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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Office of the United States
Special Envoy to Sudan

Report Number ISP-I-09-65, September 2009

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PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Acting Inspector General

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- The new United States Special Envoy to Sudan is an energetic, retired major general with a strong connection to the President. In his first 60 days, there is little doubt that he is engaged in a single-minded pursuit of international action to heal the consequences of what then Secretary of State Powell characterized in 2004 as genocide in Darfur, to help implement the agreement that ended the North-South War, and to move Sudan in the direction of stability and respect for basic human rights. The Special Envoy has already logged thousands of miles from China to Libya, and from Nairobi to Khartoum. It is far too early to say whether energetic diplomacy can sway the Sudanese Government.
- In previous years, notwithstanding the enormous efforts the United States made to help in Sudan, there was questionable cooperation between special envoys and assistant secretaries of the Bureau of African Affairs (AF). The new Special Envoy is well briefed on the pitfalls of his predecessors and determined to coordinate carefully with the new Assistant Secretary for Africa. Each considers the other a friend, and the Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan (S/USSES) staff described the relationship as comfortable. Irrespective of whatever differences may have cropped up between AF and envoys in the past, personnel in both offices stressed that working level relationships have always been strong.
- In a departure from previous organizational responsibilities, the Sudan desk function now falls under the Special Envoy. He assumes responsibility for backstopping the U.S. mission in Sudan, be it Embassy Khartoum, Consulate General Juba, or temporary duty assignments to outposts such as Al Fashir in Darfur. U.S. field personnel conduct on-the-ground, day-to-day diplomacy with all levels of the Sudanese Government. They serve in incredibly difficult, dangerous places, playing a critical, unsung role in the search for peace in Sudan.

CONTEXT

More than 50 years after attaining independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan ranks second to Somalia as one of the world's most politically unstable, failed states.¹ One may argue whether Africa's largest country geographically, mineral rich Sudan, with annual economic growth of over ten percent until the worldwide decline of oil prices,² with considerable direct foreign investment and a seemingly strong central government can be branded as failing, but this country of 40 million people has been tearing apart at the edges since its birth. While the North-South War ended in 2005, armed conflict in Darfur continues.

Sudan has also been a past breeding ground for terror against the United States. In the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden lived there and collaborated with the government until his expulsion in 1996. Omar Abdel-Rahman, "the blind sheik," convicted of seditious conspiracy in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings in New York City, traveled to the United States in 1990 from Sudan. In 1993, the United States listed Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and in 1997, imposed sanctions against trade and investment by U.S. companies in Sudan.

In 1995, former President Carter negotiated the cease fire that allowed humanitarian assistance to enter war ravaged South Sudan. In 2003, the United States actively brokered an international process that led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the North-South War. The CPA created an autonomous region in South Sudan for 6 years, with a referendum on independence to be held in 2011. Both the CPA and post-September 11, 2001, cooperation on counterterrorism led the United States to reopen its embassy in Khartoum in 2003. A new chancery is scheduled for completion in early 2010.

The conflict in Darfur generated massive death, displacement, and starvation, which in September 2004, the United States termed genocide.³ On March 4, 2009, Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, became the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes and crimes

¹The Fund for Peace: Failed States Index Scores 2008; Foreign Policy July/August 2008 issue http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350

²World Bank: Sudan Country Brief (March 2009) Sudan - Country Brief

³Prepared statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 9, 2004: "...genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear responsibility..."

against humanity. Sudan's neighbors (Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda) have experienced serious refugee flows as well as cross border violence. Sudan is also responsible for trafficking in persons of men, women, and children. As such, it is stigmatized as a Tier Three country, one not making significant efforts to eliminate human trafficking.

Sudan's shocking record led successive administrations, beginning in 1999, to name special envoys, hoping that such attention might contribute to a Sudan at peace with itself and its neighbors. President Obama named the fifth such Special Envoy in April 2009.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

No sooner had the President named the Special Envoy for Sudan, than the Department's way of doing business in Sudan was reorganized. The old AF Sudan Program Group (AF/SPG) was attached to the Secretary of State's office under a new title, S/USSES. It includes not only Sudan policy but the Sudan desk and the backstopping responsibilities that geographic desks have.

