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United States Department of State  
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors  
Office of Inspector General

# Report of Inspection

Embassy Amman,  
Hashemite  
Kingdom of Jordan

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## KEY JUDGMENTS

- The chargé d'affaires has been highly effective in guiding the mission through a complex period of increased visibility for Jordan resulting from Iraq reconstruction activities and growing security concerns. He has been particularly impressive in responding to the heavy official visitor workload.
- Support for Embassy Baghdad operations has taxed the mission heavily in the past year, including more than 70 Congressional delegation visits primarily associated with Iraq issues; off-site administrative support for Embassy Baghdad and training Embassy Baghdad personnel; and establishment of the Iraq Support Unit (ISU) in Amman.
- Embassy Amman is experiencing rapid growth. Although some agencies operating in the chancery are generously housed, other sections are seriously over-crowded. All decisions on staffing increases should be taken cautiously and only after a thorough examination of current space allocation and its possible realignment.
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- The American Embassy Community Services Association (AECSA) is in turmoil. Foreign Affairs Manual guidelines are not being met, significant management control deficiencies exist, and association members are disgruntled. Additional oversight is needed.
- Embassy Amman's consular section provides high quality consular services for both Jordan and Iraq in spite of challenging circumstances.



## CONTEXT

Jordan, a small Arab state surrounded by Israel, the occupied West Bank, Syria,



Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, is at the heart of the Arab world and the center of the Middle East, an area commonly considered by world leaders as the most troublesome and potentially volatile on earth. Jordan is mainly desert (75 percent), with its only outlet to the sea at Aqaba on the Red Sea. The population of 5.4 million, mostly in the Amman metropolitan area and two smaller cities, is predominantly Muslim. With a birth rate of 2.8 percent, arid Jordan's population will double by 2027, putting strains on scarce water resources.

Jordan suffered greatly from the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq that were imposed after the Gulf War, mostly from lost trade revenues. Iraq had been Jordan's principal market for its products, and virtually all goods shipped to Iraq traversed Jordan. Jordan's economy is in transition toward reform. In June 2004, it graduated from an International Monetary Fund supervised economic reconstruction program. This program helped to reduce inflation, the external debt, and budget deficits but was unpopular at the grassroots as life became tougher for the poor. Jordan's annual gross domestic product is over \$10 billion, of which about one quarter is based on foreign remittances. Unemployment at 13 to 15 percent is the most serious economic problem.

Seen as an island of political stability and economic opportunity, Jordan attracts U.S. trade and investment, notably in transport, telecommunication services, wheat, motor vehicles, health care, mining, drugs, information technology, and textiles. A number of developments encouraged a nearly four-fold growth of two-way trade between 1999 and 2003: Jordan's membership in the World Trade Organization;

privatization of some state enterprises; and ratification of the Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Investors have shown particular interest in Jordan's Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), industrial parks that can export products to the United States duty-free if 35 percent of the product comes from the QIZs, Israel, and/or the West Bank/Gaza.

The government of Jordan, long a vital part of ensuring the success of the U. S. government's efforts to promote peace and security in the Middle East, assumed a new role with the start of Iraq reconstruction. The U.S. mission has been successful in solidifying Jordanian diplomatic and logistical support for coalition efforts in Iraq. This includes the use of Jordanian facilities for large-scale Iraqi police and military training programs as well as Jordanian participation in coalition activities in Iraq. This new workload has had two significant impacts on the mission - an enormous increase in temporary duty (TDY) visitors to or through Jordan en route to Baghdad, and a demand for significant numbers of new employees and contractors who are based in Jordan as part of off-site Iraq support operations. Both the transit of official TDY visitors and the addition of these new Jordan-based Iraq support positions have taken place against the backdrop of serious, ongoing security threats to U.S. government operations in Jordan. The majority of Jordan's population opposes U.S. government policy on Iraq and high levels of anti-American sentiment present a challenge to the post's public diplomacy efforts. OIG has prepared separate reports on security and off-site support for Iraq.

The mission is staffed by 162 direct hire American positions, of which 103 are Department employees. There are 334 Foreign Service national (FSN) and locally employed personal services agreement staff. These employees, along with U.S. local hire staff, personal services contractors, and third country nationals, bring the total staff to 562. The mission includes USAID, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Military Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Commercial Service, Foreign Agricultural Service, Legal Attaché Office, Defense Attaché Office (DAO), Peace Corps, and Voice of America. ISU Amman, which reports to Embassy Baghdad, but receives a number of services from Embassy Amman, consists of four direct-hire U.S. positions, three of which are encumbered, along with 27 locally employed staff, 23 of which are encumbered.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The ISU totals are included in the overall numbers for Embassy Amman.

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

Embassy Amman is led by a chargé d'affaires who has inspired a high level of dedication and enthusiasm in mission staff members. Both senior staff members and entry-level officers report that he is always available for consultation and that his personal work habits and his diligence are truly impressive. He is using his skills ably to guide the mission during this complex period of Iraq reconstruction and the off-site support needs that come with it. In the past year, the mission has been tasked with the extensive support needs of thousands of travelers passing through Amman en route to or from Iraq, and a constant stream of VIP visitors who use Amman as their base for day trips to Baghdad. Washington readers gave the mission high marks for its ability to maintain normal high quality substantive reporting while at the same time providing excellent support to an exceedingly heavy official visitor workload.

OIG observed during the course of this inspection the chargé's strong support for the efforts being made by the regional security officer (RSO) to tighten security practices. The chargé makes good use of the emergency action committee to share threat information and to reiterate to committee members the need to disseminate reports on threats to their staff members, while protecting sensitive information. He warns the community against complacency and understands the high threat posed to the official and unofficial American presence in Jordan.

The chargé has been energetic in ensuring that country team members keep mission elements well informed of policy proposals and emerging issues that have implications for the activities of other sections or agencies. The weekly formal country team meeting is carried out in an open and collegial atmosphere, but perhaps the most effective coordination takes place during the daily ad hoc interactions among country team members and their subordinates. During the course of OIG interviews, senior country team members frequently cited the chargé's requests that draft reports be cleared as widely as appropriate with all elements of the mission.

No significant equal employment opportunity issues were discovered during the course of the inspection. Management operates in general compliance with U.S. government rules and regulations on ensuring equal opportunity, and the chargé sets the right tone for mission managers.

The FY 2006 Mission Performance Plan (MPP) for Embassy Amman identifies and articulates the mission's key goals and objectives, and post management properly focuses on the MPP strategic goal of enhancing regional security - in Iraq and in the Middle East peace process. The MPP is well aligned with bureau and Washington key goals and objectives, but the embassy could have used it more effectively in identifying resource implications. Although the embassy requested (and received) some 19 positions in the MPP, OIG identified areas for which the mission did not request sufficient resources. In addition, when other agencies proposed staffing increases outside of the MPP process, the post had not (understandably) predicted associated resource needs in its MPP submission. OIG recommends later in this report that all agencies at post provide periodic planning and staffing projections, and this information will help assure that post has the opportunity to request sufficient resources to support increases in mission activities.

Post management is highly sensitive to the power of public diplomacy (PD). The chargé's leadership and personal involvement in the mission's PD efforts ensure their quality and priority within the mission. The chargé inspires synergy among mission elements on program development and direction. For example, he was quick to direct that Embassy Amman's public affairs staff provide support to Embassy Baghdad's public affairs programs and staff training. His foresight made possible present and future PD activities in Iraq.

The chargé fully recognizes his responsibility for training entry-level officers. As required, he provides the review statement for each of Embassy Amman's five entry-level generalists. He has been less active in mentoring the mission's entry-level specialists but has recently initiated contacts with this group. The entry-level generalists expressed satisfaction with the chargé's willingness to offer advice and assistance upon request. OIG offered suggestions to the acting deputy chief of mission (ADCM) on ways in which the post could take a more active role in providing entry-level officers with advice on managing their careers and seeking onward assignments that offer them the most promising training and promotion prospects.

## RAMIFICATIONS OF EMBASSY AMMAN'S SUPPORT OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

In addition to supporting official travel to and from Iraq, Embassy Amman hosts a number of long-term off-site support operations for Iraq reconstruction activities. USAID plans to maintain a large portion of its Iraq program operation in Amman for the next four to five years. The Department of Defense is running a large training program in Jordan to meet the needs of the new Iraqi military force. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is working with the government of Jordan to run a facility to train and equip more than 30,000 Iraqi civilian police in the next 12 to 18 months. Embassy Amman's public affairs section (PAS) is providing logistical and other program support for Embassy Baghdad's PD programs. Embassy Amman has trained a range of Embassy Baghdad Foreign Service national (FSN) employees.

Incremental increases in staff at Embassy Amman by other agencies have led to inequities in space allocation. Space within the chancery was originally allocated quite generously, and some sections still feature spacious private offices for both American and Jordanian staff. Other sections are seriously over crowded with some employees working in uncomfortable and possibly unhealthy conditions.

One tool that the mission could use more effectively is the National Security Decision Directive 38<sup>2</sup> (NSDD-38) requirement for Chief of Mission (COM) approval of all other agency proposals for expansion or contraction of their presence in Jordan. A more aggressive attempt to capture in the NSDD-38 COM approval cable the direct and indirect costs to be imposed on Embassy Amman by proposed expansions would help ensure that the mission's ability to perform its base operations not be undermined.

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<sup>2</sup>National Security Decision Directive 38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Constituent Posts, issued on June 2, 1982, assigns ambassadors the authority and responsibility to determine the appropriate size, composition, and mandate of all staffing operating under their authority.



## POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

### ADVOCACY AND REPORTING

The Washington community told OIG that it was very satisfied with Embassy Amman's analytical and spot reporting from the political and economic sections. It is pleased that this has continued despite the huge burden the mission has shouldered during the past two years in supporting frequent Congressional and other high-level visits to Amman and operational demands related to the U.S. involvement in Iraq. Along with the remainder of the mission, the political and economic sections have been heavily engaged in visitor support. The establishment of ISU Amman and the creation of an Iraq policy coordinator position in the economic section have made the heavy Iraq-related workload more manageable.

The political and economic sections function well, are operationally effective, and maintain a high level of activity despite major staff turnovers during the spring and summer of 2004 and the elevation of the newly arrived political counselor to ADCM, an arrangement expected to last until summer 2005. Although physically separated in the chancery, the two sections maintain a strong collaborative relationship. They also have an excellent relationship with embassy leadership.

Reporting officers have adequate preparation prior to arrival; most have limited Arabic language capability at the 2/2 level. The post admits that its effectiveness would be improved considerably, however, if more officers were trained to the 3/3 level, and a few to the 4/4 level.

Staffing and position grade levels are generally appropriate to the workload. However, with the addition of the Iraq policy coordinator position (FS-02), the post might renew its suggestion to the Department to upgrade the economic counselor slot to the FS-01 level. Limited representational funds seem to be used effectively. Relations with and direction to the generally high quality FSN staff appear to be good despite the physical separation of these employees from the controlled access area. Reporting is generally high quality, well written, insightful

and analytical with good sourcing, and supplied with adequate summaries and excellent post comments to highlight salient points and context for busy Washington consumers. Some recent political and economic reports received kudos from senior Department policymakers. OIG favorably noted that a file of substantive reporting is available in an organized and systematic manner to consumers on the post's classified web site.

## POLITICAL SECTION

Since the political counselor was named ADCM in the summer of 2004, his deputy, a capable officer with strong drafting and Arabic language skills, has headed the section. Four other reporting officers, including a rotational entry-level officer, plus an office management specialist (OMS), and four FSNs (including one to support the regional refugee coordinator and another handling protocol issues), complete the section.

Despite often being short-handed due to staffing gaps and attention to congressional delegations and other senior U.S. government visitors, the political section remains highly productive. It generates a commendable volume of reporting on Jordan's relations with Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and other Arab nations; the country's growing ties with the Iraqi government; and Embassy Amman's views on the Middle East peace process and regional reform projects, such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. Reporting on the attitudes of Jordan's large Palestinian population, nascent internal political reforms, and parliamentary and local political developments finds appreciative Washington readers, as does commentary on the views of the royal family and the cabinet. The post points out that its reporting on Islamic influences in local politics, a key topic, is hampered by the opposition Islamic party's refusal to meet with embassy officers, but the section is working to overcome this impediment by searching out other reliable sources of information. Jordan's support in the global war on terrorism is reflected in thorough reporting on counterterrorism developments. Joint reporting trips with the economic and commercial sections highlighted how far removed from the "western" trappings of Amman are other parts of Jordan. Future political reporting will look at emerging issues, such as Jordan's youth. The political section meets frequently with other sections of the embassy to coordinate reporting. Unclassified biographic reporting is on a shared drive to allow officers and FSNs to update material as new information becomes available. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

The political section participates in an embassy committee to coordinate programs under the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). The section manages a training program based on a grant from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, while the public diplomacy section does the contracting and fund management. The chargé and the political section received high praise from Washington agencies for their role in engineering a quick reversal of Jordanian plans to make a military sale in contravention of U.S. law.

