

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Review of Security Programs at U.S. Embassy Baghdad

Report Number ISP-IQO-05-60, July 2005

~~IMPORTANT NOTICE~~

~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY JUDGMENTS	1
BACKGROUND	5
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY	7
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES	9
RESULTS OF EMPLOYEE SURVEY	11
Key Survey Findings	11
Training and Preparing for Iraq	12
ACCESS-CONTROL PROCEDURES	15
Emergency Notification and Information Sharing	15
MISSION SECURITY STAFFING	19
EMBASSY OPERATIONS FUNDING	21
SECURITY PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS	23
PHYSICAL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS TO INTERIM FACILITIES	25
Overhead Cover for Interim Housing	27
SECURING PERSONNEL WHEN IN TRANSIT	29
Management Issues	30
ARMORED VEHICLES	33
Fighting Platforms	34
EMBASSY GUARD PROGRAM	37
Surveillance Detection	38
Guard Camps	38
ABBREVIATIONS	41
APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE	43

KEY JUDGMENTS

Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to determine the funding requirements for the security programs in Iraq and to identify areas that are particularly challenging and costly.

- The cost of protecting U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities in Iraq is very high. Of the \$798.8 million available for embassy operations in FY 2005, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS) program alone will cost an estimated \$593.4 million, 74 percent of the total. Current funding is insufficient and the Department of State (Department) needs additional supplemental appropriations to continue mission operations. Security costs are expected to rise in future years as the U.S. military presence diminishes and Embassy Baghdad assumes more responsibility for securing its facilities and personnel. Current budget requirements for FY 2005 and beyond may be considerably greater than anticipated.
- The U.S. mission occupies the facilities formerly used by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that do not meet Department requirements for safety and security. The Department's property agreement with the Iraqi government requires the return of all interim facilities within 24 months, once Congress appropriates construction funding.
- Although new facilities must be constructed, the interim embassy facilities have received security enhancements. The largest U.S. facility is the former Republican Palace, now the embassy annex. The regional facilities outside of Baghdad, meanwhile, have received practical, field-expedient, security enhancements.
- Protecting the residences of mission employees in Baghdad has been particularly vexing, as the trailers used by the mission have been subjected to insurgents' mortar fire. The Department has been seeking a technical means of hardening these temporary, thin-skinned facilities against mortar attack. Proposed solutions have been explored, but no solution has been found other than constructing new, permanent facilities as part of the proposed new embassy compound. OIG strongly encourages the Department to act quickly to harden these facilities to the extent feasible.

- Perhaps the most significant challenge is protecting personnel while they travel throughout Iraq and to and from Baghdad International Airport. Over 1,100 armed security employees protect personnel, who travel in armored vehicle convoys. DS requested \$357.8 million in FY 2005 for this vital mission, but these funds are insufficient to finance the protective details for the entire year. DS program officers estimate the costs will exceed \$420.8 million, a shortfall of \$63 million. DS will have to either request additional funds or move funds from other program areas.
- Protective security services for convoys previously were obtained under the CPA through a patchwork quilt of contractual arrangements that was not cost effective and was difficult to manage. DS is establishing a global contract for more-uniform services and to contain costs. Yet managing such an extensive and expensive program challenges the mission and the Department. DS has identified the need for seven additional headquarters positions to manage protective security contracts and monitor contract compliance. OIG agrees that the positions are urgently needed.
- Two other extensive protective-detail programs in Iraq are not DS-funded; one is funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the other by the Department of Defense. The programs are not under the operational control of the regional security officer (RSO), but are expected to follow chief of mission (COM) rules of engagement. OIG suggests that the affected parties formally clarify the lines of authority for these protective operations.
- The Department is enhancing the protective details by adding up to 50 military-style, fighting vehicles to the mission's fleet of armored vehicles. The expanded fleet will be more costly to procure and maintain, and additional training of personnel will be necessary.
- OIG surveyed a sample of mission employees and found that they are generally pleased with the security program. Employees in Baghdad were somewhat more positive about their personal safety than those who had served previously. This may indicate that the Department's tireless efforts to bolster security are working, that the operational tempo is becoming normalized, and the situation is improving. Generally, most respondents were pleased with the security programs and management's actions to inform employees of security situations and policies. Yet a significant number of current employees are dissatisfied with access-control procedures and emergency preparedness. Many employees wanted information about security threats and incidents to have increased timeliness.

There are no recommendations in this report, but OIG will audit and inspect the mission security programs, as appropriate, and separately report its findings and recommendations, if any.

BACKGROUND

The American flag was raised at the chancery of Embassy Baghdad on June 28, 2004, marking the opening of the U.S. mission to Iraq. Never before has the Department established a diplomatic mission in the midst of such a brutal terrorist insurgency. Department of State and other agencies' personnel have achieved the remarkable task of establishing diplomatic operations in short order under severe conditions.




Figure 1: Aerial view of the U.S. Embassy Annex in the International Zone, Baghdad Iraq

The Department has had to build the mission's security program from the ground up, doing so under daily terrorist threats, including suicide vehicle attacks, kidnappings, armed assaults, and mortar and rocket fire directed at mission facilities. There were no effective Iraqi police or security services in place to protect the mission. Were an embassy already in place, the

Department would likely have closed it, responding to the threat levels and the inability of the host nation to provide security. Instead, U.S. foreign policy objectives required that the mission persevere. Due to the support of U.S. military forces, the effectiveness of the embassy security program, and what may be a bit of good luck, the number of official personnel killed by terrorists has been relatively low.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Establishing a safe and secure environment for the mission is one of the Department's highest priorities. The nature of the ongoing conflict and the commitment of the U.S. government prompted OIG to conduct a broad survey of the security programs in Iraq. Specifically, OIG identified: 1) the resources being directed to security programs, 2) the responsibilities of the Departments' of State and Defense for protecting mission personnel, 3) the areas of Embassy Baghdad's security program that are costly or otherwise of particular future concern, and 4) future possible OIG audits and inspections.

OIG conducted this review in Washington, DC, between January and March 2005. Interviews were conducted and documentation collected from the relevant bureaus and offices of the Department of State (the Department), including DS and the Bureaus of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), and Resource Management. The FY 2005 supplemental funding request discussed in this report was signed into law after the field work was completed.

To obtain the views of Department personnel in Iraq and those who recently returned, OIG prepared and disseminated a personal-safety questionnaire. It received the responses via encrypted Internet communications over a dedicated OIG network.