THE NEW SPECIAL ENVOY

The Special Envoy appeared to understand and welcome his expanded role. He is an energetic, retired major general born of missionary parents in Africa, with a strong connection to the President. In his first 60 days, there was little doubt that he was working single-mindedly to bring about international action to heal the consequences of genocide in Darfur, help implement the peace agreement for southern Sudan, and move that country in the direction of stability and respect for basic human rights. The Special Envoy has already logged thousands of miles from China to Libya, and from Nairobi to Khartoum, seeking to motivate the international community. It is far too early to say whether energetic diplomacy can sway Sudan's government. It appears, however, that following the Government of Sudan's March 2009 decision to expel 13 international nongovernmental organizations and close three national nongovernmental organizations, the Special Envoy may have helped persuade the Sudanese Government to improve the operating environment for nongovernmental organizations, so essential to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Darfur.

The Special Envoy will be reporting to the President and Secretary of State. The same can be said of U.S. ambassadors, who are appointed by the President, but in reality are very much a part of their respective geographic bureaus. The institution of Special Envoys is something of a breed apart in the Department, and they have far readier access to the President and Secretary of State than that enjoyed by most ambassadors and geographic assistant secretaries.

In the case of previous Special Envoys for Sudan, and notwithstanding the enormous efforts the United States made to help that country, there was questionable cooperation between envoys and assistant secretaries. For example, the inspection team was told that AF would tie the hands of the U.S. chargé in Khartoum, refusing permission for him to participate in some of the international coordination efforts.

The new Special Envoy appeared well-briefed on the pitfalls of his predecessors as well as determined to coordinate carefully with the new Assistant Secretary for Africa. Each considered the other a friend, and S/USSES staff described the relationship as comfortable. Within the Department, a functional bureau praised the current level of cooperation with the staff of S/USSES. Irrespective of whatever personality or other differences may have cropped up between AF and Special Envoys in the past, personnel in both offices stressed that working level relationships were always strong.

THE SUDAN DESK

The Sudan country desk, which was housed in AF/SPG, is now part of S/USSES. The Special Envoy not only has the policy lead for Sudan, but assumes much of AF's responsibility for the day-to-day backstopping of official business with Sudan, be it the operations of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum and the Consulate General in Juba, or the myriad requests for information and services emanating from other U.S. Government agencies and departments, the Congress, the media and the public. In the Department, desks serve as the key coordinating mechanism for bilateral affairs with each country of the world. Requests funnel in and out of desks, there being an assumption that a good desk officer makes sure the right party takes action. There is also an expectation that the desk officer reads all traffic coming from or going to the country, including embassy reporting on all aspects of U.S. activities in country. Desks are part of a geographic bureau structure that brings various levels of senior oversight and comprises a support structure for a wide variety of experience on economic, political, security, consular, and management affairs.

It remains to be seen how well the Sudan country desk can operate outside the geographic bureau. There is no question that the new desk will have to stay in close touch with AF, and it appears that both the AF Assistant Secretary and the Special Envoy will encourage cooperation. Such cooperation has not been formalized, however, in a letter or memorandum of understanding that details what AF is expected to do or provide and what S/USSES will do. Such a document would help prevent any misunderstandings on who should do what.

Recommendation 1: The Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should draft and implement a formal letter or memorandum of understanding detailing what traditional desk and public diplomacy support the Office of the Special Envoy will provide and what, if any support, will be provided by the bureau. (Action: S/USSES, in coordination with AF)

EMBASSY KHARTOUM

With the desk function moved to S/USSES, the Special Envoy also assumes responsibility for backstopping the U.S. mission in Sudan, be it Embassy Khartoum, Consulate General Juba, or temporary duty assignments to outposts such as Al Fashir in Darfur.

