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**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General**

Report of Inspection

Bureau of Diplomatic Security Directorate for Training, Office of Training and Performance Support

Report Number ISP-I-07-05, January 2007

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KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team found the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) Office of Training and Performance Support (TPS) to be well managed and generally successful in meeting the bureau's training goals.
- New training requirements for all U.S. government employees assigned to Iraq and Afghanistan have placed enormous stress on TPS's administrative and financial infrastructure. The office has done a commendable job of maintaining its highest priority programs during a time of budget uncertainty, but several core training programs have not kept pace with ongoing equipment acquisition and operational needs.
- TPS has outgrown its current office space at its Dunn Loring facilities, is rapidly reaching maximum capacity at facilities in West Virginia, and needs better facilities for technical security training programs. Developing and implementing a comprehensive facilities strategy for DS training programs is a major challenge facing DS and the Department of State (Department).
- TPS needs to establish a better balance in its divisions between Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contract employees to mitigate the effects of frequent personnel rotations and heavy contractor oversight responsibilities.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between June 19 and September 1, 2006. Bohdan Dmytrewycz (team leader), William R. Belcher (deputy team leader), Arne B. Baker, Greg Cottone, Ralph Kwong, Gwendolyn Llewellyn, and Timothy Wildy conducted the inspection.

CONTEXT

TPS is one of three offices within DS's Directorate for Training. TPS provides professional training for DS special agents, security engineering officers (SEO), security technical specialists, Marine security guards, construction security technicians, Naval Construction Battalion Seabees, cleared American guards, and other Department employees. In FY 2005, TPS trained 2,419 students. Personnel resources for the office include 57 direct-hire employees, 60 contractors, one when-actually-employed employee, and one personal services contract (PSC) employee. TPS training programs account for approximately \$14.5 million in annual operating costs, approximately two percent of the bureau's total budget. This OIG inspection was limited to TPS and did not include other bureau offices.

TPS is organized into two divisions: the Security and Law Enforcement Training Division (SLTD) and the Security Engineering and Computer Security Training Division (SECD). In addition, TPS has two staffs, the administrative and training support staff and the instructional systems management staff (ISMS).

On September 8, 2005, the Diplomatic Security Training Center became the first federal law enforcement training organization to receive academy accreditation by the Office of Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA), meeting required law enforcement training standards. DS is in the process of designating the training center as a training academy; therefore the training facility will be referred to as the Diplomatic Security Training Academy (DSTA) for the remainder of this report. TPS conducts training at 14 government and contractor facilities, most of which are in the greater Washington, DC, metropolitan area.¹

¹ Special agents attend basic law enforcement training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, a joint law enforcement agency training facility at Glynco, Georgia, under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security.

MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

TPS faces several key management challenges in meeting DS training program strategic goals. These include replacement of inadequate and widely scattered training facilities and establishment of a better mix of Civil Service, Foreign Service, and contract employees within each TPS division. In the long term, management of costly special training programs applicable to high-threat posts such as Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to require senior-level DS management attention as security threats evolve. TPS deserves credit for successfully meeting its obligation to provide customized training to thousands of U.S. government employees who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan.

INADEQUATE TRAINING FACILITIES

TPS's facilities are not adequate to accommodate the bureau's training operations. The dispersal of instructors and students among different training facilities throughout the greater Washington metropolitan area is a barrier to effective team building, communication, and operational efficiency. A patchwork of 14 leased properties and contractor facilities costs the Department \$4.9 million annually. Students and instructors shuttle between facilities that extend from West Virginia to the Maryland suburbs, at a significant productivity cost to employees. The bureau must maintain a fleet of 63 vehicles to transport students between training sites, for example, and expends \$300,000 annually in per diem costs associated with training at a single location outside the Washington, DC, area. Employees in one unit estimate that they spend 10 hours a week commuting between facilities during working hours.

Several off-site annexes consist of substandard facilities. The Firearms Range and Technical Training Annex requires renovation and updating of support systems. Office space within the two buildings that constitute the annex are cramped, crowded, and may not meet applicable health and safety regulations. Bathroom facilities are inadequate for the approximately 100 students who use the facility each week.

Similarly, the Technical Training Annex is no longer adequate to meet training needs for security engineering employees, who are responsible for the installation and maintenance of complex security hardware in domestic and overseas Department

facilities. The annex currently occupies two bays totaling 8,000 square feet. DS estimates that it requires approximately 31,000 square feet of space to fully consolidate all technical training in one location, provide expanded classroom space, and accommodate explosive detection equipment, vehicle arrest barriers, and other typical embassy configurations needed for this specialized training.

