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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Middle East Regional Office

The Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract: Management by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Contractor Performance, Capping Report

Report Number MERO-I-10-08, August 2010

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and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Deputy Inspector General

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INTRODUCTION

Personal security specialists working under the second Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS II) contract are critical to the protection of Department of State (Department) personnel working abroad, especially in the volatile Middle East and south central Asia regions. Under the WPPS II contract, private firms have provided personal security and movement protection for diplomats and chief of mission personnel, as well as static guard forces at U.S. embassies, consulates, and other overseas posts. With the re-direction of U.S. military forces and potential draw-down in some areas, the security provided under future contracts will become even more crucial to the Department's success in unstable crisis, conflict and post-conflict regions.

The Middle East Regional Office (MERO) of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a series of performance audits of the WPPS II contract under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended,¹ due to concerns about personal security contractor performance and the Department's contract management ability. The resulting OIG reports² included findings as well as recommendations designed to strengthen the current program and guide the Department in awarding and managing a third contract for the newly named Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) program.³ The objectives of this capstone review were to: (1) provide a capping report of the six previously issued OIG reports on WPPS II, including the current status of all findings and recommendations; (2) determine what, if any, new policies or procedures have been formulated and/or implemented, based on OIG's comprehensive review of WPPS II; (3) determine what the Department has done to improve contract oversight and management of the WPPS II contract; (4) determine what the Department has done to improve the review and evaluation

¹ 5 U.S.C. App. 3

² See *Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations*, MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008; *Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009; *Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-03, March 2009; *Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Jerusalem*, MERO-IQO-09-05, May 2009; *Performance Audit of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-06, June 2009; and *Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan*, MERO-A-09-08, August 2009.

³ In April 2010, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security posted a proposed solicitation for a multiple award, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity WPS contract, to satisfy personal protective, static guard force, and emergency response team security service requirements worldwide.

process of the training, qualification, and personnel requirements of future WPPS contractors; and (5) determine what new concepts or approaches the Department is considering or implementing for personal protective services under the new WPS contract.

In carrying out this review, OIG re-examined its six reports on personal security contractors as well as responses to its recommendations and relevant documents at the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). To obtain updated information on compliance, new policies, and plans for the WPS program, OIG met with DS personnel and reviewed bureau documents. OIG also spoke with the Director of Political-Military Affairs, Iraq Office, in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and an attorney advisor in the Office of the Legal Advisor. This report was prepared under the direction of Richard “Nick” Arntson, Assistant Inspector General for MERO. The following staff members conducted the review and/or contributed to the report: Patrick Dickriede, Kelly Herberger, and Judith Morsy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MERO began its reviews and audits of WPPS II contract management and contractor performance in the fall of 2008 with an examination of the status of the recommendations made by the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq. This review was followed by performance audits of all three security contractors operating in Iraq, Jerusalem, and Afghanistan. OIG identified several trends related to U.S. Government direct-hire staffing problems, as well as issues associated with accounting for contractor personnel. These trends weakened DS's management and oversight of the WPPS II contract and task orders. Further, while the security contractors generally carried out their protective duties satisfactorily, OIG found issues with personal security specialist training, the ability to fill some contractor positions, inventory and storage of U.S. Government property, armored vehicles, explosives detection canines, and radios. However, once these concerns were raised, whether prevalent or limited in scope, DS responded quickly to OIG's recommendations to strengthen the WPPS II program. The bureau continues to improve the program and to incorporate new policies and lessons learned into the new WPS contract.

Several U.S. Government direct-hire staffing issues emerged during OIG's performance audits. Chronic shortages of regional security officers (RSO), who also were required to act as contracting officer's representatives (COR), were exacerbated by high rates of annual turnover, rest and relaxation absences, and an excessive number of added responsibilities. Some RSO/CORs believed they were ill-equipped to manage and oversee the contractors due to a lack of time, training, and inadequate guidance at post. OIG also found some incomplete contract files that were missing essential documents. A lack of written policies and procedures further hindered management. DS acted on all related recommendations – at times, based on OIG's briefings and before a report's final issuance. DS continues its efforts to improve these aspects of the program. More DS staff members were hired, both in the field and in the program office. The required 40-hour COR course offered specific information on security contracts, and a COR checklist was developed to ensure contract requirements were met. Contract files were improved through the use of an easily accessible Web site for essential documents.

In all locations operating under the WPPS II contract, OIG found that U.S. Government employees were not verifying the presence of contractor personnel. Specifically, RSO/CORs were not reviewing personnel rosters, called muster sheets, before

the sheets were sent to contractor headquarters in the United States for invoicing and payment by DS. This lack of on-site validation meant contractor costs could not be certifiably determined or justified. In response to OIG's recommendations, DS has established practices, including the use of an electronic scanning system for personal security specialists, as well as proper reconciliation and verification of muster sheets, to resolve this problem.

While all three security contractors were able to provide appropriate protection for U.S. Government personnel, OIG found some problems associated with personal security specialist training, staffing gaps, and management of U.S. Government-furnished property. DS's compliance with OIG's formal and informal recommendations led to resolution of these issues. Finally, DS also took steps to ensure the appropriate assignment and maintenance of armored vehicles, improve the program for testing the skills of explosives detection canines, and enhance technical expertise in radio communication.

OIG is satisfied with DS's responses to its recommendations and its efforts to strengthen the WPPS II program. The bureau modified the WPPS II contract to incorporate updated requirements, and it has also included these updates and new initiatives in the new WPS contract. DS's actions indicate that the bureau recognizes problems and works toward resolution. This willingness to address management problems is important due to the unpredictable nature of protection and security demands in high threat areas, and the likelihood of new issues arising.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE

OIG received formal written comments from DS which are included in their entirety in Appendix III. Technical comments and updated information have been incorporated into the report as appropriate.

BACKGROUND

The first WPPS contract was awarded by the Department in March 2000 to DynCorp International (DynCorp) for personal protective services in the former Yugoslavia, with subsequent deployment of personnel to the Palestinian Territories in July 2002 and Afghanistan for the Karzai Protection Detail in November 2002. In 2004, the Department provided contracted personal security specialists to the U.S. Ambassador's protection detail in Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Group.⁴ In June 2005, a new contract, WPPS II, replaced the original, and was awarded to three private security firms, Blackwater (now called U.S. Training Center or USTC),⁵ DynCorp, and Triple Canopy, for personal protective services in Iraq. The Department had originally envisioned one security contractor for all of Iraq, but found that neither DynCorp nor Triple Canopy had the capacity to meet the needs of its ever-expanding mission. Thus, three firms were assigned protective duties in Iraq: DynCorp was responsible for the Northern region, including the major cities of Erbil and Kirkuk; Triple Canopy was assigned the South, including the port city of Basra; and Blackwater (now USTC) undertook protection in Baghdad and central Iraq.

Over the next several years, all three contractors provided personal protective services in their respective regions in Iraq to officials working at Embassy Baghdad, regional embassy offices, provincial reconstruction teams, and one regional reconstruction team. In August 2005, Triple Canopy was awarded a task order under the WPPS II contract to protect chief of mission personnel in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. In February 2006, Blackwater (now USTC) was granted a task order under the same contract to provide security in Afghanistan to the U.S. Ambassador and Embassy Kabul personnel, visitors on U.S. Government business, and individuals working with the U.S. Agency for International Development. Figure 1 below shows current staffing for each location under the WPPS II contract.

⁴ The Afghanistan Reconstruction Group, created by the National Security Council in 2004, brought high-ranking former U.S. private sector executives and U.S. Government employees to Embassy Kabul as advisors.

⁵ The entity formerly known as Erik Prince Investments is now called Xe. Its subsidiary, Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, held the WPPS II contract. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center has changed its name to the U.S. Training Center.

Figure 1: WPPS II Staffing as of April 2010

Location	Task Order	Contractor	Personal Security Specialists	Support Staff	Guards	Total Staff	Base or Option Year and Expiration Date
(b) (5)	12	Triple Canopy	474	(b) (5)			Base year; 5/7/2010
	7	Triple Canopy	59				Option year 3; 8/4/2010
	9	Dyn-Corp	79				Option year 3; 8/4/2010
	2	Triple Canopy	42				Option year 4; 9/27/2010
	4	USTC	129				Option year 3; 2/7/2010
	11	Dyn-Corp	96				Base year; 3/31/2010

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security

The total cost to the Department for task orders 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, and 12 (see Figure 1 for locations), was \$465.4 million in FY 2009 and \$418.3 million in FY 2010.⁶

MERO began its work in June 2008 with a review of the status of recommendations issued by the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq (hereinafter, the Panel). From June 2008 to November 2008, MERO conducted a performance audit of DS management of personal protective services in Iraq, as well as audits of Triple Canopy and DynCorp in Iraq. A performance audit of Triple Canopy in Jerusalem was carried out between November 2008 and February 2009. Finally, from February through May 2009, MERO conducted its sixth and final WPPS II performance audit examining USTC’s protective services in Afghanistan.

In its report, *Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations* (MERO-IQO-09-01), OIG reviewed the Department’s compliance with 18 recommendations made by the Panel to strengthen coordination, oversight, and accountability of Embassy Baghdad’s security practices. Of these recommendations, OIG found the Department had completed action on 11, was

⁶ These figures do not include DS funding for WPPS II aviation assets. The total amount decreased in FY 2010 due to the closure of the regional embassy office in Hillah, Iraq, in December 2009.

implementing four more, and was awaiting action by Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Government of Iraq to implement three. Table A in Appendix I includes updated information on the seven open recommendations in this report, as well as further action by DS on two closed recommendations.

A number of OIG recommendations were included in the abovementioned report as well as its five subsequent reports covering WPPS II performance audits. Figure 2 below shows the total number of OIG recommendations in these five reports, the issues they were designed to address, and the status of compliance. All recommendations were directed to DS except as noted. Table B in Appendix I includes a full listing of every WPPS II-related recommendation made by OIG in its five reports, the status of compliance, and OIG's analysis. In total, OIG issued 21 recommendations, 18 of which were directed to DS. At the time of this report, OIG had closed all 18 recommendations, based on compliance responses from DS.