While it can be too easily forgotten, not all the action involves shuttle diplomacy. Embassy Khartoum conducts on-the-ground, day-to-day diplomacy with all levels of the Sudanese Government. The Department has very clear responsibilities for its embassy in Khartoum, as well as the consulate general in Juba. These are incredibly difficult, dangerous assignments. The posts play a critical, unsung role in the search for peace in Sudan.

The desk is the linchpin between Mission Khartoum and the Department. It is the mission’s lifeline in the Department. S/USSES is not simply the Special Envoy, but contains “the desk,” the icon that symbolizes the bilateral relationship. The inspectors share the concern articulated by several both in Washington and the field that, as presently constituted, S/USSES does not reflect the Foreign Service experience associated with geographic bureaus. The arrival of a reputedly first-class officer in mid-2009 should, however, deepen the S/USSES bench considerably.

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toum expressed great appreciation for support from AF/EX in this case. AF/EX’s
responsive support is supposed to remain unaffected by the move of AF/SPG to S/
USSES.

Embassy Khartoum rightly expects the Sudan desk to monitor its action requests. For example, the Embassy proposed recently that cultural exchanges between the United States and Sudan be expanded. It is a desk officer's responsibility to make sure that the competent Department component received the Embassy's proposal, and is taking action. In this case, action would be assigned to the Bureau for Cultural and Educational Affairs by Bureau of African Affairs Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (AF/PDPA) Sudan desk officer, but the traditional Sudan desk would make whatever policy input is in order.

Specific information on the challenges faced by U.S. personnel on the ground in Sudan is contained in the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) June 2007 inspection report.⁴

Rating the Chief of Mission

The S/USSES take over of the Sudan desk creates an unusual bureaucratic circumstance. While most desk functions come under the Special Envoy, responsibility for preparing employee evaluation reports on Sudan's chargé d'affaires does not. Such responsibility, according to long-standing Department of State practice and regulation (3 FAH-1H-2813.4), belongs to the geographic Assistant Secretary. In practice, the chargé in Sudan now has to satisfy the requirements of two bosses, and both bosses are critical to the success of U.S. policy in Sudan. While sounding complicated, the resolution is relatively simple. In reviewing the performance of the Sudan chargé, the Assistant Secretary must take into account the quality of work done by the chargé for the Special Envoy. This can be accomplished by requesting that the Special Envoy provide written commentary on the performance of the chargé, commentary that would be reflected in the employee evaluation report. During the inspection, the chargé, Special Envoy, and Assistant Secretary all changed. The moment was ideal therefore to formalize the process whereby the chargé will be rated.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of African Affairs should establish the work requirements for the chargé d'affaires reflecting support for the Special Envoy as well as the fact that the Assistant Secretary will solicit input from the Special Envoy. (Action: AF)

⁴OIG Report No. ISP-I-07-23A, Inspection of Embassy Khartoum, Sudan and Constituent Post – June 2007. <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/104103.pdf>

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

As the inspection progressed, Sudan policy was under active discussion in the National Security Council framework, with the Deputy Secretary chairing interagency meetings aimed at producing a National Security Council -approved strategy for Sudan. Concurrently, the Special Envoy was developing an office structure to support those goals.

Developing an Effective Organization

The Special Envoy for Sudan has sobering responsibilities. It will take masterful diplomacy to move Sudan towards peace in Darfur and serious managerial skills to help implement the CPA that ended the North-South War. Whether directly or indirectly, the Special Envoy affects the distribution of over \$1.5 billion in U.S. Government assistance: some through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) including Food Aid under Public Law 480 and Development Assistance; some through the Department's funding of peacekeeping operations including International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, International Military Education Training, and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs; and some through other Department funding (including Economic Support Funds). A complete listing of Department funding covering FY 2005-09 (estimated) is in the resource table of the Appendix.

The inspection took place in the midst of the Special Envoy's creation of a new office structure, designed to support his multiple responsibilities. His office will grow to 15 or more employees. At the time of the inspection, the ultimate size of S/USS-ES was unclear as was the mix of career and noncareer personnel.

The Special Envoy will have a senior representative and two directors, one for plans and operations, the other for program support. Experienced personnel at the GS-15 and FS-01 level were selected for these jobs, another indicator of the Special Envoy's ability to attract top staff.

