management office has not given priority to the important functions of turning over the mission's personal property and discarding scrap and waste material. The embassy has not conducted a property sale for over two years. A substantial amount of surplus program and ICASS furniture, equipment, and supplies is stored in ten 20-foot storage containers. Other agencies have surplus property stored in five additional containers. Surplus property stored in the warehouse has caused the property staff to store 25 new air conditioning units in a storage container. Not disposing of the excess property has allowed potential funding to pass, for the Department and other agencies, and incurred costs for property depreciation and maintenance.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti should conduct a property sale and remove waste oil from the warehouse compound. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti, after the property sale, should consolidate its remaining personal property in the warehouse and sell all empty storage containers. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Housing

Employees from the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations visited Djibouti in January to assess the viability of retaining the current embassy compound when the embassy moves to the new compound. Housing is expensive and difficult to find in Djibouti. The OIG team agrees that the current compound offers a cost-effective opportunity to create embassy housing on property the U.S. Government already owns and maintains.

Facilities Management

Current embassy facilities operate at an acceptable level. Emergency repairs are made as needed but no improvements are made due to the move to the new embassy compound in 2011. The new compound will include a warehouse and shops for the facility maintenance staff.

Embassy Djibouti's first American facilities manager arrived four months before the inspection and sits in an office in the warehouse. His presence has already improved oversight of the facilities maintenance operation, and should result in a better prioritization of work requests and staff accountability. He has begun planning for increases and changes in skill levels for the staff who will maintain the new embassy compound. One area that needs immediate attention is the purchase of proper safety equipment (goggles and safety shoes) for the maintenance staff. The OIG team left an informal recommendation for immediate procurement of the safety equipment.

Keeping up with requests for maintenance at employee residences is an unending battle. The facilities unit suffers from not having a basic stock of repair supplies. A facilities team may visit a house two or three times to fix a minor problem because of the absence of spare parts and an inability to obtain them quickly on the local market. The OIG team informally recommended that the facilities manager work

with the facilities staff, the budget office, and the procurement staff to identify items that the embassy should order on a regular basis and keep in stock, as well as to identify vendors who can quickly supply needed parts and equipment and with whom the embassy should maintain a blanket purchase agreement.

Information Management and Information Security

A first-tour information management officer, with extensive African background as a regional rover, stewards Embassy Djibouti's information management program. He is familiar with and capable of surmounting the difficult operating environment and staffing levels typically found in U.S. missions in Africa. To their credit, he and his staff have sustained operations and provided a high level of customer support despite a constant rotation of temporary personnel and a generally high-tempo embassy. Djibouti's information management program has been a consistently strong performer, as confirmed by the high ICASS survey results and solid scoring in the OIG questionnaires.

For the most part, the program adheres to Department guidelines, federal information management mandates, and common industry practices. There are, however, select areas that require management attention. Among these are the Intranet site, the radio program, contingency planning, and courier escort duties. The OIG team made several recommendations in these areas and also counseled Embassy Djibouti on issues such as media control, audit and accountability, and information management best practices. The mission has addressed some of the concerns and some mitigation activities are in progress.

The information management program covers an array of information technology operations including the OpenNet network, the ClassNet network, and a dedicated internet network. The program also comprises pouch management, radio/telephone network, cellular phone program, and home Internet and television services. The information management officer is supported by an information management specialist, who is on his first overseas tour. Overall there are 215 users, 129 workstations, and 12 servers being serviced by the OpenNet network. The classified network consists of approximately 16 workstations, and 4 servers.

Information Systems Center

The information systems center operates effectively despite minimal oversight from management for years. The issue has resulted in the senior systems administra-

tor having free reign to dictate rather than provide adequate support and guidance to allow the assistant systems administrator to run the operation by himself — an unacceptable situation in that the junior systems administrator is responsible for the network in the absence of his supervisor.