Figure 2: OIG WPPS II-related Recommendations

Issue	Number of Related Recommendations	Status of Compliance
U.S. Government Direct-hire Staffing*	8**	Closed
Personnel Accountability – Muster Sheet Review	3	Closed
Personal Security Specialists Qualifications and Training	1	Closed
Contractor Staffing	3	Closed
Armored Vehicles	4***	Closed
Explosives Detection Canines	1	Closed
Radios	1	Closed

Source: OIG

*These issues were raised in all six reports; recommendations were included in four reports.

**Of 8 recommendations – 6 directed to DS; 1 directed to Bureau of Administration; and 1 directed to Embassy Baghdad.

***Of 4 recommendations – 1 directed to Embassy Baghdad.

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DIRECT-HIRE STAFFING AND MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTORS

U.S. GOVERNMENT DIRECT-HIRE STAFFING

Throughout its five performance audits of DS management and contractor performance under WPPS II, OIG noted several U.S. Government direct-hire staffing issues that weakened management and oversight of the contract. These problems were first noted during OIG's performance audit of DS's management of personal protective services in Iraq (*Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services, MERO-IQO-09-02*) and were evident in subsequent audits of Triple Canopy, DynCorp, and USTC. Specifically, OIG found the following: (1) direct-hire staffing shortages made worse by requiring overburdened RSOs to act as CORs while also carrying out their RSO-related security duties; (2) inadequate COR training before posting and insufficient guidance for CORs upon arrival; and (3) failure to maintain adequate contract files. Since the time of these reports, DS has worked to resolve these issues and strengthen contract management.

In its performance audits, OIG also pointed out that DS lacked written policies and procedures for managing security contractors. The bureau has now taken steps to establish guidance for overall security contract management. In November 2009, two technical writers were hired to gather information and draft guidelines for a handbook. These writers have begun meeting with relevant offices in DS and will travel to WPPS II countries to review programs on-site. The handbook is projected to take at least one year to publish. The written guidelines will cover the management of all security operations overseas and will broadly document procedures. This guidance will help CORs better manage and oversee WPPS II and future WPS contracts.

Staffing Shortages

OIG noted several issues that resulted in an inadequate number of DS agents to properly manage the WPPS II contract and oversee contractor performance. RSOs and assistant RSOs from DS who act as CORs normally rotate into posts for 12 months. During these one-year tours, due to the pressures of working in war zones or high-threat locales, RSOs may take up to two months off for rest and relaxation.

OIG found these periods of leave worsened problems associated with frequent staff turnover (e.g., lack of coordination and information sharing with incoming RSOs) and the time required to train new RSOs. Frequently, posts were short-staffed, and in some cases, although the few RSOs on duty were hard-working, they were often inexperienced. RSOs also noted they had pressing, primary responsibilities (e.g., post security or accompanying protection movements) that often took precedence over COR-related contract monitoring duties, meaning COR duties were not always fully executed.

DS indicated that over the course of 2009, it increased the number of U.S. Government direct-hire CORs in all WPPS II locations and will continue to examine staffing for overall program management. Since March 2009, a DS program representative has been continuously stationed in Iraq. One full-time COR and two alternates oversee contractors in Baghdad; the COR also travels to outlying locations, and four government technical monitors have been assigned to other posts in Iraq. DS anticipates a need for additional staffing, but the ability to increase the number of positions in FY 2010 and beyond depends in part on budget authorization and appropriations. In the future, beginning in FY 2011, DS officials believe more personnel will be needed in Iraq, as a result of the U.S. military drawdown in that country.

As of January 2010, DS had established and begun recruitment of eight new personal services contractor positions for COR support in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. DS stated it is most likely these individuals will have some combination of military, in-country, and security management experience. DS plans to provide the selectees with additional contract management training as necessary. The newly hired staff will augment the contract management and oversight capability of the U.S. Government direct-hire RSO/CORs and assist them in tasks such as daily reconciliation of muster sheets, tracking hours worked, and ensuring that personal security contractors adhere to specific standards of conduct. However, the direct-hire RSOs will remain the principals for COR-related duties.

DS has also increased staffing in its High Threat Protection Division, adding four new civil service positions to provide long-term security program expertise in areas such as operational and administrative oversight and training. These individuals frequently communicate with the CORs, review invoices, and conduct program management reviews. In addition, DS has hired two program analysts and a senior financial analyst (personal services contractors) for WPS operations. DS anticipates adding more positions in its High Threat Protection Division, once the FY 2010 budget authorization is complete. With these additions and conversions of other positions, the bureau believes it now has the correct mix of direct-hire staff and personal services contractors to oversee the WPS program.

Insufficient Training and Lack of In-country Guidance

OIG found that some RSOs acting as CORs in Iraq and Jerusalem believed they were not adequately prepared to effectively monitor WPPS II contractors. In interviews conducted during the performance audits, a few RSOs and assistant RSOs indicated that COR training, consisting of one 40-hour course offered at the Foreign Service Institute, was insufficient to prepare them for their duties. Additionally, some RSOs found the COR checklists provided by DS lacking necessary detail.

In January 2010, DS reported to OIG that COR training for DS agents has evolved since the beginning of WPPS II, and now more specifically addresses security program management and oversight as well as local guard contracts. All RSOs are required to take a one-week course specially tailored for DS agents entitled “How to be a Contracting Officer’s Representative.” This course provides a solid foundation of knowledge about COR responsibilities and prepares personnel for WPPS II-related duties in-country. All RSO/CORs also take country-specific cultural awareness training courses. DS agents with contract oversight responsibilities are certified CORs who must renew their certification every two years. In addition, DS has created more detailed checklists outlining COR responsibilities for WPPS II task orders, which can be altered by the RSO in coordination with the bureau, as circumstances change. Checklists must be completed every month and are sent to the DS program office for validation. The program office also works closely with RSOs acting as CORs in the field and holds one-on-one discussions during quarterly program reviews.

Inadequate Contract Files

In some cases, OIG found WPPS II contract-related files left for incoming CORs lacked basic documents required by Federal Acquisition Regulations and were not properly maintained. These incomplete files failed to provide enough guidance for the new CORs and weakened contract oversight and management. However, DS reported in January 2010 that contract files are now more comprehensive. Since RSO/CORs change relatively often, for continuity in the field, DS is ensuring that all essential documents including task orders, contract modifications, program management reviews, and program office policies and instructions, are posted on a SharePoint^{®7} Web site where all staff members in the program office and abroad can access them.

⁷ Microsoft’s SharePoint[®] software enables document and information sharing through a Web site. Templates can be set up so that groups can share documents, calendars, announcements, and postings.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY – MUSTER SHEET REVIEW

In all of its performance audits OIG found that muster sheets recording the presence of personal security specialists were verified by contracted project managers, sent to contractor headquarters in the United States, and then to the Department for payment, without review or validation by an in-country U.S. Government direct-hire staff member. In most cases, RSO/CORs were not asked to review the muster sheets until after their transmission to the United States. Without verification by direct-hire staff prior to submission, it was not possible to determine whether payments made to these firms were justified and appropriate. Therefore, to properly substantiate invoices, OIG recommended that completed muster sheets be reviewed and validated by appropriate U.S. Government direct-hire in-country personnel before being sent to the contractors' headquarters for processing.

By the spring of 2009, DS had begun a multi-layered approach to ensure accurate accounting of personal security specialists' presence. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jerusalem, DS installed the Joint Asset Management Movement System (JAMMS), which is interoperable with the Department of Defense's Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system.⁸ JAMMS uses barcode readers as an independent means of tracking contracted personal security specialists' daily movements, as well as use of facilities and supplies. All personal security specialists working under WPPS II contracts and task orders are required to scan their letter of authorization and use the JAMMS barcode readers. These readers have been installed in Iraq, Jerusalem, and Afghanistan; the system will come online in Pakistan when the contracted installers receive their visas. JAMMS is used in Iraq (Baghdad, Tallil, and Erbil) and in Kabul, Afghanistan. In Jerusalem, DS is coordinating with the Department of Defense to enter personal security specialists into the system.

DS reported that it has strengthened the review process for muster sheets. DS special agents continue to use daily sign-in sheets to complement JAMMS in Tallil, Erbil, and Kabul, and until JAMMS is operational, rely solely on muster sheets verified by daily sign-in sheets in Jerusalem and Peshawar, Pakistan. Due to the large number of personal security specialists in Baghdad, JAMMS is the primary source of verification, but DS special agents also take daily roll calls. In Afghanistan, the WPPS II contractor, USTC, has installed its own biometric hand scanners, which are used

⁸ The SPOT system manages and tracks contractors and grantees deployed to war zones (Iraq and Afghanistan); it is used by contractors, civilian U.S. Government agencies, and the U.S. military. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, Section 861, required military and civilian agencies to report total number of personnel: 1) employed on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan; 2) performing security functions under contract; and 3) wounded and killed.

in addition to JAMMS for daily muster reports to the RSO. If a personal security specialist in Iraq or Afghanistan is on duty but unable to scan a barcode into JAMMS (e.g., when detailed to a protective security movement), a DS special agent fills out a daily exemption sheet to confirm with the RSO that the contracted staff member is on duty. Once the staff member's presence is confirmed, the RSO signs the exemption sheet. Appendix II contains examples of daily and monthly muster sheets and exemption sheets.