Training instructors must acquire training slots at other law enforcement academies and military facilities on a space-available basis. Training slots at these facilities are usually limited, must be reserved in advance, and are subject to cancellation. DS officials cite last-minute cancellations and the difficulty in locating suitable alternative training slots as obstacles to achieving their course objectives.

The OIG team found a need for a more comprehensive facilities business plan that examines cost-benefits and tradeoffs for different real estate options. For example, when the National Foreign Affairs Training Center was originally designed, a plot was designated for a DS training center and planning commission approval was granted. The plot still exists, but there is no evidence in the most recent business plan submitted to the Bureau of Administration that the site was considered as a viable alternative to leased facilities. Construction costs for a new facility to house 100 employees at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center would be approximately \$25 million, according to senior officials at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) interviewed by OIG.

The Department has pursued space for a consolidated training facility at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Reston, Camp A.P. Hill, and, most recently, at the Walter Reed Hospital, over a 15-year period. The current target, the Walter Reed hospital site, will not be available until 2011. The Walter Reed plans may not prove feasible because of legal issues involved in assuming an existing lease from the Department of Defense. The Department's training program is vital to the security of Department personnel. Without a definitive consolidation plan, DS training facilities will likely continue to be hampered by facilities shortcomings.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should develop a comprehensive facilities consolidation plan for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Training Academy, to include facilities for classroom, weapons, and tactical training. (Action: DS, in coordination with A)

STAFFING CONTINUITY AND CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT

The balance between Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contract employees is not optimal in some TPS offices. Changes are needed to improve oversight and long-term operational continuity. Contractors make up about 54 percent of the TPS staff. In one unit, a single direct-hire employee serves as the contracting officer's technical monitor for eight contractors and is the only direct-hire employee in the unit. There is no contract oversight when the direct-hire employee is absent from the job in this office. Foreign Service employees fill key leadership and training positions, and generally serve two-year tours. In certain offices with a large number of Foreign Service employees, the normal transfer cycle can result in the departure of half of all staff members during the summer months, with inevitable negative consequences for the continuity of the training program.

To strengthen continuity and contractor oversight, TPS is seeking to fill vacant Civil Service positions. TPS believes that more direct-hire employees are needed to effectively supervise its contractors. Because of bureau-level direct-hire staffing ceilings, staffing increases are not likely. In the absence of approval to hire more direct-hire employees, TPS must work with existing resources to achieve a better balance between contractors, Foreign Service employees, and Civil Service employees in its divisions. Greater use of the PSC hiring mechanism should be part of this approach, because PSC employees can perform many of the functions of direct-hire employees and are not subject to bureau position ceilings.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement a plan for the Diplomatic Security Training Center to provide an appropriate mix of Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contract employees in each division. (Action: DS)

SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING DIVISION

SLTD provides a wide range of basic and advanced security training. SLTD's flagship program is the Basic Special Agent Course, which provides new employees with the skills required by DS special agents. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) Course, required by special agents prior to overseas posting, builds on prior law enforcement training but is more specialized to prepare special agents for the responsibility of managing security programs overseas.

In response to special circumstances, such as the ongoing conflict in Iraq, SLTD has developed a training program that specifically addresses high-threat environments. As of January 2006, SLTD has trained over 1,800 government employees and contractors assigned to Iraq. These courses address topics such as improvised explosive device recognition, first aid, and general information needed to survive in a high-threat environment. SLTD also developed the armored vehicle driver-training program to train Foreign Service national drivers to respond to assassination or kidnap attempts.

SLTD also trains Foreign Service national investigators, post security officers, Marine security guards, and diplomatic couriers. Additionally, SLTD organizes seminars for chiefs of mission and deputy chiefs of mission to provide information regarding the duties and responsibilities of RSOs. SLTD, working closely with FSI, provides security briefings to the general Foreign Service officer corps, other government agency personnel serving overseas, and eligible family members.

Morale among employees in the divisions' three branches is uniformly good. However, inadequate training facilities, lack of full-time equivalent positions, staff vacancies, and funding limitations impact each branch program and present challenges for management and staff.