## ECONOMIC SECTION

Led by an able and experienced economic counselor, the section is comprised of five other officers (including a second-tour officer), an OMS, and two FSNs, including one to support the environmental hub officer. Another FSN is being hired to work with the Iraq policy coordinator.

The section's ambitious reporting program supports its efforts to ensure the effective implementation of the 2001 Jordan-U.S. FTA and the BIT. Its messages provide detailed coverage of activities in Jordan's QIZs, which have special export privileges to the United States, and in other low tax and low regulation economic zones. Reporting on Jordan's improving intellectual property environment and developing local sectors such as information technology and telecommunications is strong. OIG also found solid reporting on significant internal economic reforms, Jordan's "graduation" from its International Monetary Fund economic restructuring program, its efforts to provide more aid to Iraq through debt rescheduling and infrastructure support, and government procurement transparency issues.

The economic section helped persuade the Jordanian government to move aggressively on returning to Iraq hundreds of millions of dollars in assets of the former Saddam regime found locally. Washington agencies are impressed by vigorous post efforts to persuade Jordan to strengthen its anti-money laundering and antiterrorist financing legislation, although issues remain. Recently, the section identified an unexpected change in local procedures that would have posed a barrier to U.S. products and been inconsistent with Jordan's trade obligations. Thanks to the section's timely and aggressive intervention, the Jordanian government is undertaking a dialogue with the United States on how best to modify the policy.

To promote better coordination of embassy economic and commercial activities, the economic counselor has instituted frequent meetings with counterparts in the commercial section and USAID, which operates economic development and government reform programs. Occasionally a representative of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) of the Military Assistance Program/ Defense Attaché Office attends this meeting. These sessions help information sharing and promote brainstorming on strategy. The economic and commercial sections work closely with U.S. firms in Jordan as well as with the Jordanian-American Business Association. The RSO is establishing an overseas security advisory council to relay security information to U.S. companies and hotels.

An Iraq policy coordinator position was established in the economic section in 2004 to ease the Iraq-related burden on the political and economic sections and to ensure optimal mission-wide coordination of Iraq activities. The coordinator acts as a "one-stop shop" for Embassy Amman on Iraq developments and serves as a bureaucratic link between Embassies Amman and Baghdad. Although he reports to the economic counselor, he is a member of the country team and works with embassy leadership, section chiefs, and agency heads on the full range of policy issues related to Iraq. He chairs regular embassy-wide Iraq working group meetings, whose attendees include the chargé and relevant section chiefs, to share information on Iraq developments such as upcoming VIP visits, Iraq-related meetings or conferences in Amman, and Iraq reporting projects.

## REGIONAL POSITIONS IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS

The regional refugee coordinator (Refcoord) reports on U.S. assistance of over \$100 million in annual funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza. The Refcoord provides updates on the status of several hundred thousand Iraqis found in refugee-like conditions throughout the region. The Refcoord also monitors several Ambassador Funds projects on behalf of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. These are quick acting \$20,000 grants used when funding is not available from other sources. The Refcoord's position is funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. The coordinator estimates that she will travel outside Amman about 50 percent of the time. She is accredited in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as Jordan.

The regional environmental hub officer covers developments in 16 countries: Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, the Maghreb, and the Gulf states. The hub officer works on regional water management issues related to the Middle East peace process. He spends between one-third and one-half of his time on travel, works on scientific outreach, and also is responsible for environmental aspects of the Jordan-U.S. FTA. The hub officer has discussed with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs the issue of his accreditation to individual posts in his region, believing that the privileges and immunities arising from accreditation could provide him with added diplomatic protection in potentially hostile countries. This request is under study.

The Refcoord and the regional environmental hub officer are located in the mission's political and economic sections, respectively, and are supervised by the section chiefs. Described in the 1997 Embassy Amman inspection report as a "best practice," this management arrangement has continued to function satisfactorily. While the regional officers report to and keep supervisors informed of their activities, receiving guidance as necessary, and clearing substantive cables with the section chiefs, they operate with sufficient flexibility to accommodate their travel schedules outside Jordan. Both officers have good access to embassy leadership; the Refcoord was recently made a member of the country team.

## COMMERCIAL ISSUES

As a result of the FTA and BIT, the QIZs, and other developments, two-way trade is surging to record levels (nearly \$1.2 billion in 2003), and the United States is now Jordan's number one trade partner. Consequently, a senior commercial officer position was established at the embassy in 2001. The acting senior commercial officer reported "seamless" and "terrific" cooperation with economic colleagues, who provide the policy context to support export promotion advocacy by the senior commercial officer on behalf of U.S. firms. There are potentially large U.S. sales in the telecommunications, construction, minerals, and aviation equipment sectors in Jordan. Embassy leadership is also strongly involved in supporting export promotion efforts, as needed. Jordan's commercial importance is getting an added boost as U.S. business considers the country an attractive gateway to future activities in the Iraqi market.

U.S. Department of Agriculture interests in Jordan are handled by an experienced FSN who reports to the economic section, but who is under the administrative control of the agricultural counselor at Embassy Cairo. Key issues include maintaining the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act<sup>3</sup> food commodities assistance program, working to eliminate Jordanian restrictions on U.S. products due to mad cow disease and avian flu, and promoting U.S. agricultural exports.

## COUNTRY TEAM

### U.S. Agency for International Development

Annual funding levels in Jordan increased dramatically, from \$7.2 million in 1996 to \$950 million in 2003, making the country one of the five largest country recipients of USAID funds. The increased aid levels in Jordan, despite declining USAID aid elsewhere, reflect the country's positive contribution to the Middle East peace process, its close ties to the United States, and its position as an island of stability in a turbulent region. USAID programs focus on water conservation and providing economic opportunities. Health, education, democracy, and governance also get high priority. USAID coordinates its work with other sections, e.g., economic opportunities with the economic section; water conservation with the regional environmental hub officer; and human rights and democracy with the political and public affairs sections. USAID signed a participating agency service agreement with the public affairs section to fund speakers, exchanges, training conferences, and other PD programs. These programs addressed Embassy Amman's MPP themes of judicial reform, civic education, democratic leadership, women's issues, and mutual understanding, including interfaith dialogue.

USAID is also conducting major Iraq support operations from temporary quarters within the chancery.

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<sup>3</sup>7 USC 1691 et seq.

## Military Assistance Program/Defense Attaché Office and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

There is a combined Military Assistance Program/Defense Attaché Office at the embassy. Thus, the problem found at some embassies, determining the identity of the ranking Defense Department representative when there are separate MAP and DAO sections, does not occur at this post. U.S. military assistance is sizable in Jordan - just over \$200 million in foreign military financing in 2004 - and is a critical tool in countering terrorism and helping Jordan advance U.S. regional policy objectives. Jordan also hosts large U.S. government organized and funded programs to train Iraqi police and military forces.

The HACC in the Military Assistance Program/Defense Attaché Office section, works with post management and collaborates with embassy sections on promoting trade and investment in Iraq; developing working groups with contractors, foreign embassies, and nongovernmental organizations to share information; and resolving problems, including at the Iraqi-Jordanian border. Through its network of contacts, the HACC uncovered human trafficking rings operating between Jordan and Iraq and obtained local government cooperation in stopping them. The HACC also helps organize business conferences for Iraq reconstruction in Amman. Its coordination with other sections is generally satisfactory.

## Peace Corps

Supported by three Americans, an FSN and 12 personal services contractors, the Peace Corps program has 42 volunteers in Jordan working as English language teachers, special education advisors, and youth and community development workers. The program was suspended between late 2002 and early 2004 because of regional tensions. To preserve the integrity of an independent Peace Corps presence, there is little explicit coordination with U.S. policy programming.

## Foreign Broadcast Information Service

This regionally focused service operates in the chancery with a high degree of autonomy and has good support from the embassy. FBIS routinely briefs the country team on matters of common interest and provides prompt, well-targeted alerts on new developments affecting post goals, including those related to security, Iraq, and the Middle East peace process.

## CONSULAR AFFAIRS

Embassy Amman's consular section is composed of an FS-02 consular chief, an FS-03 American citizens services officer, four entry-level officer slots, a locally hired American OMS, and ten FSNs. All the American positions are language designated in Arabic at the 2/0 level. The American citizens services officer speaks native Arabic, however, and the section chief has a 3/3. While the entry-level officers were limited in the amount of hard language they could receive they all do effective, if limited, visa interviews in Arabic. The section's physical plant has been newly refurbished. It provides good visual control of consular operations, good access control, and sufficient space to handle the current workload and foreseeable increases for some time. Internal controls are generally in place and functioning, with some minor weaknesses, for which OIG offered suggestions and post agreed.

Embassy Amman's consular section provides high quality consular services for both Jordan and Iraq despite challenging circumstances. These include a high threat from international terrorism, strong anti-American sentiment caused by U.S. support for Israel and the Iraq occupation, and the effects of a major consular malfeasance scandal in 2003.

Providing consular support for Iraq creates a unique set of processing and planning problems for Embassy Amman's consular section. Because Embassy Baghdad is beginning to process most nonimmigrant visa (NIV) cases for Iraqis on government-sponsored travel, a larger proportion of Embassy Amman's caseload will probably now be private Iraqi travelers. Given the current situation in Iraq, most Iraqi applicants who are not government sponsored do not qualify for NIVs because they cannot establish their intent to return home after visiting the United States. Embassy Amman must nonetheless process these cases objectively, according to regulations, usually denying them. This is not only a processing burden but also a morale challenge - dealing every day with desperate people who cannot be given what they want most. Processing both immigrant visa (IV) and NIV applications for Iraqis is also complicated by the inability to confirm civil documents issued in Iraq. Passports, as well as marriage, birth, death, and divorce documents are sometimes dubious, yet usually cannot be checked with Iraqi authorities. Iraqi support responsibilities also complicate planning for future workload demands and estimating future resource needs. Changes in the Iraqi security situation directly affect Embassy Amman's consular workload, yet cannot be reliably forecast.

The section has also been dealing with the aftermath of a consular malfeasance case that resulted in two FSNs being fired and the section chief being sent home. This event and the subsequent criminal investigations damaged section morale severely. Over the past year, time and careful management attention have helped the section recover its cohesion and morale.

Having successfully dealt with Iraqi consular support needs and the aftermath of the malfeasance scandal, the section can now turn its energies to resolving other management issues. Although the section is running well overall, challenges remain. The first is to ensure that all elements of the consular section receive regular attention, supervision, and mentoring. This can be accomplished by delegating more routine management responsibilities to first-tour officers and FSNs, to give them experience and to relieve the burden on the section chief. This would enable the section chief to have more regular daily contact with officers and FSNs from all parts of the section, particularly the IV section. This contact could take the form of weekly staff meetings to exchange information and assess staff morale and attitudes. Accompanying officers and FSNs on outside calls, and team building activities within and outside of the office, would also be helpful. Developing and implementing a plan to ensure that the mid-level excursion officer, the untenured officers, and the FSNs have equal access to career enhancing mentoring and training would help raise morale and improve performance.

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Amman should develop and implement a management plan to ensure that all elements of the consular section receive regular attention, supervision, training, and mentoring. (Action: Embassy Amman)

The consular section is dedicating some of its limited resources to control external consular fraud. The section has a designated fraud program manager and one FSN investigator. The FSN has excellent contacts with airport officials, Jordanian police, and the Department of Homeland Security that enable him to help prevent travelers in Amman from boarding flights to the U.S. using fraudulent documents. The fraud program manager does not closely monitor the FSN's activities and views his fraud program manager primary responsibilities as belonging to the NIV section. The FSN provides advice on fraudulent documents for the IV and NIV sections if asked and does some visa field investigations. The ACS section has generally not taken advantage of the antifraud FSN's expertise to investigate passport or birth registration applications. The FSN, while very knowledgeable, does not provide formal antifraud training inside or outside the mission.



## PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

### Staff of Public Affairs Section

The PAS is an energetic team with Middle Eastern expertise. A seasoned public affairs officer manages three generalists. A regional English language officer also is assigned to Amman and supports PAS as one of its clients. All but one PAS officer has strong Arabic language skills. PAS has sixteen FSNs on its staff, and has hired two additional locally employed staff to support Embassy Baghdad PAS programs.

### Good Mission Relations

PAS has good rapport with the front office. PAS participates fully in the development of the MPP and contributes its expertise and program resources to strengthen efforts of other mission elements. Front office leadership and involvement help ensure broad mission support for PAS programs, and PAS closely targets MPP themes and coordinates its PD programs with other Department sections and mission agencies. Department-U.S. Information Agency consolidation has been accomplished smoothly in Amman, and the integration of PD into mission strategies and programs is extensive and productive.

### Program Increases and Multiple Partners Heighten Administrative Load

PAS has a generous public diplomacy budget and receives other funding from the many elements in the Department and other agencies that contribute to PD programs in Jordan and Iraq. PAS deserves great credit for the smooth coordination and synergy it has brought to programs and funding support from a multitude of Washington sources. For instance, the cultural affairs officer coordinates an interagency working group that monitors and provides input into the MEPI, and serves on another committee that directs MEPI's small grants program. PAS also uses USAID funds through a participating agency service agreement for its programs. PAS in turn ensures its International Visitors Program serves the entire mission.

The dramatic increase in PAS exchanges and other programs since the attacks of September 11, 2001, has sorely taxed its American and Jordanian staff. In addition to soaring program numbers, the multiplication of program partners, funding entities, and program types has increased the complexity of the administrative overhead. Worldwide antiterrorism visa safeguards have added to the staff time necessary to carry out exchange programs. PAS is hiring an additional program management clerk to address some of these duties. OIG discussed with PAS the use of the MPP to request additional personnel. OIG also left an informal recommendation supporting implementation by PAS of more uniform procedures for tracking grants.

## Addressing Broader, Younger Audiences

PAS is doing the right things to address Jordan's broader, younger audiences on MPP priority issues. It has retargeted its Arabic book translation program toward wider, younger Jordanian audiences. Its new strategy to distribute "Hi," the Department's monthly Arabic-language youth magazine, takes shrewd advantage of the mission's institutional and other linkages. PAS carries out an active program of cultural presentations and arts education targeting Jordan's youth and is in final negotiations to establish "American Corners" at two Jordanian universities.

Along with the Fulbright and other youth exchanges, PAS works with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs on implementation of its "Partnership for Learning Youth Exchange and Study" program and the "Partnership for Learning for Undergraduate Studies" exchange program for Jordanian high school students. PAS helps to implement the MEPI-funded "Business Internships for Young Middle Eastern Women" and the "Middle East Entrepreneurial Training in the United States" programs.

## Information Section Serves the Mission

PAS has upgraded its daily media reporting to the mission from a sporadically attended oral briefing into a crisp, online report of important news items. PAS submits daily media reaction reports to Washington, as well as insightful and well-written spot analyses of politically significant developments and other media trends.

In the MPP, PAS mentioned the need for more public opinion polling of Jordanian attitudes toward the United States. OIG agrees that more systematic, Jordan-specific polling would help program management. OIG discussed with PAS the use of Embassy Amman's 2007 MPP to request increased program resources for this purpose.

PAS' information resource center is adjusting well to the loss last year of half of its space as a traditional library. It now is taking on a more contemporary role as an outreach facility. It is expanding its use of electronic outreach, actively promoting U.S. web sites, and advancing quickly in its production and distribution of electronic journals, the Washington File, and other Bureau of International Information Programs publications. Despite this redirection, PAS wisely has not abandoned the center as a program venue and has expanded programming to smaller, often media-related groups. These programs underscore the mission's continued interest in hosting Jordanians in the chancery and help PAS identify participants for other programs.

The section's extensive contacts enable PAS to carry the U.S. government's message to audiences from a wide variety of institutional partners dealing with the mission's high priority MPP issues. PAS is incorporating its extensive contacts into its first computerized distribution records system, which will make its contacts more accessible both to PAS staff and the rest of the mission.

## Public Affairs Section Support for Broadcasting

PAS actively supports broadcasting by Radio Sawa, a 24-hour Arabic-language regional network under the direction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. It is now facilitating Radio Sawa's negotiations with the government of Jordan on a new, legally binding agreement to ensure the continued presence of Radio Sawa on Jordanian airwaves. PAS also regularly negotiates access for visiting U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau technicians maintaining Radio Sawa's two transmitting facilities in the country.

## American Language Center Integration a Success

The integration by Embassy Amman of the American language center's direct English-teaching program into the mission's security, personnel, procurement, and fiscal management regime after the USIA-Department consolidation was a major management success. The center primarily serves business people, government professionals, and other prime mission audiences mainly on a tuition basis, but also

through grants and scholarships. The American language center's new facilities have an auditorium for programs addressing audiences beyond its students.

## The Fulbright Program - a True Bi-national Program

The Jordanian-American Commission for Educational Exchange (JACEE), also known as the Bi-national Fulbright Commission in Jordan, is well run and enjoys high prestige. It is truly "bi-national" in spirit and fact. Both countries financially support the Fulbright Program, which has received significant annual funding increases since September 11, 2001, amounting to nearly \$1,600,000 in 2004. The government of Jordan is increasing its support through the establishment of a JACEE endowment fund, which is expected to reach \$12 million by the end of 2004.

The American executive director is dedicated and experienced, and enjoys good relations with PAS, the front office, and other mission elements. He coordinates JACEE programs to avoid overlapping with other mission programs and actively promotes alumni cohesion and integration into his and other mission programs.

## America-Mideast Educational and Testing Services - a Partner in Student Advising, Services, and Programs

The America-Mideast Educational and Testing Services (AMIDEAST) is the sole Department-approved student-advising center in Jordan. AMIDEAST, a foundation headquartered in Washington that strengthens mutual understanding between the United States and the Middle East through cooperation and education exchanges, provides advising, testing, and exchange program support under grants from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

AMIDEAST is a natural partner to PAS and JACEE and helps implement several of their exchange programs. It also hosts U.S. universities for student recruitment sessions and works smoothly with the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service's "Access Eastern Mediterranean" program, which carries out U.S. university catalogue shows.

## Public Affairs Section Amman Support for Public Diplomacy in Iraq

PAS Amman work is critical to public diplomacy efforts in Iraq. PAS Amman hired (with Embassy Baghdad's PD funds) and supervises two Iraqi nationals living in Jordan to support logistically Embassy Baghdad public diplomacy programs, including student and professional exchanges and its "American Corners" program.



## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local-Hire Staff	Foreign National Staff	PSC/TCNs	US PSC	Total Staff	Total Funding (000s)
Department of State							
ICASS	8	9	124	0	0	141	5,336
Refugee Affairs	1	0	1	0	1	3	219
All other DOS funds, except Refugee and ICASS	95	7	105	0	0	207	7,718
Foreign Commercial Service	1	0	3	0	0	4	128
Defense Attaché Office	11	1	2	0	0	14	419
Military Assistance Program and related	15	1	6	0	0	22	1,000
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center	10	0	0	0	0	10	414
U.S. Agency for International Development	16	1	3	53	5	78	3,974
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	4	0	31	0	0	35	1,755
Peace Corps	3	0	1	11	1	16	846
Foreign Agriculture Service	0	0	1	0	0	1	22
Iraq Support Unit	3	1	23	0	0	27	2,160
National Institutes of Health	1	0	0	0	0	1	135
FBI	3	0	0	0	0	3	118
<b>Totals</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>562</b>	<b>24,244</b>

## EMBASSY STAFFING AND FUNDING

Embassy Amman, as discussed in the following sections, faces a number of challenges for which future staffing demands are not known. The Department has over half of the total number of 562 employees, and its staffing increases in recent

years have been significant. In the FY 2006 MPP, the embassy requested approximately 19 American and FSN positions, and most have been approved and encumbered. The embassy expects these increases to continue. Other staff additions in the last year have occurred outside the MPP process, particularly for other agencies.

The embassy has received ample funding to carry out both Jordan-related and Iraq support activities. In 2004, the embassy received \$5.336 million in ICASS funding, \$3 million in program funding, and \$1 million in PD funds. Most Baghdad-related support funds have been transferred to the control of the ISU or Embassy Baghdad, although, as discussed in the Financial Management section of this report, a few Baghdad-related funding issues still need to be ironed out.

## CHANCERY SPACE ISSUES, NSDD-38, AND RIGHTSIZING

Embassy Amman occupies a chancery compound that was completed in 1992. In the normal course of events, the 25,000 square foot chancery would adequately house U.S. government activities in the Kingdom of Jordan. However, with the advent of U.S. involvement in Iraq, Embassy Amman has assumed an increasingly higher profile. Jordanian government leadership is friendly to U.S. interests and willing to facilitate support activities for Iraq; travel between Amman and Baghdad is eased by the proximity of Jordan to Iraq; and security conditions in Jordan permit a more relaxed lifestyle than is the case in some other countries in the region.

As a result, Embassy Amman has been the focal point for a number of U.S. government operations associated with activities in Iraq. The Department placed one of its off-site support units for Embassy Baghdad in Jordan, a group that will eventually number four Americans and 27 FSNs, housed at the Marka airbase located just outside of the city of Amman. The Marka operation still maintains five employees in the embassy chancery. Other long-term off-site support operations for Baghdad are described elsewhere in this report. The use of Amman as a central point for these activities, and the inability of the U.S. government to predict future needs, has meant that the embassy has not been able to forecast either its own resource requirements or those for Baghdad support.

Consequently, Embassy Amman has been in a reactive mode for over a year. Usual planning activities, including the MPP, have been rendered less meaningful. The MPP cannot accurately reflect resource needs that change monthly, weekly, or daily. Other agencies, in responding rapidly to their own home office concerns,

cannot always forewarn embassy management that staffing increases will occur. Off-site support activities for Embassy Baghdad might increase, taper off if more functions can be moved to Baghdad or to locations other than Amman, or cease temporarily depending on security conditions in Baghdad, or in Amman itself.

In addition to the absence of ability to plan, Embassy Amman is inundated with Congressional delegations and other VIP visitors; many establish a base in Amman for day trips to Baghdad. The 70 or so Congressional delegations in the last year have forced Embassy Amman further into its reactive mode, requiring a sizable amount of embassy support, often on short notice.

With the dramatic increases in staffing related to Iraq, Embassy Amman has stated its intention to work with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) to enlarge the physical plant in Amman, and has raised the idea of constructing an addition in the central courtyard of the south chancery building. OBO noted that additional secure space could only be obtained by creating it within the chancery compound because of the difficulty of obtaining collocation waivers from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

However, there still remains the difficulty of persuading Congress to fund an addition to Embassy Amman's chancery, particularly because the request would stem from the increase in Baghdad support and other regional activities of various agencies, and not from activities unique to the bilateral relationship between Jordan and the United States. Because the time period for support from Jordan of Embassy Baghdad is indeterminate, Congress might want more specific long-term plans before approving construction funds. During the inspection, OIG looked briefly at current space utilization in the chancery, finding that some sections are generously housed, while others are cramped. Until the embassy has equalized space allocations in the existing building and has brought them in line with those used in constructing new buildings, it would be hard to justify enlarging the current chancery. Embassy Amman is working with OBO on a space planning project, and the speedy completion of this endeavor will aid in determining whether additional space is truly needed.

The NSDD-38 process is closely linked to that of space requirements and rightsizing. If the NSDD-38 process were used more rigorously to monitor the growth of all agencies represented at post, then the mission would be able to plan more effectively for resource needs, including funding, space requirements, and staffing. An effective NSDD-38 procedure would allow mid-range planning, and would reduce the number of ad hoc and spontaneous decisions that the post has been forced to make.

OIG reviewed the mix of staffing in Department offices at Embassy Amman, and does not believe that there are any extraneous positions. All staff appear to be fully occupied. In order to address future staffing needs, more information is needed on plans for bilateral, regional, and Iraq support activities by all agencies including the Department. In its FY 2006 MPP, Embassy Amman requested ten direct hire American positions, one family member position, and eight ICASS FSN positions. Most of these positions, which were related to security, consular activities, information management, and Iraq support, have been approved, funded and encumbered.

The increase or decrease of staff by other agencies will affect the adequacy of Department support personnel under ICASS, and as other agencies modify their staffing, the post must also examine the ICASS staffing levels. This process is best done in an organized and mission wide manner. OIG recommends that Embassy Amman require that each agency represented at post (including the Department) provide one to five year plans for staffing levels, identifying the functions to be performed and justifying the need for staff to be based in Amman, particularly for regional functions. This process may be repeated as often as the embassy finds it productive to do so. In addition, OIG proposes that any decisions on staffing increases be made only after it has been determined that there is space in the current chancery to house additional personnel.