The WPPS II contract was modified to require the signature of the RSO, assistant RSO, or other U.S. Government designee on all monthly muster sheets. In all countries operating under the contract, RSOs receive daily sign-in sheets, review them on-site, reconcile them with weekly and then monthly muster sheets, and sign them before sending them back to the contractor. Once the contractors' headquarters receive the signed muster sheets, they are sent to DS with invoices. The DS program office in Washington, DC, performs a line-by-line verification of all monthly muster sheets before making payment to the contractors. Any unsigned muster sheets sent to DS are to be rejected and returned to the contractor. DS also provides written guidance to RSOs regarding muster sheet review to ensure continuity when staff members are replaced. OIG is satisfied that the process established by DS has enhanced the accuracy of personnel accountability and substantiates payment to the security contractors.

PERFORMANCE OF THE WPPS II CONTRACTORS

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

OIG found in its performance audits that all three contractors effectively ensured the safety of chief of mission personnel in Iraq, Jerusalem, and Afghanistan. No one under the protection of personal security specialists has been injured or killed as a consequence of hostile actions. The contractors provide experienced personal security specialists who are properly screened, adequately trained before their arrival, and once in-country, are required to attend continuing professional education courses. OIG noted in particular that they received proper training in the use of deadly force, and specialists showed a commendable record of restraint in this important area.

PERSONAL SECURITY SPECIALISTS' QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

The Department requires each contracted private security firm to provide individuals with specific experience and training. DS reviews and approves candidates for key leadership positions, and the contractor certifies that all other personnel meet contract requirements. Personal security specialists must have at least one year of experience in the U.S. military, the Secret Service, federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other law enforcement organizations. These specialists are required by the WPPS II contract to have specific qualifications and experience. The contract also stipulates the types of training facilities and instructors to be used. DS provides the course materials and approves all contractor-developed lesson plans. DS also carries out regular, unannounced inspections of all training programs and facilities and approves all vendor-provided trainers. Under the current WPPS II contract, personal security specialists complete 167 hours of pre-deployment instruction in courses including terrorist operations, protective security advances, cultural awareness, and radio procedures.

In all of its WPPS II audits, OIG found that nearly all personal security specialists had experience in the U.S. military (often in Special Forces units), law enforcement, or both. The specialists were adequately trained before arriving in-country, and appropriate courses were regularly taken after arriving. In these audits, OIG found only two issues related to training. In Afghanistan, USTC personal security specialists were taking cultural awareness training designed for Iraq. However, when informed by OIG, DS corrected this weakness before the report was issued by switching the course focus from Iraqi to Afghan culture. Personal security specialists in Afghanistan also reported that they were not being trained in the appropriate protective movement (motorcade) procedures for that country. DS began rectifying this problem once it was pointed out by OIG during the performance audit. Before deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, all WPPS II personnel are required to take cultural awareness training covering topics such as ethnic groups, regional religions, government and political leaders, the role of women, and proper conduct.

(b) (5)



Over the past 18 months, DS has taken steps to ensure that training of personal security specialists is appropriate and up-to-date. In October 2008, after a comprehensive curriculum review, the bureau certified all WPPS II vendor lesson plans. Further, prior to publishing the WPS solicitation, DS completed a top-to-bottom review of WPPS II standards. The bureau has revised personal security specialist labor categories, as well as security contractor training programs. The comprehensive standards review included inspection of training sites, facilities, and instructors, as well as course evaluations. Following the review, all three contractors were recertified—DynCorp in September 2008, USTC in December 2008, and Triple Canopy in March 2009. DS re-inspections of all three programs are underway and were scheduled for completion in the spring of 2010. DS also conducts routine program management reviews and unannounced training inspections at training facilities in the United States and overseas.

CONTRACTOR STAFFING

In the *Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations*, OIG reviewed the status of a recommendation from the Panel aimed at addressing a gap in contractor personnel; specifically, a lack of translators/interpreters. The Panel had recommended that, to prevent miscommunication, the private security firms provide translators for protective movements. In its review, OIG found that DS had modified the WPPS II contract to require eight personal security specialists who were translators/interpreters to serve in Iraq. OIG verified the deployment of Arabic speakers on every protective movement. At the time, the RSO, DS special agents, and the security contractors indicated that these language-qualified staff members enhanced their ability to deal with the Iraqi public and local police. More recently, DS noted that translators have helped security personnel better understand cultural norms in all WPPS II contract countries. In January 2010, DS confirmed that a mix of personal security specialists, local nationals, and third country nationals serve as translators/interpreters: 1 in Tallil; 13 in Erbil; 3 in Baghdad, in addition to 20 employed by the Embassy who may be used by the regional security office when and where necessary. There are 10 translators/interpreters in Kabul and 10 in Peshawar. In Jerusalem, locally employed staff members accompany protective movements as interpreters/translators.

OIG also found that contractors had problems filling certain labor categories including emergency medical technicians, marksmen, and canine handlers. However, when this problem was first raised in early 2009, DS confirmed it had been taking financial deductions for personnel positions not filled by the security firms, as required by the contract; DS has continued this practice. Further, DS noted it regularly assesses personnel requirements to meet changing personal protection needs. RSOs must determine the number and type of personnel needed for different protective services as required by the contract. For example, the ratio of shift leaders to team members may vary depending on the type of motorcade required. Finally, DS noted that use of daily and monthly muster certification sheets in Erbil, Tallil, and Kabul allows the RSO to track staffing levels in required labor categories.

MANAGEMENT OF U.S. GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED PROPERTY

With only two exceptions, OIG found that U.S. Government-furnished property used by security contractors was being properly inventoried and adequately stored and protected. In one case in Iraq, a personal services contractor was overseeing USTC administrative logistics security specialists controlling U.S. Government

property.⁹ OIG recommended that a U.S. Government direct-hire employee be hired, and in comments on the report, DS indicated that since OIG's site visit, a direct-hire DS special agent had been managing and overseeing logistics office personnel. (b) (5)



⁹ See pp. 17-19 of *Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-02.

¹⁰ See p. 17 of *Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-03.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

ARMORED VEHICLES

In its performance audits in Iraq, Jerusalem, and Afghanistan, OIG noted several problems related to the armored vehicles provided by the U.S. Government to contractors. Generally, the vehicles were unsuited to the rough terrain in all three locations. In addition, in some areas and for various reasons, maintenance facilities were unable to make even routine and/or adequate repairs in a timely manner, resulting in excessive downtime for the vehicles. Finally, at the Tallil Airbase, personal security specialists were putting unnecessary wear and tear on expensive armored vehicles by using them for administrative tasks on the protected base.

In response to OIG's recommendations, DS reported that in March 2008 and April 2009, it had conducted full program reviews of the armored vehicle program in Iraq and continued to provide guidance on safety, operation, and maintenance of vehicles. The bureau also noted that the mission-appropriate armored vehicles in Iraq were capable of handling the terrain and providing protection. (b) (5)

In discussions with OIG in January 2010, DS noted that contractor staff members at the Tallil Airbase in Iraq are now using older armored vehicles for administrative functions. Since these vehicles have already been pulled out of service due to age, their use does not affect ongoing and future protection movements. One of OIG's recommendations regarding the distance of an armored vehicle maintenance facility was directed to Embassy Baghdad,¹¹ and the Embassy has since contracted with a local vehicle maintenance vendor to resolve this issue. Based on information provided by DS in May 2010 regarding wheel rims on vehicles in Afghanistan, OIG closed a final recommendation related to armored vehicles.

¹¹ See p. 7 of *Performance Audit of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq*, MERO-IQO-09-06.

EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINES

In Afghanistan, OIG found several weaknesses in the contractor's explosives detection testing procedures for canines. USTC was not testing for all scents required by its contract, was using old materials instead of necessary fresh scents, and was improperly storing explosive testing substances which might have resulted in cross contamination. However, in early 2010, DS took steps to improve its explosives detection canine program. According to DS, USTC is now testing for all [REDACTED] scents required by the contract. Further, to improve the overall program, the bureau engaged an expert in this field to conduct a comprehensive review of canine testing. By January 2010, this expert had examined canine acquisition, training, and standards at domestic locations. He was in Kabul, Afghanistan from March 28-31, 2010 and in Iraq from May 23-June 1, 2010 to review protocols for training standards and canine proficiency as well as storage of equipment and testing supplies, and to field test all canines to ensure compliance with contract performance standards. At the time OIG's report was issued, the expert's final report was still pending, but DS had incorporated several changes and lessons learned into the program, including a contract modification to clarify handling and storage protocols for explosive sampling scents; new storage lockers that meet the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives standards; use of the National Odor Recognition Test; and the establishment of a dedicated subject matter expert position in the program office. In Afghanistan, explosives are now stored in individual, rubber sealed, air tight containers. Finally, USTC is seeking fresh explosives for testing and is also encouraging the use of non-hazardous testing substitutes.

RADIOS

To enhance coordination between protection teams and military elements in Iraq, the Panel had recommended the Department acquire a certain model of hand-held radio. In the *Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations*, OIG noted that the embassy had received and distributed a different model of radio and was still having communications problems. Thus, OIG recommended that DS acquire dedicated tactical communication expertise to help field and evaluate a tactical radio communication system. (b) (5)

[REDACTED] Con-
sequently, the radios were only used, if at all, for "line of sight" communication in Baghdad and Tallil. The radio technician in Baghdad was in the process of ordering modification kits at a cost of \$17,500 per radio. At the same time, the OIG team in

Kirkuk discovered that a staff member had modified the frequency and successfully used the radios at no added cost. OIG requested that the RSO in Kirkuk inform the RSO and the WPPS project manager in Baghdad about the solution used in Kirkuk and directed them to stop the order for modification kits. The frequency modification procedure was then distributed to Baghdad and throughout Iraq. These actions saved the U.S. Government more than \$2 million that it was planning to spend on the modification kits. In March 2009, DS reported it had filled positions for a tactical radio program manager and a tactical radio instructor.