The OIG team found that communication from the American management to the systems administrators was minimal, and did not include the standard sectional meeting. The complexity of the information management program is not conducive to an oversight-free environment. The OIG team consulted with management regarding the need for team meetings and other measures to better manage operations, gauge productivity, and address areas of concern. During the course of the inspection, the information management officer acknowledged the requirement and initiated a section meeting to address this issue. The OIG team supports management's action thus far but stresses the need for continual communication.

Furthermore, the assistant systems administrator is incorrectly classified as an operations clerk, although fully qualified and currently conducting systems administrator duties. This anomaly has existed since he was hired six years ago. Regardless of cause, the assistant systems administrator should be correctly classified to reflect actual duties performed.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should conduct regularly scheduled information management staff meetings to appropriately manage operations, gauge productivity, and address areas of concern. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should immediately reclassify the information management operation clerk to an assistant systems administrator to appropriately reflect duties performed. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Information Programs Center

The information programs center operations are impaired by the limited collaboration between the two specialists, and also by the performance deficiencies of the first-tour information management specialist who requires a lot of mentoring and is not familiar with general Department operations. The OIG team discussed with the supervisor the need to document deficiencies adequately and provide counseling before the first performance review. With the upcoming move to the new embassy

compound, the mission will undoubtedly continue to grow, requiring additional support and more capable specialists. There is no fix at hand for the current situation at Embassy Djibouti, but the OIG team suggests that the Department more carefully consider work requirements and capabilities prior to assigning specialists to small posts with inherently limited infrastructure.

Intranet Site

Embassy Djibouti does not have an active Intranet site. The mission has, however, embarked on the hiring process for an additional systems administrator who would be responsible for the revitalization of the Intranet site and other collateral duties. Management is planning on creating the mission's Intranet site via a locally installed and administered *Microsoft Office SharePoint Server 2007* application. Management plans to use SharePoint to accelerate the automation of business processes between the embassy and Washington. The OIG team made an informal recommendation regarding this issue.

Information System Security Officer

As is endemic with small embassies, information systems security officer duties are not appropriately separated per Department regulations. The information management specialist is designated as the information systems security officer for both the unclassified and classified systems. The assistant regional security officer is the alternate for both systems but has not completed the required information systems security officer's course mandated by 12 FAM 622.2. The current designations result in an inherent conflict of interest. With respect to the current workload, the appropriate separation of information systems security officer duties is not feasible.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should send the regional security officer designated as the alternate information systems security officer to the required training course IA 101. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Mailroom Operation

Embassy Djibouti manages an active mail and diplomatic pouch operation with minimal staff. At present, there is only one dedicated position for the various mailroom duties critical to embassy operations and overall mission morale. Although the mailroom has scrambled to maintain a high level of support, the increasing size of

the mission and scheduled move to the new embassy compound may warrant additional support. Furthermore, the mailroom should be adequately staffed to provide operational coverage without requiring the support of an already stretched information management staff. Without appropriate staffing for the mail operation, there will continue to be intermittent operational disruptions that harm mission operations. The OIG team left an informal recommendation regarding this issue.

High Frequency Radio Network

Embassy Djibouti's authenticates its high frequency radio with Embassy Addis Ababa. The mission has been unable to authenticate its radio frequency with Embassy Addis Ababa because of technical difficulties. This subject is discussed in the OIG report on Embassy Addis Ababa.

The radio tests are designed to ensure operational readiness of all high frequency equipment in the event of an emergency. According to 5 FAH-2 H-723, if the mission's high frequency radio equipment fails, the operators are responsible for contacting their regional information management center. In the event of a disaster or critical need, the embassy will not be able to communicate via radio frequency to neighboring missions.