(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)
(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES

The primary responsibility for protecting mission personnel resides with U.S. military forces under the direction of the commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The COM of Embassy Baghdad shares this responsibility. A memorandum of agreement (MOA), dated June 23, 2004, and signed by the CENTCOM commander and the COM, formally establishes their respective duties. A second MOA, dated June 10, 2004, and signed by the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, addresses more-specific responsibilities regarding physical security, equipment, and personal protective services. The U.S. military is generally responsible for protecting the large, enclosed International Zone of Baghdad, where the governments of Iraq, the United States, and other nations have diplomatic facilities, and for protecting localities throughout the rest of Iraq, the Red Zone.

The embassy's security staff protects the mission compound within the International Zone. All American personnel (including assigned military personnel) under COM authority are required to follow mission procedures for security briefings, personal identification programs, residential security, and embassy emergency action plans. For traveling throughout Iraq, all mission personnel must follow CENTCOM procedures and travel restrictions, including convoy requirements, curfews, and no-travel zones. The relationships appear to work well, and interaction and coordination among military personnel and embassy security personnel is very good.

RESULTS OF EMPLOYEE SURVEY

OIG developed a questionnaire to obtain the views of Embassy Baghdad employees about their personal safety and the security situation generally. OIG requested that the embassy invite all employees to complete the questionnaire on an OIG Internet site. OIG also obtained a list from NEA of personnel who had previously served in Iraq for 90-days or more and asked them via e-mail to complete the questionnaire. The vast majority of those in this survey group (90 percent) had returned to Department headquarters or other missions abroad during 2004. Overall OIG received 187 responses, split about equally between current and former employees. (The summary of responses to the questionnaire is in Appendix A of this report.)

KEY SURVEY FINDINGS

In the survey, employees currently in Baghdad offer somewhat more positive views about their personal safety than those who had served previously. This may indicate that the Department's efforts to bolster security are working and that operations are becoming more normalized. Generally, most respondents were pleased with the security programs and management's actions to inform employees of security situations and policies. Yet a significant number of current employees were dissatisfied with access-control procedures and emergency preparedness. Some employees wanted more timely information about security threats and incidents.

A full 72 percent of respondents said they were motivated to serve in Iraq by their desire to help establish democracy there. Other reasons for accepting an assignment in Iraq were adventure (43 percent), career development and promotion (38 percent), and financial inducements (29 percent). Overall the survey found personnel generally felt safe while working and walking around the embassy compound; their ratings for these activities as "generally safe" or "very safe" were 71 percent and 75 percent, respectively.

Yet only 59 percent of respondents felt "generally safe" or "very safe" in their residences. Employees' concern over the security of the residential trailers arises from random mortar fire directed into the compound and from the inadequate

protection offered by these structures. DS officials said the frequency of mortar or rocket attacks on the compound was actually very low. Some 55 percent of employees surveyed said they felt “generally unsafe” and “very unsafe” when traveling outside the International Zone, an understandable view given the frequency of attacks on convoys.

The survey also found safety is perceived as improving. More specifically, only 16 percent of current employees indicated feeling “generally unsafe” or “very unsafe” at their residences, although 33 percent of personnel who had been previously assigned offer that response. Likewise, a similar improvement was found with respect to traveling outside the International Zone. Only 43 percent of current employees felt “generally unsafe” or “very unsafe,” as opposed to 65 percent of personnel who had been previously assigned.

Table 1: Questionnaire Responses Concerning Perceptions of Safety Under Various Scenarios Grouped by Current and Former Staff

Question 21	“Very safe” or “Generally safe”		“As safe as not or undecided”		“Very unsafe or “Generally unsafe”	
	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff
How safe or unsafe do (did) you feel ...						
1. at your residence?	70%	50%	14%	17%	16%	33%
2. at your workplace?	74%	69%	16%	11%	11%	20%
3. while traveling between the International Zone and another area?	39%	16%	18%	19%	43%	65%
4. while walking around the International Zone?	54%	58%	30%	28%	16%	14%
5. while walking around the embassy compound?	79%	69%	16%	21%	5%	9%
6. in an armed convoy?	41%	33%	31%	20%	28%	46%
7. when with military or civilian security personnel?	51%	41%	26%	24%	22%	35%
8. in the bunkers?	75%	64%	21%	23%	4%	13%
9. wearing protective gear?	45%	29%	46%	42%	10%	29%

Note: The above percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

TRAINING AND PREPARING FOR IRAQ

DS, the Foreign Service Institute, and others jointly developed the Department’s Diplomatic Security Anti-terrorism Course-Iraq (DSAC-I). The course is intended for personnel preparing to serve in Iraq for 30 days or more and focuses on security and emergency preparedness regarding Iraq. Respondents to

the OIG survey found the course beneficial and said it prepared them for the difficult living and working conditions. When asked the extent to which the DSAC-I course prepared them for the actual situations in Iraq, 97 percent said the course had prepared them to some extent and 39 percent said they were prepared to a great or very great extent. Only three percent said the course gave them little or no preparation. Responses were very similar for current employees and those who had previously served in Iraq.

Despite the overwhelmingly positive response to the DSAC-I course, the majority of respondents also provided suggestions to enhance it. Because the Department has been modifying the training in response to feedback, many of these suggestions had already been acted upon. Some suggestions, though, had not been implemented. For example, 13 of 52 (or 25 percent) employees who arrived in Baghdad between January-June 2004 said they needed defensive driving training. However, DS has not incorporated such training into the curriculum because it does not want to encourage driving, which the post has prohibited. On the whole, the respondents currently in Iraq who commented about DSAC-I were complimentary, and a few suggested that more time might be spent on Iraqi political and cultural issues and on administrative operations at the Embassy. One employee said the course would be more useful if some course material were presented during employees' second week in Iraq, rather than when still in Washington, DC. Current employees must attend a comprehensive RSO briefing when they arrive in-country that builds upon the DSAC-I curriculum.

In a related question concerning Iraq living conditions, the vast majority of respondents said they were prepared for the conditions they found on arrival. More specifically, over three-fourths of both current and former embassy employees said they were "generally prepared" or "very prepared" for all five of the war zone conditions enumerated by the survey question (Table 2). This favorable response can be attributed in part to the DSAC-I training.

