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United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General

# Report of Inspection

## Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan

**Report Number ISP-I-10-11, November 2009**

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## **PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION**

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

### **PURPOSE**

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### **METHODOLOGY**

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; conducted on-site interviews in Washington and Afghanistan; visited mine action sites and mine action organizations in Afghanistan; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



**United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

*Office of Inspector General*

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel  
Deputy Inspector General

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Department's Humanitarian Mine Action/Weapons Reduction program in Afghanistan is effectively designed and managed by the Bureau of Political Military Affairs' Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). The program benefits from capable and dedicated personnel.
- The Department's contractor for mine action and conventional weapons and ordnance destruction, DynCorp International (DCI), has fulfilled the terms of its contract.
- All six of the humanitarian mine action nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that receive Department funding merit further support.
- PM/WRA has sound plans for the next mine action contract period, which begins in spring 2010. This plan will reduce technical assistance and continue managerial capacity building for the Afghan government and mine action NGOs.
- PM/WRA must provide close oversight of the transition to a new mine action contract in order to assure smooth program continuity and proper accountability of U.S. Government property.
- The Department and Embassy Kabul need to improve coordination on mine action among all appropriate agencies and programs of the U.S. Government.
- The international community goal of a "mine-free" Afghanistan by 2013 is unrealistic, and is not in keeping with the U.S. approach to mine clearance, which seeks a "mine impact-free" end state.
- Mines and unexploded ordnance will be a feature of Afghanistan for decades. PM/WRA needs to determine what will constitute the mine impact-free situation for Afghanistan and be prepared to end its large scale assistance when that point is reached.
- Embassy Kabul must assure that mine action personnel from the Department and the embassy have the necessary transportation and security resources to effectively monitor mine action contractor performance in the field.
- Community-based demining (CBD) offers a promising model for reaching difficult mine-impacted areas.

- Many suspected hazardous areas are found not to be contaminated. Recent surveys to more precisely delineate hazardous areas are productive at putting land back in use. A full “tool kit” of mine clearing machines, technology, and dogs effectively supplement these efforts.
- Additional attention should be paid via public diplomacy to telling the story of U.S. mine action/weapons reduction successes.
- PM/WRA has also done a good job in Mine Risk Education and Victim Assistance, and these programs should continue.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between April 15 and June 20, 2009, and in Kabul, Afghanistan, between May 17 and 28, 2009. (b) (6)(b) (6) (b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

## CONTEXT

The humanitarian mine action program for Afghanistan was the world's first. The 20-year-old program is still the world's largest and most complex. It is also one of the world's most successful. Some 8,000 Afghan deminers have cleared more than 244 square kilometers of high priority, mine-infested and unexploded ordnance (UXO)-infested land, destroying over 210,000 landmines and millions of pieces of UXO. The landmine/UXO casualty rate has been reduced by half since program inception, to the current rate of an average 63 incidents per month, about a quarter of which result in death. Over 1.5 million refugees have been able to return home, and over 7 million people have received mine risk education. Various victim assistance programs assist casualties, the total number of which is estimated at 60,000.

However, the UN-supported Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA) estimates there are still over 690 square kilometers of hazardous areas remaining, impacting over 2,090 communities. Some of these areas are inaccessible due to ongoing conflict, difficult terrain, or deteriorating infrastructure. New hazardous areas are frequently identified.

MACCA, which is a UN Mine Action Service project implemented by the UN Office for Project Services, plans and coordinates all humanitarian mine action in Afghanistan via the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). MAPA is funded both bilaterally and through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. MACCA manages the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. It also maintains a well-regarded database that is used in prioritizing suspected hazardous areas.

The Afghan mine program is in slow transition toward national ownership. The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs served as the contact point with MACCA and the international community until 2008. The Government of Afghanistan at that time established an Inter-Ministerial Body for Mine Action, which directed that the Afghan Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) in the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority partner under MAPA with mine action agencies to plan and coordinate mine action activity. DMC reports to the Office of the President.

The Government of Afghanistan and MACCA also decided at the time, however, that existing institutions would continue to provide support to the Afghanistan government on mine action until 2013. The 11-member staff of the DMC moved

into the offices of MACCA in May 2008, to begin a process of familiarization and capacity building. MACCA and the DMC will work to transition to the DMC authority for:

- Accreditation of mine action entities
- Custody of mine action standards
- Quality assurance monitoring
- Coordination of mine-risk education with the Ministry of Education
- Final signoff on cleared land
- Preparation of reporting

DMC is tasked under MAPA to develop and publish plans with the UN Mine Action Service for DMC capacity building and transition of mine action authority from the United Nations to Afghanistan. A contracting entity is also to be established in either the DMC or its parent, the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority.

The MAPA 2009 clearance strategy focuses on working to achieve two key benchmarks to which Afghanistan has committed:

- The Ottawa Treaty promise to clear all anti-personnel mines by 2013;
- The Afghanistan Compact commitment, signed in London in 2006 with major donors to clear 70 percent of mine and UXO by March of 2011.

The United States, through the Department of State, was one of the first countries to support humanitarian mine action, when it began contributing to the Afghan program in 1988. The Department has since contributed about \$125 million, primarily from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account. The assistance covers all three mine action pillars: clearance, education, and victim assistance. Department of State program assistance in FY 2009 was \$25 million.

PM/WRA is responsible for crafting and managing the Department's mine action and weapons removal program in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan program manager, a former U.S. military officer with an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) background, is primarily responsible for the design and day-to-day management of the Afghan program, as well as programs in Pakistan and most African countries, and receives supervision and support from others in the office for specialized functions such as contracting, grants management, and public diplomacy.