Domestic Training Branch

The Domestic Training Branch develops, manages, and coordinates the entry-level, in-service, and advanced training programs for DS special agents. Courses taught by the branch include the basic agent class and in-service training for RSOs. In addition to training for DS special agents, the branch is also responsible for providing criminal investigative and protective security training to foreign police officials who attend the international law enforcement academies.

The staff complement is generally sufficient. However, management believes that a Civil Service position is needed for continuity because currently all 20 staff are Foreign Service special agents, with the exception of one PSC. DS is in the process of obtaining a Civil Service position for the branch to provide continuity.

Overseas Training Branch

The Overseas Training Branch develops, manages, and coordinates courses for security professionals who directly support the Department's overseas security program. Courses taught by the overseas training branch include the basic RSO and RSO in-service seminar.

Staffing gaps present a major challenge for the overseas branch. At times these gaps are caused by summer rotations and temporary duty assignments for Foreign Service employees. The total special agent complement has increased from seven to nine, but three positions remain vacant, leaving a 30 percent vacancy rate among special agents. These vacancies negatively affect staff productivity. Two personal services contractors were hired recently. As noted earlier in the report, a better balance between contractors, Foreign Service employees, Civil Service employees, and contractors could reduce the adverse impact of vacancies and the normal Foreign Service rotation cycle on the branch's operations.

Special Skills Training Branch

The Special Skills Training Branch provides state-of-the-art instruction on recognizing and reacting to emergency and life-threatening situations. Instructors are subject matter experts who focus on demonstrating and teaching tactical techniques that are used in the execution of law enforcement responsibilities, conducting protective details, or serving in high-threat areas. The unit is responsible for teaching sections of the Basic Special Agent Course and related refresher courses for DS special agents. Four units comprise the special skills branch: firearms training, explosives countermeasures, defensive tactics and room entry, and driver training. Staffing is sufficient for two of the four units; however, additional instructors are needed in the firearms training and defensive tactics and room entry units. OIG made an informal recommendation that the bureau provide additional instructors in these areas.

Armored Vehicle Program

TPS is not fully meeting the requirement to provide armored vehicle driver's training to Department personnel. There are approximately 55 eligible Foreign Service national drivers who have not attended armored vehicle training. According to 12 FAM 389, the RSO must ensure that drivers assigned to drive chief of mission or principal officer armored vehicles have attended the counterterrorism driving course approved by the DSTA or the academy's armored vehicle driver training program. The regulations also state that the RSO must ensure that refresher training is given every five years to all drivers who drive chief of mission or principal officer armored vehicles once the initial training has occurred.

TPS states that funding restrictions have affected their ability to offer courses to Department personnel. Funding for the program dropped from \$612,400 in FY 2004 to zero in FY 2006. In order to continue courses for FY 2006, TPS reallocated

funding from other programs to supplement the armored vehicle program. A total of 190 drivers were due for refresher training in FY 2006, but as noted above, 55 Foreign Service nationals have not yet received the training.

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide required counterterrorism driving training to all Foreign Service nationals assigned to drive chief of mission and/or principal officer armored vehicles. (Action: DS)

SA-7 Firing Range

The SA-7 firing range requires modernization. The 20-year old range communication system is antiquated. Acoustical tiles located alongside the walls are deteriorating and losing their sound suppression properties. An average of 100 students use the facility each week. The Bureau of Administration's Domestic Environment and Safety Division has not conducted annual safety inspections of the lead, ventilation, and noise levels in at least two years. TPS is aware of firing range deficiencies and has sought funding to correct the problems. TPS obtained quotes and found that \$200,000 was needed to upgrade the SA-7 firing range. Since 2001, DS has postponed action on funding an upgrade to this facility in anticipation of a move to a new, consolidated training center. Employee workplace safety regulations must be observed even in an interim facility.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Administration should conduct an environmental, safety, and health review of the SA-7 firing range. (Action: A)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should correct any environmental, safety, and health deficiencies at the SA-7 firing range immediately on completion of the Bureau of Administration's review. (Action: DS)

SECURITY ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SECURITY TRAINING DIVISION

SECD provides training primarily to Department security engineering and information technology (IT) employees. The division consists of three branches: the Technical Training Branch (TTB), the Security Engineering Branch (SEB), and

the Information Assurance Branch (IAB). The division has offices in three separate buildings located in Maryland and Virginia. Management of the division has undergone major changes with summer rotations. The new division chief arrived during the inspection. In spite of monumental workloads and inadequate training facilities and equipment, morale in the division was excellent. Many employees would welcome clearer direction and communication from management in the form of regular all-hands meetings, an issue OIG addressed through an informal recommendation to TPS management.