LOOKING AHEAD - WORLDWIDE PROTECTIVE SERVICES

WPPS II CONTRACT MODIFICATIONS

DS modified the WPPS II contract eight times to resolve problems OIG found regarding contract management and oversight and contractor performance. During development of the WPS contract, DS has incorporated “lessons learned” from the previous two WPPS contracts. All issues already addressed in WPPS II through modifications will be included in WPS. Further, DS has indicated that the WPS contract can also be modified should unforeseen issues arise. Figure 3 shows WPPS II contract modifications related to OIG’s findings and recommendations; these modifications were incorporated between late 2007 and early 2010.

Figure 3: WPPS II Contract Modifications, November 2007-February 2010

New Requirement	Modification number	Date
Personal security specialist interpreters	12	11/20/2007
Video recording equipment in vehicles	14	2/11/2008
Interview policy ^a	16	5/14/2008
Weapons discharge policy ^b	16	5/14/2008
Contractor personnel data (use of SPOT)	16	5/14/2008
Cultural awareness training	17	7/8/2008
Combating trafficking in persons (TIP) ^c	21	6/22/2009
Medical conditions ^d	22	9/15/2009
(b) (5)	24	12/18/2009
Muster sheets	26	2/18/2010

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security

^a Each employee must read and sign an interview policy stating that he or she will not be removed from a contract based on refusal to answer questions regarding work under the contract except where the individual has been advised in writing that neither his/her statement nor anything derived from it can be used against the individual in a criminal proceeding, other than prosecution for providing false statements.

^b Any individual under the WPPS II contract who discharges a weapon during a serious incident will surrender the weapon and ammunition to the regional security office armorer. The senior regional security officer will decide whether to reissue weapons or reassign duties. If the Department of Justice accepts a case for investigation, work status will be determined by the senior regional security officer in consultation with the Department of Justice and DS. The Department reserves the right to have the employee indefinitely removed from the contract if the investigation involves alleged or actual criminal activity.

^c A clause on combating TIP is required by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 52.222-50).

^d The modification removes the requirement that an employee must be free from communicable disease. Additionally, “A qualified candidate may not have a medical condition that would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others, or that, with or without reasonable accommodation, would prevent the individual from performing the duties of the job.” The modification includes several factors to be considered when assessing medical fitness.

WORLDWIDE PROTECTIVE SERVICES CONTRACT

The WPS contract will include protection needs to be provided by personal security specialists, static guard forces, and emergency response teams. The contract will address several issues raised during the WPPS II era and will also include revisions based on modifications of the WPPS II contract (see Figure 3 above).

First, there will be updated, standardized, and clear standards of conduct for all personal security specialists. DS has conducted a thorough review of the standards of conduct clauses in contracts for WPPS II, the Baghdad Embassy Security Force, and the Kabul Embassy Security Force and has developed a revised set of standards. These standards include a prohibition on alcohol consumption in all locations where expatriate or third country national personal security specialists and guards live in camps, updated drug testing requirements, and a more comprehensive set of reporting requirements to address incidents of misconduct. Second, personal security specialists will be required to undertake an increased amount of overall training and country-specific cultural awareness training. The number of required training hours has been raised from 167 to 278. Personal security specialists will receive the same training as DS special agents prior to working in high threat locations. Additional courses will include tactical communications, helicopter operations, new weapons systems, vehicle control, and barricade breaching. There will also be a 20-hour final training exercise. Third, DS has established revised labor category descriptions. The bureau will require industry standard certifications in certain professional categories (e.g., program managers, canine handlers, and emergency medical technicians). Fourth, all personal security specialists will be required to obtain proper medical clearances. Medical fitness will be assessed according to the guidelines in modification 22 of the WPPS II contract. Finally, the contract will include weapons discharge policies for all contractor personnel as established by the Diplomatic Security Firearms Policy and Review Board, the Foreign Affairs Manual (12 FAM 023), and modification 16 of the WPPS II contract.

In general, the WPS contract will also ensure that the appropriate number of translators accompany all protection movements; video recording equipment is installed in all protective vehicles; SPOT is used to improve monitoring of personal security specialists; and an increased use of information technology, including Blue Force Tracker systems.¹² The WPS contract will also include a trafficking in persons (TIP) clause.¹³

¹² The Blue Force Tracker system consists of a computer, satellite antenna, and Global Positioning System receiver. The system displays the location of the host vehicle or aircraft on the computer's display map, along with other platforms in their respective locations.

¹³ The required TIP clause states that contractors shall not engage in any severe forms of trafficking in persons, procurement of commercial sex acts, or use of forced labor.

CONCLUSION

OIG's intent throughout these performance reviews was to identify actual or potential problems and recommend means for resolving them. DS was responsive to OIG's recommendations to strengthen the WPPS II program, both during and shortly after these performance audits. The bureau has continued to work on improving management and oversight of the WPPS II contract and task orders. DS's actions have enhanced contract oversight and management, sharpened the focus on and improved the validation of contractor performance, and resulted in new policies and procedures. The bureau has adapted the current contract and task orders and incorporated updates into the WPS contract. Personal protection requirements in volatile areas of the world will continue to change rapidly and unpredictably and will need to be adjusted as circumstances demand. DS's actions over the past 18 months suggest the bureau is willing to correct problems, capable of finding solutions, and is poised to respond quickly to future challenges to ensure the safety of U.S. Government personnel. OIG will continue its oversight of the WPS program as it is implemented to assist DS in its efforts to meet these challenges.

ABBREVIATIONS

COR	contracting officer's representative
Department	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
JAMMS	Joint Asset Management Movement System
MERO	Middle East Regional Office
OIG	Office of Inspector General
Panel	Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq
RSO	regional security officer
SPOT	Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker
TIP	trafficking in persons
USTC	U.S. Training Center
WPPS II	second Worldwide Personal Protective Services
WPS	Worldwide Protective Services

APPENDIX I


Table A

Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations, MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008: Open Panel Recommendations, Two Closed Panel Recommendations, Department of State Response, OIG Comment and Analysis, and Updated Information*

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
OPEN Panel Recommendations		
<p>2. The State Department should urgently engage with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of Management and Budget, and then with Congress, to establish a clear legal basis for holding contractors accountable under U.S. law., p. 15</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> The Department of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser actively engaged with an interagency working group, led by the DOJ, to work with Congress on legislation clarifying the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) in order to hold U.S. Government private security contractors overseas accountable for offenses. Ultimately, these efforts proved unsuccessful. The Secretary of State wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee urging legislation on this issue. The Department will continue to monitor the status of this legislation, and advocate for its enactment.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> OIG views the Department’s actions as a serious effort to resolve difficult legal/sovereignty issues. An interagency working group drafted legislation to expand the MEJA to hold private security contractors working overseas accountable for criminal offenses they commit in their official capacities. The Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor will stay engaged in this process until the legislation is passed. Full implementation of this recommendation will not be completed until a later date.</p>	<p><u>Department Update</u> On Oct. 4, 2007, Rep. David Price, D-N.C., sponsored the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 (HR 2740), which passed the House. However, the bill never went further. On February 2, 2010, the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) of 2010 (HR 4567) “to provide accountability for the criminal acts of Federal contractors and employees outside the United States, and for other purposes” was introduced in the House by Rep. Price. On Apr 26, 2010, HR 4567 was referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced a CEJA bill (S 2979) in the Senate on February 2, 2010, where it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Office of the Legal Advisor continues to monitor the progress of these bills.</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
<p>3. The Department of State should work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine how to commence discussions with the Government of Iraq on a new regulatory framework for Personal Protective Services contractors. p.16</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> The Department and the Department of Defense have discussed plans for a new Iraqi regulatory framework. While draft legislation regarding PPS contractors has been discussed, the Government of Iraq has not implemented a new regulatory framework for PPS contractors. U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior continue to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a Strategic Framework Agreement, which may also impact PPS contractors to the U.S. Government.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> With the UN mandate set to expire at the end of 2008, negotiations of a SOFA with the Government of Iraq were concluded and an agreement was signed. The SOFA is intended to clarify the terms under which the U.S. military is allowed to operate in Iraq and includes legal issues associated with individuals and property. The negotiation of a long-term security pact had slowed over Iraqi concerns the agreement will infringe upon Iraqi sovereignty, including civil and criminal jurisdiction over private security contractors. Relevant terms of the SOFA could be codified in new legislation that will replace the current legacy law of Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (revised). Embassy officials anticipate the new Iraqi law on armed security contractors will be passed by early 2009. Full implementation of this recommendation will not be completed until a later date. This recommendation is open.</p>	<p><u>Department Update</u> On November 17, 2008, the U.S. Government and the Government of Iraq signed two agreements, “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” and “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq.” However, neither agreement included any terms or conditions related to civilian personal security contractors, and neither offered privileges or immunity to such contractors. Security contractors are required to obtain a license to operate in Iraq from the Government of Iraq, and personal security contractors working in the country are subject to Iraqi law.</p>

(b) (7)(A)



Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
<p>6. The regional security office should be provided with additional Department of State special agents so that an assistant regional security officer (A/RSO) can accompany each personal protective security movement. The State Department should ensure that each A/RSO completes an Iraq-specific orientation program., p.17</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> 45 new full time employee DS special agent positions were created for Iraq. Currently, 24 of these new positions are staffed at post and the remaining DS agents are completing high threat training. Additionally, the regional security office staff is currently augmented by 16 temporary duty DS personnel. All DS special agents complete Iraq-specific training at the DS training center and Foreign Service Institute prior to deployment.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> As of December 3, 2008, 45 new agents had begun their tours, bringing the total number of special agents to 81. Iraq-specific training is being performed. According to senior embassy officials, there are still not sufficient numbers of special agents to accompany all protection movements. The high operational tempo is pushing performance limits.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u> In early 2010, DS verified there are 81 DS special agents in Iraq and a request for 24 special agent positions in 2011.</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
<p>10. The regional security office should be provided video and audio recording equipment for each security vehicle, audio recording equipment in the tactical operations center to record all radio transmissions; and computer enhancements to record all Blue Force Tracking (BFT) Data., p. 20</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> To date (July 2008), video recording systems have been installed into 191 mission vehicles throughout Iraq. The remaining installations have been funded and are planned for completion by December 2008. Each protective mission now includes a vehicle with video recording capability. Protective vehicle video camera installations have been institutionalized. All new vehicles are now being hard-wired for video recording capability in the assembly line process. The radio recording system in Baghdad's tactical operations center is operational, and all embassy radio transmissions are recorded. (b) (5)</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> The contract was modified on February 11, 2008, to provide for installation of video recording equipment into vehicles. OIG verified that at least one vehicle with a camera is assigned to each movement team. Post-production retrofitting of security vehicles with cameras, trackers, and communication equipment has not been conducted in a timely or efficient manner.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u> All radio transmissions-communications data between the regional security office tactical operations center and the protective security detail are recorded in Baghdad and Erbil. In Tallil, the tactical operations center does not electronically record radio transmissions. The regional security office does maintain an electronic log of transmissions for all missions.</p> <p>As of January 2010, DS had completed 254 mobile video installs in Iraq. While the original tasking was to do 200, DS has been tasked and funded to do an additional 216 installs. Material for the additional 216 has been ordered and is en route to Baghdad.</p> <p>Post has the ability to recreate timed events using data from the BFT system. All BFT data is now archived and retrievable and all or one tracker can be recalled and its history can be played in a graphic display overlay of the Google imagery platform.</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
<p>15. Coordination with Multi-National Force-Iraq elements could be further enhanced if the pending order for (b) (5) [redacted] radios were received. The Department of State should intervene, including with DOD as necessary, to obtain these units., p. 24</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> Post received (b) (5) [redacted] All radios have been loaded and configured with DOD-compatible channels and were distributed to regional security office protective security teams.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> Post received (b) (5) [redacted]</p> <p>OIG recommends that DS acquire dedicated tactical communication expertise. DS concurred there is a need for dedicated DS tactical communications expertise and established two personal services contractor positions to assist RSO Baghdad with its tactical radio communications program. One position will serve as a tactical radio program manager to manage the DS countrywide tactical radio communications program and coordinate communications architecture and interoperability issues with the Department of Defense and the Bureau of Information Resource Management. The other PSC position will be tactical radio instructor to provide basic and refresher training on tactical radio systems to DS personnel. With the identification of viable candidates, DS is processing their security clearances and ensuring completion of the mandatory Department training for Iraq. With the identification of two tactical radio specialists and their planned deployment to Iraq the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u> DS is actively pursuing an inter-governmental partnership with the Space and Naval Warfare Center, Atlantic, (SPAWAR) to design and support a comprehensive Tactical Radio Communications Infrastructure for Iraq and Afghanistan that is independent of but wholly interoperable with the Department of Defense.</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
<p>16. When the “Go Team” is not involved in investigating incidents, it should be employed in pattern analysis. DS in Washington should provide the regional security office with a relational database to be used to review incidents and determine potential patterns. Such a database would include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Date and time of incident2. Destination and GPS coordinates3. GPS coordinates of incident4. Mission identifier5. Vehicle identification numbers6. Incident type7. Names of all security personnel involved and their assignments in the motorcade8. Such other details as would be useful <p>Data on each event would be input promptly after it occurs. Weekly reports should be generated to look for potential patterns that would call for systemic or individual changes., p. 26</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> Pattern analysis software was identified, tested, modified, and Beta tested. Software was tested locally through May 2008 and milestones were met. The software was deployed to Baghdad June 19, 2008, and is undergoing various forms of testing with hardwire and encrypted radio networks. Based on feedback from the field, deployment of the finalized version of pattern analysis software from headquarters with full operational capability is expected by December 2008. As an interim measure the “Go Team” keeps multiple spreadsheets to track and conduct pattern analysis and to identify potential patterns as well as to review incidents.</p> <p>(b) (5)</p> <p>Tests were being conducted on the system and embassy security officials hope to have results before December 2008.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u> Post has the capability to gather and analyze data by geographical area. The software has been deployed to Baghdad and is functional. However, it cannot be integrated to provide its fully functional capability because of network connectivity issues. (b) (5)</p> <p>(b) (5)</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
Two CLOSED Panel Recommendations		
<p>7. The WPPS contract should be amended to require the contractor to provide a limited number of Arabic language staff for use as needed., p. 18</p>	<p><u>Department response</u> The WPPS contract was modified to require eight (8) protective security specialist/translators, as requested by the regional security office, to serve throughout Iraq.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> The contract was modified on November 11, 2007, for each of the three contractors to require protective security specialists/translators. OIG verified the deployment of Arabic language staff. Regional security office agents and security contractor officials stated that the addition of language qualified staff has increased their effectiveness in dealing with the Iraqi public and local... police. This recommendation is CLOSED.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tallil has 1 personal security specialist translator and 3 third country national translators• Erbil has 2 personal security specialist translators, (b) (5) and 7 screener/interpreter positions on the guard contract• Baghdad has 3 personal security specialist translators, augmented by 20 interpreters employed by post who the regional security office has at its discretion; <p>(b) (5)</p>

Panel Recommendation	Department of State Response OIG Comment and Analysis as of December 2008	Updated Information
8. Additional training modules should be added under the WPPS contract to enhance the cultural awareness of assigned personnel, acquaint them with diplomatic structures and procedures, and familiarize them with Multi-National Force-Iraq tactics, techniques, and procedures., p. 19	<p><u>Department response</u> The WPPS contract was modified to require that all WPPS personnel complete the Iraq Cultural Awareness training program developed by the DS Training Center and the online “Working in an Embassy” course offered by the Foreign Service Institute.</p> <p><u>OIG comment and analysis</u> The contract was modified to require cultural awareness training in February 2008. The DS Training Center conducted WPPS contractor training and course CDs have been distributed to the security contractors. This recommendation is CLOSED.</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u> DS has implemented cultural awareness training for all WPPS personnel deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. WPPS vendors use a country-specific media presentation approved by the Diplomatic Security Training Center that runs 4 hours long. The following topics are covered during the training: Demographics, Ethnic Groups, Primary Languages, Regional Religions, Government and Political Leaders, Culture, Religious/Ethnic Attire, Role of Women, and Proper Conduct. All WPPS personnel are required to complete this training prior to deploying on task orders to either Iraq or Afghanistan. Additionally, all WPPS vendors are required to submit Training Status Reports documenting when the training occurred and who was trained.</p>

*Some information has been summarized and paraphrased by OIG as appropriate.