Table 2: Questionnaire Responses Concerning Preparedness for War Zone Living Conditions Grouped by Current and Former Staff

Question 33	"Very prepared" or "Generally prepared"		"Undecided"		"Very unprepared" or "Generally unprepared"	
	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff
Prior to arriving in Iraq, how prepared or unprepared for living conditions in a war zone with respect to ...						
1. lack of privacy?	93%	83%	2%	5%	5%	12%
2. crowded working and living conditions?	91%	83%	6%	4%	4%	13%
3. threat of death and serious injury?	85%	81%	6%	9%	10%	10%
4. limited off-duty diversions?	77%	90%	8%	2%	14%	8%
5. limited availability of products and services items?	79%	88%	6%	4%	16%	8%

Note: Above percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

ACCESS-CONTROL PROCEDURES

OIG queried employees about their impressions of the effectiveness of security personnel in limiting unauthorized access to mission facilities and in excluding explosives and unauthorized weapons. Most respondents viewed the identification badge system as generally adequate or more than adequate and believed that vehicles and bags were being properly searched by guards. However, a sizeable number said these procedures were insufficient. For example, when asked about the quality of screening for unauthorized weapons, 20 percent of respondents felt the procedures were “inadequate” or “very inadequate.” Generally, current employees viewed the security procedures more favorably than those who previously served.

Table 3: Questionnaire Responses Concerning Security Personnel Grouped by Current and Former Staff

Question 22	“More than adequate” or “Generally adequate”		“Of marginal or borderline adequacy”		“Inadequate” or “Very inadequate”	
	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff	Current Staff	Former Staff
In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate is security personnel at ...						
1. ensuring badge photo matches individual?	72%	71%	17%	15%	10%	14%
2. controlling access to restricted areas?	86%	75%	9%	14%	5%	12%
3. searching bags?	64%	54%	22%	29%	14%	17%
4. screening for unauthorized weapons?	60%	54%	24%	22%	16%	24%
5. checking vehicles?	79%	61%	14%	20%	7%	19%

Note: Above percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

There is room for improvement in emergency notification and information sharing. A significant number of employees did not believe they were knowledgeable about emergency procedures or that the emergency notification system was audible in all places, and they would like more timely information after an incident occurs. However, current employees responded more favorably on this issue than did those previously stationed in Iraq.

The emergency notification system is apparently not audible in many parts of the compound. When queried about this issue, only 28 percent of all respondents indicated that the system is audible at “all or almost all the locations” in the place/annex compound, and 17 percent indicated it is audible at “none or hardly any of the locations.” OBO officials responded by stating that a scope of work has been prepared and funds earmarked to repair the fire alarm system of the embassy annex.

There is also cause for concern over employees’ awareness of the prescribed emergency procedures. Only 51 percent of survey respondents indicated that they knew the prescribed action to take “all or almost all of the time.” Perhaps even more troubling, 12 percent said they knew what action to take “none or hardly any of the time.” However, this situation is apparently improving since only six percent of current employees responded “none or hardly any of the time” of the time, compared to 19 percent for that answer by previously assigned employees.

Generally, the survey showed that employees were more satisfied with the role of mission management and the security office staff in informing them about changes in security policies and procedures. However, this area could use improvement as well. A full 13 percent of respondents said they received timely information “none or hardly any of the time,” and only 44 percent said this was true “all or almost all of the time.” The survey also disclosed some improvement, however. Only four percent of current employees indicated receiving timely information “none or hardly any of the time,” compared with 21 percent of previously assigned personnel. Likewise, 57 percent of current employees indicated receiving timely information “all or almost all of the time,” although only 31 percent of previous employees offered this response.

However, the survey showed that employees do not uniformly feel they are always given timely information when an incident occurs in the embassy annex compound or elsewhere in the International Zone. When asked about this issue, 26 percent of respondents said they received timely notification “none or hardly any of the time,” and only 21 percent indicated receiving this information “all or almost all of the time.”

On the other hand, the survey also found that only 15 percent of current employees indicated receiving timely notification “none or hardly any of the time,” compared to 37 percent of previously assigned personnel. Likewise, 25 percent of current employees indicated receiving timely notification “all or almost all of the time,” although only 16 percent of previous employees offered this response.

Embassy management has addressed this concern by establishing an RSO Tactical Operations Center staffed with analysts who provide timely threat information to the mission community and private sector. Given the threat environment, it is unlikely that all employees will be fully satisfied with the amount and timeliness of information provided. According to DS officials, threat information is shared as soon as possible. As for the lack of post-incident information, DS said information of this sort was closely held because information revealing the location of the impact, the damage, and the response could aid insurgents' capacity for future targeting.

MISSION SECURITY STAFFING

Security staffing in Baghdad and regional offices as of January 21, 2005, included 25 security officers, with four more scheduled to arrive. The security office is augmented with five temporary-duty assistant regional security officers (ARSO). The protective detail has approximately 1,100 employees, and there are over 1,500 contract guards. There is a Marine security guard detachment that has been augmented with Marines who guard the compound grounds.

EMBASSY OPERATIONS FUNDING

Congress appropriated a total of \$1.072 billion between November 2003 and August 2004, for embassy operations in Iraq, including funds transferred by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the Department that had been previously appropriated to the CPA. Of this, OBO received \$81.5 million for embassy security, construction, and maintenance (ESCM) and \$990.9 million for diplomatic and consular programs (D&CP). Virtually all of the D&CP funds were allotted to DS, NEA, and Bureau of Information Resource Management, for embassy operations and security. These funds are insufficient to fund Iraq embassy operations through FY 2005, however, and the Department is depending on additional funds that have been requested by the Administration as a supplemental appropriation in FY 2005.

Table 4 shows the sources of funds appropriated by the Congress or made available by OMB for the D&CP and ESCM accounts, as of February 8, 2005.

Table 4: Mission Iraq Operations Funding

Funds Appropriated	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Allocated
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP)		
PL 108-106 ¹	\$ 35,800,000	
PL 108-106 transferred from CPA ²	105,750,000	
PL 108-106 authorized for transfer from Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund		\$184,000,000
PL 108-287 ³	81,037,000	\$584,263,000
Total D&CP	\$222,587,000	\$768,263,000
Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)		
PL 108-11 ⁴	\$ 50,945,000	
Carried forward to FY 05		\$ 10,555,000
PL 108-287 ⁵		20,000,000
Total ESCM	\$ 50,945,000	\$ 30,555,000
Total funds appropriated to State for Iraq	\$273,532,000	\$798,818,000

¹ On November 6, 2003, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and For the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (PL 108-106) provided \$35.8 million for D&CP.

² After the transfer of responsibility from the CPA to the mission on June 28, 2004, OMB reappropriated to the D&CP accounts \$105.75 million of unobligated funds that had been provided by P.L. 108-106 for CPA operations. OMB also reappropriated to the D&CP accounts \$184 million from funds appropriated by the Act for Security, Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Iraq.

³ On August 5, 2004 The Department of Defense Appropriation Act (PL 108-287) appropriated \$665.3 million (the \$81.04 million obligated in FY 2004, plus the \$584.26 million that remained available in FY 2005) for D&CP.