Technical Training Branch

TTB's mission is to provide technical security training to the Department's SEOs, security technician specialists, Seabees, special agents, Foreign Service officers, and other U.S. government personnel. These employees are trained in the installation, use, and maintenance of technical security systems and procedures to protect U.S. citizens and property.

TTB has been adversely affected by the facilities shortcomings and staffing imbalances described earlier in this report. TTB funding is not adequate to meet its needs for acquisition of state-of-the-art technical security and technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) equipment and systems. The expansion of the Visa and Passport Security Program, Global Technical Security Upgrade Programs, and Security Management Systems Enterprise Program in FY 2007 will increase existing and new technical and physical security specialist training requirements.

DS continues to experience a significant increase in the number of students requiring specialized training on intrusion detection systems, explosive detection, digital closed-circuit television recording systems, and emergency notification systems. As training requirements increase, TTB personnel will have little time to maintain instructor proficiency and certifications. These requirements, combined with facilities limitations, create a concern about TTB's ongoing ability to meet FLETA accreditation standards. TPS is aware of this situation and has recently hired additional curriculum developers to assist in curriculum documentation.

Security Engineering Branch

SEB's mission is to provide technical security countermeasures training to employees responsible for protecting U.S. government assets from intelligence compromise. SEB trains newly hired security engineering employees in technical, physical and procedural security. SEB also trains construction surveillance technicians and

site security managers responsible for protecting overseas construction sites. Lastly, the office educates the diplomatic community on matters related to the technical espionage capabilities of foreign countries.

The current TSCM lab is undersized and overcrowded. There is only one qualified instructor for the TSCM program, and as a result, he must teach two classes simultaneously, using lab assistants, a difficult and awkward task at best. TSCM's facilities, staffing, and funding issues are similar to those of other branches discussed earlier in this report.

Efforts have been underway for at least three years to establish classified connectivity with the Interagency Training Center in Fort Washington, MD. The Center has requested this connection to enhance secure communications with the Department. OIG made an informal recommendation that DS provide classified network connectivity for this branch office.

Presently, SECD conducts technical espionage awareness training in an unclassified environment at FSI for Department new hires, chiefs of mission, and deputy chiefs of mission. The technical espionage awareness training used to be conducted at DSTA so that classified demonstrations of real world technical espionage capabilities could be presented. However, the training has been modified for the FSI environment and no longer includes demonstration items.

Information Assurance Branch

IAB provides role-based training designed to meet requirements in the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. The information assurance security training strategy is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-16, Information Technology Security Training Requirements. The branch is comprised of 11 contract employees, a direct-hire SEO, and a direct-hire branch chief. Space is an issue as employees are squeezed into small offices throughout the building.

The Bureau of Information Resource Management, Office of Information Assurance, in coordination with SECD/IAB, created a comprehensive training plan that establishes defined roles and responsibilities between the Bureau of Information Resource Management, DS, and FSI. The plan identifies TPS as responsible for providing the training while the Bureau of Information Resource Management, Office of Information Assurance, provides oversight to confirm that the training meets all requirements. OIG staff found that IT security training provided by the Department was conducted without duplication between DS and FSI. Federal

Information Security Management Act and Office of Personnel Management guidance require each agency to identify employees with significant IT security responsibilities. The Department's plan lists positions with significant IT security responsibility and identifies mandatory courses for those positions.

The SECD/IAB has developed, and is currently providing, approximately 1,200 classes per year for information system security officers (ISSO), system administrators, IT managers, non-IT managers, senior level managers, executive level managers, RSOs, and SEOs. Over the past few years the Department has identified a steady increase in attempts to compromise IT systems. IT security training for employees with significant IT security responsibilities is vital to the Department's overall IT security posture.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TRAINING SUPPORT STAFF

The administrative and training support staff provides a full range of administrative support services to staff and students assigned to DSTA. Within this staff is the training academy registrar's office, which develops course catalogs, training continua, student orientation handbooks, training forms, and conducts liaison with the FSI registrar's office. The Administrative Support Services Unit supports TPS administrative requirements for transportation, travel, equipment, facilities, property management, and budget, in coordination with the DS Executive Office (EX).