The Directorate of Plans and Operations is, in a sense, the action directorate. It will consist of:

- North-South Division, responsible for implementation of the CPA; preparation for the 2010 national elections and the subsequent referendum on independence for South Sudan; and capacity building.
- Darfur Affairs Division, focusing on the humanitarian response; political reconciliation; and economic development.
- Security Affairs Division, handling military capacity building; law enforcement; and counterterrorism.

The Directorate of Program Support will provide behind-the-scenes, traditional Washington support as follows:

- International affairs subdivision overseeing policy planning and outreach;
- The Sudan country desk;
- Intelligence liaison; and
- Financial management.

BILATERAL ISSUES AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The sole country desk officer is currently the acting Director of Program Support. This desk is responsible for traditional desk duties, including dealings with the Embassy of Sudan in Washington; consular issues; dissemination of taskings from the Executive Secretariat passed through the AF Front Office staffers; economic issues, including general sanctions and licensing questions; maritime security issues; and general coordination of the U.S. Government interagency process. The incumbent attends AF staff meetings and the expanded AF meeting and represents Mission Sudan in internal Department and interagency meetings. The incumbent received high praise from Embassy Khartoum for strong, responsive support.

Three other desk officers are responsible for North-South Affairs, Darfur Affairs, and Security Affairs, respectively. These liaison desk officers combine policy coordination within the Department, the U.S. Government interagency process, and the international community with program management by serving as contracting officer's representatives (COR) and grants officer's representatives (GOR). This melding gives S/USSES the flexibility to respond quickly to changes on the ground in Sudan with tangible support of U.S. policy. It also gives the thematic desk officers, all with

several years experience working in AF/SPG, practical as well as policy experience. The thematic desk officers work very closely and collaboratively with colleagues in USAID and the functional bureaus.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

The Special Envoy and S/USSES are the Department lead for all policy issues relating to Sudan. S/USSES staff works closely with, among others, the U.S. Department of the Treasury on sanctions and USAID on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and development assistance. One example of effective interagency coordination was when the U.S. Government was about to impose conditions of entry into U.S. ports on ships that had recently visited a port in Sudan. The country desk officer took the initiative in persuading the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee to task the U.S. Coast Guard to send a team to Sudan to conduct port security surveys. The desk officer then worked with the Sudan embassy in Washington, while the U.S. Embassy worked with the government in Khartoum to allow the team to visit Sudan, and then to accept the team's recommendations to enhance port security thus eliminating the need for imposing conditions of entry.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

S/USSES has its own public affairs support for the Special Envoy. One member of the staff is responsible, depending on the circumstances, for working with the AF/PDPA, the Bureau of Public Affairs, and Embassy Khartoum on drafting press guidance, arranging media opportunities for the Special Envoy, background briefings for the media, and public presentations to those interested in Sudan.

S/USSES is not as engaged in support for public diplomacy programs conducted by Embassy Khartoum. During the concurrent inspection of AF, and in the subsequent inspection report, the inspection team suggested that the work of the four AF/PDPA desk officers who support the 35 overseas public affairs offices should be more closely integrated with their counterparts in the respective geographic directorates. Under the current structure, the AF/PDPA country affairs officer for East Africa provides advice and support to nine public affairs sections, including that of Embassy Khartoum. As noted in the earlier example of the cable on educational exchanges, S/USSES will have to take care that the public diplomacy function is

given the same level of support and guidance as those of other sections of the Embassy. The inspection team counseled S/USSES to include public diplomacy advice and support in the formal letter or memorandum of understanding between S/USSES and AF (Recommendation 1).

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

At the initial meeting with the Special Envoy and the inspection team, he spoke at length about the reorganization of the office, the importance of staffing, and his concern for financial oversight. The morale of his staff was on his mind, not in terms of their strong motivation, but in terms of the way he had driven performance during his first weeks in office. He stated that he now had a team and felt proud.