Department contracting is done by the Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisition Management (A/LM/AQM).

The Department contributes to the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) bilaterally, through direct contributions to five Afghan Humanitarian Mine Action NGOs, and to one international Humanitarian Mine Action NGO, the respected HALO Trust, founded in Great Britain. The Department also contracts with DCI to provide the Afghans technical assistance and training, and EOD capability. DCI also plays an important role in monitoring NGO performance and reporting to PM/WRA. Several smaller grants are provided to international NGOs working on victims assistance, developing a security incident warning system for NGOs, including those engaged in mine action, and providing trained mine detection dogs. Direct monitoring and program review and coordination is done through visits of PM/WRA officials to Afghanistan, and by an Embassy Kabul demining officer, who is a Foreign Service officer working in the embassy political-military section.

Although the United States chooses to fund Afghan Mine Action bilaterally, the United States coordinates its programs with MACCA and shares the MACCA goal of national capacity building, and eventually turning over all responsibility to Afghanistan for coordinating humanitarian mine action within its borders.

The United States is not party to the Ottawa Treaty, which bans all use of anti-personnel mines. Nor does U.S. policy seek the clearance of every mine in Afghanistan or in any other country as the end state, believing such a goal is impractical and not cost-effective. Rather, the U.S. goal for mine action is to clear until an area or country is "mine impact-free." That is, until mines and UXO present no serious threats to human life. Minefields in extremely remote, inaccessible areas of no economic value may just be cordoned and clearly marked or cleared to a lower standard than "mine-free."

With the exception of reported sporadic use by the Taliban, parties to the conflicts in Afghanistan are reportedly not using anti-personnel mines in the standard military sense. Afghanistan acceded to the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty in 2002. Persistent antipersonnel mines are not used by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and international watchdog groups report no confirmed reports of deliveries of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups in Afghanistan in recent years.

Note that this report uses "mine action" rather than "demining" in keeping with current terminology in the political-military and humanitarian action communities. Also note that, humanitarian mine action, conventional weapons destruction (CWD), and EOD are closely linked in activity, statistics, and funding. This is in part because

UXO, mines, and at-risk weapons all pose similar risks and are often found collocated in the same hazardous areas. The term “mine action” alone may often be used in this report for brevity, but may connote CWD/EOD activities as well, including small arms/light weapons destruction funding.

## THE CHALLENGES OF MINE ACTION

Mine action today uses a combination of machines (mechanical), survey, canine, and manual means. It is a dangerous, slow, labor-intensive process, with the surest method still being individual deminers working in clearly marked lanes with hand-held mine detectors and hand-held probes somewhat akin to gardening tools. The work is risky. MACCA reported in July 2008 that 371 civilian deminers had been killed since the beginning of the mine action program; some media reports place the figure far higher.

Deminers are also frequently attacked, killed, kidnapped, and robbed by the variety of armed groups and criminals rampant in Afghanistan. In the last two years, some 27 deminers were shot dead, most in the provinces of Kandahar, Jawzjan, Kunduz, and Farah. Deminers also regularly lose vehicles and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in attacks or raids by insurgent or criminal groups. Armed persons, for example, abducted 13 deminers working in the eastern province of Paktia, later releasing them, but keeping their vehicles.

Just this year alone, PM/WRA has had more than 20 of the teams it funds targeted, attacked, threatened, or involved in other incidents, such as thefts. DCI contractors received death threats. A HALO Trust vehicle was attacked by likely insurgents during the inspectors' trip to Afghanistan.



## EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

PM/WRA has successfully crafted and managed the Department's mine action and weapons removal program in Afghanistan. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspectors' interviews in Washington and Kabul show widespread belief that PM/WRA's Afghan mine action policies and programs are well-reasoned, successful, and cost-effective. The inspectors agree with these findings, in particular agreeing that the following policies and programs are correct:

- Direct funding of Afghan NGOs, which puts funding directly to work in getting mines and explosive ordnance out of the ground, and builds Afghan capacity.
- Coordinating with the UN-controlled MACCA, which has done an admirable job guiding MAPA.
- Promoting national ownership by the Afghans of mine action. Full ownership will not, and need not, occur soon, but the Afghans will need to be able to handle residual responsibilities, perhaps such as Ottawa compliance, after the bulk of the mine action is completed and MACCA ceases operations.
- Provision to the Afghans of a "full tool kit" of mine action capabilities, including manual, mechanical (machine), and canine means, along with training, as this increases productivity.
- Seeking as a goal for U.S. program participation a "mine-impact free" Afghanistan, rather than "mine-free." The U.S. goal should be to help return as much land as possible to productive use as soon as possible. Afghanistan, with the mine action expertise it has developed, will be well situated to finish the job to Ottawa Treaty standards.

PM/WRA officials engaged in the Afghan mine action program, across the board, received high marks from all of inspectors' interlocutors in Washington and Afghanistan. The OIG inspectors reviewed the quality of the officials' planning, implementation, financial accounting, and written products, and agree with the interviewees. PM/WRA and the Afghan mine action program benefit from a cadre of capable, engaged officials. The Embassy Kabul mine action officer is likewise well-informed, imaginative, and even passionate about her work. The mine action officer serves in the embassy political-military section, and has mine action as about half of the portfolio. The half portfolio is currently judged sufficient, especially given the embassy's long work days and six-seven day work week.



## PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

### HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

#### Afghan Nongovernmental Organizations

All five Afghan NGOs that receive PM/WRA funding are long established and technically and managerially competent. These five are:

Afghan Technical Consultants – The oldest and still largest of the five Afghan NGOs, Afghan Technical Consultants was established in 1989. It employs over 1,500 people and uses the full tool kit of machines, dogs, and manual deminers to clear both mines and UXO. PM/WRA funding in FY 2009 was \$2.85 million. This funded one project office, nine mine action teams, two mechanical (machine) mine action units, three EOD teams, and five mine detection dog sets (three dogs per set).

Demining Agency for Afghanistan – Founded, like most of the Afghan NGOs, in Pakistan in the early 1990s, the Demining Agency for Afghanistan also uses the full tool kit of machines, dogs, and manual deminers. It currently fields the modern Slovak demining machine “Bozena,” provided by PM/WRA. The Demining Agency for Afghanistan is engaged in CBD. It received \$2 million in PM/WRA funding in FY 2009.

Mine Clearance Planning Agency – Established in 1990, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency initially did mine action surveys, databases, and impact surveys. It now also clears mines and UXO, using the full tool kit, including a PM/WRA-provided Bozena. FY 2009 PM/WRA funding was \$2.3 million.

Mine Detection Center – The Mine Detection Center started as a trainer and provider of mine dogs and handlers to other mine-clearance NGOs within the UN system. It eventually shifted to handling all aspects of mine clearance, but continues to provide dogs/handlers to other NGOs and is training dogs for other elements of Afghan government, including border police, customs, antinarcotics, presidential security, and police. The Mine Detection Center has trained/supplied dogs to demin-

ing programs in Yemen and Tajikistan. PM/WRA funding of \$850,000 for FY 2009 provides, inter alia, four mine dog groups of the 26 fielded by the Mine Detection Center and supports six mechanical and several manual mine action teams.

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghanistan Rehabilitation – This organization uses the full tool kit for mine action and also provides mine risk education over its television station. The Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghanistan Rehabilitation is engaged in CBD in the eastern region. PM/WRA funding for FY 2009 is \$2.5 million.

The United States is the largest long-term bilateral financial supporter of all five of the NGOs, but they all also receive significant funding from the UN Voluntary Trust Fund and other countries, such as Japan. The OIG inspectors visited and met at length all five Afghan NGOs and visited many of their operations in the field. Inspectors' observations, and their discussions with DCI, MACCA, and Embassy Kabul (all of which monitor the NGO work) and many others in the mine action community lead to a finding that all five organizations are technically competent, well-organized, and productive, and merit continued support. All provide regular and reliable reports to PM/WRA.

## HALO Trust

The Department has also productively funded the HALO Trust. HALO is the world's first, and still by far, largest and most productive mine action NGO. It is a nonpolitical, secular NGO, registered in Britain and the United States as a charity. HALO introduced the concept of humanitarian mine clearance to the world in Afghanistan in 1988. Its policy in Afghanistan has been based on adherence to principles of good governance and recruiting a multiethnic workforce, and this played a large part in guaranteeing HALO the ability to work more or less without interference since 1988, regardless of the regime in power. (The five Afghan NGOs also appear to have worked effectively under most regimes, including the Taliban. Some NGO leaders reportedly even served the international community at times as a channel to Taliban leadership.)

HALO Afghanistan currently employs over 3,300 Afghans, and runs a mixture of some 160 manual, light mechanical, survey, and weapons and ammunition destruction teams. Between 1988 and 2008, HALO Afghanistan has destroyed over 692,000 mines (156,000 emplaced mines and 536,000 stockpiled mines), nine million items of large caliber ammunition, and 45.4 million bullets. HALO has only 10 expatriate staff.

PM/WRA funding for HALO in FY 2009 was \$3.9 million for mine clearance and \$700,000 for weapons and ammunition destruction. The OIG inspectors believe that HALO also merits continued support.

## Victims Assistance

While the bulk of PM/WRA's funding has been devoted to mine removal, the victims assistance component has gained in both funds and attention. DCI subcontracted the victims assistance component to Clear Path International (CPI), a U.S.-based NGO, which is also active in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lebanon. CPI began operating in Afghanistan in 2007, and has developed programs with six Afghan NGOs. One of those groups is the Afghan Mine Action Technology Center (AM-ATC) which is located in Kabul in the offices of the Kabul Orthopedic Organization (another CPI beneficiary) on the grounds of the Afghan Army Hospital. AMATC designs and manufactures equipment that can be used by both the Kabul Orthopedic Organization and the various NGOs and commercial organizations engaged in mine action campaigns in Afghanistan. The equipment ranges from material to be used in mine awareness education presentations to devices that are to be used to disrupt or make inert a variety of explosive devices. The latter device, known as a disruptor, is being purchased by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan to be provided to EOD teams, Afghan and U.S., for use in disarming roadside bombs. Previously such equipment was imported at much higher cost. CPI's goal with AMATC is to help it develop and market products so that AMATC and the Kabul Orthopedic Organization can become self-sustaining.

Another important objective for CPI is to help Afghan NGOs raise the profile of the disabled within the government and civil society. CPI helped organize the third National Disability Workshop. In a society where the presence of mines and other explosive remnants of war will continue to claim victims for years to come, it is essential that the government of Afghanistan's legal and regulatory regimes become more disabled friendly.

## Other Nongovernmental Organizations

PM/WRA funding has also productively funded:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Maintenance and Supply Agency – A \$225,000 grant for FY 2009 supported the physical security and stockpile management practices of the Afghan National Army.

Information Management Mine Action Program – A \$400,000 grant for FY 2009 continued deployment of the OASIS data management and geospatial situational awareness tool in Afghanistan.

Marshall Legacy Institute – A \$150,000 grant for FY 2009 provided 15 mine detection dogs to Afghan implementing partners.