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Courier Escort Duties

The courier escort duties are not appropriately shared by all agencies that use the classified pouch. Currently, the information programs center staff provides all of the escort duties. Per 12 FAM 151.1, all agencies that use the classified pouch share the responsibility of courier escort duties. As necessary, the management officer and the DCM should intervene with agency heads to ensure equitable distribution of classified pouch duties.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should develop and implement a schedule giving all resident agencies that use the classified pouch appropriate responsibility for courier and other classified pouch duties. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

QUALITY OF LIFE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

Embassy Djibouti has had no designated American Equal Employment Opportunity counselor in country for the past two years, and no officers currently at the embassy have had the requisite training. An Equal Employment Opportunity counselor in embassy Khartoum agreed to provide support from a distance but management has issued no notices to the Djibouti embassy community alerting employees to this offer or otherwise provided information on how to contact the Khartoum-based counselor should services be needed. The OIG team informally recommended that the management officer issue an announcement to the community regarding the Equal Employment Opportunity program, including information on how to contact the Khartoum Equal Employment Opportunity counselor.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti should identify an incoming employee to serve as Equal Employment Opportunity counselor and ensure that this person takes the required course. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

A local employee once served as an Equal Employment Opportunity advisor to other local employees, but this arrangement seems to have ended and the management officer told the OIG team that he had no knowledge of such a designation. The OIG team informally recommended that the management officer work with the locally employed staff committee to identify an Equal Employment Opportunity representative for local employees.

COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICE

The community liaison office coordinator, who has been on the job since January 2009, is the spouse of the management officer. The embassy has an approved nepotism waiver that stipulates that the DCM serve as the supervisor and rating officer. The overly burdened DCM has, however, delegated day-to-day responsibility for supervising this position to his office management specialist. This arrangement

has led to confusion and a lack of guidance for the community liaison office coordinator. Work requirements were not drafted until November 2009, and they identified the office management specialist as the rating officer and the DCM as reviewer. The coordinator declined to sign the document until the rater and reviewer were appropriately changed to the DCM and Ambassador, as stipulated in the nepotism waiver. She has not received a revised set of work requirements. According to 2 FAM 113.7-3(B), “the community liaison office coordinator is supervised by a U.S. citizen officer, usually the management counselor or management officer, unless nepotism considerations disallow this arrangement.” Embassy management may wish to consult with the Department’s Family Liaison Office in the development of appropriate work requirements.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti should complete work requirements for the community liaison office coordinator, designating the deputy chief of mission as rating officer and the Ambassador as reviewer. The work requirements should clearly spell out the duties for which the community liaison office coordinator is responsible. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

HEALTH UNIT

Djibouti’s health care system suffers from a shortage of qualified personnel, weak infrastructure, unavailability of drugs, and poor sanitation. Infant and child mortality is among the highest in Africa. Malnutrition is common, as are contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. Immunization rates are among the lowest in the world. Water-borne illnesses are endemic. A cholera outbreak in 2007 killed dozens in the capital city.

Against this background, Embassy Djibouti’s tiny health unit provides essential services to embassy personnel, both American and local. The unit’s three rooms total less than 300 square feet. There is no waiting area since the unit is otherwise too small to ensure privacy for patients during consultations. Within this modest space, the OIG team found equipment, supplies, and medications meticulously catalogued, cared for, and dispensed. Personalized, hands-on care is generously provided. The embassy’s sole health care provider has managed the unit for ten years, first as a medical technician and since 2006 as a registered nurse.

The nurse, who sees an average of ten patients every working day, is the first stop for embassy members seeking medical care or advice. The nurse's support team includes a long-time post medical advisor, the regional medical officer in Sana'a, a physician's assistant in Asmara, the regional psychiatrist in Nairobi, and the regional medical technician in Cairo. She consults frequently with these experts by email and telephone, and they visit regularly. The French military hospital in Djibouti is the embassy's primary provider of emergency services. Although the hospital only sees embassy employees and family members on a space-available basis, the nurse does not remember an embassy patient ever being turned away. She also cultivates relations with the medical clinic at Camp Lemonnier, which is not obliged to assist embassy personnel as there is no formal agreement for it to do so. The relationship depends solely on the good will of individual doctors assigned to the clinic, so the nurse is careful not to presume upon their generosity.