⁴ The Emergency Wartime Supplemental Act, 2003 (PL 108-11) was passed on April 16, 2003, providing \$61.5 million (the \$50.95 million obligated in FY 2004, plus the \$10.56 million that remained available in FY 2005) for the costs of establishing an interim diplomatic facility in Iraq.

⁵ P.L. 108-287 also provided \$20 million for ESCM for interim facilities for Embassy Baghdad. P.L. 108-447 provided allowed these funds to also be used for non-interim mission facilities, including associated planning, site preparation, and preconstruction activities.

According to Bureau of Resource Management officials all funds allotted to the bureaus for FY 2004 and FY 2005 Iraq-related expenditures were derived from three appropriations. The three Acts earmarked a total of \$782.6 million for Iraq-related expenses, and OMB transferred to the Department an additional \$105.75 million from funds previously appropriated for CPA operating expenses. In addition, \$184 million, or one percent, was transferred from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund for Department operations.

On February 14, 2005, the President asked Congress for additional supplemental funding for Iraq, including \$690 million for Department operations for the remainder of FY 2005 and for extraordinary security and logistics costs arising in FY 2006. The request also included \$658 million for the construction of a new embassy compound in Baghdad.

SECURITY PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS

Since embassy operations began, the Department and the embassy have significantly strengthened the mission's security program. Enhancements have ranged from upgrading physical security measures in Baghdad and at the regional embassy offices (REO), improving procedural security, creating a tactical operations center to serve as a focal point for routine and emergency situations, and carrying out several thousand protective security missions of personnel traveling outside the International Zone.

These vast security requirements are costly. Of the \$798.8 million allocated for embassy operations in FY 2005, DS program costs amount to about \$593.4 million, or 74 percent. Security costs are expected to increase considerably in future years, as the U.S. military presences diminishes and Embassy Baghdad takes on a greater role in protecting mission personnel and facilities. The elements of the security program costs, according to DS financial personnel, are described in Table 5.

Table 5: Diplomatic Security Iraq Resource Requirements: FYs 2004 - 2006
(S 000s)

Item (as named in description of 2004 costs)	FY 2004 actual	FY 2005 Cost requested	FY 2006 estimated
Baghdad			
Personnel (DS special agents)	\$ 7,868	\$8,555	\$9,000
Travel (Survey teams)	550	1,805	1,890
Contract Security Specialists (500+ individuals in protective details and other security support includes weapons and living costs)	74,970	206,190	224,001
Other Protective Personnel (04 surveillance detection and in 05 & 06 about 1000 TCN guards and living costs.)	32	80,400	173,650
Equipment (armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition)	23,427	28,537	19,645
Physical Security (metal and bomb detectors, x-ray equipment)	3,301	1,869	300
Technical Security (communications and technical security upgrades)		3,018	225
Information and Other Support (radios, equipment and in 05 information security contractors)	1,010	5,748	2,570
Human Intelligence (investigations)	779	1,861	1,353
Training (Iraq-specific)	553	2,335	2,450
Amman support (05 & 06 1 ARSO and local guards)		469	495
Kuwait Support (05 & 06 1 ARSO, 1 FSN investigator surveillance detection and local guards)		930	970
Baghdad Subtotal	112,490	341,717	436,549
Regional Offices/embedded teams (Physical security details and interim Physical security upgrades)	54,629	236,675	248,987
Armored Vehicles - Hi threat Posts (150 for 05)		15,000	
Total D&CP Appropriation	167,119	593,392	685,536
ATA (Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs Appropriation) (Iraqi VIP protection and training)	26,400		10,000
Total	\$ 193,519	\$ 593,392	\$ 695,536

Source: DS

PHYSICAL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS TO INTERIM FACILITIES

In Baghdad, U.S. mission facilities were previously used by the CPA and include the chancery, embassy annex, and COM residence. In addition, REOs have been established in Basrah, Al-Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul⁶ on sites inherited from CPA. These are all interim facilities that DS and OBO officials say do not meet security standards and are not structurally sufficient for long-term operations.

The current embassy annex is the former Republican Palace and does not meet minimum safety and security requirements for a diplomatic facility. Other facilities throughout Iraq are similarly insufficient for long-term operations. The Department has made field-expedient modifications to shore-up the physical security of these facilities. Ultimately, and depending on when funding will be available, new facilities will be necessary. The property agreement with the Iraqi government regarding the planned NEC calls for the return of all interim facilities, including those of the REOs, within 24 months of the Department receiving funds for NEC construction.

The REO in Al Hillah is a stand-alone facility in a former hotel on a river. REO Kirkuk is a stand-alone building in a relatively secure neighborhood that is about a 20-minute drive to the nearest airbase. REO Mosul is collocated with a Striker Brigade on a U.S. Army forward operating base. REO Basra shares its location with a company-size, mechanized, infantry unit of the British Army. Some of the key security measures in place are summarized in Table 6.

OBO funded improvements using the \$81.5 million in the ESCM account for FY 2004 and FY 2005. Approximately \$26 million of this sum is earmarked for planning an NEC in Baghdad. OBO officials intend to use these funds for preconstruction support services. In the FY 2005 supplemental appropriation, the Administration requested \$658 million for the construction of an NEC.

⁶There are also Department embedded teams in Tikrit, Ramadi, Karbala, Najaf, and Baqubah.

Table 6: Key Security Measures at Embassy Baghdad Facilities

Security Measures	Embassy	Embassy Annex	Al-Hillah	Basrah	Kirkuk	Mosul
360 degree antiram and anti-imb perimeter wall	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vehicular/pedestrian perimeter Compound Access Controls	Yes	Yes	Partial	Partial ⁷	Partial	Partial
Public Access Controls at all entrances to office building ⁸	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
FE/BR ⁹ doors and windows	Partial	Partial	No ¹⁰	No ¹¹	No	No
CCTV/Emergency Notification System ¹²	Yes/Yes	Yes/Yes	No/Yes	No/Yes	No/Yes	No/Yes

OBO, DS, and the Bureau of Information Resource Management plan to fund additional improvements to the interim facilities. OBO plans to spend \$3.3 million as follows:

- \$1.8 million to install a classified communications center,
- \$1.2 million to repair the fire alarm systems in the interim embassy annex, and
- \$300,000 to reimburse the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for security equipment and construction of generator shelters at the interim chancery.

DS plans to spend an additional \$10 million for additional field-expedient improvements at the REOs. The improvements, which were scheduled for installation beginning in May 2005, include:

- Installing improved compound-access and/or personnel-access control facilities at each REO site,
- Protecting fuel tanks and generators,
- Moving fuel tanks underground, and
- Installing additional bunkers to provide protection from rocket and mortar attacks.