Clear Path International – A \$304,555 grant for FY 2009 will continue victim assistance projects with CPI in Kabul and Jalalabad.

## DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL

The OIG inspectors found that DCI had fulfilled the terms of the contract task order it won for the Afghan mine action program in 2005. The contract runs for five years, until May 2010, and cost about \$30 million over that period; \$7.2 million in FY 2009.

DCI is tasked with providing:

- technical assistance, oversight, and mentoring to the five Afghan-mine action NGOs;
- EOD technical advisors to, inter alia, mentor and manage seven Afghan CWD teams deployed throughout the country;
- Two fully-equipped protective security details for program security;
- Establish a victims assistance component that provides support for medical care, rehabilitation, and counseling; and
- Providing mine and UXO awareness training.

DCI employs 34 expatriates and 172 Afghans to carry out its responsibilities. The expatriates include a project manager, several EOD technical advisors and trainers, two medics, two dog trainers, a mechanical demining advisor, three victims assistance coordinators, and logistics, finance, and grant specialists. Sixteen of the expatriates belong to the security detail and are Gurkhas recruited from Nepal. Afghans serve as CWD technicians, team leaders, guards, medics, ambulance drivers, cooks, translators, and administrators.

DCI provides CWD assistance to the Afghan national army and police, U.S. and ISAF military contingents, MACCA, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in destroying weapons stockpiles and UXO. It has trained the seven CWD teams to

be self-sufficient and able to be tasked directly by Afghan authorities, MACCA, or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. To date, the teams have secured 6,503 tons of mines and munitions, destroyed 2,230 tons of mines and munitions, and trained 73,691 Afghans in UXO awareness and avoidance. Much of the weaponry and UXO is collected in visits the teams make to villages. Other UXO is collected from Afghan and ISAF authorities and deminers. Statistics show the success of the program.

The CWD teams are careful to maintain their humanitarian posture. While they respond to calls from ISAF and Afghan authorities, their job is to aid in destroying dangerous UXO, unowned weapons, and unserviceable munitions stockpiles. Visits to villages are arranged with village elders on a voluntary basis.

## DCI Contract Management

The OIG team found the DCI contract and change orders were well-conceived, defined, and managed. Inspectors met with all A/LM/AQM and PM/WRA staff involved with the contract, including office directors, the contracting officer and the contracting officer's representative, and grants managers. The OIG team also reviewed the contract, initial bids, and change orders. The review, and discussions with the above officials and a wide range of others, led inspectors to the conclusion that the contract has been well managed. In fact, A/LM/AQM officials feel the contracts are clear, correct, and therefore fairly easy to manage. They also noted that DCI and PM/WRA officials are knowledgeable and responsive.

DCI provides a solid body of reports to PM/WRA, including weekly operations reports and quarterly inventory reports of U.S. Government-owned property.

## Coordination

One surprise was the lack of coordination between the various components of DCI that are working in Afghanistan. DCI is the Department's largest contractor in the country. The mine action contract may be the smallest of its operations there. DCI is also the prime contractor for the counternarcotics program, provides the aviation assets that move embassy officials, works in police training, and continues to train/mentor the presidential protective detail. The original DCI bid for the mine action contract did not include a provision for housing because the DCI mine action unit believed it had an understanding with the DCI Civilian Police training program under which the DCI mine action personnel would be billeted in the Civilian Police regional training centers. After the contract was awarded, the understanding, apparently never more than a gentlemen's agreement, came undone, perhaps due to lack of space. DCI requested a change order to the contract to provide for housing, but

the Department refused, pointing to the bid. DCI thus absorbed the housing costs, about \$500,000 per year. After two years, however, deterioration in the security situation, increased security costs and demands, and rising rents, the Department agreed to add \$697,000 to the third year of the contract to cover housing and related security. As planned from the start of the contract, specifications for the fourth and subsequent years of service were reviewed, revised, and freshly reconstituted. Housing was included, at a cost of \$798,000 for the fourth year.

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### Inventory Control

The inspection team identified some problems with inventory control. When DCI took over the Afghan mine action program from the previous contractor, RONCO, in 2005, as many as 27 vehicles were never accounted for. The transition was problematic and reportedly rancorous, with the previous contractor largely gone before the arrival of DCI, due largely to a delay in awarding and implementing the new contract. Both DCI and RONCO complained of insufficient (or no) transition time. RONCO claimed it had given the vehicles to the United Nations MACCA under verbal instructions from the PM/WRA contracting officer's representative.

OIG auditors and the director and staff of A/LM/AQM attempted to determine what had happened and to assign responsibility. OIG auditors traveled to Afghanistan, but were unable to find anyone from RONCO or the embassy or the United Nations who could provide significant information or documentation. The auditors heard that the contracting officer's representative had possibly arranged a handshake deal with the United Nations regarding the vehicles. The contracting officer's representative had since retired, and the trail went cold. PM/WRA also advised that, technically, under property disposition rules, the vehicles would have been considered valueless as they were somewhat older than three years and had been devalued by their constant use in a hazardous area.

Ultimately, the OIG auditors identified a few problems with DCI inventory procedures. DCI took note, and began submitting quarterly inventory reports in 2006. Inspectors determined that PM/WRA regularly receives and reviews the reports,

but PM/WRA has not itself conducted a formal onsite inventory. The inspectors reviewed the quarterly reports and conducted informal spot checks of the inventory at each of the DCI sites they visited in Afghanistan. In general the results were satisfactory. There were excellent records of weapons at all sites. An initial inventory of vehicles in Kabul turned up a number of discrepancies, but all were cleared up. Vehicle inventories at two other sites reconciled.