AF/EX will continue providing management services for S/USSES. This sensible arrangement mirrors that of other special envoy offices', although some continue to receive management support from the Executive Secretariat. The arrangement is not unusual, however, and will help preserve linkages between the Special Envoy's office and the regional bureau. S/USSES personnel, as well as Embassy Khartoum, spoke gratefully of the services AF/EX provides.

HUMAN RESOURCES

In discussing his staff, the Special Envoy noted that the work may lead to burn-out. S/USSES employees voiced this concern themselves, realizing that after 2 to 3 years of strenuous, stressful work, it could be wise to seek positions elsewhere in the Department. Foreign Service personnel are reassigned after 2 years, but Civil Service personnel are not. Therefore, Civil Service employees, if they wish to leave S/USSES, are faced with returning to AF, if they have reemployment rights, or searching for other open positions for which they can apply in AF or other bureaus in the Department. It is important to note, however, that S/USSES is not the only office where the work is stressful and other positions may be equally taxing.

The director of AF/EX's human resources division spent one month detailed to S/USSES to assist in establishing the new office structure. In the director's absence, AF/EX's human resources staff, in addition to providing normal support to the bureau and overseas posts, wrote position descriptions for USSES's schedule B employees.⁵ When the Special Envoy's office transferred from AF to the Secretary's office, all existing AF/SPG full-time equivalent positions were detailed to S/USSES.

⁵Excepted service, 5 CFR 213.3201.

AF/EX then recruited, hired, and processed new S/USSES staff. AF/EX, without experience in hiring Schedule B employees, responded well.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The financial management division transitioned from certifying AF/SPG vouchers to those for S/USSES without difficulty. These contracts, awarded by the Department's Office of the Procurement Executive, Acquisition Management, and International Programs are the same ones AF/SPG followed in the past. The S/USSES contracting officers' representatives first review contractors' vouchers to determine whether goods and services were provided as the contracts specified. Then, AF/EX's financial management division reviews the vouchers to verify funds availability. Following the certification, the vouchers are sent to the Charleston Financial Management Office for payment. The division is also managing the S/USSES supplemental FY 2009 \$4.3 million budget. Grants payments are handled by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; not AF/EX.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

S/USSES employees complained of delays associated with travel vouchers. These complaints are not unusual for those using Carlson WagonLit's E2 Solutions application. The difficulties with using E2 multiply increase when overseas or complex travel is involved, both commonplace for USSES employees. The section has ensured all valid requests for procurements are processed timely; as an example, it moved with exceptional speed to purchase, inventory, and distribute BlackBerry® equipment for S/USSES staff.

Systems

Notwithstanding the Department's domestic information management consolidation, AF/EX systems staff works with the S/USSES staff daily, sometimes hourly, to resolve computer issues. This response is key to providing needed service because the consolidated information management services are slow and often unresponsive. Trouble tickets the consolidated service group initiates in response to requests for service may take more than 2 days to address. AF/EX systems provides an immediate response. This attention to S/USSES may affect AF/EX's primary mission to support overseas posts.

The inspection team left an informal recommendation that the Special Envoy raise with the Bureau of Information Resource Management the shortcomings associated with the consolidation of domestic information management services to ensure that priority work in S/USSES is not compromised by inadequate systems support.

Security

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security provides a bureau security officer who manages the security program for AF and S/USSES. The bureau security officer provides oversight of the two S/USSES unit security officers. The inspection team found no outstanding security issues for S/USSES.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

In July 2008, AF provided reasonable assurance that the management control objectives were achieved. The evaluation only disclosed potential material weaknesses and/or significant deficiencies at three AF embassies. None of the offices in AF, including AF/SPG at that time, identified management control deficiencies. A question remains as to whom S/USSES should report any management control weaknesses for FY 2009. Given that AF/EX provides all of the administrative support, the OIG team supports the idea that the AF management control coordinator, the deputy executive director of AF/EX, continue conducting or arranging for all relevant management control programs and coordinating the timely performance of risk assessments and management control reviews (when required). The OIG team made an informal recommendation to address this issue.