⁷ At both Basrah and Mosul, Delta barriers had been delivered but were not yet installed because U.S. and U.K. Striker and Warrior fighting vehicles must be able to enter the compound. Currently, heavy vehicles are being used as a field expedient to provide antiram capability at compound entrances in Basrah. New compound access controls that can accommodate the fighting vehicles are planned in Phase II field-expedient upgrades.

⁸ Includes hardline and Marine security guard Post One

⁹ Forced entry/ballistic resistant

¹⁰ In-filled windows at Tactical Operations Center

¹¹ Shatter-resistant window film on trailer windows

¹² Closed-circuit television and Selectone warning system

OVERHEAD COVER FOR INTERIM HOUSING

The threat of overhead mortar attack to mission residences in the International Zone is a serious concern. Trailers constructed of sheet metal and wood paneling generally provide embassy housing. The Department of Defense installed some of these trailers during the CPA's administration, and OBO purchased an additional 75 trailers. To mitigate the damage of a mortar attack, piles of sandbags were placed adjacent to the trailers, and bunkers were built near the housing area for refuge.

DS explored its options regarding the trailers, in consultation with OBO, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other organizations having the technical expertise to address the threat posed by indirect fire from mortars and rockets. The Army Corps of Engineers studied overhead-cover options on behalf of DS and presented two construction options, detailed cost estimates, and construction timelines. These construction options can provide limited protection from indirect fire. However, there are long construction timelines and high costs associated with each overhead-cover option, and no decision has yet been made regarding the REOs. Long-term, the obvious solution in Baghdad is an NEC.

DS presented a comprehensive briefing to the embassy on the indirect-fire threat and overhead-cover options on March 25, 2005, and DS briefed the Acting Under Secretary for Management on April 13, 2005. DS, in conjunction with NEA, is also providing additional briefings to senior Department leadership on these matters.

In March 2005, DS and OBO were drafting a decision memorandum to the Acting Under Secretary for Management, proposing two viable options. OBO and DS officials agreed to inform OIG of the Department's decision on a solution.

There are drawbacks to correcting the situation, however. For example, the trailers are close together, and some must first be removed to create the room for workers to harden the others. This will displace some residents.

SECURING PERSONNEL WHEN IN TRANSIT

The threat environment in Iraq necessitates an unprecedented level of protection of personnel traveling to and from the International Zone. Protective Security Details (PSD) are equipped with several fully-armored vehicles, armed protective personnel, and trained drivers. Convoy configurations vary, depending on the individual being protected, the threat environment, and the availability of personnel and vehicles.

Prior to its experience in Iraq, DS relied on a contract with DynCorp to gain protective services for certain high-level U.S. officials and designated foreign officials at certain posts.

The Department also obtains protective services in Baghdad through a contract with Blackwater Security Consultants. To protect REO Hillah and the Department's embedded teams in Najaf and Karbala, CPA initially used blanket purchase agreements with the firms Blackwater and Triple Canopy.

The actual budgetary requirements for protective services in Iraq are uncertain. DS requested \$357.8 million for PSDs for FY 2005, including \$151.7 million for the regional offices, and that total is projected to increase to \$386.5 million in FY 2006. DS program and budget officials estimate the protective services contracts will cost about \$420.8 million in FY 2005. Thus, the FY 2005 requirements for supporting all mission protective details are under funded by \$63 million. The Department may need to request additional funding to maintain current operational levels.

All personnel under COM authority must travel in armed convoys. Sometimes, U.S. military vehicles accompany the PSDs. Roughly, 25 to 50 PSDs occur each day. In the first six months of embassy operations the protective program conducted over 3,750 missions. The PSDs have over 1,100 protective personnel, and no one protected by a PSD has been killed, although several PSD personnel have been killed. In addition, one mission official was assassinated while driving alone in an unarmored vehicle in the Red Zone, and two other employees were killed by a rocket fired into the embassy annex. Both incidents were the subject of Accountability Review Board reviews.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

The Department inherited a confusing mix of protective services from the CPA, which had acted quickly to obtain protective services. DS has rationalized the contracting process through use of an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract for worldwide personnel protective services (WPPS). Under this competitive solicitation, DS plans, by March 2006, to bring under the WPPS contract all work performed under current contracts and under blanket purchase agreements. Three companies will be selected, and work will be assigned for Iraq and other countries using task orders.

The WPPS should result in more efficient operations and increase the number of skilled protective personnel. Under current competitive contracts, the annual cost for one protective employee is about \$400,000, including pay of \$150,000 to \$200,000. The cost does not include weapons and armored vehicles, which are provided by the Department. Under noncompeted blanket purchase agreements, the total cost per year can be as high as \$790,000. In addition to savings, WPPS will require all protective personnel to meet minimal training requirements and will establish an acceptable level of competence.

Table 7: Contractors Providing Personal Security Details

Contractor	Total PSD Personnel	Embassy Baghdad	Regional Embassy Offices	Department Embedded Team	Treasury Attaché	INL Police Trainers	Other locations in Iraq ¹³
		Cost responsibility: DS, PCO, ¹⁴ and other gov't Agencies	Cost responsibility: DS, PCO, and USAID	Cost responsibility: DS and PCO	Cost responsibility: Treasury	Cost responsibility: INL	Cost responsibility: DS and USAID
Blackwater	390	324	16	22			28
DynCorp	157	121	16 ¹⁵			95 ¹⁶	20
Controlled Risks Group	12-16				12		
MVM	12-16	12-16					
Triple Canopy	130		81	49			
Aegis Security ¹⁷	403	197	94	112			
Total	1,104	654	207	183	12		48

¹³ Blackwater in Sulimaniyah and DynCorp (for USAID) in Irbil

¹⁴ The Project Contracting Office has a separate contract with Aegis Security.

¹⁵with USAID

¹⁶ DynCorp PSDs funded by INL are not included in the 157 PSDs shown at left as the total for Baghdad and REOs.

¹⁷Includes PSDs at Camp Victory

DS faces a difficult challenge in overseeing this expansive and expanding global program. In Washington the DS Office of Overseas Protective Operations has insufficient staff to oversee the contracts and review contractor invoices, although DS management has approved three additional Civil Service program analyst positions and four contract support positions. OIG supports the additional personnel as a means of ensuring that expenditures are kept in check. Recently, a DS contract specialist questioned unsupported or improperly charged costs submitted during a four-month period by DynCorp. As a result, the contractor resubmitted 18 invoices at a reduced cost of over \$470,000, a clear indication that more robust oversight is warranted.

In Iraq, the RSO manages a protective program that includes over 1,100 PSD personnel countrywide. This daunting responsibility is assigned to two ARSOs in Baghdad. DS is considering ways to assist the mission in ensuring that protective services are consistently provided in a highly professional manner and in accordance with the contract. One viable option under consideration is to establish a roving team of supervisors with expertise in protection to assist the RSO in managing the extensive program.