The nurse also helps with the embassy's supplemental medical plan, which reimburses local employees for certain percentages of medical treatment for themselves, their spouses, and their children. She ensures that the employees understand treatment instructions as well as prescriptions, and that receipts and application forms are complete and correct before submitted for reimbursement. The embassy has requested permission to join the Department's standard medical plan, which provides more liberal benefits than the local plan does.

RECREATION ASSOCIATION

Embassy Djibouti has no employee association but has formally submitted a proposed charter and by-laws to the Department.

WELCOME TO POST

There are no established procedures for welcoming new employees. Under standard work requirement statements, the community liaison office coordinator is supposed to send welcoming information systematically to new employees and families. Neither the management office nor the community liaison office does so. The community liaison office coordinator sends information on consumables and schools to those who ask for it, but there is no systematic contact with new employees, even after they have arrived in Djibouti. Newcomers are often left to figure out the workings of the embassy on their own.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should create a comprehensive welcome program for new employees beginning with a welcome letter when a new officer's assignment to Djibouti is announced and ending when the new employee completes orientation and check-in. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Many employees and their families have spent weeks or even months in temporary housing, including cramped hotel rooms. Employees have moved into their permanent housing to find basic systems or appliances still not in working order.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Djibouti should create and use a checklist of housing and maintenance items that are required before a housing unit is considered ready for occupancy. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Officers new to the mission often have little, if any, familiarity with military conventions and rank structure. The OIG team informally recommended that the mission work with the military to hold familiarization briefings for new embassy employees and long-term temporary duty personnel.

OVERSEAS SCHOOLS

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(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6) There is no suitable international school. There is an Indian elementary school, with instruction in English, that one child attended in the past. It lacks air conditioning (and temperatures during the prolonged hot season soar far above 100 degrees) but the family was happy with the quality of the education.

(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)
(b)(2)(b)(6) The school curriculum is reportedly about a year behind that of U.S. schools. All children currently in Djibouti are adjusting well (b)(2)(b)(6)
(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6) The lack of an international school, with an English-language curriculum, is a recruitment factor for embassy Djibouti, which is a difficult mission to staff in any case.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The 2009 chief of mission's statement of assurance on management controls states that Embassy Djibouti's systems of management controls, taken as a whole, comply with the Comptroller General of the United States' standards and the Department's objectives and does not identify any deficiencies in inventory controls. The statement of assurance identified, as a significant deficiency, a lack of management oversight resulting from too few U.S. direct-hire ICASS staff. The embassy has requested additional U.S. direct-hire positions in the management section to correct this deficiency. A U.S. direct-hire facilities manager position was created and filled in September. The Department has approved a new financial management officer position. A temporary duty officer is filling two months of a four-month gap in the general services officer position.

The management officer is the embassy's designated management controls officer. The mission has adopted collaborative management initiative procedures and uses eServices for some work orders. The local employee who manages eServices is encouraging a broader use of the system, and she keeps, and reports, usage data.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The embassy uses purchase orders to generate purchase card transactions for individual, small purchases, thus resulting in relatively high administrative costs per transaction. The OIG team recommended informally that the financial management office coordinate with the procurement unit and provide bulk funding for credit card purchases.

The management section's purchase card was cancelled for nonpayment for eight months during 2009. The financial management unit had adopted an incorrect practice, making partial payments based on receipt of property, rather than paying the credit card bill in full when it was due. Failure of the financial management office to understand and perform its role in the purchase card program resulted in the card's cancellation – a problem that took many months to resolve. In addition, the financial management unit failed to perform monthly purchase card reconciliations. The OIG team recommended informally that voucher examiners take online training for the purchase card program.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with Embassy Nairobi, should establish policies and procedures for the management office purchase card program. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with Embassy Nairobi)

Recommendation 19: Embassy Djibouti should amend the senior local budget analyst's work requirements to include responsibility for appropriate monthly reconciliations of the purchase card invoices. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