GRANTS AND CONTRACTS

S/USSES uses grants, contracts, and interagency transfers as necessary to facilitate execution of Sudan programs. In reviewing a small sample of grants and contracts, the OIG inspection team concluded that grantees and contractors have generally performed well, and did not identify any weaknesses in the grants or contract process. The OIG team found that the overall management of the grants program was good, and procedures on how to award, monitor, and evaluate grants were clear and precise. Financial payments procedures are closely monitored, and required technical reports are tracked closely. As for the management of the contracts, required documents are in the files and meetings between the contracting officer and the program take place regularly. A sample review of the contracts showed that they were in order and well maintained in hard copy and on an electronic tracking system. Weekly reports from the contractors to the CORs are circulated and reviewed. Close-out procedures are followed meticulously.

The CORs and GORs in S/USSES work closely with either the contracting officer or the grants officer located in the Office of Acquisitions Management of the Office of Logistics Management in the Bureau of Administration (A/LM/AQM), especially in the oversight area. S/USSES hired additional staff dedicated to these tasks. Each S/USSES grant, contract, and interagency agreement is accompanied

by regular reporting requirements, including financial reporting, which are reviewed by the relevant COR or GOR respectively. Funding recipients located overseas are regularly visited by S/USSES GORs and CORs, staff from Embassy Khartoum or Consulate Juba, as well as full-time government technical monitors hired by S/USSES. The inspection team verified that all CORs and GORs have the proper designation in writing and have taken the appropriate training within the last two years. The inspection team found that the CORs and GORs (in coordination with field-based government technical monitors) follow Federal Acquisition Regulations and inspect/inventory U.S. Government-owned property held by grantees and/or contractors as appropriate.

One area that may impact future S/USSES operations is the anticipated departure of a key employee who has a high understanding of contracting issues. This employee was highly regarded by the Office of Acquisitions Management. Although it is too early to determine the impact of his departure, it is important for S/USSES to prepare a succession and knowledge transfer plan now. The OIG team addressed this issue in an informal recommendation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should draft and implement a formal letter or memorandum of understanding detailing what traditional desk and public diplomacy support the Office of the Special Envoy will provide and what, if any support, will be provided by the bureau. (Action: S/USSES, in coordination with AF)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of African Affairs should establish the work requirements for the chargé d'affaires reflecting support for the Special Envoy as well as the fact that the Assistant Secretary will solicit input from the Special Envoy. (Action: AF)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Systems

S/USSES has a policy priority that is second to none in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, realities on the ground are dangerous for employees of the U.S. Government in Sudan. It is essential that Washington and Embassy Khartoum and the Consulate General Juba have good working electronic communication. The maintenance and support of information technology systems must be as strong as the Department can provide.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, should work with the Bureau of Information Resource Management, to establish standard operating emergency procedures to ensure that priority work is not compromised by inadequate systems support.

Management Controls

AF/EX currently provides all of the administrative support, including the coordination of management controls.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan should confirm that the deputy executive director of the Bureau of African Affairs will continue conducting or arranging for all relevant management control programs and coordinating the timely performance of risk assessments and management control reviews (when required).

The soon anticipated departure of a key employee who is a knowledgeable COR will leave a big hole if his knowledge isn't transferred to others in S/USSES prior to his departure.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan should immediately prepare a succession and knowledge transfer plan before a key contracting officer representative transfers from the office.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
The Special Envoy	J. Scott Gration	April 23, 2009
Senior Representative for Sudan	Timothy R. Shortley	July 1, 2008

~~**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**~~

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ABBREVIATIONS

AF	Bureau of African Affairs
AF/EX	Bureau of African Affairs, Executive Office
AF/PDPA	Bureau of African Affairs, Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
AF/SPG	Bureau of African Affairs, Sudan Program Group
A/LM/AQM	Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GOR	Grants Officer's Representative
OIG	Office of Inspector General
S/USSES	United States Special Envoy for Sudan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