The mission's Protective Security Policy requires that all travel outside the International Zone by personnel under COM authority must involve at least:

- Three fully armored vehicles, and
- Eight armed, protective-security specialists or their equivalents, such as military personnel or law enforcement agents.

All personnel must also wear the body armor they are issued. Helmets must be carried and worn when required by the situation. Travel is generally not permitted during darkness. To request a security escort, mission personnel must submit the required form to the regional security office at least two days prior to traveling.

The principal PSD convoys for the mission are operated by DS-funded contracts with DynCorp and Blackwater and operate under the direct control of the RSO. By all accounts these convoys adhere strictly to COM guidelines, and employees are aware of the requirements.

There are other PSD operations in Baghdad that are not under the embassy RSO's control, and it is unclear whether these operations are carried out in accordance with COM guidelines. The Project Contracting Office (PCO) and police trainers who work for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) have separate contracts that are not funded by DS. For instance, PCO has a contract with Aegis Security for static guard coverage and protective missions for

PCO personnel. Under the joint security MOA dated June 23, 2004, the PCO is under COM security responsibility. The embassy's INL section, meanwhile, has a separate contract with DynCorp to protect its police trainers and other personnel when traveling in the Red Zone. These INL contract personnel support the Iraqi police-training program under the direction of CENTCOM, but are not expressly addressed in the joint security MOA. According to the acting director of the INL office at the embassy, the INL personnel are not under COM authority, but their PSD convoys do adhere to mission policy and follow the requirements without significant differences.

OIG could not assess this matter first hand and thus is not making a formal recommendation. However, OIG believes all parties should consider clarifying their rules of engagement and lines of authority.

ARMORED VEHICLES

The Department has a variety of heavily armored vehicles for protective convoys. In FY 2004, DS spent \$14.2 million to procure 160¹⁸ vehicles for use in Iraq. There are 151 vehicles in Iraq, and more than \$15 million¹⁹ was allocated in FY 2005 to buy additional vehicles.

The Department's armored vehicles must meet Overseas Security Policy Board standards. These vehicles are rated, based on their levels of ballistic resistance, on a scale ranging from Category A through E, the latter representing the most heavily armored type (12 FAH-6 H-522.6).

Table 8: DS Armored Vehicles in Iraq, FY 2004 Funding

Armor Level	Vehicle Type	Number
Level C	Excursion	8
Level C	Chevrolet Suburban	42
Level C	Express Vans	12
Level C	Follow Cars/Chevrolet Suburban	20
Level D	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)	4
Level D	Chevrolet Suburban	25 ²⁰
Level C	Toyota Land Cruiser	40 ²¹
TOTAL		151

Besides the DS vehicles, Embassy Baghdad has over 300 CPA vehicles that do not meet Overseas Security Policy Board standards for armoring. Many of the armored vehicles were poorly constructed, with gaps and design flaws in the armor. Some are inoperable, although others continue to be used.

¹⁸ Of the 160, eight still are waiting shipment, one was returned after being attacked with an improvised explosive device, and 8 were declared missing.

¹⁹ A full \$10 million has been allocated for Baghdad and \$5 million for the four REOs and five Department embedded teams. Over \$14.2 million was spent in FY 2004.

²⁰ One was returned to the Department after being attacked with explosives.

²¹ Eight were lost during shipment to post.

FIGHTING PLATFORMS

The extraordinary threat to personnel in Iraq has caused the Department to significantly enhance the PSDs' response capabilities. For instance, the embassy RSO wants to acquire a gun-truck with a roof-mounted weapon.

Initially, the mission believed the MOA of June 10, 2004, meant that the U.S. military would accompany mission convoys with military fighting vehicles, such as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). (The MOA, signed by the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, addresses the responsibilities regarding physical security, equipment, and personal protective services.) In fact, military support is available only to augment about eight to ten PSDs each day, primarily those going to and from Baghdad International Airport.

DS was not able to obtain the 50 HMMWVs it requested but anticipates receiving 12 by September 2005. As an alternative, DS has ordered ten Lenco Bearcats, which have gun platforms and should be available by June 2005. DS officials prefer the Bearcat over the HMMWV because they believe the latter was designed as a light truck, loses speed when armored, and is prone to maintenance problems. The Bearcat also has better armor, Class E; its engine compartment is armored, and antimine armor protects it somewhat from road-implanted explosives. Another concern about the HMMWV is that its ventilation is impeded by its added armor, a problem in Iraq's intense heat. Therefore, the factory armored HMMWVs must also be retrofitted so that its air conditioners are on its top, making them vulnerable to damage.

Compared to the HMMWV, the Bearcat is also more spacious. It can carry ten people, and its cabin is also long enough to handle wounded personnel. The Marine Corps and Air Force use the Bearcat for domestic security missions.

The Bearcat is a more expensive vehicle, however, costing \$205,742 each, compared to the \$169,428 cost of a HMMWV. In addition, embassy security personnel prefer the HMMWV, which is widely used by the U.S. military. If current delivery schedules hold, Embassy Baghdad will have 12 HMMWVs and ten Bearcats by the October 1, 2005.

The armored vehicles need frequent maintenance, which is done under contract by the company Kellogg Brown and Root. DS personnel who recently inspected the operation were pleased with the quality of this work.

The challenge for DS is to work with the mission to develop a manageable risk level for using armored vehicles, one that recognizes the protection required in Iraq. Vehicles need to allow PSDs to shoot at attackers and must be sufficiently armored to counter landmines. The number of vehicles needed in the long run must be planned, so that delivery orders can be placed and funded.

EMBASSY GUARD PROGRAM

The mission’s guard program is large and expensive. DS expects to need about \$80 million to fund the guard program through the remainder of FY 2005 and about \$174 million for FY 2006. This includes the living expenses of the approximately 900 guards (as of February 2005) in Baghdad. Guards at the REOs are included in the protective service contracts for those sites.

Table 9: Fixed-Position Guard Contractors

Contractors	Fixed-position guards	Embassy Baghdad facilities ²²	Interim Iraqi government sites in Baghdad	Regional embassy offices	Department embedded teams	Other locations ²³
		Cost Responsibility: DS and PCO	Cost Responsibility: DFI ²⁴	Cost Responsibility: DS, PCO, and USAID	Cost Responsibility: PCO	
Blackwater	112			112		
DynCorp	38	38 ²⁵				
Aegis Security	166	133		17	3	13
Triple Canopy	155			155		
Global Risk Strategies	1114	692	422			
Total	1585	863	422	284	3	13

The CPA originally awarded a one-year guard contract to Global Risk and continued to fund it through a six-month extension that was scheduled to expire on April 30, 2005. At the Department’s request, the CPA awarded an additional six-month extension through October 31, 2005, allowing DS time to complete the competition and award of a new contract.