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Amman should require that each agency represented at post (including the Department) provide one to five year plans for staffing levels, identifying the functions to be performed and justifying the need for staff to be based in Amman, particularly for regional functions. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should complete needed chancery measurement, space allocation, and realignment activities before making decisions regarding staffing increases. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

OIG is issuing a separate report on the Department's provision of off-site support to Embassy Baghdad. In that report, OIG is recommending that for a number of reasons, the offices of ISU Amman be relocated to the Embassy Amman chancery compound. There are various ways in which this could be done,

including the construction of a small office area on the ground floor of the south chancery building, the erection of temporary modular units on the chancery compound, or the remodeling of existing office configurations. The need to find suitable quarters for ISU Amman increases the importance of a thorough review of space allocation within the chancery compound buildings and a comprehensive scrutiny through the NSDD-38 process of each agency request to add staff to the mission.

## INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

Embassy Amman activities are complicated by a lack of routine, reliable methods for communicating a wide variety of information among American and FSN employees and American family members. OIG found that not all family members were receiving timely information regarding security incidents. Many FSN employees were not aware that the embassy had a training plan. Information stemming from emergency action committee meetings was not being speedily and effectively forwarded to all those who should receive it. The embassy e-mail systems are not linked, and not everyone is able to receive e-mailed administrative notices and the weekly newsletter. These items are not distributed in hard copy. The e-mail lists are not kept up-to-date. When information is e-mailed, even if the Community Liaison Office (CLO) coordinator forwards it to family members, not all of these persons have Internet capability. Many notices are prepared only in English. Distribution of more information in Arabic would be useful to those employees who do not have strong English abilities.

In a brief review of the e-mail lists, OIG discovered that the embassy maintains over 40 distribution lists. OIG was told that the information systems center (ISC) relied on input from the CLO to keep the distribution list of family members up to date. In a separate meeting with the CLO, OIG was told that ISC prepared the lists that the CLO used. The human resources (HR) office is developing check-in forms for family members that will include notifying ISC of a family member's e-mail address. The distribution list of FSN employees is updated when newly hired FSNs complete the check-in process. When FSNs who are terminating employment complete the checkout process, their names are removed from the distribution lists. OIG found that there was no good procedure for ensuring that the names of employees who were fired were removed from various distribution lists, although the HR section agreed to complete pro forma checkout forms for these persons. In general, the number of distribution lists and the varying responsibilities for informing the ISC of changes appear to cause some confusion.

The general breakdown in communication is so widespread that OIG advised the embassy to consider it first as a single problem, before taking individual steps to remedy the situation. There are various ways to do this, including town hall meetings to gather input from employees and family members or surveys to obtain suggestions on what might be done to improve the dissemination of different types of information.

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Amman should undertake a comprehensive review of information dissemination among employees and family members and should develop and implement procedures to assure that information is disseminated in a thorough, timely manner. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Embassy Jordan has an experienced management counselor who arrived at post a few months before the inspection. He plans to pursue a number of initiatives including tracking management section performance with ICASS performance measures and working with the ICASS council to combine some ICASS and USAID administrative operations. The vast majority of management subsections received good scores on an OIG-administered workplace and quality of life questionnaire provided to all Americans at post. Services receiving fair to low ratings included customs and shipping, adequacy of office space, equity of the employee awards program, CLO programs, the equity and administration of the post housing program, community and family morale, and cafeteria operations. Some of these issues are discussed below. Additionally a number of safety and health vulnerabilities need to be corrected, and AECSA membership criteria and operations require attention.

OIG found that there was only limited interaction among the different units of the management section. Not every unit of the management section holds regular weekly meetings with FSNs. The blue-collar employees, particularly those working in the annex that houses the maintenance, motor pool and warehouse, were not always aware of happenings elsewhere in the management section. OIG left an informal recommendation with the embassy that the management section establish procedures to ensure that all employees and units be included when disseminating formal or informal notices and other information and that all units hold frequent, regular staff meetings with FSNs.

## GENERAL SERVICES

The general services unit does a solid job of delivering services to the embassy community in spite of relentless increases in its workload. The war in neighboring Iraq has profoundly affected every aspect of the unit's operations. A total of approximately 70 congressional delegations this year - nearly all headed to Iraq - and a flood of other high-level visitors have challenged the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the unit. Procurement actions have tripled in less than three years, while maintenance work orders increased by 29 percent in the same period. The motor pool has hired new staff and now works a standard 48-hour week. Travel services in particular have been under strain as large numbers of temporary duty personnel transit en route to Baghdad, overloading the already limited capabilities of the embassy's travel agent. Similarly, shipping and transportation services have suffered from congestion at the Red Sea port of Aqaba. Despite these obstacles, general services office (GSO) employees have performed well in most service areas. The establishment of ISU Amman has also helped ease some pressures on Embassy Amman's resources.

## Maintenance

The maintenance unit consists of two American facilities maintenance specialists, one of whom is on a long-term detail to Baghdad, and a staff of 40 FSN maintenance workers. In recent years, internal resources have been shifted to support the residential maintenance program and construction projects, at the expense of the safety, health, and environmental management (SHEM) program and preventive maintenance for the embassy's many complex systems. The embassy has managed a full range of construction projects, including a new \$150,000 fitness center, renovation of the consular section, and a host of other smaller projects. The embassy makes a persuasive case that maintenance requirements have overwhelmed the unit's ability to carry out its responsibilities. Last year, maintenance staff worked 18,669 hours of overtime - equivalent to nine full-time positions. Even with some improvements to operational efficiencies, further maintenance staffing increases may be unavoidable.

At the same time, OIG believes that there are opportunities to improve efficiency in maintenance operations. For example, contracting of minor painting and make ready services could lessen demand on maintenance staff during the busy summer season, when as many as 65 residences are prepared for occupancy. Use of fully equipped plumbing and electrical utility vehicles could reduce the number of trips needed to complete work orders. Hiring more eligible family members as

security escorts would free maintenance staff from escort duties. Deductions from landlord leases for minor repairs performed by the embassy - routinely taken until 1999, according to maintenance staff - could also augment strained resources. OIG left informal recommendations that the embassy consider operational changes in each of these areas.

OIG found that the maintenance section morale was low. Employees complained about the computer-assisted job evaluation (CAJE) process, and said that they were not being given equal consideration for training and awards. Maintenance employees believe that they are not provided tools and uniforms in line with those given to other mission employees. OIG left an informal recommendation that the mission review the oversight of the maintenance section and establish procedures to ensure that maintenance employees are given equal consideration with other FSNs in the provision of training, awards, uniforms, and equipment.

## Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Project

In September 2003, OBO approved a project to install a heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) upgrade to protect the mission from chemical and biological contaminants. The first component of the \$2.5 million project was the installation of an HVAC filtration system for the embassy mailroom that would allow screening of mail in the chancery building. According to OBO, the mailroom component of the HVAC system was not designed to operate as a standalone system. Until the full HVAC upgrade has been completed, proper mailroom airflow cannot be assured. Embassy Amman personnel resumed processing of mail in the chancery after installation of the mailroom HVAC components. There appears to have been some confusion about the limitations of the HVAC system at the time of its initial deployment at the mailroom. Mailroom staff complained of high air temperatures and poor airflow after installation of the system, resulting in its deactivation for the four months before the OIG inspection. Issues related to embassy mail screening are discussed in the classified security annex to this report.

The HVAC environmental upgrade at Embassy Amman is a pilot project that has not been implemented elsewhere. OIG believes that an internal OBO review of the HVAC environmental upgrade project is warranted, because approximately \$1.8 million in funds remain to be expended and the project's success is important to embassy security. OBO agreed to send a senior engineering team to Embassy Amman to review the project's status and apprise local personnel of its future direction.

**Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Amman, should review Embassy Amman's environmental security upgrade project to ensure that the project is meeting its stated objectives. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Amman)

## Safety and Fire

The embassy's SHEM program needs strengthening. U.S. government employees and their family members working overseas experience much higher fatality rates from carbon monoxide poisoning, pesticide exposure, swimming pool operations, and motor vehicle accidents than their domestic counterparts. Accordingly, Department regulations (6 FAM 610) require that posts establish occupational health and safety programs to reduce the risks of workplace injuries and fatalities. OIG observed numerous SHEM deficiencies during the inspection, including the following:

- Maintenance workers apply volatile solvents in unventilated workspaces, lack proper safety equipment, use unapproved ladders, and have not had training in basic occupational safety practices for some years.
- Swimming pools lack self-latching gates, signage, and emergency rescue equipment.
- Safety belts in official government vehicles are in a poor state of repair, placing passengers at higher risk of injury in motor vehicle accidents.
- Carbon monoxide alarms are not in place at residences with gas furnaces.
- In certain parts of the chancery, the ventilation system releases black soot, affecting the air quality and raising concerns among employees about workplace health hazards.

To his credit, the newly arrived facilities manager has begun to revive the SHEM program. The post's SHEM committee met in September 2004 to assess safety practices. However, a fully functioning SHEM program does not yet exist at the embassy. Unlike posts of similar size, there are no FSNs with SHEM responsibilities in their work requirements. Turnover in American staff also has hindered the development of a SHEM program: the post has had three facilities managers in

the past year, for example. As a result, SHEM issues have not received the attention needed. In view of deficiencies in this area, OIG believes that sustained engagement from the embassy and assistance from OBO are necessary to protect employee health and safety.

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should develop and implement a safety, health, and environmental management program for the embassy. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

## Preventive Maintenance

The embassy does not have a robust preventive maintenance program in place to maintain government-owned property. The embassy's physical plant includes multi-million dollar equipment, such as chillers, generators, boilers, and security equipment that needs regular maintenance. Posts are required to develop preventive maintenance programs under 6 FAH-4 H-309.1 guidance. Until recently, the maintenance unit lacked electronic tools needed to implement an effective preventive maintenance program. For example, the work order system formerly in use did not allow for tracking of uncompleted work orders, did not provide summary information on hours worked by category of employee, and did not include preventive maintenance work orders. Accordingly, preventive maintenance tasks were completed on an episodic and irregular basis. Records of maintenance work for major systems do not exist. The recently implemented Department work order system will allow the embassy to develop a more comprehensive preventive maintenance program. OIG left an informal recommendation that the embassy allocate more resources to preventive maintenance requirements for the chancery.

## Housing

OIG found no significant problems with the post's housing program. A selection of the 136 short-term leased residences inspected by OIG was attractive, spacious, conveniently located near the embassy, and relatively inexpensive. The housing board meets regularly, keeps minutes of its proceedings, and attempts to assign personnel to housing that meets individual requirements. Housing board appeals are handled generously, and the board routinely grants requests to relocate personnel when such requests are supported by adequate documentation.

The embassy's housing profile was last updated in 2001 when it included 112 leased residences. The current embassy housing pool of 136 residences includes a number of leases that exceed maximum space standards under 6 FAM 723.3. These residences require individual lease waivers, a time-consuming and paper-intensive process. OIG informally recommended that the embassy prepare an updated housing profile for review and approval by OBO. Doing so will provide blanket approval for residences within the space profile and reduce paperwork in the leasing process.

## Other Real Property Issues

The shortage of warehouse space at the embassy is particularly acute. Embassy Amman is a de facto logistics and transportation hub for Iraq, but unclassified warehouse space on the chancery compound is woefully inadequate for supporting anything other than the immediate needs of the mission. As a result, the embassy uses shipping containers outside the gates of the chancery for extra storage space, and the PD section has leased its own warehouse (used for Iraq-related activities) at an annual cost of \$24,000. Other mission elements have leased warehouse space for a total of five warehouse operations. As noted elsewhere in this report, OIG believes that there is room for better coordination among agencies in the consolidation of warehouse space.

## Parking

Inadequate parking is another sign of rapid growth at the mission. There are some 210 parking spots for over 500 Americans and FSNs, and parking lots usually are full during working hours. On-street parking is limited, and neighbors are becoming increasingly negative when embassy employees park in front of their residences. OIG left an informal recommendation that the embassy designate a block of parking spots for the use of short-term visitors and on-call personnel. In the medium term, a careful examination of available options, to include acquisition of new parking spaces and consideration of carpooling or public transportation for employees, is desirable. Particularly in light of security concerns about using public transportation or walking to work, the embassy will need to be creative in resolving its parking shortage.