Chart B

OIG WPPS II-Related Recommendations, Status of Implementation,
and OIG Analysis*

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
U.S. Government Direct-hire Staffing		
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop a workforce plan to meet the current high operational tempo and expected increased requirements for personal protective services due to the anticipated drawdown of the U.S. military in Iraq.</p> <p>Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations (MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008), p. 7</p>	<p>DS concurred there is a need to review the current workforce plan. DS is currently assembling a team consisting of representatives from various DS directorates, including the Office of Regional Directors, the Office of Overseas Protective Operations, and DS Human Resources, to review staffing and management of the entire DS security program in Iraq. DS anticipates this team will travel to Iraq in mid-March.</p>	<p>With the assembly and planned travel of a DS team to review the security situation and workforce requirements in Iraq, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop a workforce plan for the High Threat Protection Division to fill staff vacancies and encourage retention of staff responsible for administering the WPPS contract.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>DS concurred with the recommendation and implemented several initiatives designed to address the staff vacancies and retention issues in the High Threat Protection Division. Most significantly, DS added four civil service positions to augment immediate staffing needs and help form a cadre of personnel in HTP to provide long-term program expertise in areas such as operational and administrative oversight and training. One of these positions is being used to convert the aviation program manager position which is currently filled by a personal service contractor (PSC). The remaining positions are designated for management and oversight of the ground task orders in Iraq. With these conversions and the new civil service positions, in addition to the current positions, staffing for the management and oversight of the Iraq task orders will have been sufficiently augmented and possess the right balance of direct hire, PSCs and contractor positions.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>All four civil service positions are currently filled and being used to provide program management support to task orders in Iraq. DS hired two PSC Program Analysts; one who will provide support and expertise to the Afghanistan task order and one who will serve as the chief in our Operations Center to oversee the processing and tracking of WPPS personnel. Additionally, we hired a Senior Financial Analyst, dedicated to providing financial oversight to all WPPS operations. Once the FY 2010 position authorization is complete, DS anticipates additional civil service and foreign service positions to be established in the High Threat Protection Division. These positions will be further augmented by the PSC-14 CORs who will reside at post.</p> <p>With the anticipated new positions, the High Threat Protection Division's breakout of personnel is as follows: 10 civil service, 6 foreign service, 15 PSC, and 13 third party contractors.</p>	<p>With the establishment of a U.S Government direct-hire position to conduct operational and administrative oversight and training and the conversion of third-party contractors to direct PSC positions, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>2. The Bureau of Administration should develop a workforce plan for the Acquisitions Management Division to ensure sufficient staff to oversee the WPPS contract, including assigning a dedicated contracting officer to Embassy Baghdad to provide proper oversight of WPPS contractor activities.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>A/LM/AQM is in discussions with Diplomatic Security regarding the appropriate support on the ground in Iraq. A/LM/AQM recognizes the requirement has identified funding and will coordinate with DS regarding how to delineate tasks to be performed in Iraq by a contracting officer and contracting officer's representatives. In addition, A/LM/AQM is actively working on a plan to put in place an independent contracting officer to reside in A/LM/AQM/WWD to focus exclusively on the DS WPPS contracts (support of current contract and task order administration, ongoing task order competitions, and the new RFP for the re-competition of the base WPPS III contracts. The plan is to be implemented early in the first quarter of FY 2010.</p>	<p>The Bureau of Administration has responded that it intends to put in place an independent contracting officer to focus on WPPS contracts in the first quarter of FY 2010. This recommendation remains OPEN pending verification that the plan described by A has been implemented. Response was due 10/29/2009; A bureau has been notified of overdue compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>3. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign dedicated contracting officer's representatives to Embassy Baghdad and Regional Embassy Offices to provide proper oversight of WPPS contractor activities.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>DS concurred with this recommendation and initiated a plan to establish a continuous presence of rotating temporary duty CORs to support RSO Baghdad. Since March 18, 2009, DS has maintained a COR from the High Threat Protection Division (HTP) in Iraq, fulltime, to work with RSO Baghdad and oversee WPPS contractor activities. The position is being staffed by direct-hire and PSC personnel on a rotating temporary duty basis. One HTP employee will be present in-country at all times, based in Baghdad and travelling to outlying locations. In response to the OIG recommendation, DS added a new COR within DS/IP/OPO and the three new civil service program managers will be designated as assistant CORs upon their arrival.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>The program office has maintained the presence of a program office representative in Iraq continuously since March 2009. In addition, the program office has established and begun recruiting for eight new PSC-14 positions to act as CORs and will live in-country and provide constant and direct contract oversight at each task order location. These positions will not replace the RSO CORs or government technical monitors, but will augment and assist those DS officers to ensure full compliance with all contract requirements. The PSC CORs will live in the same facility as the contract employees, will assist with muster sheet verification, will confirm qualifications of personnel, hours worked, living conditions (to the extent that they are required by contract), adherence to standards of conduct, inventory control verifications and other contract oversight needs as directed by DS and the RSO COR or [direct-hire] government technical monitor.</p>	<p>With the assignment of a dedicated COR to Baghdad, including the establishment of three new civil service managers designated as assistant CORs, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>4. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and publish standards, policies and procedures for managing private security contractors in the Foreign Affairs Handbook, similar to those created for Local Guard and Residential Security programs.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>DS concurred with this recommendation. DS/IP/OPO developed a scope of work to direct technical writers for the development of a handbook for managing private security contractors performing high threat protective operations. DS hired two technical writers. DS projects that the information gathering and writing process will take at least a year, with additional time required for the clearance and publishing process.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u> A senior technical writer and staff writer began work on November 9, 2009. The writers will develop and publish policies, and procedures for managing high threat protective operations in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH). They have begun work, meeting with relevant offices, holding meetings with desk officers in DS's High Threat Protection (HTP) division, and opening lines of communication with individuals having specialized knowledge in FAM and FAH writing. They will also travel to the WPPS II countries to review the programs on the ground.</p>	<p>OIG verified the hiring of the two writers to develop and publish the standards for managing private security contractors in the Foreign Affairs Handbook. Understanding the actual development and subsequent publication will take additional time; DS actions meet the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>
<p>5. Embassy Baghdad should assign a U.S. Government direct-hire employee to supervise and approve the work completed by the RSO's Logistics Office.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>Embassy Baghdad has put in place an assistant regional security officer who is a U.S. Government direct-hire employee and who has supervisory responsibility for the logistics office.</p>	<p>Based on OIG's verification that this individual has assumed responsibility, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>2. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should better define required contracting officer's representative duties, ensure contract management and invoice reviews are performed on-site, and provide additional contracting officer's representative training opportunities.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Jerusalem (MERO-IQO-09-05, May 2009), p. 7</p>	<p>DS concurs with this recommendation. DS/IP/OPO/HTP has provided the contracting officer's representative (COR) in Jerusalem with specific checklists to outline their responsibilities and for monitoring contractor performance.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u> DS is changing procedures to ensure that the RSO COR validate muster sheets prepared by Triple Canopy on-site before they are submitted back to Washington for payment.</p> <p>The CORs for the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract in Jerusalem are required to have completed the Department's one-week COR course. The Department's COR course provides a solid foundation of COR knowledge for the duties these DS Agents are expected to fulfill while assigned in Jerusalem. DS/IP/OPO/HTP is coordinating with the regional security office in Jerusalem to determine the specific areas of additional guidance the office needs for its COR.</p>	<p>With the development of a checklist outlining COR responsibilities to monitor contractor performance and requiring that all CORs complete the Department's one-week COR course, as well as the possibility of additional guidance, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should assign a dedicated Contracting Officer's Representative to Embassy Kabul to provide proper oversight of contractor activities under the second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract with U.S. Training Center.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 6</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>The program office has established and has begun recruiting for eight new PSC-14... positions to act as CORs and will live in-country and provide constant and direct contract oversight at each WPPS II task order location. These positions will not replace the RSO CORs or government technical monitors but will augment and assist those DS officers to ensure full compliance with all contract requirements. The PSC CORs will live in the same facility as the contract employees, will assist with muster sheet verification, will confirm qualifications of personnel, hours worked, living conditions (to the extent that they are required by contract), adherence to standards of conduct, inventory control verifications and other contract oversight needs as directed by DS and the RSO COR or government technical monitor.</p>	<p>Recommendations to resolve similar issues are included in the Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), and therefore OIG is not requiring a formal response from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to this recommendation. (p. 7)</p> <p>In response to similar recommendations in MERO-IQO-09-02 and other WPPS II reports, DS has increased the number of CORs overseeing the WPPS II contract and associated task orders. DS now also ensures that all muster sheets used for contractor personnel accountability are reviewed, reconciled, and verified on-site by U.S. Government direct-hire personnel. Based on the actions taken by DS, Recommendation 1 is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Personnel Accountability - Muster Sheet Review		
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that regional security officers at Consulate General Jerusalem review and verify the accuracy of muster sheets prepared by Triple Canopy before they are submitted to Triple Canopy program management and subsequently to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the United States.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Jerusalem (MERO-IQO-09-05, May 2009), p. 7</p>	<p>DS concurs with this recommendation. Currently, the contracting officer's representative (COR) in the program office for the Worldwide Personal Protective Service contract (DS/IP/OPO/HTP) sends Triple Canopy invoices to the RSO COR for review and receives RSO COR clearance before approving payment.</p> <p>DS has instructed Triple Canopy that effective July 1 all personnel must initial a muster sheet daily to confirm their presence in-country and availability for duty. These muster sheets will be provided to the RSO monthly for review and signature and be used to prepare the muster sheet that accompanies the monthly labor invoice. DS/IP/OPO/HTP will continue to submit the invoices to the RSO COR for review and clearance prior to approving payment.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>The RSO/COR requires each employee to initial a muster book each day. This book is reconciled daily by the RSO/COR and again monthly before signing the muster sheets. JAMMS has been installed, but the DS program office (DS/OPO/HTP) is coordinating further with DoD regarding the entry of personnel in Jerusalem into SPOT and access issues from Israel for RSO and Triple Canopy personnel. When fully functional, JAMMS will be used as a supplemental verification of the signed muster book, and can be accessed by the program office in Washington as well as by the COR in Jerusalem. The final, monthly muster sheet, once reconciled, is then signed by the RSO/COR and returned by Triple Canopy's in-country program manager to his headquarters for processing and subsequent submission to the program office with the monthly labor invoice. The program office then conducts an independent, line item by line item verification of the invoice, before approving it for payment. The RSO also provides a scanned copy of the completed muster book to the DS program office each month.</p>	<p>With the RSO COR clearing on all Triple Canopy invoices before payment and the requirement of all Triple Canopy personnel initialing muster sheets on a daily basis to confirm their presence in country, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>2. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that its special agents at Regional Reconstruction Team Erbil review and verify the accuracy of muster sheets prepared by DynCorp before the sheets are sent to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security contracting officer's representative.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-06, June 2009), p. 7</p>	<p>DS Update</p> <p>The regional security office has implemented the use of Daily and Monthly Muster Certification sheets, similar to those created by regional security office in Kabul, to support muster sheet reviews. The daily sheet is completed after reconciling it against the JAMMS report. Contractors who may not be present to scan their letter of authorization into JAMMS on a given day are entered into the daily exemption authorization signed by the RSO. The RSO maintains all the supporting documentation on file, including the daily reconciliation. The RSO uses the daily reconciliation sheets to support the final monthly muster sheet review. Once the RSO is satisfied that services invoiced were received, he/she signs the final muster sheet and returns it to DynCorp's in-country project manager. The project manager then forwards the signed muster sheet to DynCorp's headquarters for processing and subsequent submission to the program office with the monthly labor invoice. The program office then conducts an independent, line item by line item verification of the invoice before approving it for payment. The RSO also provides a copy of each signed muster sheet to the DS program office in Washington.</p>	<p>Recommendations to resolve similar issues are included in the <i>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq</i> (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p.7</p> <p>In its response to the <i>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq</i> (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009) and <i>Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq</i> (MERO-IQO-09-03, April 2009), DS informed OIG that it had taken actions to correct the related issues of ensuring that contractors provided appropriate staffing and that muster sheets were reviewed by U.S. Government direct-hire personnel.</p> <p>Based on the actions taken by DS, Recommendation 2 is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>2. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should review and verify the accuracy of muster sheets prepared by U.S. Training Center before they are submitted to U.S. Training Center program management and subsequently to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the United States.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 6</p>	<p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>The COR reconciles the muster sheets on a daily basis using reports from a biometric hand-scan system (provided by USTC) and has created a daily and monthly Muster Certification Sheets, broken down by labor category to aid in muster sheet review and verification. Copies of the Daily and Monthly muster certification sheets, as well as a Daily Exemption from Scanning Requirement Authorization sheet, are attached. With the addition of JAMMS, the COR possesses an additional tool for muster sheet reconciliation. The COR reconciles the daily muster sheets against weekly and monthly submissions to verify accuracy prior to signing the final muster sheet submitted each month. Task Order personnel who are not physically present (due to fly-away teams or other operational necessities) are accounted for using daily exemption from scanning requirement authorization sheet. The exemption authorization annotates the name of employee, location and reason for the exemption and is signed by the RSO/COR each day once confirmation that the contractor employee was present in country is provided (for example, confirmation from a DS agent-in-charge that the employee was on a mission out of Kabul and unavailable to scan on a particular day). Once the RSO/COR is satisfied that services invoiced were received, he/she signs the muster sheet and returns it to USTC's in-country program manager. The program manager then forwards the signed copy to USTC headquarters for processing and subsequent submission to the program office with the monthly labor invoice. The program office then conducts an independent, line item by line item verification of the invoice before approving it for payment. The RSO also provides a copy of each signed daily muster certification sheet to the DS program office in Washington.</p>	<p>Recommendations to resolve similar issues are included in the <i>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq</i> (MERO-IQO-09-02), and therefore OIG is not requiring a formal response from DS on this recommendation. (p. 7)</p> <p>In response to similar recommendations in MERO-IQO-09-02 and other WPPS II reports, DS has increased the number of CORs overseeing the WPPS II contract and associated task orders. DS now also ensures that all muster sheets used for contractor personnel accountability are reviewed, reconciled, and verified on-site by U.S. Government direct-hire personnel.</p> <p>Based on the actions taken by DS, Recommendation 2 is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Personal Security Specialists' Qualifications and Training		
<p>3. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that personal security specialists receive the appropriate training for operations in Afghanistan and in Afghanistan cultural awareness.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 6</p>	<p>DS concurs with this recommendation.</p> <p>Cultural Awareness Training: All WPPS II personal security specialists deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan receive Foreign Service Institute cultural awareness training that is country-specific. The Office of Overseas Protective Operations (DS/IP/OPO) issued a Contract Modification effective July 8, 2009, requiring all deployed personnel receive the appropriate course. New personnel receive the appropriate course prior to departure for post, or within 10 days after arrival at post.</p> <p>Operational Training: Personal security specialists' initial training includes operational instruction in improvised explosive device recognition that is country-specific. In addition, a contract modification issued December 18, 2009, requires WPPS II vendors to train all new personal security specialist candidates from module of instruction provided by DS (b) (5)</p> <p>Follow-on country-specific operations are presented to experienced individually selected candidates in-country.</p> <p>DS requests this recommendation be closed.</p>	<p>Based on the contract modification and the required courses for personal security specialists assigned to Afghanistan, this recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Contractor Staffing		
<p>6. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should conduct an assessment to determine the personal protective service requirements in Iraq to include how many security personnel to employ, where they should be deployed and the level and manner of protection given the threat in particular locations.</p> <p>Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p. 9</p>	<p>Since the beginning of the WPPS II contract in 2005, regional security office Baghdad personnel have continually monitored and assessed personnel manpower needs in coordination with DS/IP/OPO. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that approximately one-third of the 67 total modifications to Iraq Task orders have been associated with personnel changes in order to meet shifting needs and requirements. These changes directly supported the Department's policy goals and objectives in Iraq, while remaining cognizant of the ever-present and evolving threat. The RSO requested a realignment of existing WPPS protective security personnel (b) (5)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>This action was approved by DS headquarters and the WPPS contract was modified to reflect the realignment. Dramatic transformation is currently taking place in Iraq including the aforementioned changes in the IZ, the implementation of the Security Agreement, and repositioning of military units. Given the constant transition and military downsizing, RSO Baghdad continuously reviews its countrywide protective operations and requirements to meet post's policy imperatives such as increased engagement.</p>	<p>The intent of this recommendation was for DS to take a fresh look at its protective security footprint in Iraq to determine whether the composition and allocation of resources made sense given the fast-changing security environment. In its response, DS has shown that it is actively assessing the threat situation and modifying personnel through changes in the WPPS contract task orders. (b) (5)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>In the <i>Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad's Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq</i>, (MERO-A-09-10), OIG/MERO reported that the RSO is actively reassessing security requirements in the International Zone due to increased Iraq responsibility for perimeter security. This recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure DynCorp provides personnel in the labor categories as required by the second Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-06, June 2009), p. 7</p>	<p>DS Update</p> <p>The daily and monthly muster certification sheets in use in Kabul, Tallil, and Erbil were primarily developed to aid in muster sheet review and reconciliation, but they also provide a mechanism for each RSO to track the staffing levels in each labor category.</p> <p>DS continues to monitor staffing levels, both on the ground and via invoice review. Anytime personnel shortage or unqualified personnel are identified, a short pay is issued.</p>	<p>Recommendations to resolve similar issues are included in the Review of Diplomatic Security's Management of Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-02, January 2009), p.7</p> <p>Based on compliance with previous recommendations, OIG verified that DS had taken actions to correct the related issues of ensuring that contractors provided appropriate staffing and that muster sheets were reviewed by U.S. Government direct-hire personnel.</p> <p>Based on the actions taken by DS, Recommendations 1 and 2 are CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>6. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should perform a detailed analysis of protection needs in Afghanistan to determine the appropriate level and allocation of security personnel under its contract with U.S. Training Center. This analysis should include a feasibility study involving the integration of Afghan nationals into personal protective services.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 7</p>	<p><u>DS Initial Response</u> DS does not concur with this recommendation. Telegrams (07 KABUL 952, 08 KABUL 40, 08 KABUL 2985, 09 KABUL 304, 09 KABUL 49709, 09 KABUL 2285), Memoranda (b) (5) [REDACTED] of Dec. 17, 2008) and various e-mail exchanges have established a chain of discussions concerning the growth of Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) in Afghanistan over the past two years. (These documents are on file in DS/OPO/HTP and are available for review by the OIG). While the program has evolved considerably in that time, each step has been in response to specific needs identified at Post, developed by the regional security officer (RSO) and confirmed by DS/OPO/HTP. DS is confident that adequate resources are being allocated to address current program needs. DS requests this recommendation be closed.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u> DS has examined integrating Afghan nationals into personal protection and RSO Kabul is moving toward integrating Agents from the Afghan Presidential Protective Service (PPS) into the Embassy Protective Detail (EPD) operations. Since the issuance of the OIG's report, RSO has determined that personnel from the Afghan D-10 unit are no longer a viable option for integration. While the PPS is currently a small operation and generally only capable of supporting the protection needs of the President of Afghanistan, it has agreed to assist the Embassy with its integration initiative. DS requests this recommendation be closed.</p>	<p><u>OIG Initial Analysis</u> The intent of Recommendation 6 was for DS to determine appropriate protection staffing levels in Afghanistan and study the integration of Afghan nationals into personal protective services. DS has provided enough information to assure OIG it is examining appropriate staffing levels. However, DS has not informed OIG as to whether it has studied of integration of Afghan nationals. This recommendation cannot be closed until OIG receives such information.</p> <p><u>OIG Update</u> OIG verified that DS has studied the integration of Afghan nationals and has determined that it is currently not a viable option. DS should continue to monitor this situation. Recommendation 6 is closed.</p>


Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Armored Vehicles		
<p>1. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement an armored vehicle package specifically tailored for the requirements of protection missions in geographically challenging terrain.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-03, April 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>DS concurred with this recommendation. (b) (5)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>These armored vehicles have proven capabilities in challenging terrain and provide a superior level of ballistic and blast protection for Mission Iraq personnel.</p> <p>DS conducted full program reviews of Mission Iraq's armored vehicle program in March 2008 and April 2009, provides continuous guidance to Post on the best driving and maintenance techniques, and issued a formal guidance cable (08 STATE 78047) concerning safety and proper vehicle operation. Additionally, over the last three years, (b) (5)</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>U.S. embassies to Iraq.</p>	<p>With DS's ongoing review of Mission Iraq's armored vehicle program and the provision of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and low-profile armored vehicles, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>2. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should provide a sufficient number of standard road vehicles suitable for required administrative, non-protection transportation.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the Triple Canopy contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-03, April 2009), p. 8</p>	<p>DS concurs with this recommendation. Embassy Baghdad agrees that administrative moves in Basra and Tallil, which are on a military compound, do not require armored vehicles. The regional security officer (RSO) is requesting a contract modification to provide additional unarmored vehicles for contractor administrative use in Tallil only as operations are likely to conclude in Basra by the end of August 2009.</p> <p>The security situation in Iraq is in a constant state of flux as the U.S. military draws down. Baghdad is significantly different than Tallil and Basra because the IZ is changing rapidly and as the Iraqis assume control of the checkpoints, the IZ is likely to become porous. Therefore, there is still a need to provide armored vehicles in Baghdad. The RSO plans to use armored vehicles not suitable for protective details (due to age or condition) for administrative moves because they provide a greater level of protection than non-armored vehicles.</p>	<p>With the use of unarmored vehicles for contractor administrative use and the use of armored vehicles not suitable for protective details (due to age or condition) for administrative movement in Baghdad, the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>3. Embassy Baghdad should ensure there is appropriate maintenance support in Erbil for armored protection vehicles.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the DynCorp Contract for Personal Protective Services in Iraq (MERO-IQO-09-06, June 2009), p. 7</p>	<p>Post is working to organize maintenance support for regional security office's (RSO) armored vehicles in Erbil on the Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) compound. RSO prepared a statement of work to construct a vehicle maintenance bay on the RRT's Ankawa compound, and utilize vendors certified to service most mechanical needs of all DOS vehicles.</p> <p>Recently, Post approved a vehicle maintenance contract between the RRT and local General Motors (GM) dealer in Erbil which will service the RRT's fleet of (b) (5). Additionally, Post approved a vehicle maintenance contract between the RRT and local vendor in Erbil which will service the RRT's fleet of (b) (5). RSO Erbil identified a local vendor with a certified GM mechanic, which was utilized previously to service RSO low-visibility protection vehicles. The local service contracts will enable the RRT to obtain routine vehicle maintenance in Erbil and avoid the requirement to travel weekly to the Kirkuk Regional Air Base for maintenance.</p> <p>Post arranged to obtain maintenance for armored and non-armored vehicles at the Kirkuk Regional Air Base (KRAB) under Task Order 151 in the event local vendors in Erbil cannot provide the service required for the vehicle.</p>	<p>Embassy Baghdad's entering into a maintenance agreement with local mechanical vendors, the planned construction of a vehicle maintenance bay at the RRT, along with a back-up service plan for armored and non-armored vehicles at the KRAB, meets the intention of the recommendation to ensure appropriate maintenance support for vehicles based in Erbil. Recommendation 3 is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
<p>5. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement a fully armored vehicle tire package specifically tailored to the requirements of protection missions in geographically challenging terrain.</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 7</p>	<p><u>DS Initial Response</u> DS does not concur with this recommendation. The attached document (Security/Safety Advisory Concerning the Use of Armored Vehicles (08 STATE 078047) provides clear instruction for operating armored vehicles in geographic terrains worldwide. Thus, implementation of a tire package specifically tailored to the requirements of protection missions in geographically challenging terrain is unnecessary. DS will provide this advisory to the field annually.</p> <p>DS requests this recommendation be closed.</p> <p>Attachment (cable) provided by DS: UNCLASSIFIED STATE 00078047</p> <p><u>DS Update</u> DEAV specifically addresses the issue of wheel rim material as follows. Aluminum rim failure is attributed directly to one, or a combination of the following factors: excessive speeds on geographically challenging terrain; inadequate PSI (pounds-force per square inch) tire levels; or exceeding established max gross vehicle weight. DEAV and armored vehicle industry experts do not recommend nor endorse the use of steel rims on armored vehicles due to safety related issues and possible damage to vehicle suspension. The force caused by collisions with speed bumps, curbs, or other road debris can be transferred to the suspension and axle with steel rims instead of being absorbed by the aluminum rims. Steel wheel rims transfer shock and vibration into the frame and armor, eventually leading to vehicle failure. Alternative shock absorber and vehicle suspension system research and development, that may mitigate the shock/vibration damage caused by road conditions and driving speeds, is ongoing. DS requests this recommendation be closed.</p>	<p><u>OIG Initial Analysis</u> The intent of Recommendation 5 was for DS to specifically address the issue of wheel rim material with the Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles Division (DEAV). As noted on p. 21 of the report, personnel from the DS program office, the regional security office in Kabul, and USTC indicated in discussions with OIG that the steel rims initially approved, but subsequently denied by DEAV, would lead to fewer tire blowouts than the aluminum rims currently used. Paragraph 9 in the cable provided by DS acknowledges that poor environmental conditions, as well as driver behavior, contribute to premature replacement of wheel rims, tires, ball joints, and other vehicle components. However, the armored vehicle guidance does not address actions to minimize the potential for such premature system failures, particularly as it relates to the use of steel rather than aluminum wheel rims. Since the armored vehicle guidance provided by DS does not address the use of steel rather than aluminum wheel rims, this recommendation remains open until DS reports to OIG the results of discussions with DEAV regarding this specific issue.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Explosives Detection Canines		
<p>4. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should ensure that U.S. Training Center (a) tests its canines with scents from all (b) (5) explosives required by its contract with the Department of State; (b) replaces its canine explosive testing material with fresh material prior to annual testing; and (c) stores its (b) (5) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Performance Audit of the U.S. Training Center Contract for Personal Protective Services in Afghanistan (MERO-A-09-08, August 2009), p. 6</p>	<p>DS partially concurs with this recommendation. USTC has brought the number and type of explosive scents used in training up to the (b) (5) required by the contract.</p> <p>USTC is actively working to establish a reliable supply chain for the periodic replacement of training and testing aides, in addition to implementing an acceptable substitute when actual replacement samples are not available. In April 2009, USTC, through the regional security office in Kabul, requested assistance with facilitating the replacement of actual training aides via available U.S. Military assets in theater. To date, RSO and USTC have been able to obtain three new training and testing aides. RSO/USTC continues to seek new/fresh training/testing aides for other scents. DS is encouraging WPPS contractors to explore alternatives to live explosives.</p> <p>Based on OIG's report, USTC has begun storing each explosive training aid in its own individual air-tight glass container equipped with a rubber seal. Air-tight containers alleviate a need for storing in separate facilities. These samples, each in its own air-tight bottle, are placed in separate foam lined Pelican-type air-tight cases dedicated to a single sample type and marked accordingly. All cases are then secured within a shock and fire-proof storage container. The handling protocol for sample scents has also been revised. New instructions are being issued in the form of a contract modification that more rigidly control the handling of sample scents, in order to avoid the possibility of cross-contamination of those scents. In addition, DS/OPO/HTP has hired an independent expert to validate all phases of the DS/OPO/HTP explosives detection dogs handler program. This process is underway with an anticipated completion of late April 2010.</p>	<p>DS has reinstated testing for the sixth mandatory scent, is establishing a supply chain for new testing materials and seeking acceptable substitutes, and is using sealed air-tight containers to store explosives. Based on these actions, this recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