APPENDIX

Sudan - Split by Type of Assistance (2005-2009)								
SECTOR	2005	2006	2007	2008 Total Estimate	2009 Total Estimate	2009 Supp Enacted	2009 Spring Supp Request	2009 Total Estimate
DARFUR/CHAD								
Humanitarian Assistance								
Food Aid (PL-480)	174.41	265.89	299.39	438.31	216.19	71.66		287.84
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)	109.67	105.78	109.31	95.56	65.00	30.00		95.00
Refugees (MRA)	75.86	75.36	56.58	77.90	53.00	14.00		67.00
Emergency Migration (ERMA)			7.60	7.00				
Other Food Aid (Emerson Trust)	172.04							
TOTAL	531.98	447.03	472.87	618.77	334.19	115.66	-	449.84
Peacekeeping Support								
AMIS & UNAMID for TCC (PKO)	152.30	186.00	223.00	29.76		8.00		8.00
CIPA (UNMIS & UNMID)			83.00	884.00	414.00		4.33	418.33
TOTAL	152.30	186.00	306.00	913.76	414.00	8.00	4.33	426.33
Transition and Reconstruction								
Economic Support Funds (ESF)	1.96		3.60	6.10	20.00			20.00
Transition Initiatives (TI)	1.42	1.40	2.47	0.19	1.00			1.00
VAW - Development Assistance (DA)	9.22							
UNAMID Police			1.00	12.45	2.50			2.50
TOTAL	12.60	1.40	7.07	18.74	23.50	-	-	23.50
Darfur/Chad Total	696.89	634.43	785.94	1,551.27	771.69	123.66	4.33	899.67
OTHER SUDAN								
Humanitarian Assistance								
Food Aid (PL-480)	156.01	127.81	94.49	106.56	62.29	22.38		84.67
Disaster Assistance (IDA)	82.17	77.50	61.50	45.00	25.00	10.00		35.00
Refugees (MRA)	35.90	36.69	29.99	34.10	18.00	5.00		23.00
Emergency Migration (ERMA)								
TOTAL	274.08	241.99	185.98	185.66	105.29	37.38	-	142.67
Peacekeeping and Security Sector								
Security Sector Transformation (PKO)	17.00	20.00	31.00	41.07	30.00			30.00
Demining (NADR)	3.10	3.00	3.73	4.40	4.00			4.00
Police (INCLE)			8.80	11.13	12.90			12.90
IMET			0.10	0.35	0.40			0.40
FMF								
CIPA	131.94	368.21	107.92	293.50	208.90		88.46	208.90
TOTAL	152.04	391.21	151.55	350.44	256.20		88.46	256.20
Transition and Reconstruction								
Gov, Econ Grth, Edu, Infr (DA)	70.00	70.00	70.00	127.72				
Conflict Resolution & Infrastructure (TI)	4.92	5.31	5.33	8.76	3.60			3.60
Health Services (CSH)	18.00	19.00	23.79	17.49	23.19			23.19
Global HIV/AIDS (GHAI)		2.09	3.00	3.25	6.33			
Implementation of the CPA (ESF)	41.44	19.80	41.40	139.78	234.10	25.00		259.10
IDFA (Roads/CPA Implementation)	60.00	47.50	33.50					
TOTAL	194.36	163.70	177.02	296.99	267.21	25.00		285.89
Other Sudan Total	620.48	796.90	514.55	833.09	628.70	62.38	88.46	684.76
SUDAN Total	1,317.36	1,431.34	1,300.49	2,384.36	1,400.39	186.04	92.79	1,584.43

Notes concerning table on next page.

Notes

1. Supplemental funding numbers do not include USAID OE supplemental funds for Sudan which were received in 2006, 2008 and 2009.
2. Numbers are as of February 1, 2009 and are subject to change.
3. Numbers do not include total obligations but instead amounts appropriated.
4. FY 2006 Supplemental Request for PL480 includes reimbursements for other food aid emergencies.
5. Since emergency funds are not requested on a bilateral basis, levels for emergency funding for FY 2009 Request (PL480, IDA, TI, MRA, ERMA) represent current planning estimates for FY 2009 as of February 1, 2009.

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