## Property Management

The embassy follows sound practices in managing personal property. Required inventories of expendable and nonexpendable supplies are conducted, property is correctly tracked, receiving reports are prepared when required, inventories are spot checked by the GSO, and sales of excess property occur at regular intervals. The embassy replaces residential furniture on a regular cycle, taking into account age and condition; most furniture in the pool is less than ten years old. Recent increases in staffing levels have forced the mission to reuse some furniture destined for sale.

## Motor Pool

The embassy motor pool (including ICASS and program operations) consists of 49 vehicles, in a mix of armored and standard passenger vehicles. The embassy has acquired replacement vehicles for its aging fleet, but mechanical breakdowns occur frequently among the armored vehicles. Routine vehicle maintenance is reactive, and would benefit from better tracking of required oil changes, lubrication, and tire replacement so that vehicles could be serviced before breakdowns. The Ambassador's driver detail reports to the RSO section rather than the motor pool supervisor. As a result, daily trip records for RSO vehicles are not returned to the motor pool supervisor in GSO to permit review of fuel consumption, mileage, and monthly vehicle statistics. OIG informally recommended that the RSO-assigned drivers, as well as drivers of GSO maintenance utility vehicles, complete and return daily trip records to the motor pool supervisor on at least a monthly basis. Finally, the post has several vehicle inventory anomalies, including two fully armored vehicles from Embassy Baghdad that have awaited disposal for 14 years but do not appear on vehicle inventory lists. At least four surplus vehicles occupy much-needed parking spaces, and embassy management should arrange for their disposal. OIG left an informal recommendation to this effect.

**Best Practice: Electronic Shopping Basket for Expendable Supplies**

**Issue:**

Individuals at many posts are unfamiliar with expendable supplies that are available locally. Orders for supplies may be incorrectly completed, requiring telephone calls or delays as requirements are clarified.

**Response:**

Embassy Amman has an electronic shopping basket for expendable supplies that allows customers to select exactly what they need, when they need it.

**Result:**

Embassy employees receive better service, dispensing of supplies is streamlined, and the embassy is better able to manage its stock of supplies.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Embassy Amman operates a comprehensive information management (IM) program including computer networks, communications, mail, pouch, radio, telephone, and digital videoconferencing services. OIG questionnaires reported relatively good marks for IM services, and embassy customers appear satisfied. However, there are areas of concern that need to be addressed, the most critical of which are information processing center (IPC) facilities that are inadequate and potentially unhealthy to staff. IM resources are being stretched through obligations to provide support such as pouch services to other agencies within the region. Considering the increased workload imposed by regional concerns, as well as the considerable staffing gaps in the section, careful planning for future resource needs is essential, as well as more stringent adherence to Department policy on providing services to other agencies. Deficiencies in systems security planning and program implementation, including the role of the information systems security officer, are discussed in the classified security report.

The IM section has six authorized direct-hire American positions, of which four are filled, three eligible family members, and 19 FSNs. The IM section provides services to approximately 500 users in the embassy, of which 350 are information systems users. The IM section also provides services to a considerable number of temporary duty employees from other agencies. The mailroom operates the Army/Air Force post office (APO), as well as a copy center and messenger service. The ISC operates a training center providing basic computer training to end-users. The IM section also provides numerous services to ISU Amman, including systems support at the Marka facility, as well as APO and pouch services. Embassy Amman also provides APO and pouch services to Embassy Damascus.

The IM section has experienced significant staffing gaps over the last year, including three curtailments. At times staffing was down to just the information management officer (IMO) and information program officer (IPO), with additional support provided by temporary duty rovers. The section is still recovering from these gaps. Two positions have been added to the IPC in the last two months, including one information management specialist (IMS) and an information management assistant. The remaining IMS position in the IPC will not be filled until May 2005. A selection has recently been made for the vacant information systems officer position, but the replacement will not arrive until late December. The IMO plans to request an FSN receptionist position for the ISC. Despite the recent additions, the IM section is still not fully staffed, and with further gaps created by the expected departure of the IMO in December and possible departure of one of the IMS staff in the near future, the section will continue to struggle to meet the increasing demands for support from the region.

## Information Processing Center Facilities

IPC facilities are inadequate to meet the space or safety needs of the section's staff. Three of the employees currently share a small space in the IPC, and the IPO's desk is in another small space around the corner. The remaining IMS position, when filled, would also have to fit into the same office space. The staff has serious concerns over the air quality in the IPC. Particulate matter regularly falls from the overhead air ducts, and soot covers many surfaces in the office. The regional medical officer (RMO) has expressed serious concerns about the air quality in the IPC. In addition to concerns for personnel health, the poor air quality could be harmful to computing and communications equipment in the IPC. Concerns are exacerbated by the fact that some individuals working in the office full time or temporarily have had respiratory problems that could possibly be related to the office environment. There are plans to relocate a secure storage area and convert

the current storage room to office space, so that staff would no longer regularly sit inside the IPC but rather just enter to perform work as necessary. The embassy told OIG that it plans to have the ventilation system cleaned when possible, which would require halting IPC operations. Nevertheless, no work has begun on the ventilation system, and until that is addressed IPC personnel are working in a potentially dangerous environment.

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Amman should request that the Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations expeditiously visit the post to test air quality in the information processing center. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should relocate the office space for information processing center personnel to the secure storage room. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

## APO, Mail, and Pouch Services

The volume of shipping through all mail services (APO and pouch) has increased dramatically over the last year, without any corresponding increase in staffing or resources to handle the workload. Pouch volume has more than doubled in the last six months. Most of this volume is not for Embassy Amman but rather for support of U.S. operations in Iraq, as well as for Embassy Damascus. Pouch operations have become the single biggest workload factor in the IPC.

Classified pouch courier escort duties have fallen almost exclusively on the IM section, despite some efforts to encourage equitable sharing of responsibilities. There has been some discussion with the RSO of allowing a cleared American escort to assume this duty. Adding to the stress on the IM section is the high number of non-pro couriers from other agencies coming through Amman, which requires the duty communications officer to come in to the office after hours several times per week. There were approximately 110 non-pro couriers transiting Embassy Amman between March and October 2004. There is a perception among IM staff that there is a lack of willingness to add staff to meet increasing demands

that are seen as temporary. Nevertheless, the strain on the section is real. Department guidance for the use of non-pro couriers is given in 12 FAM 100, 2002 State 28217, and 2004 State 150477.

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Amman should establish and implement procedures to allocate classified pouch courier escort duties equitably among sections and agencies that use the service. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Amman should enforce Department guidance on the use of non-pro couriers, including minimizing their use, requiring that support to the final destination be provided by the originating agency, and demanding that other agencies provide compensation for overtime costs incurred by Department personnel. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## Information Technology Local Change Control Board

Embassy Amman has not established an information technology local change control board as required by 5 FAM 862. The IMO, information program officer, and information systems officer have consulted informally in the past to determine what software could be added to the system, but the only records of this discussion were e-mails. No formal decisions were made or forwarded to the Bureau of Information Resource Management, as specified in 5 FAM 862.3. One instance in which the local board should have been employed was in the procurement of a content manager application for the Internet web site. The product was customized and purchased locally without source code. As a result, the embassy does not have adequate documentation of this program. In the future all decisions to procure or develop software locally, or otherwise deviate from baseline applications, should be made through the local change control board in coordination with the Department Information Technology Change Control Board.

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Amman should formally establish an information technology local change control board following the guidance in 5 FAM 862, and broaden membership beyond the information management section to include the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## HUMAN RESOURCES

Five FSNs and an American officer on his first tour staff the HR office. Although the American officer does not have a lengthy Department background, the five FSNs have a total of more than 80 years of experience working for the embassy in Amman. While this experience has given them a depth of expertise in some areas, it has not translated into as efficient an operation as might have been expected. The section received a low score on OIG questionnaires, an outcome that the HR officer attributes to the general dissatisfaction of the embassy community with the CAJE process.

The HR section has been heavily involved in a number of Iraq support activities. The office worked to help establish ISU Amman, hiring staff and training human resources personnel from both ISU Amman and Embassy Baghdad. The section has been charged with the management of control rooms for the many Congressional delegations stopping in Amman and performs this duty approximately once a week.

When the HR officer arrived in April 2004, he inherited a number of challenging issues, all of which he is striving to correct or address. These include a large amount of bitterness about the implementation of CAJE and a lack of written policies and procedures. These issues are discussed below.

### Computer Assisted Job Evaluation

The implementation of CAJE at Embassy Amman has been filled with missteps. It appears that, in spite of town hall meetings and management notices that provided the correct information, many American supervisors erroneously told their employees that CAJE would result in position grade increases, and, consequently, expectations were high. The former HR officer and former management counselor decided that CAJE results would be implemented sequentially, instead of waiting until all positions had been classified under the CAJE system to announce the results. After the results for the first office became known and the position grades did not increase, and when the HR staff progressed to the next office, they encountered both rancor and attempts to inflate artificially the job descriptions so that employees would receive upgrades. The grade increase of the FSN who was performing the CAJE process did not help the situation. One American supervisor decided that every employee in the section should have the same grade, and job duties were juggled until the results came out to that individual's liking. Department representatives from the Office of Overseas Employment visited post,

reviewed the CAJE process and a number of completed evaluations, and assured employees that the process was being done correctly. However, by that time the distrust of, and dissatisfaction with, the process had spread through the mission.

When OIG inspectors met with the FSN committee, the primary issue of discussion was the CAJE process. The committee pointed out that it lacked transparency, that the human element made the results suspect, and that not enough information had been provided to employees about CAJE. While OIG believes that the embassy did provide information regarding CAJE, given the widespread discontent with the process, embassy officials should have taken extra care to calm the situation, and this did not happen.

OIG found that adverse reactions to the CAJE process were more apparent in some sections than in others. For example, in the maintenance section the grades of employees appear to have been generally lower than usual around the world even before the CAJE process was implemented. The CAJE process has not been completed for that section, but there appear to be misunderstandings on both the HR and maintenance sides of the issue. OIG believes that HR employees may not understand the complexity of the work that maintenance employees are doing, the value of the equipment on which they are working, or the necessity of these individuals not only to the well-being of the embassy, but to its most basic operations. On the other hand, HR employees think that maintenance staff may have overestimated their importance and the effect of their jobs within the embassy structure. Maintenance personnel told inspectors that some employees were hired from job announcements that listed advanced degrees and other minimum criteria for jobs but that their position descriptions did not reflect these considerations. When the jobs were classified under the CAJE system, the less stringent criteria were used. OIG left informal recommendations that the HR staff attend briefing sessions in the maintenance section to view first hand the work that occurs there. In addition, OIG recommended informally that Embassy Amman contact other similar-sized embassies to obtain information on how those posts classified the maintenance jobs.

The new HR officer has taken charge of the CAJE process. He has had most of the employees in the HR section CAJE-certified, so that all share the CAJE duties. He is also CAJE-certified and is reviewing all CAJE results. The embassy received a waiver for the implementation deadline for CAJE and now anticipates that most positions will be classified under the CAJE system by the end of 2004.

To date, some 136 positions (63 percent of the total) have been classified under CAJE, with 30 position upgrades and one downgrade. Those individuals receiving upgrades are receiving higher salaries, while employees in positions that might potentially be upgraded continue to receive their previous wages.

OIG believes that the embassy is taking reasonable measures to resolve the problems that exist with the manner in which CAJE was implemented. Time and a great number of individual and group discussions will be required. OIG discussed with the HR officer various ways to help the situation, including reminding employees that as job duties change, the position descriptions will be revised and the positions reclassified under CAJE, as appropriate. In other words, the CAJE process is not a one-time, final determination, and position classifications will continue to be monitored and reviewed under CAJE, just as they traditionally have been.

## Written Policies and Procedures

Embassy Amman lacks up-to-date, written personnel policies and procedures. The disciplinary policy has not been reissued since 1996. The FSN handbook was last revised in 1998 but is now being updated. There is no policy regarding how supervisors deal with the poor performance of employees. The HR officer has begun a comprehensive program to update and distribute policies, and has assigned various members of his staff to develop the policies as a way of both expanding their skills and making the information readily available to the community. The HR officer is also putting information on personnel matters in the weekly newsletter. OIG suggested that the embassy issue more policies and announcements in both English and Arabic, so that this information reaches all employees, regardless of their English language ability, and the HR officer agreed.