Regretfully, PM/WRA did not prepare a lessons learned document from the transition experience. Many of the key Department officials during the last transition have either transferred from the involved organizations or retired. PM/WRA will have to take care that problems, such as lack of a turnover period, incomplete inventory, and undocumented change orders, do not arise in the transition when the contract is re-bid and awarded in the spring of 2010.

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with and the Bureau of Administration, should prepare and agree on a plan by November 30, 2009, to include timelines, travel, and oversight responsibility, for bidding, awarding, and implementing the new mine action contract in spring 2010. (Action: PM, in coordination with A)

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should conduct a formal inventory of U.S. Government-owned equipment at all DynCorp International locations prior to the conclusion of the current contract. (Action: PM)

**Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should revise the work requirements statements of at least two Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement officials to reflect the need for regular inventory reviews and spot checks. (Action: PM)

Other inventory issues also need to be addressed. Two of the DCI regional site managers said that they had never formally assumed control of their site equipment or inventories, in spite of requests to DCI in Kabul that this take place. All of the sites had office and household equipment that appeared to not be listed on the inventory and did not appear to be personally owned. Some of it was said to be unserviceable and awaiting disposal. Other equipment, but nothing of major cost, appeared to be missing.

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should verify that DynCorp International inventory transfer procedures meet U.S. Government contracting standards so that inventory at all sites is properly assigned to the responsible employee. (Action: PM)

## OVERSIGHT

Effective project oversight of the mine action projects by the appropriate direct-hire U.S. Government personnel, such as the program manager, contracting officer's representative, and the embassy mine action officer has been difficult. Some oversight is provided by the contractor, DynCorp International, combined with required reporting of the grantees to MACCA. PM/WRA officials told inspectors they want, and often plan, to make quarterly oversight visits, but have not always been able to do so. Even when the program manager has been able to visit, he has rarely been able to travel outside of Kabul. The embassy mine action officer has likewise only infrequently been outside Kabul on mine action visits. While security conditions are a constant consideration, the most consistent reason cited was the lack of transportation and security resources, often because of the travel needs of the high number of ranking visitors to Kabul. Mine action travel was therefore often assigned a lower priority, resulting in cancelled trips and even reduced country clearance periods. The new embassy leadership team has obtained new transportation resources, which should help resolve the problem. Those resources enabled the inspection team to travel to numerous sites in three areas far outside Kabul. None of these sites had been visited by an embassy officer or the project manager.

It is impossible for either the PM/WRA project manager or the embassy mine action officer to visit each site, many of which will only be occupied for a couple of months while the clearance effort takes place. It is essential, however, that such visits are an element of the work requirements of the embassy mine action officer and part of the itinerary of the PM/WRA project manager when he visits.

**Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Kabul, should develop and implement an annual plan for the project manager and embassy mine action officer to conduct desired site visits with time for undertaking formal inventories. (Action: PM, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

**Recommendation 6:** Embassy Kabul should revise the work requirements statement for the embassy mine action officer to include accompanying the project manager on site visits at least twice a year and visiting sites outside Kabul at least once a year alone. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

## SECURITY

DCI employees in Afghanistan are necessarily armed. Gurkha and Afghan guards generally use AK-47s, while U.S. personnel and other third country nationals have M-4s and pistols. Various other weapons, such as light machine guns, are also used. The weapons are properly inventoried and stored. DCI expatriate personnel, the majority of whom are former military personnel, regularly practice with the weapons. They are all familiar with the DCI Rules of Use for the weapons. The Rules of Use are regularly reviewed and had just been updated and disseminated prior to the inspection.

DCI expatriates live under very strict controls. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) They do not patronize restaurants or bars, and are forbidden to drink alcohol. (b) (2)(b) (2) None of the expatriate personnel has had to fire a weapon other than on the practice range.

All expatriate employees interviewed expressed satisfaction and confidence in their Gurkha and Afghan guards. In sum, the OIG inspectors give DCI high marks on its weapons control policies.

Security has impacted the DCI contract in two other ways. The contract originally called for the deployment of eight CWD teams. The establishment of the eighth team has been put on hold because the expected area of deployment was judged insecure. Also when DCI took over the contract, one of the CWD teams was deployed in the southern city of Khandahar. That team and its expatriate advisors had to be relocated because the city and the province were judged as unsafe.



## FUNDING SOURCES

Funding for humanitarian mine action comes primarily from the NADR account, which is part of the Foreign Assistance budget. NADR-Humanitarian Demining and NADR-Small Arms/Light Weapons funding is managed by PM/WRA. Small amounts of funding for victims assistance has been provided by the Centers for Disease Control. USAID-controlled funding from the Leahy Victims Assistance Program does provide help to some victims of landmine accidents, but it is difficult to separate those amounts from that provided to victims of other violence-related activities. USAID does not fund demining directly, but, for virtually all of its projects, which include construction, the contractor is required to verify that the site has been rendered mine-safe. Like USAID, Corps of Engineers-funded construction projects include requirements that sites be certified mine-safe. Department of Defense (DOD) units do not engage in humanitarian demining activities and the Commanders Emergency Response Program funds are not authorized for mine action projects. There is a small DOD-funded program engaged in research on methods and equipment for demining, but it does not currently have any activities in Afghanistan.

### NADR Funding for Afghanistan Mine Action Programs 2005 – 2010

<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Amount (millions of Dollars)</b>
2005	16.7
2006	17.2
2007	17.2
2008	19.5
2009 (estimated)	25.0
2010 (requested)	35.0



## THE FUTURE

### MEETING TARGETS

It is highly unlikely that the international community's and Government of Afghanistan's target of making the country mine-free by 2013 will be met. To meet that commitment, there would need to be three changes to the operating environment.