Recommendation	Status of Implementation	OIG Analysis
Radios		
<p>(b) (5)</p>  <p>Status of the Secretary of State's Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations (MERO-IQO-09-01, December 2008), p. 7</p>	<p>DS concurred there is a need for dedicated DS tactical communications expertise and established two personal services contractor positions to assist RSO Baghdad with its tactical radio communications program. One position will serve as a tactical radio program manager to manage the DS countrywide tactical radio communications program and coordinate communications architecture and interoperability issues with the Department of Defense and the Bureau of Information Resource Management. The other PSC position will be tactical radio instructor to provide basic and refresher training on tactical radio systems to DS personnel. With the identification of viable candidates, DS is processing their security clearances and ensuring completion of the mandatory Department training for Iraq.</p> <p><u>DS Update</u></p> <p>DS is actively pursuing an inter-governmental partnership with the Space and Naval Warfare Center, Atlantic, (SPAWAR) to design and support a comprehensive Tactical Radio Communications Infrastructure for Iraq and Afghanistan that is independent of but wholly interoperable with the Department of Defense.</p>	<p>With the identification of two tactical radio specialists and their planned deployment to Iraq the recommendation is CLOSED for acceptable compliance.</p>

*Some information has been summarized and paraphrased by OIG as appropriate.

APPENDIX II

Examples of Daily/Monthly Muster Certification Sheet and Daily Exemption from Scanning Requirement Authorization

WPPS – Task Order _____
Daily / Monthly Muster Certification Sheet
Date: _____

Position Name	CLIN	Acronym	Number Required	Number Present	Number Short
Project Manager	01-A	PM			
Detail Leader	02-A	DL			
Deputy Detail Leader	02-B	DDL			
Shift Leader / Team Leader	02-C	SL			
Protective Security Specialist	02-D	PSS			
PSS / Emergency Medical Technician	02-E	EMTI			
PSS / Designated Defensive Marksman	02-F	DDM			
Shift Leader / Team Leader	03-A	SL			
Protective Security Specialist	03-B	PSS			
PSS / Emergency Medical Technician	03-C	EMTI			
PSS / Designated Defensive Marksman	03-D	DDM			
Explosives Detection Dog/Handler	04-A	EDD			
EDD / Kennel Master	04-B	EDKM			
Admin. and Logistics Security Specialist	04-C	ALSS			
Intel Analyst	04-D	IA			
PSS / Operations Chief	04-E	PSOC			
Operations Security Specialist	04-F	OSS			
PSS / Firearms Instructor	04-G	FI			
Armorer	04-H	ARM			
FAV / LAV Armor / Vehicle Technician	04-J	AVT			
Field Security Technician	04-K	FST			
Physician Assistant	04-L	PA			
Deputy Project Manager – Facilities	04-M	DPMF			
Intel Analyst – Team Lead	04-N	IAL			
Guard	05-B	G			
Interpreter	05-A	IT			

I certify that the above _____ (vendor) personnel were present in _____ (TO location) to support Task Order ____ (TO number) of the WPPS contract on the day specified at the top of this sheet. I have reconciled this daily summary sheet with other records submitted and have found no discrepancies.

WPPS – Task Order COR: _____ Date: _____

WPPS – Task Order: _____
Daily Exemption from Scanning Requirement Authorization
Date: _____

Last Name	First Name	Location	Reason for Exemption

I certify that the above _____ (vendor) personnel were present in _____ (location) to support Task Order _____ (number) of the WPPS contract on the day specified at the top of this sheet. Due to operational requirements these USTC personnel were unable to physically be present at the designated scanning site and are exempt from this scanning requirement for this date only.

WPPS – Task Order COR: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

The Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract: Management by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Contractor Performance Capping Report

General Comments

(U) Diplomatic Security (DS) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG), Middle East Regional Office (MERO)'s Capping Report on the Second Worldwide Personal Protective Services Contract: Management by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Contractor Performance report. DS believes that the independent audits and analysis undertaken by the OIG are valuable tools in improving the performance of our programs. DS also appreciates that the OIG recognized the bureau's efforts to incorporate recommendations and strengthen our program. As DS continues to prepare for the transition to the new Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract, DS will continue to incorporate lessons learned as they are developed and identified.

(U) Since the January update, DS's canine subject matter expert traveled to Baghdad and Kabul to conduct program management reviews. He visited Kabul from March 28 - 31 and Iraq from May 23 - June 1. The final report of his review is still pending, but DS incorporated several changes and lessons learned to the program, including a contract modification to clarify the handling and storage protocols for explosive sampling scents; new storage lockers that meet the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) standards; the use of the National Odor Recognition Test; and the establishment of a dedicated subject matter expert position in the program office.

(U) As the OIG notes, DS is committed to improving all areas of program management and contract oversight of the WPPS II contract and task orders. DS's efforts to enhance its performance will continue as services transition into the new Worldwide Protective Services contract and we look forward to the assistance the OIG and others may provide us in meeting the challenges that lie ahead.

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