²² Embassy Baghdad facilities include the chancery and embassy annex, the convention center, Al Rasheed hotel, and USAID Baghdad. The guard costs of the embassy annex, convention center, and Al Rasheed Hotel are shared on a 60-40 basis between the Department and the Department of Defense. USAID pays all of the guard costs. USAID facilities are located on the chancery compound.

²³ Diwaniyah

²⁴ Development Fund for Iraq - primarily oil revenues and funds seized from the former Iraqi government.

²⁵ For DynCorp’s employee camp, which also houses the PSD guards from Blackwater

DS expects that about 1,300 guards will be needed to secure embassy facilities in Baghdad as the U.S. military withdraws its support for the embassy and construction begins on an NEC. (In addition to the construction site, a camp for 2,400 local laborers will also need protection). OBO will pay for the additional guards for the NEC, using the same contractor used for the embassy compound.

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION

Embassy Baghdad plans to establish a surveillance detection (SD) program by September 30, 2005. An SD program, such as those at most U.S. missions worldwide, to detects and reports on surveillance and interrupts terrorist operations targeting mission facilities and personnel. (The guard program will also have some SD capabilities.) Embassy Baghdad is currently identifying requirements for the SD program's personnel, training, equipment, and materials. The embassy will initially establish and design a test program at one of the REOs to determine the feasibility of using Iraqi nationals for SD operations. A program involving 40 SD employees and related expenses is project to cost \$450,000 in FY 2005 and \$650,000 in FY 2006. Cost could be significantly higher were the program incorporated at all posts in Iraq.

Due to the security concerns of hiring and vetting Iraqis for such jobs as guards and SD personnel, local hires probably will initially serve as screeners and interpreters. Those positions, not designated for either Iraqi or American citizens, will be designated as third-country national positions. Those filling such a position first must obtain a favorable Moderate Risk Public Trust determination from the Department. DS may accomplish its hiring objective by recruiting from English-speaking countries where public records can be used to verify guard applications.

GUARD CAMPS

Embassy Baghdad is unique in that all guard personnel reside within the International Zone, and the embassy must provide them with housing, water and sewage, dining facilities, and recreation. Current plans are to expand and relocate the existing camp, which is on the NEC site. (A new camp will be needed to house the NEC construction workers.)

Originally the camp was built to house about 400 guards, but there are now about 800 guards located there, and living conditions are very crowded. Because

the guard camp is on land designated for use as the NEC, the camp will have to be moved. Some limited security improvements have been made to the camp, including the placement of barrier walls and sandbags.

Another concern is that the current guard site includes one of the dining facilities used by the mission community; if it closes, it must be replaced. DS officials say they have funds to buy additional trailers for the guards but also need to plan for up to 500 additional guards. Thus, finding the money to pay for the new camp is an issue. In the meantime, life for the guard force is more difficult than for other members of the mission community, and the guards' morale may become a problem.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARSO	Assistant regional security officer
CENTCOM	Central Command
COM	Chief of mission
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DSAC-I	Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course-Iraq
D&CP	Diplomatic and Counselor Programs
ESCM	Embassy Security Construction and Maintenance
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
MOA	Memorandum of agreement
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NEC	New embassy compound
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PCO	Project contracting office
PSD	Protective security detail
REO	Regional embassy office
RSO	Regional security officer
SD	Surveillance detection
TCN	Third-country national
USAID	U. S. Agency for International Development
WPPS	Worldwide personnel protective services

APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of the Inspector General

IRAQ QUESTIONNAIRE – PERSONAL SAFETY

Security of mission personnel is everyone's most critical concern. The Office of Inspector General (OIG), Iraq Coordination Office, is currently conducting a personal safety survey of personnel assigned to or recently returned from Mission Iraq under Chief of Mission authority. While the mission has worked tirelessly to ensure optimal security under the most difficult circumstances, OIG wishes to solicit the personal views of mission personnel on this critical subject. Specifically, the objectives of this survey are to: (1) obtain the views of personnel about conditions on the ground; and (2) use your informed views in developing OIG's work plan for Iraq. OIG is also reviewing the status of security programs for Iraq with the cognizant program offices in Washington. This survey is intended as an evaluation tool. OIG will not issue any recommendations based solely on the responses to this questionnaire.

When completed, this questionnaire will be considered SBU. Please ensure that your responses do not include any national security classified information. The summary results will be provided to various interested parties.

This questionnaire should only take about 15 minutes to complete. Please do so by clicking the desired choice or typing any response when required. After completing it, please return the questionnaire electronically to OIG by clicking "SUBMIT" on the last page. Space has been provided at the end of the questionnaire for any additional comments you might want to make.

If you have any questions, please call Mr. James Martino, Senior Security Inspector, at (703) 284-1897 or email Martinoj@State.Gov.

Please provide the requested identifying information. You may wish to reply anonymously. However, this information will only be used for possible follow-up questions. Be assured, all information provided is encrypted by technology approved by the National Security Agency.

1. Name: _____
2. Title: _____
3. Agency/Organization/Office: _____
4. Telephone Number: _____
5. E-mail Address: _____
6. Primary Workplace (while stationed in Iraq if tour completed) _____
7. Date arrived at Post (MM/DD/YY)
8. Date scheduled to leave Post (date returned if tour completed) (MM/DD/YY)
9. Before arriving in Iraq, did you attend the Diplomatic Security Anti-terrorism Course (DSAC) training?
 1. [64%] Yes
 2. [36%] No ----- > GO TO QUESTION 7.
10. To what extent, if at all, has (did) the DSAC training prepared you for the actual situations in Iraq?
 1. [3%] Little or no extent
 2. [23%] Some extent
 3. [34%] Moderate extent
 4. [33%] Great extent
 5. [6%] Very great extent
11. What changes to the DSAC training, if any, would you suggest in view of your actual experiences in Iraq?

53% provided suggestions.
12. Did you attend a briefing conducted by the Regional Security Officer (RSO)?
 1. [53%] Yes ----- > GO TO QUESTION 13.
 2. [47%] No (*Please explain.*) > GO TO QUESTION 14.
13. About how many days after your arrival did you attend the RSO's briefing?

Number of days _____
14. Were you issued your own protective gear?
 1. [93%] Yes

2. [7%] No ----- > GO TO QUESTION 17.