First, there would have to be a substantial increase in the availability of funds for mine action, which appears unlikely. Donor fatigue is already evident, with the United Nations identifying a shortfall of over \$55 million per year through 2013. A couple of key donors already plan to reduce or even terminate assistance as Afghanistan takes over more mine action responsibility and continues progressing. Examples of recent donor assistance, for perspective, for FY 2007, reportedly included:

<b>Country</b>	<b>Amount in U.S. Dollars</b>
Canada	23.7
United Kingdom	6.9
Japan	5.9
Germany	6.2
Netherlands	4.7
Australia	4.2
Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland provided between 1 and 3 million	

MACCA and other donors are reportedly encouraging the NGOs to seek assistance from Muslim nations, as none reportedly currently offer mine action assistance.

Second, there would have to be a near total end to hostilities throughout the country. Third, there would have to be a cessation of discoveries of new hazardous areas. None of these conditions appears likely to be met.

The fact that the 2013 goal is unlikely to be met is, in itself, probably not a major problem and should not be seen as a failure of donor-funded mine action programs. As statistics show, good progress has been made and productivity is increasing. The reality is that mines and other explosive remnants of war will be a lingering problem in Afghanistan for decades, just as it has been in many countries since the Second World War. Most officials who met with the inspectors believed that a mine impact-free date for Afghanistan is many years in the future.

## INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY

The past two years have seen an emphasis on increasing productivity by expanding each of the NGO's ability to integrate the use of mechanical and canine assets with their existing manual clearance processes. This has been coupled with a well-conceived emphasis on more accurate surveys and delineation of suspected hazardous areas, in which machines and dogs often assist. These surveys (such as the "polygon" surveys done by HALO and Mine Clearance Planning Agency) help to more promptly return land to productive use, as many suspected hazardous areas turn out not to be mined or to be sparsely mined. Some HALO surveys have reduced suspected hazardous areas by as much as 40 percent. (Mine action personnel like to point out that a fairly high percentage of the land they work is in fact not contaminated.) While the NGOs are still working out the most effective means to use all the tools, there have already been impressive increases in productivity. The 82,000 antipersonnel and 90 antitank mines cleared in 2008 represent over 20 percent of all mines cleared since 1989.

Inspectors reviewed PM/WRA's draft Afghanistan country plan for mine action in FY 2010, and were heartened to see significant funds directed to surveys and area reduction. Inspectors also support the FY 2010 still unfunded PM/WRA Afghan Mechanical Demining Initiative of \$2 million to provide additional demining machines, such as Bozenas, to Afghan NGOs. In determining what machines to provide, it is important to take into account the terrain that remains to be cleared. PM/WRA is also helpfully providing promising new sensor technology, such as the HSTAMIDS – the dual use Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System that uses both magnetic and density via a ground penetrating RADAR system, which may be used in conjunction with machines or stand-alone.

## LESS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NEEDED

The humanitarian mine action program in Afghanistan has achieved one of its principal goals -- the creation of an indigenous mine action clearance capacity. All five of the Afghan NGOs engaged in mine action got their start in the late 1980s and early 1990s through UN activities in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. They have now operated steadily and successfully for years, even when the Taliban was in power. Everyone with whom inspectors met acknowledged that Afghanistan has thousands of expert mine action personnel at every part of the management and implementation spectrum. Virtually all believe, therefore, and the OIG inspectors agree, that the process of capacity building of personnel, in terms of clearance activities, should be considered essentially complete. MACCA recognized this and has steadily cut the number of expatriates it employs by over half in recent years. MACCA pulled its last expatriate technical advisor from the field in 2006.

The OIG inspectors thus see little need for significant continuing technical assistance. PM/WRA agrees and notes the funding saved could go to the NGOs to continue getting mines out of the ground.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

There is a need, however, to assist the government of Afghanistan in developing managerial capability for mine action. The transition to Afghan ownership of responsibility and decision making for mine action is designed to be a slow process, with a target date of 2013 for full assumption of responsibility by the government of Afghanistan. There are a great number of capable, well-educated, and very experienced Afghans working on mine action throughout MACCA, the Afghan NGOs, and commercial companies. An Afghan, Dr. Mohammad Hader Reza, a former deputy foreign minister, became MACCA's program director and top official in July 2007. MACCA's seven Area Mine Action Centers, located throughout the country, are staffed completely by Afghans, and the Director of Operations and his 50-person staff are also Afghan. The founders and directors of the five Afghan NGOs are also Afghan, as are almost all the nation's 8,000 deminers. Many Afghan mine action experts have even moved on to international mine action positions in other countries.

The government of Afghanistan's capacity in mine action, however, is reportedly quite weak, which seems to be acknowledged by the government's own decision not to accept full mine action responsibility until 2013. The DMC is widely viewed

throughout the Afghan and international communities as in an embryonic state, not unlike many parts of the government of Afghanistan. The DMC has had some recent initial success, however, in arranging some Government of Afghanistan directives to Afghan military units regarding mine action operations.

Pointing to widespread allegations of corruption in the government of Afghanistan, the inspectors' Afghan interlocutors almost to a person also expressed concern about any premature national ownership of mine action responsibility.

PM/WRA, in keeping with the U.S. Government's national capacity building goals, already has well-conceived plans to help strengthen the DMC. It has budgeted \$200,000 to build a DMC office. The OIG inspectors believe this will help build DMC as an institution and raise its professional profile. The inspectors also, however, heard in its discussions in Afghanistan that some additional help in administration, accounting, good governance, transparency, public relations, and other institution building skills would be helpful.

**Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should fund technical assistance, mentoring, and training for the Afghan Department of Mine Clearance in administration, good governance, and public relations to help prepare it for the government of Afghanistan's planned assumption of responsibility for mine action in 2013, and the bureau should coordinate plans for this assistance with other mine action donors, especially the Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan. (Action: PM)

Mine action community experts note that the Government of Afghanistan need not plan to replace MACCA per se. While mine action programs will continue in Afghanistan for decades, the intensity of the work will decline primarily because of the success of reducing the amount of contaminated area. There will be less work, less international funding and less international participation. Many of the mine action NGOs will no longer have sufficient work to remain in operation. The Government, in short, will have to design the institutions and processes for decades of residual mine action. Again, much as many countries still do for World War II explosive remnants of war.

## VOCATIONAL TRAINING

As noted above, there will not be enough mine action work within a few years to keep all those currently involved in humanitarian mine action engaged. Virtually all of the Afghan NGOs have already had to lay off significant numbers of deminers. Some NGOs are looking to establish for-profit mine clearance operations to compete for contracts such as clearing construction sites. With PM/WRA assistance and funding, two have, begun offering their employees vocational training. This training has been well received and appreciated. The OIG team agrees with PM/WRA plans to continue and even expand this program.

USAID is also engaged in developing vocational training centers and believes there may be some benefit in coordinating the programs, or at least exchanging information. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers encourages its contractors to give preference to graduates of the USAID-sponsored schools and, if standards of the mine action vocational programs are the same, might consider extending preferences to the former deminers.

**Recommendation 8:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Kabul, should exchange information on vocational training and employment programs, and explore possible synergies, such as shared training standards, with the United States Agency for International Development and the Corps of Engineers by December 31, 2009. (Action: PM, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

## COMMUNITY-BASED DEMINING

MACCA and the mine action organizations have developed a promising new program to deliver mine action services in needy, but less secure, economically marginalized areas with limited or no government support structures. The program, Community-based Demining (CBD), seeks to employ about 90 percent of the mine action personnel locally within the communities being cleared. A small cadre of NGO leaders, supervisors, and trainers liaise directly with target communities to agree on a program and identify personnel to be hired and trained. A few expert supervisors remain after training to guide the locally recruited deminers.

CBD has already been successfully implemented by the NGOs in several areas where standard demining operations are believed too risky, either because local pop-

ulations are hostile to any outsiders, or because of high levels of insurgent activity. The NGOs have demonstrated that they have the local knowledge and personnel to ensure reliable, effective agreements with local authorities. (Again, the NGOs worked productively through the reign of the Taliban.) Virtually all NGOs and experts agree they can train a journeyman deminer in about three weeks, and they have done so successfully, attaining productivity similar to that of the “professional” deminers. The locally recruited demining teams may work in only one village, or an entire valley, but because of local buy-in, security issues are minimized. Most CBD projects are geared to last approximately 12-18 months. The projects provide a welcome revenue stream during this period. As demining is generally a half-day activity, deminers are often also able to continue with their other pursuits, such as agriculture.

While CBD has been successful, it is not without potential problems. Much of the recent success may be premised on the assumption that once a community has been cleared, there will be some kind of development funding available to help the community better use the cleared land. This has not been the case in the traditional clearance process and speaks to a level of coordination far greater than currently exists. Pushing CBD too aggressively into insecure areas also may eventually place the NGO management/training staff and even the community deminers at risk, and not only from insurgents or criminals. Allied pilots, for example, will want to take care not to mistake deminers for insurgents. There is also the risk of shifting mine action resources to areas where there is actually less immediate economic return.

## COORDINATION

There is a notable lack of coordination on Afghan mine action between U.S. government agencies and entities both in Washington and in Afghanistan. The Washington interagency working group on humanitarian mine action stopped meeting in 2001, and was replaced by the Policy Coordination Committee Subgroup. This subgroup was to be composed of representatives from the National Security Council, DOD, the Department, and USAID, but is also inactive. There is no longer a U.S. Ambassador for Humanitarian Mine Action either. This may be due in part to the successful launch and the accomplishments of the U.S. mine action program, and the fact that mine action is now a pretty vibrant international and UN humanitarian activity. (Note: PM/WRA informed inspectors that it plans to begin convoking a regular interagency mine action meeting later this year. Members will include at a minimum DOD and USAID.)

However, inspectors heard in their interviews that, in the case of Afghanistan, there is a need for additional coordination. PM/WRA has virtually no contact with USAID in Washington and very little in Afghanistan. This is unfortunate, as USAID and mine action interests may intersect in a number of areas. USAID pays commercial deminers to prepare for large- and small-scale construction projects, land returned to productive use could often benefit from development assistance, and both USAID and the demining program have victims assistance and vocational training programs. (Victims assistance programs include the Leahy Initiative for families and communities affected by war, a \$9 million annual program funded by USAID and implemented by the International Organization for Migration.) Both USAID and the mine action program also have considerable “ground truth” knowledge that might be worth sharing. PM/WRA also reports little feedback from other bureaus within the Department, and inspectors saw little coordination with the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

There was also little coordination on mine action within Embassy Kabul or with the Provincial Reconstruction Team offices at the embassy. Inspectors discussed this issue with the new Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador and are confident that coordination within the embassy will soon improve. Mine action might now be discussed at the Integrated Civilian Military Advisory Group, at the Executive Working Group to be headed by the new Deputy Ambassador, or at one of several other groups that meet periodically and include multiple agencies.