## Religious Balance Among Foreign Service National Staff

All of the FSNs in the HR section are Christian in a country that is reported to be over 90 percent Muslim. OIG was told that the city of Amman may contain more Christians than the rural areas of the country, and thus it may be that the percentage of Christians in Amman is greater than elsewhere. Employees guess (hard data have not been collected, but informal tabulations have been done) that in the embassy itself, FSN employees are about 50 percent Christian and 50 percent Muslim.

For many years the embassy has run a successful Jordanian internship program in which college students spend 60 days at the embassy performing unpaid labor to gain work experience and college credit. However, until the summer of 2004, these students were identified only through a program run by the Young Women's Christian Association. Because many of the association's interns subsequently applied for positions with the embassy, the program has been a conduit for bringing new hires into the mission. Of the 60 interns in the last six years, 41 were Christian, and 19 were Muslim. From this group, the embassy hired one Muslim and five Christian employees. The new HR officer expanded the program to include students from the Jordan University of Science and Technology, and has contacted the University of Jordan for potential interns. OIG praises the efforts of the HR officer to expand this valuable program and his efforts to diversify the work force.

## Foreign Service National Hiring Process

Before the arrival of the current HR officer, the HR office did not screen the applications for job openings but sent all that were received to the hiring office for review and selection. The HR office is now training staff members to screen the applications for qualified candidates, and only those that meet the criteria are forwarded to the hiring office. In reviewing this process, OIG found that the selection of qualified candidates is done summarily and without recording the results - applications that are deemed qualified are placed in one stack, and the ones that are not qualified are placed in another. In an audit of the applications received for one position, OIG found that four of the candidates who were determined to be qualified did not meet the minimum qualifications, while eight of those who were classified as not qualified appeared to meet the minimum requirements.

There are several aspects of this process that could be improved. The minimum qualifications are frequently stated in an ambiguous manner, or can clearly not be met. For example, there are various, subjective ways to interpret such phrases as "two years of experience in this or a related field," or "working knowledge of English and Arabic." In addition, when the minimum qualifications include such requirements as "knowledge of Department of State procurement regulations," and the embassy is accepting applicants from outside the mission community, there is obviously no expectation that most applicants can meet the requirement.

OIG suggested that the embassy include in job announcements only those job requirements that are clearly stated, that can be met by most applicants (unless the embassy plans to hire from within), and by which applications can be objectively screened. In addition, the embassy should develop and implement a process that shows clearly on which characteristics the candidates are being screened, leaving a written record of whether the candidates have met the minimum requirements.

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Amman should develop and implement a written checklist to determine whether candidates for Foreign Service national job openings meet the minimum requirements for the position. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## Other Issues

Embassy Amman has provided training to 37 individuals in the last year and to another 234 employees who attended group training sessions held locally. Although Embassy Amman has a training plan, OIG found that few persons outside of the HR office were aware of its existence. OIG left an informal recommendation that the embassy devote more attention to publicizing the development of the training plan, including gathering training requests from as many employees and supervisors as possible.

Embassy Amman has an active awards program that encompasses most of the mission. OIG encouraged embassy officials to ensure that office management specialists were included in group awards given to sections in which they were working.

OIG reviewed the FSN personnel files and found deficiencies in the security clearance procedures. This issue is discussed further in a separate classified OIG report.

Embassy Amman is receiving large numbers of applications for vacant positions, a sizable percentage of which are from qualified individuals. Retention of employees is high. During 2003, of 288 total employees, 23 left embassy service. Only five of the employees accepted higher paying jobs, and all of those were outside of Jordan. None left embassy employment for higher paying jobs in Jordan. Salary adjustments were made in July 2003 (a seven percent across the board increase) and in October 2003 (a five percent increase for grades 4 to 13).

Another salary adjustment is under review by agency heads and will probably be announced in late October or early November 2004.

There are a number of activities in the HR section that are working well. Official personnel files are well maintained, and evaluations, for the most part, are being completed on time. The new HR officer is cross-training staff who have been "stove piped" for years; all policies and procedures are being reviewed and updated; and the section is taking a positive approach to resolving the rancor that stemmed from the CAJE process. The section has a proactive attitude, and OIG believes that further improvements will be made.

## Equal Employment Opportunity Issues

Embassy Amman has three equal employment opportunity counselors, only one of whom has received training. The other two were recently selected and approved by the Office of Civil Rights in the Department. State 121920 dated June 2, 2004, requires that all nominees accepted by Office of Civil Rights complete a 32-hour course prior to being placed on the list of equal employment opportunity counselors and conducting counseling. Embassy Amman has not yet arranged for training for the two additional counselors and should do so immediately.

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Amman should arrange for immediate training for all equal employment opportunity counselors who have not yet received it. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## Family Member Employment and Strategic Networking Assistance Program

Embassy Amman employs 20 family members inside the mission in various offices and agencies. Another ten family members are working on the economy.

Under the Strategic Networking Assistance Program, the local employment advisor (LEA) helped seven family members find jobs, and worked with another 19 on job searches or part time employment. The LEA left post in June 2004, and a new LEA has been hired and is scheduled to begin work in late October 2004. The previous LEA held training workshops, helped clients prepare resumes, and networked with companies in Jordan. Family members suggested that the new LEA

be more proactive in contacting spouses to determine if they wanted to work and in maintaining lists of those who might be available for employment. OIG left an informal recommendation to this end.

The family member employment program at Embassy Amman received mixed reviews during the OIG inspection. Although the HR office reported that every family member who wanted a job was able to find one, the family members said that they believed that some job vacancies were not actually open for competition and that individuals had already been chosen for them at the time they were announced. There was no way in which OIG could review this allegation, but the inspectors did discuss the matter with post officials. As a part of remedying the perceptions of family members about inequities in the post employment program, OIG suggested that post review its family member employment procedures, and the makeup of the post employment committee, and issue updated guidance to the community. OIG made an informal recommendation regarding this matter.

There appears to be some confusion between the LEA and the CLO about the role of each in the family member employment program. With the hiring of a new LEA, it is an appropriate time for the management counselor to meet with both to assure that the functions of each are clearly understood and that family member employment activities are adequately covered. OIG discussed this matter with the management counselor and prepared an informal recommendation.

## FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

An experienced and capable financial management officer recently arrived at post to lead the financial management section. The office, consisting of an FSN supervisor and nine additional FSNs, operates well and received praise from embassy staff in interviews and in an OIG-administered survey. Obligations contained the proper approvals and supporting documents. Representation vouchers had the proper approvals, and guest lists for representation events generally consisted of at least 50 percent foreign nationals. Cashiering operations run well, and the one existing fiscal irregularity was reported to the Bureau of Resource Management. Prior to the establishment of ISU Amman, the financial management section supported Embassy Baghdad financial management operations. Now that a financial management officer has been assigned to ISU Amman, the embassy provides only sporadic support. ICASS support provided to Embassy Baghdad or the ISU is workload-counted and billed to the ISU as an ICASS customer. The embassy still maintains a few Iraq-related fund cites including one that needs to be reviewed.

A fund cite from INL, established to support administrative costs related to the one INL direct-hire employee in Jordan, has been used to pay the salaries of Iraqi police officers training at an INL-run facility in Jordan. The government of Iraq has reportedly had trouble transferring funds from Iraq to Jordan for this purpose. INL funds held by Embassy Amman have been used to front the salaries, after which reimbursement is requested. To date about half of the requested reimbursements have been received. Although the assistance may be necessary, Embassy Amman generally does not know when and whether payments will be needed and must scramble at the last minute to obtain the funds to make the payments. These payments are not the intended use of Embassy Amman-held INL funds. OIG informally recommended that INL place these funds and responsibilities in an Embassy Baghdad-related entity - such as ISU Amman.

Neither the financial management section, nor AECSA could locate a copy of the agreement with the bank maintaining an automatic teller machine in the American Club. While OIG was at post, the machine malfunctioned and withdrew funds from personal bank accounts for cash transactions, but did not dispense any cash. According to AECSA, the embassy signed the agreement with the bank, although AECSA oversees its operation. OIG informally recommended that the embassy locate and review the agreement and take full responsibility for the oversight of the automatic teller machine.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES

ICASS operations run smoothly, and agencies are generally satisfied with the ICASS services received. ICASS FY 2004 funding totaled \$5.336 million with services provided to 27 entities. Although the ICASS council, chaired by a USAID officer, meets every few months, the ICASS working group meets monthly and conducts much of the council's business. Relations between the council and service provider are good. When the influx of Iraq-related TDYers in FY 2004 put a strain on post's ICASS staff, the council relieved the pressure by approving nine new FSN positions, which were subsequently funded and encumbered. Although ICASS has succeeded in providing adequate services to customers, these services are not being supplied efficiently, as discussed below.

## Potential International Cooperative Administrative Support Services Efficiencies Ignored

There has been little, if any, attempt to combine duplicative U.S. government agency administrative structures at Embassy Amman. The Department, USAID, and MAP maintain unnecessarily redundant administrative arrangements. For example, the U.S. government maintains multiple warehouses in Amman. USAID's 4,750 square foot short-term leased warehouse costs the U.S. government \$13,300 a year; PD's 5,112 square foot short-term leased warehouse costs \$24,000 per year; MAP's 1,170 square foot short-term leased warehouse costs \$8,400 a year; and the ICASS 11,730 square foot warehouse, which is government-owned, has no annual lease costs. Although the ICASS warehouse is not big enough to accommodate all other agency inventories, OIG believes that consolidation of at least some of the warehouse space would save U.S. government funds. Reducing the number of warehouses would also reduce the cost of security coverage for the separate properties.

The Department, USAID, and MAP also maintain separate motor pool operations. Consolidation would likely result in more efficient use and a reduced number of vehicles, driver hours, and management infrastructures. USAID, for example, recently requested that a separate unit be built to house USAID's dispatcher at a cost of \$10,000. In addition to warehouse and motor pool operations, USAID and ICASS maintain separate procurement and financial operations. USAID and the ICASS management sections are collocated on the embassy compound. Efficiencies gained by consolidating might allow the U.S. government to reduce the number of staff needed for operations and might free up sought after space in the chancery. The Department and USAID also maintain separate Iraq support units. The table below shows USAID and Department staffing for some administrative services.

	<b>Department of State</b>	<b>USAID</b>
American executive/management officers	1	1
FSN drivers	18	6
FSN warehousemen	12	2

American contracting officers	1	1
FSN contracting staff	5	3
American financial management officers	1	1
FSN financial management staff	11	8
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>22</b>

The ICASS council chairperson and the management counselor thought that a number of ICASS services could be consolidated including warehousing and motor pool operations and told OIG that they planned to initiate a study. The council chairperson and USAID executive officer thought USAID would likely become the service provider for some services due to the section's efficiency. Post's willingness to consider consolidation of services is encouraging. The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in September 2004 that:

"agencies often decide not to use ICASS services and self-provide support services - citing reasons of cost, programmatic needs, and greater control - which can lead to duplicative structures and a higher overall cost to the U.S. government...Neither service providers nor customer agencies have made systematic efforts to contain costs by consolidating or streamlining services. Moreover, ICASS structures designed to encourage and reward managerial reforms are not adequate for overcoming strong disincentives deriving from resource management authorities and parochial interests of both customers and service providers."

To stimulate change, the Government Accountability Office recommended that the ICASS executive board, a Washington-based interagency group, eliminate duplicative administrative support structures where possible. The ICASS executive board, which is tasked in 6 FAH-5 H-101 with addressing unresolved policy issues and thorny operational problems in the field, is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. OIG believes that Embassy Amman would benefit from this board's assistance in reviewing services to determine if consolidation is possible.

There is also a Department/USAID joint management council, established to prioritize and oversee implementation goals set forth in the joint Department/USAID strategic plan. These goals include pursuing opportunities to coordinate and integrate management structures. A representative from the Department's Bureau of Management co-chairs the council's executive committee, along with the USAID deputy administrator. OIG believes that the post ICASS council would benefit from the assistance of the joint management council in integrating Department and USAID management structures.

OIG's 1997 Embassy Amman inspection report also reported that USAID believed it could conduct some operations at a lower cost than the Department and that USAID "may become a service provider by offering travel services for all takers, and warehousing for some of the very small agencies," but no move toward consolidation of services occurred.

**Recommendation 15:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management and the Bureau of Administration, should formally and in writing, evaluate whether U.S. government agencies operating in Amman can combine warehouse, motor pool, procurement, and financial operations. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with M/P and A)

ICASS service standards have not been reviewed since 2002, and the management section does not track the extent to which ICASS service standards are met. Further, ICASS customer surveys have not been conducted to evaluate the service provider's adherence to the standards. The management counselor and ICASS council chairperson plan to perform a customer survey in the near future and to regularize ICASS council meetings.