15. What is the frequency with which you wear/wore your protective gear?

1. [12%] All or almost all the time
2. [15%] More than half but not all of the time
3. [8%] About half of the time
4. [46%] Some but less than half of the time
5. [19%] None or hardly any of the time

16. Do (did) you wear your protective gear ... (Check all that apply.)

1. [82%] while traveling to or from the International Zone and another area?
2. [41%] while walking around the International Zone?
3. [19%] while walking around the Embassy Compound?
4. [26%] while riding the shuttle bus (aka "the happy bus") around the International Zone?
5. [45%] while driving around the International Zone?
6. [12%] while in your residence?
7. [6%] while working in the Palace/Annex?
8. [43%] at other times? (Please specify.) _____

17. Besides traveling to and from the airport, do you ever travel outside the International Zone?

1. [75%] Yes
2. [25%] No ----- > GO TO QUESTION 21.

18. On average, about how many times per month do (did) you travel outside the International Zone?

Responses ranged from "less than once a month" to "daily."

19. When you travel outside the International Zone, is it for ... (Check all that apply.)

1. [100%] official business?
2. [16%] personal business?
3. [8%] other reasons? (Please specify.)

20. When traveling outside the International Zone, do (did) you travel ... (Check all that apply.)

1. [86%] with armed guards and in a convoy (several armored vehicles)?
2. [33%] with armed guards and one armored vehicle?
3. [15%] alone in a soft vehicle (non-armored)?
4. [3%] alone in a taxi?
5. [23%] with fellow Americans without armed guards?
6. [21%] with locals as guide?
7. [32%] by other means? (Please specify.)

21. How safe or unsafe do (did) you feel ... (Check one box in each row; choose not applicable only if you have never experienced one of the choices; e.g., never traveled in an armed convoy.)

	Very safe	Generally safe	As safe as not or undecided	Generally unsafe	Very unsafe	Not applicable
1. at your residence?	14%	46%	16%	19%	6%	
2. at your workplace?	20%	51%	13%	13%	2%	
3. while traveling between the International Zone and another area?	1%	26%	18%	34%	21%	
4. while walking around the International Zone?	9%	47%	29%	14%	1%	
5. while walking around the embassy compound?	20%	55%	18%	7%	0%	
6. in an armed convoy?	5%	32%	25%	29%	9%	
7. when with military or civilian security personnel?	8%	38%	25%	23%	6%	
8. in the bunkers?	23%	47%	22%	5%	3%	
9. wearing protective gear?	3%	33%	44%	15%	5%	

22. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate is security personnel at... (Check one box in each row.)

	More than adequate	Generally adequate	Of marginal or borderline adequacy	Inadequate	Very inadequate	Don't know/no basis to judge
1. ensuring badge photo matches individual	28%	44%	16%	4%	8%	
2. controlling access to restricted areas	33%	47%	11%	5%	3%	
3. searching bags	22%	37%	26%	7%	9%	
4. screening for unauthorized weapons	20%	38%	23%	12%	8%	
5. checking vehicles	22%	48%	17%	7%	6%	

23. What type of residential housing are (did) you occupying (occupy)? (Check one.)

1. [4%] Tent
2. [54%] Trailer
3. [5%] Palace/Annex building
4. [37%] Other (*Please specify.*)

24. What additional physical protection, if any, would you recommend for the housing you occupy?

81% provided comments.

25. Where is (was) your primary workplace? (*Check one.*)

1. [53%] Palace/Annex
2. [10%] Other State Department offices in the International Zone
3. [37%] Other, including a regional office (*Please specify.*)

26. What additional physical protection, if any, would you recommend for your primary workplace?

68% provided comments.

27. In your experience, where in the Palace/Annex compound is the emergency notification system audible? (*Check one.*)

1. [28%] All or almost all the locations
2. [26%] More than half but not all of the locations
3. [13%] About half of the locations
4. [15%] Some but less than half of the locations
5. [17%] None or hardly any of then locations

28. When the emergency notification system is activated and audible, do (did) you know the prescribed action to take? (*Check one.*)

1. [51%] All or almost all the time
2. [20%] More than half but not all of the time
3. [10%] About half of the time
4. [7%] Some but less than half of the time
5. [12%] None or hardly any of the time

29. After an incident within the Palace/Annex or another part of the International Zone, do (did) you receive timely security information from the mission? (*Check one.*)

1. [21%] All or almost all the time
2. [21%] More than half but not all of the time
3. [10%] About half of the time

- 4. [23%] Some but less than half of the time
- 5. [26%] None or hardly any of the time

30. Are (were) you informed about changes in the mission's security policies and procedures in a timely manner? (Check one.)

- 1. [44%] All or almost all the time
- 2. [27%] More than half but not all of the time
- 3. [7%] About half of the time
- 4. [10%] Some but less than half of the time
- 5. [13%] None or hardly any of the time

31. Are (were) you an employee of ... (Check one.)

- 1. [72%] the Department of State?
- 2. [16%] another federal agency?
- 3. [6%] a 3161 contractor (hired specifically to work in Iraq)?
- 4. [6%] any other contractor?
- 5. [1%] any other non-federal entity? (Please specify.)

32. Why did you accept an assignment in Iraq? (Check all that apply.)

- 1. [72%] Desire to help establish democracy in Iraq
- 2. [43%] Adventure
- 3. [38%] Career development/promotion
- 4. [29%] Financial inducements
- 5. [37%] Other (Please specify.)

33. Prior to arriving in Iraq, how prepared or unprepared were you for the living conditions in a war zone with respect to ... (Check one box in each row.)

	Very prepared	Generally prepared	Undecided	Generally unprepared	Very unprepared
1. lack of privacy?	37%	51%	4%	7%	2%
2. crowded working and living conditions?	39%	47%	5%	6%	3%
3. threat of death and serious injury?	29%	53%	8%	7%	3%
4. limited off-duty diversions?	32%	52%	5%	8%	3%
5. limited availability of products and services items?	39%	45%	5%	9%	2%

34. Have you been (were you) affected by any of the factors listed in the previous question?

1. [44%] Yes *(Please explain.)*
 2. [56%] No
35. In your opinion, what could be done to improve security? Additionally, please use the space below to continue or elaborate on any answer or to provide any additional information that you think is important or pertinent. *(Please explain.)*

76% provided comments.

FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE, OR MISMANAGEMENT
of Federal programs
and resources hurts everyone.

Call the Office of Inspector General
HOTLINE
202-647-3320
or 1-800-409-9926
or e-mail oighotline@state.gov
to report illegal or wasteful activities.

You may also write to
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of State
Post Office Box 9778
Arlington, VA 22219
Please visit our Web site at:
<http://oig.state.gov>

Cables to the Inspector General
should be slugged "OIG Channel"
to ensure confidentiality.