Coordination with DOD elements is mixed. The Corps of Engineers has a large construction portfolio in Afghanistan, and like USAID its contractors are expected to ensure that the land being built upon is mine free. Whereas the MACCA standard is that clearance be done to a depth of 13 centimeters, the Corps requires one meter. This can, and has, resulted in land being cleared more than once, but that may be unavoidable. Coordination with U.S. Forces Afghanistan is relatively new and is focused on incorporating demining, particularly CBD, as part of an incentive system for communities in less secure parts of the country. (See the section on CBD for a fuller treatment of this issue.)

There is also a desire for greater coordination on mine action among allied embassies. Experienced and otherwise well-informed officials of the embassies of two key allies reported they know very little about our programs, although they were interested in learning about the U.S. program and had some views and opinions they were anxious to share. Three embassies noted that periodic mine action donor meetings in Kabul would be useful. The heavy workload at the embassy and the difficulty of leaving the embassy compound make meetings difficult, but they are necessary.

Finally, MACCA and all six of the NGOs supported by the United States said they would welcome coordination or contact with ranking embassy officials, USAID, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the U.S. military.

Again, inspectors discussed these coordination issues with the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador, and both were clearly intent on rectifying the situation.

**Recommendation 9:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Kabul, should use one of the program officer's visits to Kabul to convoke, with the Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan, a mine action donor meeting, either at working or higher levels, as appropriate. (Action: PM, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

## PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

U.S. support for mine action programs in Afghanistan is a good news story. The United States has helped develop five highly qualified NGOs employing thousands of Afghans. Those NGOs have cleared away thousands of mines and tens of thousands of tons of explosive remnants of war making it possible for hundreds of thousands of Afghans to live and work without having to worry about being killed or injured by mines or other munitions. The United States is not the only donor engaged in this activity, and the five Afghan NGOs are not the only ones doing the work, but there remain significant unexploited opportunities for public diplomacy, especially, and most importantly, in Afghanistan.

Such an effort has to be carefully managed to avoid putting deminers at risk during the clearance phase but the impact of the work needs to be better publicized. The NGOs and DCI told the inspectors that they do incorporate references to PM/WRA at their worksites, and inspectors were able to verify that fact at most of the sites visited on the trip. However, references to PM/WRA are essentially meaningless outside of the mine action community, and do nothing to generate positive attitudes for the broader U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

While it may be risky to closely identify a particular mine action activity as U.S. Government-funded during the clearance process there is far less risk involved when the work is done and the demining team is no longer on site. Once a project is completed the clearance agency is required to obtain MACCA certification and to “turn over” the ground to the community. Embassy participation at some of these ceremonies would provide excellent publicity dealing with an outcome of U.S. assistance and the capabilities of Afghan NGOs.

**Recommendation 10:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Kabul, should produce a semiannual fact sheet detailing the outcomes of the mine action program in Afghanistan and provide the fact sheet to Embassy Kabul’s public diplomacy section for placement with the Afghan press and use on the embassy’s external website. (Action: PM, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Kabul should implement a plan to have the embassy mine action officer, public diplomacy office, and the executive office develop at least two press events per year involving the turning over of cleared land to Afghan communities. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Kabul should implement a plan to have the embassy mine action officer work with the public diplomacy office and the executive office to develop at least one press event per year involving the signing of mine action grant agreements with the Afghan nongovernmental organizations and a similar event involving the victim's assistance grant recipients. (Action: Embassy Kabul)

## FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with and the Bureau of Administration, should prepare and agree on a plan by November 30, 2009, to include timelines, travel, and oversight responsibility, for bidding, awarding, and implementing the new mine action contract in spring 2010. (Action: PM, in coordination with A)

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should conduct a formal inventory of U.S. Government-owned equipment at all DynCorp International locations prior to the conclusion of the current contract. (Action: PM)

**Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should revise the work requirements statements of at least two Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement officials to reflect the need for regular inventory reviews and spot checks. (Action: PM)

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs should verify that DynCorp International inventory transfer procedures meet U.S. Government contracting standards so that inventory at all sites is properly assigned to the responsible employee. (Action: PM)

**Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Political Military Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Kabul, should develop and implement an annual plan for the project manager and embassy mine action officer to conduct desired site visits with time for undertaking formal inventories. (Action: PM, in coordination with Embassy Kabul)

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## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

### Embassy Kabul

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Arrival Date</u>
Ambassador	Karl Eikenberry	05/09
Deputy Ambassador	Francis Riccardone	04/09
Chiefs of Sections:		
Economics	Thomas Engle	05/07
Management	John Olson	08/07
Political	Alan Yu	08/08
Political Military	Robert Clarke	08/07
Political Military Mine Action Officer	Lubna Khan	08/07
Provincial Reconstruction	Valerie Fowler	07/07
Public Affairs Section	Scott Rauland	08/07

### Other Agencies:

#### USAID

Deputy Director	Peter Argo	07/07
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### Department of Defense

U.S. Forces	BG John McMahon	03/09
CSTC	Major Mike Schnoover	07/08

### Bureau of Political Military Affairs/Office of Weapons Reduction and Abatement

Office Director	James Lawrence
Deputy Office Director	Col. Yori Escalante
Afghanistan Program Manager	Peter Villano
Director, Resources	Timothy Groen
Grants Officer	Marcus Carpenter
Public Diplomacy/Partnerships	Stacy Davis



## ABBREVIATIONS

A/LM/AQM	Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisition Management
AMATC	Afghan Mine Action Technology Center
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
CBD	Community-based demining
CWD	Conventional weapons destruction
CPI	Clear Path International
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
DCI	DynCorp International
DMC	Department of Mine Clearance
DOD	Department of Defense
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan
MAPA	Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
NADR	Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PM	Political Military
PM/WRA	Bureau of Political Military Affairs/Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance



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