## QUALITY OF LIFE

### AMERICAN EMBASSY COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION

AECSA manages a commissary, cafeteria/snack bar, pool, video and souvenir shop, playground, barbershop, and postage stamp sales. Although OIG observed that each of these activities was functioning, the association itself is in turmoil. During the inspection, three of seven new board members were elected, a new chairman was instated, and the association general manager resigned. FAM guidelines are not being met, significant management control deficiencies exist, and association members are disgruntled. For example, U.S. contractors have access to the commissary (including duty-free privileges) although AECSA files do not demonstrate that 6 FAM 542 requirements have been met. Additionally, the family of a Department of Defense employee permanently assigned to a third country (Iraq) had access to the commissary despite the fact that there are no provisions in the FAM to afford these privileges and instructions to the contrary from A/OPR/CR. The 1997 OIG inspection report for Embassy Amman also cited numerous problems with AECSA and recommended increased oversight. 6 FAM 520 states that the principal officer, or the designee thereof, is responsible for monitoring the activities of the employee association and certifying that its operations are managed prudently and in accordance with regulations.

**Recommendation 16:** Embassy Amman should establish and implement procedures to ensure that American Embassy Community Services Association activities are conducted in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Amman)

AECSA has started to obtain the documentation needed for contractors to be granted access to the commissary (including duty-free privileges). 6 FAM 542 requires that the use of facilities be stipulated in writing by the designated official and approved by the principal officer, that the contract or program be funded fifty-one percent or more by the U.S. government, and that the individuals be accorded duty-free import privileges by the host country. The embassy believes that contractors working at the Jordan International Police Training Center are entitled to duty-



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## THE EMBASSY NETWORK

The Embassy Network (NET) was established at Embassy Amman in 1996 when funding for the community liaison office was limited. The NET is an unofficial, voluntary group that seeks to improve community morale and to increase cohesiveness within the embassy and with the community in Amman. To achieve this goal, NET has raised funds, sponsored community activities, donated to community events and charities, and worked in other ways to benefit the mission. NET has a bank account and makes independent decisions regarding how funds are to be used.

The NET appears to be established and to be functioning as an employee association, but is not meeting the requirements of 6 FAM 500 for such activities. As stated in 04 State 014540 and 6 FAM 551 (B), in the absence of an approved charter, no association will be authorized to operate on U.S. government property or under U.S. government auspices. Posts providing space and other forms of logistical support to informal groups place the U.S. government at risk since these groups generally are not appropriately insured nor do they have formal or independent means of accounting for the funds they raise or spend. These activities also place individuals at risk for lawsuits and other liability claims.

The 2004 cable from A/OPR/CR adds that groups that raise money for CLO activities may do so within certain parameters, including the justification of expenditures as being on behalf of employee morale and welfare. If the group is not performing functions that are typical of chartered employee associations, the fundraising is not subject to appropriations law. If, however, the embassy expends

resources on the group for fundraising activities, then this support must be justified under appropriations law. Any group not meeting the criteria described by A/OPR/CR may not operate on U.S. government premises nor be provided space.

Following discussions with OIG and A/OPR/CR representatives, Embassy Amman acted quickly to bring NET activities in line with Department guidance, including closing the NET bank account and placing these funds under AECSA sponsorship. Although there are other steps that must be done to fold NET into AECSA, OIG is not making a formal recommendation, as the inspectors believe that the embassy, under A/OPR/CR direction, will successfully complete this process.

## COMMUNITY LIAISON OFFICE

Embassy Amman has one 40-hour per week CLO coordinator, and a second who works 20 hours per week. Both report directly to the management counselor. OIG received complaints that the sponsor program managed by the CLO was not well organized. Family members believe that the CLO should be holding more coffee mornings for newcomers and more activities for spouses.

On OIG questionnaires containing 53 items, the CLO sponsor program was ranked in 50th place (1 being the highest, and 53 the lowest), overall community morale was ranked 45th, and CLO sponsored activities were ranked 38th. There are a number of factors that might contribute to low morale in the embassy community, including the amount of work demanded by U.S. operations in Amman and Baghdad, the uncertainty about the future of U.S. involvement in Iraq, the lack of communication among the embassy community (discussed elsewhere in this report), and security conditions in the Near East. An effective CLO operation is a management tool that can be used to help improve morale, even when such difficult circumstances prevail. The low scores on the questionnaires show that the CLO program is not effective in helping build community morale, and the many negative comments received by OIG indicate widespread community dissatisfaction with how the CLO program is being managed. Embassy Amman's CLO program is not meeting mission needs, and it should be restructured.

**Recommendation 20:** Embassy Amman should review its community liaison office program and should take steps to resolve inadequacies perceived by the community in its operation. Such steps might include revising the community liaison office coordinator position descriptions and re-announcing the two coordinator positions and forming a community liaison office advisory committee to establish priorities for community liaison office activities. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## MEDICAL ISSUES

The RMO and his staff at Embassy Amman serve a community of close to one thousand, which includes hundreds of U.S. government TDY personnel in Jordan on work related to the U.S. involvement in Iraq. Because the RMO also has responsibility for Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, and Israel, he is away from post roughly half of the time. The well-equipped embassy health unit, staffed by two locally hired registered nurses, received high marks on the inspection workplace and quality of life questionnaire. The health unit's location in a heavily used part of the chancery accessible to the general public has given rise to some concern that visits to the health unit are not as private as might be desirable.

The RMO has developed an embassy chemical-biological reaction plan in collaboration with other embassy sections and is working on a natural disaster reaction plan. He and his staff closely monitor conditions in the cafeteria at the American Club, which was briefly closed in 2003 due to health concerns.

The RMO has developed solid professional relations with Jordanian hospitals and local physicians. He briefs incoming personnel on how to avoid illnesses prevalent locally and warns his clientele about the high incidence of motor accidents in Jordan. According to the RMO, work-related stress is a particular problem at the embassy. The completion early next year of a large embassy fitness center on the chancery compound may be useful in ameliorating stress. The adequacy of fitness facilities received the lowest score in responses to the inspection workplace and quality of life questionnaire. However, OIG believes that more frequent visits by the regional psychiatrist and more attention to stress management would benefit the employees of this overworked post.

**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Amman should request, and the Office of Medical Services should support the request, that the regional psychiatrist based in Cairo make more frequent visits to Embassy Amman for staff consultations on stress management. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with M/MED)

## (b)(2)(b)(6)

The (b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6) Amman, has a 2004-2005 school year enrollment of 380. Of these, 173 are U.S. citizens, and 66 are U.S. government dependents. In the high school, there are 14 embassy family members out of an enrollment of 128. (b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6)(b)(2)(b)(6) The Office of Overseas Schools (A/OPR/OS) in FY 2004 provided ACS grants of \$50,000 for security upgrades and \$57,000 for academic support.

During the 2003-2004 school year, several families complained to post management about what they perceived as the low quality of the (b)(2)(b)(6) program. Their criticisms noted that (b)(2)(b)(6) offered a very limited course selection, and was deficient in special education programs and advanced placement courses. They also complained that (b)(2)(b)(6) policy prohibited study hall periods; student volunteer activities were limited; textbooks were shabby; teacher quality was poor; and elementary/middle schoolteachers were relied upon inappropriately to teach high school classes. They also noted that the physical plant was run down and that classroom air conditioners did not work. Communication among parents, the school board, and the school administration was poor. Much criticism focused on the (b)(2)(b)(6) superintendent and his communication style.

OIG believed that much of the rancor was created by a lack of communication and suggested to the superintendent that he be proactive in informal and formal communication with mission officers and family members. OIG also suggested that mission management encourage more regular participation by family members in school board meetings.

The regional education officer from A/OPR/OS visited Amman in February 2004 to evaluate complaints and respond to requests that the school be declared "inadequate." She declined those requests and mission management supported that decision. Several parents, however, were bitter about the judgment. The regional education officer did not release a written report on that visit, pending a projected follow-up visit in January 2005 to evaluate (b)(2)(b)(6) improvements on the shortcomings she did find. OIG believes this visit is critical and strongly encourages that it take place as scheduled to ensure that (b)(2)(b)(6) management achieve the improvements A/OPR/OS expects.

The embassy front office was also active in negotiations between the parents and school officials. The DCM met with concerned parents in the CLO office and listened to their issues. The DCM later spoke with the regional education officer at the DCM management conference, and asked her to meet with concerned parents. As a result, the regional educational officer, along with a representative from the Family Liaison Office in Washington, met with a group of parents, some who supported the school, and others who had strong concerns. The embassy also held a follow-on meeting afterwards with parents.

(b)(2)(b)(6) does not have adequate financial reserves, a situation that would make it difficult for (b)(2)(b)(6) to respond to unanticipated financial emergencies, such as fires at the school, urgent capital improvements, lawsuits, or dramatic enrollment fluctuations. The school has experienced a number of difficulties in the recent past. Official American personnel have been evacuated from Amman twice in recent years, along with teachers, thus affecting both the student body and the faculty. In addition, the school has found it difficult to recruit faculty due to uncertainties about the war in Iraq and subsequent reconstruction efforts. Per 2 FAM 613.1, schools receiving A/OPR/OS grants should possess adequate insurance coverage to protect their assets. OIG suggests that the embassy work with the school to review insurance levels for adequacy. The (b)(2)(b)(6) superintendent explained that he is trying to develop a foundation to accumulate additional funding for the school. OIG suggests that the embassy offer mission expertise, if available, to review (b)(2)(b)(6) plans.



## MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

Management controls at Embassy Amman are generally effective, however, additional attention needs to be paid to security measures, safety and health issues, and AECSA. In its FY 2004 management controls certification, Embassy Amman reported one material weakness and one reportable condition. (b) (2)(b) (2) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) the post has been unsuccessful in completing the reconciliation of the Worldwide Property Accounting System database tracking certain radio and computer equipment. OIG believes that the embassy's corrective measures for these weaknesses are appropriate.

## AMERICAN EMBASSY COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION

Numerous management controls must be instituted related to AECSA operations. Periodic spot checks of inventories and cash counts have not been conducted. AECSA has not reviewed the profitability of separate cost centers to determine if any are losing money. Employee contracts may not be consistent with local labor law and should be reviewed. The association maintains five bank accounts, some of which are likely unnecessary. OIG is particularly concerned about AECSA bank accounts because two of the banks did not verify account balances when requested by the association's auditor. The auditor included this as a scope limitation to the audit. A number of these management controls are addressed as informal recommendations.

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Amman should institute and conduct management controls for the American Embassy Community Services Association, to include periodic spot checks of inventories, review of bank accounts, and review of the profitability of operations. (Action: Embassy Amman)



## FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 1:** Embassy Amman should develop and implement a management plan to ensure that all elements of the consular section receive regular attention, supervision, training, and mentoring. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 2:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should evaluate the potential border security threat to the United States arising from external consular fraud at Embassy Amman and should establish an appropriate program to control that threat. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with CA and DS)

**Recommendation 3:** Embassy Amman should require that each agency represented at post (including the Department) provide one to five year plans for staffing levels, identifying the functions to be performed and justifying the need for staff to be based in Amman, particularly for regional functions. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 4:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should complete needed chancery measurement, space allocation, and realignment activities before making decisions regarding staffing increases. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 5:** Embassy Amman should undertake a comprehensive review of information dissemination among employees and family members and should develop and implement procedures to assure that information is disseminated in a thorough, timely manner. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Amman, should review Embassy Amman's environmental security upgrade project to ensure that the project is meeting its stated objectives. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 7:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should develop and implement a safety, health, and environmental management program for the embassy. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 8:** Embassy Amman should request that the Office of Safety, Health, and Environmental Management of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations expeditiously visit the post to test air quality in the information processing center. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 9:** Embassy Amman, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should relocate the office space for information processing center personnel to the secure storage room. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with OBO)

**Recommendation 10:** Embassy Amman should establish and implement procedures to allocate classified pouch courier escort duties equitably among sections and agencies that use the service. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 11:** Embassy Amman should enforce Department guidance on the use of non-pro couriers, including minimizing their use, requiring that support to the final destination be provided by the originating agency, and demanding that other agencies provide compensation for overtime costs incurred by Department personnel. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 12:** Embassy Amman should formally establish an information technology local change control board following the guidance in 5 FAM 862 and broaden membership beyond the information management section to include the regional security office. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 13:** Embassy Amman should develop and implement a written checklist to determine whether candidates for Foreign Service national job openings meet the minimum requirements for the position. (Action: Embassy Amman)

**Recommendation 14:** Embassy Amman should arrange for immediate training for all equal employment opportunity counselors who have not yet received it. (Action: Embassy Amman)



**Recommendation 21:** Embassy Amman should request, and the Office of Medical Services should support the request, that the regional psychiatrist based in Cairo make more frequent visits to Embassy Amman for staff consultations on stress management. (Action: Embassy Amman, in coordination with M/MED)

**Recommendation 22:** Embassy Amman should institute and conduct management controls for the American Embassy Community Services Association, to include periodic spot checks of inventories, review of bank accounts, and review of the profitability of operations. (Action: Embassy Amman)

## INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or onsite compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

### ***Human Resources***

Although Embassy Amman has a training plan, few employees outside of the HR office are aware of its existence.