Registrar's Office

The registrar's office is responsible for enrolling new students in DSTA training courses, a role that requires close coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and FSI. To standardize records management, DSTA adopted the FSI Student Training Management System in 2004. The new system allows human resources technicians to enroll students directly in DS training. Course offerings are also available online in a standardized format used by FSI. With the surge in mandatory Iraq and Afghanistan DS antiterrorism course training, the office has assumed new responsibilities for preparation of interagency training agreements.

The registrar's office also maintains records of firearms qualifications for DS agents. According to 12 FAH-3 H-422, agents are responsible for reporting their weapons qualifications scores to their supervisors, and the firearms officer must submit agents qualification scores to the TPS registrar's office. The database used to track qualifications is obsolete. DS does not have an automated central record

system that can generate reports to verify that agents have completed firearms qualifications requirements. In the event of an injury or death related to firearms discharge in the line of duty, training records can protect the agency from claims of negligence.

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update the firearms qualification recordkeeping database with accurate information on special agent firearms qualifications test results. (Action: DS)

Administrative Support Services Unit

TPS provides limited administrative support to its employees through a unit that consists of a Civil Service employee and three contractors. Two additional positions are vacant, including a budget analyst position that has been vacant for a year. At the time of the inspection, TPS expected to advertise the budget analyst position in the immediate future. TPS is directly responsible for budget planning and travel authorization. Other administrative services, such as human resources, funds control and accounting, and most property management responsibilities are carried out by DS/EX. Despite staffing shortfalls, the unit has delivered satisfactory service to its TPS clients in most areas.

Security

In those areas of SA-11 occupied by TPS, classified material is properly secured and safeguarded; classified processing equipment is appropriately marked; and access into classified storage, processing, and discussion areas is controlled adequately. TPS maintains effective public access controls for the main building at SA-11. A 24-hour uniformed DS security patrol provides protection to SA-11, SA-11A, and SA-11B.

INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT STAFF

The instructional systems management staff performs several functions: FLETA accreditation, curriculum and instructional systems development, multimedia development and support, distance learning and interactive courseware, and external training.

To maintain accreditation standards, TPS established the Curriculum and Instructional Systems Development (CISD) unit to be responsible for the instructional design, development, accreditation, and management of the DS curriculum. Additionally, CISD conducts media services for TPS training to include audiovisual and graphic services, and develops distance-learning materials. CISD also manages external training for all DS employees. A senior instructional systems specialist who oversees two direct-hire employees and 13 contractors leads and manages the office.

With the implementation of the accreditation process, new policies and procedures evolved for TPS to follow. CISD has primary responsibility for instituting these policies in order to maintain TPS's accreditation. For example, instructors must attend an approved instructor-training course and receive teaching credentials. CISD offers guidance on how to improve and enhance presentation skills through its train-the-trainer course. CISD maintains current information on instructor qualifications, course data, and subject matter qualifications necessary for the accreditation process. Prior to CISD's inception, instructional materials consisted of presentation slides that were not updated. In addition, similar courses were taught by various TPS divisions, which resulted in inconsistent training and duplication of effort.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

DS management controls responsibilities are divided between TPS and DS/EX. In most cases, the DS Assistant Secretary or his designee at the bureau level has responsibility for bureau-wide management controls such as certifying the accuracy of property inventories, conducting year-end reviews of obligation validity, and IT security for the bureau network as a whole. DS/EX supports TPS operations by providing property disposal, vehicle disposal, and allotment accounting, for example. TPS completed a Bureau of Resource Management risk assessment questionnaire prior to the start of the inspection. All individual administrative functions received adequate management controls scores. TPS employs acceptable management controls in most areas. Contract management and acquisition planning procedures, however, need improvement. Additional attention is needed as well regarding IT security and configuration planning.

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

The TPS contract workforce consists of approximately 60 contractors and one when-actually-employed staff person. TPS could improve procedures to monitor its labor-hours contracts. A sample of monthly contract invoices found that some bills submitted did not include timesheets of contractor hours worked. The contracting officer's representative or contract technical representative did not sign some invoices. Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.601(a)(1) requires government review of labor-hours contracts to prevent payment for services not actually delivered. Because labor-hours contracts provide no positive profit incentive to the contractor for cost control or labor efficiency, government surveillance is necessary to give reasonable assurance that an efficient method and effective cost controls are being used.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement procedures for all contracting officer's representatives and contract technical representatives outlining required invoice review procedures including review of timesheets, substantiation of administrative charges, and review of hourly rates applied to contracts. (Action: DS)

ACQUISITION PLANNING

TPS acquisition planning has not been adequate to ensure full and open competition for major contracts. Four of the 10 major contracts administered by TPS had expired or were due to expire at the time of the OIG inspection. Temporary extensions (bridge contracts) will be required as a result. In one instance, a contract with an estimated value of \$6 million expired after the exercise of the fifth-year option and was in the process of being extended for six months through a sole source justification and approval. In another case, the scope of work for a multimillion-dollar contract was not completed in sufficient time to permit full and open competition.