HUMAN RESOURCES

The human resources office performs the timekeeping function for the embassy and understands post differential termination rules. After two cases where allowances were not terminated on time, the regional human resources officer established procedures to ensure all allowance terminations and reinstatements are concurrent with travel. The procedures do not address, however, the requirement for travelers to inform the embassy of U.S. travel. The OIG team found that some American travelers profess not to understand the Department's allowance program or their obligation under 4 FAH-3 H-533.10-3 c. to inform the embassy of travel to the United States, requiring termination of post differential.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Djibouti should issue a management instruction reminding employees of the requirements and circumstances to terminate post differential when traveling to the United States. The instruction should explicitly state employees' obligation under 4 FAH-3 H-533.10-3 c. to communicate affirmatively to the relevant embassy section any travel that requires termination of post differential. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

All property management tasks are performed by a staff of five, a small number to effect proper separation of duties. The nonexpendable and expendable supply clerks (record keepers) have central and varying roles in the inventory reporting process. In many cases the same person handles all aspects of a requisition: receiv-

ing and filling an order and updating property records. The limited staff is justified based on workload. The unit's accountable property officers have not conducted semiannual management reviews required by 14 FAM 411.2 d. to mitigate the risks associated with limited separation of duties.

Property disposal records, Form DS-132, did not indicate oversight of a property disposal officer nor acknowledgment of cash proceeds by the financial management officer. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has furniture and equipment stored in the warehouse that are not listed on an inventory as required by 14 FAM 414.1-1 a. (2). The OIG team made an informal recommendation that the embassy create an inventory record for this property. Residential property inventories required by 14 FAM 416.3 a. had not been returned by three families. The OIG team recommended informally that the management officer become directly involved in obtaining these documents.

The property management unit does not use the WebPASS expendable supply replenishment-level function nor otherwise consider historical usage in ordering expendable supplies. Instead, property staff use a makeshift process to order bulk expendable supplies from the United States. As a result, the embassy experiences numerous supply shortages and is forced to order supplies locally at higher prices. The OIG team recommended informally that the embassy implement and document supply usage analysis for bulk supply orders and train staff to use the replenishment-level function on the WebPASS application.

Deficient controls in property management are linked to the unit's limited American supervision. The general services officer works out of the main embassy compound and is removed from day-to-day operations on the warehouse compound where property transactions occur. The embassy has only begun to use scanners to record inventory and does not have required inventory documentation for the previous two cycles. Due to the missing data, the embassy cannot be sure that inventory reports are accurate and that property is not misplaced, lost, or stolen.

Recommendation 21: Embassy Djibouti should enroll in the online management controls workshop and conduct and document a management control review of the property management unit consistent with the methodology of the online course. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

MOTOR POOL

The motor pool does not ensure the accuracy of its vehicle information in the Integrated Logistics Management System-AM database. The OIG team discovered discrepancies while performing an inventory to verify the accuracy of the Inventory of On-hand Vehicle Report. Six vehicles were on the inventory that had been sold or discarded years ago. Some data items, such as vehicle identification numbers, were incorrect. The discrepancies indicate a lack of coordination between the embassy and the Bureau of Administration and create a risk of loss.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should verify that the motor vehicle information stored in the Integrated Logistics Management System-AM database is accurate and complete. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination A)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti, after updating its vehicle information in the Integrated Logistics Management System-AM database, should submit its annual Inventory of On-hand Vehicle Report certification for 2010. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Djibouti should request a security clearance for the eligible family member employee in the political/economic/commercial section. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti should apply 7 FAM 1300 Appendix X to ensure that the military courier service at Camp Lemonnier works within all specified regulations and procedures. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should create a program assistant position for a local employee in the public affairs section. (Action: Embassy Djibouti, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Djibouti should complete all outstanding local and American employee evaluations. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Djibouti should require the management officer to monitor recruitment actions on a regular basis, reviewing all applications deemed qualified, ineligible, and unqualified for an individual recruitment, to ensure that internal candidates receive full consideration for advertised embassy positions. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti should install and use the WebPASS procurement application. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti should conduct a property sale and remove waste oil from the warehouse compound. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti, after the property sale, should consolidate its remaining personal property in the warehouse and sell all empty storage containers. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should conduct regularly scheduled information management staff meetings to appropriately manage operations, gauge productivity, and address areas of concern. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should immediately reclassify the information management operation clerk to an assistant systems administrator to appropriately reflect duties performed. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should send the regional security officer designated as the alternate information systems security officer to the required training course IA 101. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 12:

Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should develop and implement a schedule giving all resident agencies that use the classified pouch appropriate responsibility for courier and other classified pouch duties. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti should identify an incoming employee to serve as Equal Employment Opportunity counselor and ensure that this person takes the required course. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti should complete work requirements for the community liaison office coordinator, designating the deputy chief of mission as rating officer and the Ambassador as reviewer. The work requirements should clearly spell out the duties for which the community liaison office coordinator is responsible. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should create a comprehensive welcome program for new employees beginning with a welcome letter when a new officer's assignment to Djibouti is announced and ending when the new employee completes orientation and check-in. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

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Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti, after updating its vehicle information in the Integrated Logistics Management System-AM database, should submit its annual Inventory of On-hand Vehicle Report certification for 2010. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

Embassy Djibouti does not have a formal entry-level officer program.

Informal Recommendation 1: Embassy Djibouti should either institute a formal program or, at a minimum, occasionally bring together all entry-level officers, either on-site or off-site, for informal discussions.

POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SECTION

The expected arrival of a second officer in the political/economic/commercial section will create new structural and portfolio responsibility issues to be resolved by the front office.

Informal Recommendation 2: Embassy Djibouti should determine the structure and portfolio responsibilities of the new two-officer political/economic/commercial section.

CONSULAR SECTION

Most Djibouti citizens and residents were educated in French. The embassy public Web site is solely in English.

Informal Recommendation 3: Embassy Djibouti should provide complete consular information in French on its public Web site.

Many applicants for consular services only know the Somali language.

Informal Recommendation 4: Embassy Djibouti should provide consular information in Somali on its public Web pages.

The consular section periodically performs nonimmigrant visa validation studies but has not fully analyzed the data collected.

Informal Recommendation 5: Embassy Djibouti should consult with the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs in order to use its validation study data to identify patterns useful to adjudicating visa applications.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Human Resources

The locally employed staff handbook was last revised in 2001.

Informal Recommendation 6: Embassy Djibouti should update the locally employed staff handbook with current policies and procedures.

Local employees in the lower grades receive smaller transportation allowances than higher graded employees.

Informal Recommendation 7: Embassy Djibouti should send a cable to the Bureau of Human Resources, Office of Overseas Employment, requesting a change to the local compensation plan to pay one transportation allowance for all local employees.

Procurement

Procurement assistants were not aware that ICASS standards existed for their unit's services.

Informal Recommendation 8: Embassy Djibouti should publicize International Cooperative Administrative Support Services procurement standards in the procurement office.

Some customers believed that purchase request feedback was inadequate.

Informal Recommendation 9: Embassy Djibouti should provide periodic procurement status reports to its customers.

The procurement unit would benefit from greater use of blanket purchase agreements.

Informal Recommendation 10: Embassy Djibouti should establish more blanket purchase agreements.

The procurement assistants do not have advanced contracting skills and thus their purchasing methods are limited to petty cash, purchase order, and credit card procurements.

Informal Recommendation 11: Embassy Djibouti should provide the procurement assistants with contract training.

The embassy has only one purchase card holder, which limits its ability to maximize card usage.

Informal Recommendation 12: Embassy Djibouti should increase the number of purchase card holders.

Facilities Management

Some employees in the facilities maintenance unit do not have required safety goggles and safety shoes.