**Informal Recommendation 1:** Embassy Amman should publicize the development of the training plan and gather training requests from as many employees and supervisors as possible.

Embassy Amman is participating in the Strategic Networking Assistance Program and has hired a local employment advisor to assist family members in finding employment.

**Informal Recommendation 2:** Embassy Amman should specify that the local employment advisor be proactive in contacting family members to determine if they wish to work and should maintain lists of those who might be available for employment.

There is confusion between the local employment advisor and the community liaison office coordinator regarding the role of each in the family member employment program.

**Informal Recommendation 3:** Embassy Amman should clarify the roles of the local employment advisor and the community liaison office coordinator in the family member employment process and assure that all activities are adequately covered.

The family member employment program at Embassy Amman received low scores on OIG questionnaires, and OIG heard complaints that the program was not equitable.

**Informal Recommendation 4:** Embassy Amman should review the family member employment procedures and the makeup of the post employment committee and issue updated guidance to the community.

There are indications from both the maintenance and human resources sections that both sections are hampered by a lack of correct information regarding how to classify maintenance jobs.

**Informal Recommendation 5:** Embassy Amman should require that the human resources staff attend briefing sessions in the maintenance section to view first hand the work that occurs there and the equipment that is maintained and should use this information in determining the data to be used in the computer-assisted job evaluation process.

**Informal Recommendation 6:** Embassy Amman should contact other similar-sized embassies to obtain information on how those posts are classifying their maintenance jobs and should use this material in reviewing and modifying, as needed, the job classification results for the maintenance section.

### ***Information Management***

There is no training program for information management staff. Personnel records for training requests are the only means used for tracking which employees have taken training.

**Informal Recommendation 7:** The information management section should develop a training program for staff to include detailed records of which training employees have completed as well as schedules of future training.

Embassy Amman's standard operating procedures for the sensitive but unclassified network are a work in progress, and not all of the details have been specifically adapted from the template to the situation in Amman.

**Informal Recommendation 8:** Embassy Amman should ensure that the standard operating procedures for the sensitive but unclassified network are complete and the details specific to Embassy Amman.

### ***General Services and Maintenance***

The embassy makes minor repairs to residences that are the landlords' responsibility under terms of the lease.

**Informal Recommendation 9:** Embassy Amman should deduct expenses incurred for routine maintenance of short-term leased residences from lease payments made to landlords.

The maintenance section experiences an annual surge in its workload during the moving season, when as many as 65 residences have to be prepared for new occupants. The heavy workload severely strains maintenance resources, resulting in overtime and burnout for maintenance staff.

**Informal Recommendation 10:** Embassy Amman should examine whether contractors could perform painting and make ready services, instead of direct hire employees.

Embassy family members complain that all work orders must be submitted electronically, disadvantaging those persons who lack access to the Internet at home.

**Informal Recommendation 11:** Embassy Amman should provide a work order telephone number for family members to communicate directly with the maintenance unit.

Records of trip reports and fuel consumption for RSO vehicles are not submitted to the motor pool supervisor, compromising his ability to accurately report and track fuel consumption, mileage and vehicle usage as required by 6 FAM 228.7-1.

**Informal Recommendation 12:** Embassy Amman should direct that all daily trip records and fuel consumption records for the regional security office driving unit be turned in on at least a monthly basis to the motor pool supervisor.

Maintenance workers lack appropriately equipped plumbing and electrical utility vehicles. Consequently, they frequently make two or more trips to residences to complete routine work orders, lowering productivity. Maintenance employees believe that they are not provided tools and uniforms in line with those given to other mission employees and said they were not being given equal consideration for training and awards.

**Informal Recommendation 13:** Embassy Amman should review the oversight of the maintenance section and establish procedures to ensure that maintenance employees are given equal consideration with other employees in the provision of training, awards, uniforms, and equipment.

**Informal Recommendation 14:** Embassy Amman should equip an appropriate number of plumbing and electrical utility vehicles to increase efficiency in completing maintenance work.

Embassy Amman's preventive maintenance program for government-owned properties is not robust.

**Informal Recommendation 15:** Embassy Amman should review its maintenance priorities and allocate sufficient internal resources to preventive maintenance for government-owned properties.

There are no short-term parking spaces available at the embassy for the use of family members or on-call personnel.

**Informal Recommendation 16:** Embassy Amman should designate a small number of parking spots for short-term parking for the use of family members and on-call personnel.

The post has no method for disposal of fully armored vehicles, some of which have been surplus for 14 years.

**Informal Recommendation 17:** Embassy Amman should dispose of the surplus fully armored vehicles in its inventory.

The embassy's housing profile is out of date because of increases in staffing in the last three years.

**Informal Recommendation 18:** Embassy Amman should update its housing profile and submit the updated profile to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations for approval.

### ***Financial Management***

Embassy Amman is using INL funds to pay salaries of Iraqi police officers receiving training in Jordan.

**Informal Recommendation 19:** Embassy Amman should request that the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs review the process used to pay salaries of Iraqi police officers and transfer responsibility, including fund oversight, for this function to the Iraq Support Unit in Amman.

The agreement between the embassy and a local bank for a sometimes-malfunctioning automated teller machine on the embassy compound could not be located. Embassy management reportedly signed the agreement, although AECSA may have oversight responsibilities.

**Informal Recommendation 20:** Embassy Amman should locate and review the agreement for the automated teller machine and take full responsibility for its oversight.

Although the embassy gave PD grants to U.S. citizens in CY 2003, the amounts were not reported on 1099s to the Internal Revenue Service as required in 4 FAM 417.

**Informal Recommendation 21:** Embassy Amman should coordinate with the public diplomacy section to ensure that earnings for U.S. citizen grant recipients are reported to the Internal Revenue Service.

The existence of a PD warehouse used for Iraq-related activities has not been reported to the OBO. Additionally, PD rather than OBO funds are being used to pay lease costs for this warehouse.

**Informal Recommendation 22:** Embassy Amman should provide the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations details about the leased public diplomacy warehouse and ensure that proper funds are used for lease costs.

Program funds, rather than OBO operation funds, were used to renovate PD space.

Informal Recommendation 23: Embassy Amman should ensure that Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations funds, rather than program funds, are used for embassy renovation projects.

***American Embassy Community Services Association***

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AECSA board members do not consult with AECSA management before making decisions that could increase the number of individuals entitled to AECSA privileges.

**Informal Recommendation 25:** Embassy Amman should develop procedures to keep American Embassy Community Services Association management aware of decisions affecting the number of individuals afforded privileges, so that American Embassy Community Services Association management can assess the impact on operations.

Documentation supporting the firing of some AECSA employees was minimal. A number of AECSA employees are concerned that they will be fired during the changeover in AECSA management and board membership.

**Informal Recommendation 26:** Embassy Amman should ensure that all employment decisions taken by the American Embassy Community Services Association are made in conformance with local labor law and Department guidelines.

The employee association has made a number of changes to its membership categories in the last year, but it is unclear if the embassy community is aware of these changes.

**Informal Recommendation 27:** Embassy Amman should develop and distribute to the embassy community information on the categories of membership in the American Embassy Community Services Association, the cost for those memberships, and the entitlements of the memberships.

**Informal Recommendation 28:** Embassy Amman should issue a letter to each member of the American Embassy Community Services Association describing the type of membership that he/she has, the annual fees applying to that membership, and the benefits to which he/she is entitled.

AECSA board members sometimes confront AECSA staff about performance issues and conduct of day-to-day operations, a function best performed by the AECSA general manager.

**Informal Recommendation 29:** Embassy Amman should task the American Embassy Community Services Association board with informing new association board members that employee performance, conduct, hiring and firing are the responsibility of the association general manager, rather than the association board members.

Neither the board of AECSA nor the principal officer or designee, has executed tasks listed in the management letter from the annual audit. These internal controls include tracing AECSA inventories to records, comparing the meal tickets from the cafeteria with the series of pre-numbered tickets issued during the day, validating sales (primarily of alcohol and cigarettes), conducting periodic cash counts, comparing inventories with bills of lading, ensuring that cash receipts and bank deposits match, and scanning customer lists for individuals not afforded AECSA privileges.

**Informal Recommendation 30:** Embassy Amman should develop and implement procedures to ensure that internal control procedures listed in the annual management letter to the American Embassy Community Services Association are instituted.

### ***Public Diplomacy***

OIG found a lack of uniformity in procedures used to track documentation for compliance review of grants signed and held by the public affairs section.

**Informal Recommendation 31:** Embassy Amman should implement written administrative procedures from the Office of the Procurement Executive to ensure the orderly flow of documentation tracking public diplomacy grants and other grants signed by public affairs section warrant officers.

### ***Health Unit***

The embassy recently installed one automated external defibrillator at Post One and has two more on order. The RMO requested that more be placed around the compound.

**Informal Recommendation 32:** Embassy Amman should obtain automated external defibrillators and place one on each floor of the chancery, in the health unit, at the American Club, and in the Ambassador's residence.

### ***Management Section***

OIG found that there was only limited interaction among the different units of the management section and that some employees and units were left out of some day-to-day activities.

**Informal Recommendation 33:** Embassy Amman should establish procedures ensuring that the management section includes all employees and units when disseminating formal or informal notices and other information, and that all units hold frequent, regular staff meetings with Foreign Service nationals.



## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Deputy Chief of Mission (Chargé)	David M. Hale	07/03
Chiefs of Section:		
Administrative	Perry M. Adair	08/04
Consular	Daniel E. Goodspeed	08/03
Political (Acting DCM)	Christopher P. Henzel	08/04
Economic	Richard M. Eason	03/04
Public Affairs	Haynes Mahoney	08/02
Regional Security	Robert Goodrich	07/04
Iraq Support Unit	Terry Larson	08/04
Other Agencies:		
Foreign Commercial Service	Laurie Farris	08/03
Foreign Broadcast Information Service	Sheryl Robinson	04/03
Defense Attaché Office	David McLean	10/03
Military Assistance Program	Randy Jackson	07/03
Humanitarian Assistance Control Center	Scott Brennan	01/04
U.S. Agency for International Development	Anne Aarnes	03/03
Legal Attaché	Andre Khoury	06/04



## ABBREVIATIONS

A/OPR/CR	Office of Commissary and Recreation Staff
A/OPR/OS	Office of Overseas Schools
ACS	American Community School
ADCM	Acting deputy chief of mission
AECSA	American Embassy Community Services Association
AMIDEAST	America-Mideast Educational and Testing Services
APO	Air Force/Army Post Office
BIT	Bilateral investment treaty
CAJE	Computer-assisted job evaluation
CLO	Community liaison office
COM	Chief of Mission
DAO	Defense attaché office
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
Defense	Department of Defense
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FSN	Foreign Service national
FTA	Free trade agreement
GSO	General services office(r)
HACC	Humanitarian assistance control center
HR	Human resources
HVAC	Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

IMO	Information management office(r)
IMS	Information management specialist
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPC	Information processing center
IPO	Information program officer
ISC	Information systems center
ISU	Iraq support unit
IV	Immigrant visa
JACEE	Jordanian-American Commission for Educational Exchange
LEA	Local employment advisor
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MPP	Mission performance plan
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NET	The Embassy Network
NIV	Nonimmigrant visa
NSDD-38	National Security Decision Directive 38
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMS	Office management specialist
PAS	Public affairs section
PD	Public diplomacy
QIZ	Qualifying industrial zones
Refcoord	Regional refugee coordinator
RMO	Regional medical officer
RSO	Regional security officer

SHEM	Safety, health, and environmental management
SNAP	Strategic Networking Assistance Program
TDY	Temporary duty
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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