Acquisition planning is a joint responsibility of the requiring office and the contracting office. Requiring offices must prepare a formal acquisition plan for acquisition activities over \$5 million. TPS had two contracts over the \$5 million threshold in FY 2006 but did not complete formal acquisition plans, as required by Department of State Acquisition Regulation 607.103. The result of inadequate planning included higher costs to the government and restricted competition for the contracted services.

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institute acquisition planning procedures required by the Department of State Acquisition Regulation for all formal contracts over \$5 million (Action: DS)

TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION

TPS funded approximately 3,000 travel orders totaling about \$2 million in FY 2005. Because several training facilities are outside the 80-mile Washington commuting area, the office frequently must prepare travel authorizations for trainees. The office does not have a mechanism for collecting unused airline tickets for trips that are canceled or rescheduled. Because unused tickets are not submitted to the Carlson-Wagonlit travel contractor by TPS, the Department may not be collecting refunds it is owed. The OIG inspection team made an informal recommendation that TPS require travelers to submit unused travel tickets or a certification that all tickets were used at the time vouchers are submitted for payment.

GENERAL SERVICES AND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

The bureau employs acceptable internal controls over TPS personal property and motor vehicles in its custody. This property includes 63 government-owned vehicles and personal property valued at \$1.19 million in FY 2005. A contract employee prepares receiving reports and also participates in the annual inventory process. The contract employee does not exercise ultimate disposal authority for government property, a function that is performed by the bureau's property disposal officer. The OIG inspection team informally recommended that TPS designate a principal custodial officer and area custodial officers to segregate duties as required by the regulations.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

The OIG inspection team noted that there was no posted Equal Employment Opportunity notices in the workplace, as required by 29 CFR 1614.102(b)(7). The OIG inspection team made an informal recommendation to address this issue.

INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

TPS information management systems are a component of the DS information systems network supported by DS's chief technology office. TPS has approximately 500 users. One full-time contractor administrator and one part-time administrator provide onsite support, and one ISSO performs the ISSO duties. It should be noted that the TPS information systems wiring and equipment is obsolete and out of date. Wiring systems upgrades have been postponed indefinitely because of uncertainty about TPS's long-term facilities decisions. Consequently, TPS personnel must work with less than satisfactory equipment. This problem will not be addressed until facilities questions for TPS and its office are resolved. The OIG inspection team identified three areas in TPS where management attention to IT issues is needed -- adequacy of IT support, IT security documentation, and inappropriate material on the networks.

Information Technology Support

IT support for TPS users is inadequate. TPS users stated that the administrators were overworked and slow to respond to support calls. One full-time and one

part-time administrator cannot adequately support 500 users. Many of the users are students, and the continuous turnover of students increases the workload of the IT administrators. The inability to properly handle IT support calls in a timely manner can cause decreased productivity and increased frustration for users.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should monitor the performance of the Office of Training's information technology support contract (SL-AQM-020-001), document any performance deficiencies identified, and seek corrective action from the contractor. (Action: DS)

Information Security

The ISSO effectively maintains the security of the TPS networks and is proactive in responding to computer incidents, educating users, and adhering to many Department directives. However, issues concerning documentation and inappropriate material need to be addressed.

Documentation

TPS lacks configuration management plans, contingency plans, and systems security plans. DS did not have plans required by 5 FAM 867 and 12 FAM 622.4-1(a). Configuration management plans, contingency plans, and systems security plans provide an overview of the automated information systems security requirements and describe the established and planned controls for meeting the requirements. The plans also provide the means for improving the protection of information technology resources and delineate the responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals who access the system. The lack of required plans places the TPS IT infrastructure, its systems, and assets at risk. Further, users may not be aware of their specific responsibilities related to the systems, which increases the risk of cyber security incidents.