Informal Recommendation 13: Embassy Djibouti should provide all necessary safety equipment for the facility maintenance staff and train them in the proper use of the equipment.

The facilities unit does not maintain a stock of standard maintenance items.

Informal Recommendation 14: Embassy Djibouti should identify maintenance items to keep in stock and vendors with which the embassy should maintain blanket purchase agreements for emergency maintenance and repair supplies.

Information Technology Unit

Embassy Djibouti does not have an active intranet site.

Informal Recommendation 15: Embassy Djibouti should revitalize its intranet site. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

Embassy Djibouti manages an active mail and diplomatic pouch operation with minimal staff.

Informal Recommendation 16: Embassy Djibouti should establish an additional locally employed staff position to appropriately staff the mailroom operation. (Action: Embassy Djibouti)

QUALITY OF LIFE

Equal Employment Opportunity

The Equal Employment Opportunity counselor in embassy Khartoum agreed to provide support for employees in embassy Djibouti.

Informal Recommendation 17: Embassy Djibouti should issue a notice regarding the Equal Employment Opportunity program in Djibouti, identifying the Khartoum counselor and providing contact information.

Local employees do not have a designated local employee who serves as an Equal Employment Opportunity advisor.

Informal Recommendation 18: Embassy Djibouti should identify a local representative to assist local employees with Equal Employment Opportunity issues.

Welcome to Post

Officers new to the mission often have little, if any, familiarity with military conventions and rank structure.

Informal Recommendation 19: Embassy Djibouti should work with the military to hold military familiarization briefings for new embassy employees and long-term temporary duty personnel.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

Financial Management

Purchase orders were used to generate purchase card transactions for individual, small purchases resulting in relatively high administrative costs per transaction.

Informal Recommendation 20: Embassy Djibouti should initiate bulk funding for credit card purchases.

The financial management unit does not fully understand its role in the purchase card program.

Informal Recommendation 21: Embassy Djibouti should require that voucher examiners take online training for the purchase card program.

Management Controls - Property Management

The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has furniture and appliances stored in the warehouse without an inventory required by 14 FAM 414.1-1 a. (2).

Informal Recommendation 22: Embassy Djibouti should create an inventory record for the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations property at the warehouse compound.

Residential property inventories required by 14 FAM 416.3 a. had not been returned by three families.

Informal Recommendation 23: Embassy Djibouti should obtain delinquent residential property inventory documents.

The property management unit does not use the WebPASS expendable supply application replenishment-level function nor otherwise consider historical usage and maximum and minimum stock levels in ordering expendable supplies, resulting in supply stock shortages.

Informal Recommendation 24: Embassy Djibouti should train staff to use the WebPASS expendable supply application replenishment-level function.

Informal Recommendation 25: Embassy Djibouti should implement and document supply usage analysis for bulk supply orders.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

| | Name | Arrival Date |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Ambassador | James Swan | 10/08 |
| Deputy Chief of Mission | Eric Wong | 12/07 |

Chiefs of Sections:

| | | |
|---|------------------|------|
| Management | Robert Osborne | 8/08 |
| Political/Economic/Commercial | Rebecca Hunter | 1/08 |
| Consular | Heather Wright | 8/09 |
| Regional Security | Michael Lombardo | 8/09 |
| Public Affairs | Niles Cole | 4/08 |
| Regional Affairs | Thomas Call | 8/09 |
| New Embassy Compound Project Manager | Vansri Stephens | 2/09 |

Other Agencies:

| | | |
|--|---------------------------|------|
| U.S. Agency for International Development | Stephanie Funk | 9/08 |
| Department of Defense | Lt. Colonel Edward Dupont | 9/09 |

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|---|
| AFRICOM | United States Africa Command |
| CJTF-HOA | Combined Joint Task Force –Horn of Africa |
| DCM | Deputy Chief of Mission |
| ICASS | International Cooperative Administrative Support Services |
| OIG | Office of Inspector General |

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and resources hurts everyone.

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