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement configuration management plans, contingency plans, and systems security plans for the Diplomatic Security Training Academy in accordance with Department regulations. (Action: DS)

Inappropriate Material

When the ISSO finds inappropriate material, the user is notified of the finding and requested to delete the material. It is only when there are multiple incidents from the same user that the user's manager is notified. The OIG inspection team found sexually explicit material on the TPS information systems. Sexually explicit material on government computer systems is strictly prohibited by 5 FAM 723(6)(c). The inappropriate material was removed during the time of the inspection. The OIG team informally recommended that the ISSO's instructions be revised to require that the user's management, not the user, be informed when inappropriate material is initially found.

FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should develop a comprehensive facilities consolidation plan for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security Training Academy, to include facilities for classroom, weapons, and tactical training. (Action: DS, in coordination with A)
- Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement a plan for the Diplomatic Security Training Center to provide an appropriate mix of Foreign Service, Civil Service, and contract employees in each division. (Action: DS)
- Recommendation 3:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide required counterterrorism driving training to all Foreign Service nationals assigned to drive chief of mission and/or principal officer armored vehicles. (Action: DS)
- Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Administration should conduct an environmental, safety, and health review of the SA-7 firing range. (Action: A)
- Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should correct any environmental, safety, and health deficiencies at the SA-7 firing range immediately on completion of the Bureau of Administration's review. (Action: DS)
- Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update the firearms qualification recordkeeping database with accurate information on special agent firearms qualifications test results. (Action: DS)
- Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement procedures for all contracting officer's representatives and contract technical representatives outlining required invoice review procedures including review of timesheets, substantiation of administrative charges, and review of hourly rates applied to contracts. (Action: DS)
- Recommendation 8:** The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institute acquisition planning procedures required by the Department of State Acquisition Regulation for all formal contracts over \$5 million (Action: DS)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should monitor the performance of the Office of Training's information technology support contract (SL-AQM-020-001), document any performance deficiencies identified, and seek corrective action from the contractor. (Action: DS)

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement configuration management plans, contingency plans, and systems security plans for the Diplomatic Security Training Academy in accordance with Department regulations. (Action: DS)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

SECD employees do not have regular all-hands meetings to share information and discuss important work challenges with management.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish regular all-hands meetings for the Security Engineering and Computer Division of the Diplomatic Security Training Academy.

A contract employee prepares receiving reports, maintains property records, and conducts the annual property inventory. Proper separation of duties requires that another individual perform one of these functions, preferably maintaining property records.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate a principal custodial officer and area custodial officers to ensure proper separation of duties in property management.

Staffing is not sufficient in the firearms training and defensive tactics units to meet training goals and objectives.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign additional instructors to the firearms training and defensive tactics units in the Special Skills Training Branch.

Equal Employment Opportunity notices are not prominently posted in the workplace as required by 29 CFR 1614.102(b)(7).

Informal Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should post information on the Equal Employment Opportunity program, including the names of approved counselors, in a prominent workplace area.

There is no internal office procedure to seek refunds from Carlson-Wagonlit for unused airline tickets. As a result, the government may be paying for trips that are canceled but for which tickets have been issued. The tickets should instead be refunded.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should institute a procedure to require travelers to submit unused travel coupons, if any, or a certification that all tickets were used when they submit their completed travel vouchers.

TPS standard operating procedures do not comply with 5 FAM 7236(c) regarding inappropriate material on U.S. government computers.

Informal Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should notify the user's management of the training academy when inappropriate or unapproved material is found.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Arrival Date
Assistant Director of Diplomatic Security Training Charlene Lamb	08/05
Director Office of Training and Performance Support David Benson	07/06
Division Chief for Security and Law Enforcement Training Division Bill Miller	10/04
Division Chief for Security Engineering and Computer Security Training Division Mike Corbett	07/06
Training Officer Instructional Systems Management Staff Cynthia White	06/06

ABBREVIATIONS

CISD	Curriculum and Instructional Systems Development
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DSTA	Diplomatic Security Training Academy
EX	Executive Office
FLETA	Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
IAB	Information Assurance Branch
ISSO	Information system security officer
IT	Information technology
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PSC	Personal services contract
RSO	Regional security officer
SEB	Security Engineering Branch
SECD	Security Engineering and Computer Security Training Division
SEO	Security engineering officer
SLTD	Security and Law Enforcement Training Division
TPS	Office of Training and Performance Support
TSCM	Technical surveillance countermeasure
TTB	Technical Training Branch

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